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ABSTRACT
Custodians of a Tradition: Republican Leaders and the 
Development of American Foreign Policy, 1 944-T94-9.'
A study of the attempt by leading members of the Republican 
Party to define a coherent Republican attitude to foreign 
affairs at a time when America’s role was being transformed. 
The principal Republican leaders are identified as Senator 
Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan and John Poster Dulles, 
foreign policy adviser to Thomas E. Dewey. The study is 
based on research in archive collections in the United States, 
including the personal papers of Dulles, Vandenberg and 
Herbert Hoover, and on analysis of the published writings 
of Repuplican leaders.
Conceptually the study rejects the notion that the 
Republican record on foreign affairs was "isolationist" 
and it re-interprets the Republican Tradition as being 
one of Nationalism. The Internationalists in the Republican 
Party are seen as a small but disproportionately vocal 
minority who, unlike the Nationalists, accepted Wendell 
Willkie’s concept of inter-dependence. The dominant 
leaders, Dulles and Vandenberg, are revealed as pragmatists 
who consciously avoided close identification with the 
Internationalists in order to maximize their influence in 
the Republican Party.
The study demonstrates how a majority of Republicans in 
Congress had continuing reservations about the direction 
of American foreign policy. They critized Roosevelt and 
Truman for their alleged failure to stand up for American 
principles and interests at the war-time conferences and
they were opposed to the promotion of post-war policies 
which stood in the way of the restoration of domestic 
"Normalcy". Many Republicans were, however, manoeuvred 
into supporting the British Loan, the Truman Doctrine and 
the Marshall Plan by Administration exploitation of the 
anti-communist issue, but by 1948 still only a minority 
had come to accept the underlying assumptions of American 
post-war planning. In consequence, Republicans tended to 
press for a policy that was more consistently anti-communist 
than that which the Administration appeared to be following, 
whilst at the same time looking for a reduction in economic, 
military and political commitments. The most prominent 
articulators of this viewpoint were Hoover and Rebert A. 
Taft, but as this study demonstrates, elements of this 
apparently contradictory position were present in the 
thinking of both Vandenberg and Dulles. To the end of 
his life Vandenberg never lost his concern that the United 
States might impair its own economy and way of life by 
over-commitment. Dulles also, who was extremely sensitive 
to domestic political constraints on foreign policy, tended 
to emphasize American moral and intellectual leadership and 
to argue for less costly initiatives such as a world-wide 
Intelligence service and promotion of European unity with 
the ultimate end of making Europe self-supporting. As the 
study demonstrates, the surprise defeat of Thomas Dewey in 
the 1948 election was a blow to Vandenberg and Dulles' 
leadership; in the a.ftermath of defeat the initiative 
although not the final victory belonged to those who, with 
Taft and Hoover, had had deep reservations about the develop 
ment of American foreign policy in the post-war years.
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INTRODUCTION
As the Second World liar drew to a close, leading members 
of the Republican Party in the United States began to 
grapple with the problems inherent in the need to shape 
and defend the foreign policy record of their party, in a 
period in which foreign policy came to dominate American 
politics, and the United States emerged as the dominant 
power in the world.
An initial assumption of this study is that it makes 
sense to analyze the foreign policy responses of American 
politicians in the context of their positions of prominence 
in the Republican Party. It is recognized that party is 
not the sole determinant of behaviour; ethnic factors, geo­
graphic location, even age, might be relevant variables 
for a study of foreign policy attitudes. However, the in­
dividuals who are the subject of this thesis regarded them­
selves, and were so regarded by the mass media and fellow 
politicians, as the leaders of their party. Their careers 
and their ideological goals were identified to a large 
extent with the electoral success of the Republican Party.
They were dependent on party support and unity, in so far 
as it was obtainable, to maintain their political credibility, 
and such support was by no means automatic, but had to be 
continually earned by argument and persuasion. To a large 
degree then, their party affiliation affected the symbols 
they used, their self-image,their image of others of different 
political persuasion, and ultimately, their general view of 
the world.
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Since the time of Lord Bryce, it has been readily 
assumed that American political parties are concerned 
solely with winning elections and gaining power, and that 
their cohesion on issues and principles is suspect. Bryce's 
conclusion, based on his observation of American politics 
in the 1880's, was that "neither party has any principles, 
any distinctive tenets. Both have traditions. Both claim 
to have tendencies. Both have certainly war cries, organiza 
tions, interests enlisted in their support. But those in­
terests are in the main the interests of getting or keeping 
the patronage of the government. " 1 Recent political science 
has tended to accept Bryce's view, and to attribute the lack 
of cohesion and unity of American political parties to the 
constitutional principles of federalism and the division of 
powers. Thus James MacGregor Burns has argued that the 
United States does not have a two-party system at all, but
a four-party system with each major party divided into presi
pdential and congressional parties. Others have argued 
that there are in fact 100 political parties in the United
3States, one for each major party in each state. It is 
possible, however, to over-draw the picture. Even Bryce 
modified his portrait: ". . .one cannot say that there is 
to-day no difference between the two great parties. There
1 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, ed. Louis M. Hacker 
2 vols. (Mew York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1959), 1:151.
2James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Four- 
Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1 9oi), PP. 257-^T.3Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1968), p. 30.
v
is a difference of spirit or sentiment perceptible even 
by a stranger. . . Bryce's rider is still relevant. If 
American political parties are often demonstrably divided 
on political issues, this does not necessarily invalidate 
political affiliation as a method of analysis. This study, 
then, takes as its definition of the Republican Party, that 
which is in common, everyday usage. It assumes that if a 
man calls himself a Republican, he has a sense of identity, 
which may not be totally rational, with something he believes 
to be the Republican Ihrty.
A methodological difficulty of this study, which is 
related to the structure of American political parties, is 
that of selection of "leaders"-. There is no clearly defined 
party leadership in the American political system, especially 
for a party that does not control the White House. The 
label "titular" leader customarily accorded to a defeated 
presidential candidate carries with it no authority or res­
ponsibility, and has been described by one Republican of the 
1940’s as "a newspaper creation. . . a sort of brass ring 
for the defeated candidate to grab at during the rlde."^ 
Another Republican, John Poster Dulles, told a Canadian 
audience in March, 1948, that "no one person can today speak 
with authority with respect to foreign policy. . .Therefore,
any estimate of Republican foreign policy involves an element
6of guesswork." Dulles' careful disclaimer of "authority" 
¿Bryce, Is 157.
-•Joseph Martin, Jr., My First Fifty Years in Politics (Hew 
¿.York: McGraw Hill, 19oOY, p7 130.
°"A Republican's View of U.S. Foreign Policy", address de­
livered to the Canadian Club, Toronto, March 8th, 1948, Dulles 
MSS., Princeton University Library.
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did not represent a disclaimer of "leadership", however. 
Whilst nobody outside the quadrennial national convention 
had the "authority" to speak for the Republican Party as 
a whole, this did not prevent Dulles and others from seek­
ing to develop a coherent and responsible party policy and 
image.
For the purposes of this study, leadership is defined 
in terms of Influence. not in terms of constitutional 
authority. This definition, however, introduces a methodo­
logical problem. There is no way in which such influence 
can be measured. The nearest the social scientist can get 
to it is to compile a questionnaire which he then circulates 
to all the members of a particular group being studied; but 
however skilfully constructed such a questionnaire can do 
no more than measure perceptions of or reputation for in­
fluence.^ The methods of the social scientist, even with 
their limitations, are not for the most part open to the 
historian. In this particular instance, many of the ordinary 
Republicans whose ranking of leaders might have been useful, 
are dead; for the remainder, the random nature of their sur­
vival and the frailty of the human memory renders the exer­
cise less than useful. Ultimately, then, the historian is 
forced to make his generalizations on the basis of incomplete 
and fragmentary evidence. Thus the man who carefully commits 
his every thought to paper and who carefully leaves his 
papers to posterity may appear more important than he really
^Richard Gillam, ed., Power in Postwar America : Interdisclp- 
linary Perspectives on a Historical Problem (Boston: Little 
Brown, 197i'T, PP.' Ü-TT.---------------------
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was, and more important than the man who kept little written 
record, or whose records were destroyed by a protective 
secretary or guarded by sensitive relatives. In its selec­
tion of leaders this study can make no more positive affirma­
tion than that on the basis of the large and reasonably 
varied, but not exhaustive evidence studied, the major per­
sonalities dealt with here, seem, in the judgement of the 
present writer, to have been the most important.
A further point which needs early clarification relates 
to the system of classification used. The words "Isolationist" 
and "Internationalist", which have often been used to describe 
foreign policy attitudes have been used imprecisely. There 
is a particular problem with the word "Isolationism" in that 
it originated largely as a pejorative term; to accept it 
"as a neutral descriptive category" and as "a political 
position with programmatic and ideological dimensions" as 
one historian has recently argued, does therefore raise 
definite problems.® Not the least of these problems is 
that of definition. The writer already referred to made 
a valiant attempt by defining it as "an attttude, policy, 
doctrine, or position opposed to the commitment of American 
force outside the Western Hemisphere, except in the rarest
Qand briefest instances."^ The last phrase of the definition 
reveals the difficulty of finding an all-embracing formula
O°John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Vanity of Power: American Iso­
lationism and the First World War 19TT-191 *7 (Westport. 
Connecticut: Greenwood, 1969), p. 257.
“ibid., p. 2 .
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without losing precision; thus the writer referred to managed 
to find one which could include both the imperialist Henry 
Cabot lodge and the pacifist William Jennings Bryan,
Another writer, in a study of that commonly regarded bastion 
of "Isolationism", the Chicago Tribune, evaded the problem 
neatly with the comment that "’isolationist* is, at best, 
a difficult word to define".^ The present study then avoids 
use of the term "isolationism" because of its pejorative 
origins, and because of the related difficulty of defini­
tion. An added reason is that none of the Republican leaders 
studied would have accepted the label "isolationist" as 
describing their own foreign policy position, although they 
sometimes used it of others.
The same difficulty does not exist with "Internationalism". 
Whilst it was a pejorative term to some, there were others 
who were happy to describe themselves as "Internationalists". 
"Internationalist" has therefore been retained in this study, 
although in a rather more precise sense than it was used 
in the 1940*s . Within the Republican Party the Internation­
alists are taken to be those, such as the 194-0 presidential 
nominee, Wendell Willkie, who believed that ultimately 
American freedom, security and economic strength was de­
pendent on a liberal world. In this category, which was a 
minority one in the Republican Party, was also Harold Stassen, 
the much publicized former Governor of Minnesota who, after 
demobilization in 194-5, campaigned actively both for his own
^Jerome E. Edwards, The Foreign Policy of Col. MeCormlck's 
Tribune 1 929-194-1 (Reno: University of lievada, 19717» P. 74-.
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candidature and for the liberalization of the Republican 
Party. In Congress only a few, relatively uninfluential 
Republicans such as Senator Warren Austin (Vermont) and 
Representative Charles Eaton (New Jersey) can properly 
be described as Internationalists.
The second category used is that of Nationalist, which 
like Internationalist was used in the 1940's, and not usually 
in a pejorative sense. The Nationalist position, which was 
the dominant one in Congress, was one which placed prime 
emphasis on the restoration of "freedom" in the United States, 
and which did not see a liberal world as necessarily essen­
tial to this purpose. In this category may be placed vir­
tually the whole congressional leadership, including the 
de facto Republican leader in the Senate, Robert A. Taft, 
the majority leaderin the House (and Speaker in the 80th 
Congress) Joseph Martin, and the formidable senior Republican 
on the House Appropriations Committee, John Taber of New 
York. Outside Congress, former President Herbert Hoover 
and the 1936 presidential candidate, Alfred Landon of Kansas, 
belong in the same category.
Por the purposes of this study a third category has
thosebeen created, the Centre group, to describe/who seemed 
primarily concerned with developing consensus and compromise. 
In this group may be placed the three dominant Republican 
leaders whose careers inter-lock. Arguably the most impor­
tant was Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, a senior 
Republican Senator, who had been in the Senate since 1928.
x
In 1944, at the age of sixty, he seemed to be nearing the 
end of an unremarkable Senate career, but from his position 
as a senior Republican on the influential Foreign Relations 
Committee, was to exercise incalculable influence in the 
post-war years. Vandenberg, with his impeccable congressional 
credentials, served as an indispensable collaborator with 
John Foster Dulles of Dew York. Dulles had never held 
political office, but in his late fifties was Increasingly 
drawn into Republican politics as a result of his relation­
ship as friend and foreign policy adviser to the third of 
the Centre group, Governor Thomas Dewey of Dew York, presi­
dential nominee in 1944 and 1948. The story of Republican 
foreign policy leadership in the years 1944-1949 is the story 
of the relationship between these three very different men, 
and of their inter-action with the dominant groups in the 
Republican Earty.
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CHAPTER ONE
Nationalism, Internationalism and the Republican Tradition
By the end of World War II, the Republican Party had 
been in opposition for over a decade. In this time, the 
United States had undergone momentous changes to which the 
majority of Republican politicians remained firmly opposed.
In domestic affairs, the majority of Republicans had from 
the high watermark of Roosevelt's popularity in 1936, be­
come committed to the end of the New Deal and the restora­
tion of a less interventionist government in Washington.
The recession of 1937-1938, the Democratic split over 
Roosevelt's plan to reform the Supreme Court, and the 
success both of Republicans and conservative Democrats in 
the 1938 elections had seemed to indicate in the last pre­
war elections, that the New Deal was drawing to a close and 
that the nation was returning to conservatism.^ This move­
ment was seemingly prevented, however, by the continued 
personal popularity of Roosevelt, and by the increased and 
ultimately almost total pre-occupation with foreign affairs 
after the outbreak of war in 1939. Still, despite the loss 
of their third successive Presidential election in 1940, 
the Republicans made significant gains in the 1942 Con­
gressional elections, and seemed set to restore the United 
States to more orthodox paths once the war and Franklin 
Roosevelt were removed from the scene.
^James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New 
Deal; The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress.
1933-1939 (Lexington; University of Kentucky, 19^77, PP. 288-93.
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The question of foreign policy stood in the way 
of Republican restoration to majority party status in 
the nation. The majority of Republicans in Congress had 
opposed Roosevelt's foreign policy initiatives in the years 
1939-194-1. After Pearl Harbor, they were ' likewise disturbed 
at the growing assumption that traditional American policy 
was out of date, and that a totally new policy was required. 
For World War II was a time for visionaries: for Vice- 
President Henry Wallace to talk of the "Century of the 
Common Man"; for Clarence Streit to promote ideas of union 
with the British Empire and western Europe; for Henry Luce, 
the influential Republican publisher, to forecast the coming 
"American Century"; for Wendell Willkie, the Republicans' 
charismatic but controversial 1940 nominee, to talk of the 
inexorability of "One World".^ It was a time, too, when 
opinion polls could report that over 70% of Americans were 
in favour of post-war American participation in an inter­
national police force.^
The majority of Republican politicians could not share 
the optimism about the world that was to emerge from World 
War II: aside from their concern about what the war was 
doing to the United States, they had no faith in the Soviet 
"alliance" and were horrified at the growth of "internation­
alist" sentiment. Herbert Hoover, whose views were representa 
tive of the majority of Republicans in Congress, revealed
^The following are useful
tual climate: Robert A. Divine, __Internationalism In America during 
Athenuem, 19o7); Arthur A. Ekirch, 
.as. The Impact of the New
for an understanding of 
Secad Chance 
World
the intellec 
The Triumph of 
II (New York: 
and
War __
Ideologies
Utopis
(cMci
J r . ______________
Deal on American Thought
.Chicago: Quadrangle, 1559).
^The opinion poll figures for April, 1943, are quoted by Ellsworth Barnard, Wendell Wlllkle: Fighter for Freedom 
(Marquette. Michlgin: Northern Michigan University Press 
1966), p. 419.
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his disdain in a letter to Alfred Iandon: "Vie
are just simply deluged with fantastic and other ideas 
about peace. They involve all degrees from cooperation 
to collaboration on one hand, and unions of all sorts and 
varieties which abandon the sovereignty of the United Sates 
on the other. The Americans are the only people who are 
talking such s t u f f . F o r  the most part the visions of 
the war years were not shared by Fanklin Roosevelt either.5 
For Republicans, however, they presented a more difficult 
political problem: if they were to win in 194-4- and restore 
the United States to "Normalcy", they could not afford to 
seem to be out of step with the prevailing mood in the 
nation; the problem was aggravated by the dominant image 
of "isolationism" which had become fastened to them.
With a few noted and largely discredited exceptions, 
such as Charles A. Beard and the Chicago Tribune, both the 
academic community and the msss: media helped to distort the
ftRepublican position on foreign affairs. Thus the New 
Republic, for example, a late convert to the cause of inter­
vention in Europe, found no inconsistency in attacking *&
^Herbert Hoover to Alfred M. Landon, September 25th, 194-3, 
Hoover MSS. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West 
Branch, Iowa.•^ This evaluation of Roosevelt depends largely on James Me 
Gregor Burns, RooseveIt: The Soldier of Freedom (London: , 
Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1971) and Robert A. Divine, 
Roosevelt and World War II (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
.1969).&A useful if polemical and unwieldy study of this is.James J 
Martin, American Liberalism and World Politics. 1931-194-1 : 
Liberalism^ Press and Spokesmen on the Road Back to War 
between Mukden and Pearl Harbor, 2 Vo Is’. [¥ew York: Devin- 
Adair, 1964).
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Republicans for having opposed policies, such as neutrality
revision in 1939, which the magazine itself had opposed in
the form initially presented to Congress.7 Similarly, in
December, 194-1, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. suggested that the
crisis confronting the Republican Party over foreign policy
was analogous to that of slavery which had killed the Whig
Party before the Civil War; he predicted that it would go
the way of the Whigs unless it gave complete support to
8Rooseveltfs foreign policy. Prom within the Republican 
Party's own ranks, the constant criticisms of Wendell Will-
kie and his supporters also helped to fasten the image of
. 9"isolationism" on the majority of Republicans.
The preoccupation of an historically-minded generation 
with avoiding the "mistakes" of World Warl, was central 
to the perception of the Republican Party as the Party 
of "isolationism" . 7 *10 History, as understood during World 
War II, showed that the major cause of the present war 
was American rejection of the League of Nations and the 
subsequent retreat into "isolation" under Harding. History 
also indicated, and here memories of Henry Cabot Lodge be­
came fused with Republican opposition to Roosevelt's foreign 
policy before Pearl Harbor, that the greatest repository 
of "isolationism" was the Republican Party. At its crudest,
7 Ibid., p. 12 3 6.
glbid., p. 1277.
^Donald R. McCoy, "Republican Oppsition during Wartime", 
Mid-America XLIX (July, 1967), PP. 174-89.
100n the influence of World War I on thinking at this time, 
see Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past; The Use and 
Misuse of History in American Foreign Po'llcy "(New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), PP. 7-TB3
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'’isolationism’' seemed to be used to attack anybody who ex­
pressed any reservations about the conduct of the war or 
the need for the United States to protect its own interests; 
it presented, therefore, an almost insuperable problem for 
an opposition party in a time of war, but one which had 
to be overcome if Republicans were to win in 194-4-. One 
suggested method of doing this was to develop a bipartisan 
policy, perhaps by developing a common Republican and Demo­
cratic foreign policy plank for 1944. Both patriotism and 
electoral pragmatism suggested to some that this was a satis­
factory solution, but distrust of Franklin Roosevelt's dip­
lomacy, as well as sensitivity to slurs on the Republican
1 1Party's record ruled out such a course.
It is clear then that the majority of Republican politi­
cians dissented from the view of history that came to be 
accepted during ¥orld War II. One of the Republicans who 
had tried to advance the idea of a bipartisan foreign 
policy plank came, to realize this, and expressed the view 
that "possibly some of our critics have gone too far in 
painting the picture that our country was the principal 
sinner in bringing about the world collapse. It tends to 
put those of us, who want to have a constructive and positive 
foreign policy developed, in a wrong position and tends to
^  On the attempt to organize a "bipartisan" election plank, 
see the letters from H. Alexander Smith to C. Colbourn Hardy, 
May 11th, 1943, to J. Kionberger Davis, May 13th, 1943, to 
Clarence Budlngton Kellard, November 19th, 194-3, and to 
Frank Knox, December 1st, 1943; see also Arthur H. Vandenberg 
to Smith, November 22nd, 1943, H. Alexander Smith MSS, 
Princeton University Library. Among the opponents were 
Hoover and Landon, Hoover to John W. Bricker, August 30th, 1943, Hoover MSS; Donald R. McCoy, Landon of Kansas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, f9oT), p. 500.
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stiffen the backs of people who feel that we are consider­
ing the interests of other countries before we are con-
1 2sidering our own". Some Republicans, it is true, did 
appear to share the dominant view. Thus Raymond Buell, a 
former president of the Foreign Policy Association, the 
author of various books on international relations, an 
associate of Time Inc. and a member of Willkie's 1940 
campaign staff, readily drew parallels with 1920 in a memo 
randum he circulated to Republican Internationalists in 
1943. Governor Bricker of Ohio, he wrote, referring to 
the foremost presidential hopeful from the Midwest, "is 
no more to be trusted on the international situation than 
Harding with his promises as to an ’Association of Nations 
So also Nillkle himself was ever watchful for a repetition 
of history, in the shape of the Republican Old Guard stand 
ing "pat" until such time as they could cash in on post­
war disillusionment.^ John Foster Dulles, too, was sensi 
tive to language in the draft of the 19'44 platform which 
to him was reminiscent of 1920. J For the most part, how­
ever, Republican politicians dissented from a view of 
history which portrayed the United States, and the Re­
publican Party in particular, as in any way responsible
12Smith to Brooks Emeny, June 9th, 1944, Smith MSS. 
'■^Memorandum by Raymond L. Buell, "Notes on the State of 
.the Nation", Raymond L. Buell file, Smith MSS.
'^ New York Times Magazine, January 2nd, 1944.Foster Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, May 16th, 1944, 
Dulles MSS (Supplement), Princeton University Library.
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for the holocaust of world war. The development of Re­
publican policy had to take note of these susceptibilities; 
it had to be based on sympathy with and understanding of 
the thought processes of Congressional Republicans, who 
remained predominantly conservative in domestic affairs and 
nationalist in foreign affairs. Although as it proved, 
congressional Republicans were not strong nor cohesive 
enough to control national conventions and to nominate their 
own presidential candidate^, their views could not be over­
ridden if the Republican Party was to attain the unity 
necessary to regain its major position in American life.
The Nationalist Position
If Congressional Republicans had been asked at any time 
in the period 1941-1945 to fill in a questionnaire giving 
their own description of their position on foreign policy, 
the majority would have described themselves as Rationalists 
Such a label would as always have covered a range of dif­
fering views, but nevertheless, it would have been the best 
one to describe the dominant set of values which deter­
mined Republican foreign policy. One Republican Senator, 
tired of being labelled an "isolationist", set out the 
nationalist position in January, 1945, as follows: i ) an 
unwillingness to surrender American sovereignty; il) an 
unwillingness to allow the United States to interfere 
"arbitrarily" in the internal affairs of others; lii) op­
position to a "give away" policy; iv) unwillingness to put 
complete dependence on collective security; v) collaboration 
with like-minded, sovereign nations; vi) help to other 
nations to help themselves; vii) adequate national security;
-7-
Such1 fviii) eternal vigilance to protect American liberty, 
a statement offers no reliable guide to the policy to be 
pursued in a specific instance, but it does offer an in­
sight into a thought process which was politically sig­
nificant in the Republican Party, even if intellectually 
out of vogue at the end of World War II. An understanding 
of this thought process is essential to an understanding 
of the development of Republican foreign policy.
Among the most prominent spokesmen for the Rationalists 
was the Chicago Tribune, published by the anglo-phobic 
Colonel Robert McCormick, a man of some influence in Re­
publican circles in Illinois and other areas of the Mid­
west.1^ Endorsing the attempt by Governor John Bricker of 
Ohio to gain the 194-4- nomination, the Tribune commented:
MWe don't have to found our foreign policy upon fear 
of any nation or combination of nations. It is a 
curious fact that other nations which have far more 
reason to fear for their safety than we have are 
here proposing no sacrifices of their sovereign 
freedom of action in the interest of world peace 
. . .Only in America. . .is there any considerable 
body of opinion demanding that the nation commit 
its men and its wealth to 1fhe service of other 
countries on their demand."1“
Denying that the Midwest was "isolationist" in the sense
1^ Congressional Record, 91, January 22nd, 1945, p. 401.
'‘John Gunther, Inside U.S.A. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1947), 
p. 3^9, gives a contemporary report .of Colonel McCormick's influence in Illinois and his activities in other Midwestern 
states; Senator C. Wayland Brooks of Illinois, a fairly 
extreme Rationalist, was considered a spokesman for Me 
Cormick, John Tebbel, An American Dynasty: the story of 
the McCormicks, Madllls and Pattersons (Garden City, Rew 
York: Doubleday, 1947J, p. 145; for a recent study of McCormick's views, see Jerome E. Edwards, The Foreign Policy 
of Col. McCormick's Tribune 1929-1941 (Reno: University 
of Revada, 1971).10Chlcago Tribune. May 16th, 1944.
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in which the term was usually understood, the Tribune sprang 
to the defence of the much maligned interior: "The middle 
west is well aware both of the problems of the rest of 
the world and of the fact that the tremendous increase 
in power that the war has given this nation makes those 
problems an American concern whether we like it or not".
But, recognizing that responsibility accompanied power, 
that power must be used "primarily for America". That 
didn't mean that "it shall be used to injure our world 
neighbours. It does mean that we shall not injure ourselves 
to benefit others." ^ 9
In 1944, the Tribune commended to the Republican Party 
the\platform adopted by Illinois Republicans. In their 
platform, Illinois Republicans had set out the bases of 
American foreign policy as, i) the preservation and pro­
tection of American Interests; ii) aid in restoring "order" 
and "decent" living in the world; iii) recognition that
the United States should do its full share in helping to
20secure permanent peace. It is unlikely that the order
4
was accidental, for the primacy of American interests was 
a basic premise of the Nationalist position. They were 
prepared to cooperate with other nations, and to help in 
restoring and securing a better world, but they did not 
see this as a vital interest. Convinced of the awesome 
superiority of the United States over potential rivals, 
which in the words of the Tribune. made other countries 
"almost as auxiliaries of no great importance," they de­
manded "an end to an American foreign policy founded on 920
l9Ibld., May 20th, 1944.
2 0Ibid.. May 19th, 1944.
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fear and fawning".
Politically the most important spokesman for the Nation­
alist cause was Senator Robert Taft. Although not keen to 
become involved in matters of foreign policy, Taft was 
frequently to offer a dissenting opinion, and was always
a potential leader of opposition to Administration foreign
22policy in the post-war years. Although differing in some
respects from the Tribune and its proprietor, Taft shared
2^its belief in the invulnerability of the United States.
Given this belief it made no sense from Taft's viewpoint 
to imperil liberty at home by over-extension overseas.
Taft was prepared therefore, to cooperate with other na­
tions in trying to eliminate war from the world, because 
war was a threat to the political economy in which he be­
lieved, and led in the modern world to big government, the 
growth of executive power, higher taxes, conscription and 
economic controls; but he was not prepared to sanction a 
policy of "Internationalism" which led down the same road
21
llbid., June 24th, 1944.
“ As an indication of his priorities, Taft rejected the 
suggestion by Herbert Hoover in 1944 that he should take 
a vacant seat on the Foreign Relations Committee; Taft 
preferred to stay on the Finance Committee which would 
exercise control of post-war foreign economic policy. Hoover 
to Robert A. Taft, December 12th, 1944; Robert A. Taft to Hoover, December 14th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
2^He was frequently embarrassed by some of his supporters 
in right wing politics; to a Chicago Tribune reporter he 
commented humorously in 1948, "I hear you got the Colonel 
off safely to Europe, where I trust he will not start 
a war with the British.", James T. Fatterson, Mr, Repub- 
lican: a biography of Robert A. Taft (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin7 1972), p. 589, n. 29.
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to what he regarded as collectivism. 24
1  complex figure, often stereotyped by contemporaries
as an "isolationist", Taft's views on foreign policy were
O Rless quaint than they were often portrayed at the time. J 
More recent historians, of right, left and centre have 
been less willing to write him off,as did one early writer, 
as having no foreign policy, or as simply representing 
the "psychology of the moat", or the desire to be left alone. 
Taft's views on foreign policy were a compound of his ar­
dent partisanship, his constitutionalism (in particular his 
distrust of executive power), his dislike of militarism 
and imperialism, and his scepticism about the foreign eco­
nomic expansion which was central to most contemporary 
thinking about foreign policy. He was also lacking both
27in sentimentality for Europe and in any sense of mission. 
"Isolationism", a term which two of his recent conservative 
defenders have described as an "abusive term coined by 
the advocates of a grandiose American intervention in 
Europe and Asia"hardly does him ¡Justice.* 2®
24Vernon Van Dyke & Edward L. Davis, "Senator Taft and 
American Security", Journal of Politics XIV (May, 1952),
PP. 177-203; John P. .Armstrong, "*'The" Enigma of Senator.Taft and Foreign Policy", Review of Politics, XVII (April, 
1955), PP. 206-31; William S. White, The Taft Story.(Hew 
p York: Harpers, 1954), pp. 150, 154-5.
d5por an extensive guide to the way in which Taft was labeled 
an isolationist by Journalists and academics, see Henry 
W. Berger, "Senator Robert A. Taft Dissents from Military 
Escalation" in Cold War Critics, ed.. Thomas G. Paterson 
( Chicago: Quadrangle Paperback, 1971)* PP. 195-6.
2°Armstrong, pp. 212, 227, 231.
27patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 195-201.
2°Russell Kirk and James McClellan, The Political Principles 
of Robert A. Taft . (Hew York: R. A. Taft Institute of 
Government, 1967),-P. 162.
Like his father, President William Howard Taft (1909- 
13), Taft believed in the rule of law in domestic and 
foreign affairs, and had been a supporter of the League 
of Nations as well as of American participation in the 
World Court.Taft,therefore, found no difficulty in 
accomodating himself to the revived demands for American 
participation in some form of international organization 
which came to the fore from 194-3. He was evidently pre­
pared to agree to an organization without a veto, provided 
the emphasis was on regional rather than universal peace­
keeping arrangements, and provided that the new League had 
no power to interfere in a nation's domestic affairs other 
than over the question of armaments.^ Taft saw interna­
tional organization as an instrument for extending the rule 
of law, and for developing the principle of peaceful ar­
bitration of disputes, rather than as a system of collec­
tive security. He was, therefore, totally opposed to the 
concept of an international police force, which Harold 
Stassen and other Republican Internationalists were in 
favour of.31 Taft's exaggerated legalism perhaps ignored 
the difficulties Involved in developing the rule of law, 
but it was consistent with his basic premises: if the
^Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 7 8, 140-4-1.
^uKirk and McClellan, p. T59; New York Times Magazine. 
February 6th, 1944.
Ibid.; Divine, Second Chance, p. 109; H. Bradford Wester- field, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to 
Korea (New Haven: Yale, 1955), p” 138i
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VUnited States was invulnerable, why sacrifice freedom and 
independence in pursuit of less than vital goals? His con­
cept of International organization would give the United 
States a world role in helping to develop peace, without 
entangling it in every political dispute.
To Taft, it was axiomatic that "the purpose of foreign 
policy is to insure freedom for the people of the United 
States, and prevent invasion of this country and foreign 
wars which, might bring destruction to our people and pre­
vent their working out here at home the destiny of the
32American Republic". The United States was,in his view, 
not primarily fighting to spread democracy or the Foure 
Freedoms throughout the world:
"We are anxious to help other peoples, but only to 
the extent that this can be done without involving 
us in unnecessary wars or endangering the future 
welfare of our own people. We did not enter the 
present war in order to crusade throughout the world 
for the Atlantic Charter or the Four Freedoms. There 
is no Intention on our part to insist on the freedom 
of India or, apparently, even the freedom of the 
Baltic States or eastern Poland. We are not fight­
ing for democracy except for our own."33
The logic of Taft's views could not be faulted. Since
American policy must be based on the removal of any threat
of external domination, it made no sense in his view to
insist on the Four Freedoms in the Soviet Union unless the
United States was prepared to commit itself to perpetual 
34war.
^?New York Times Magazine, February 6th, 1944.llw£ ----------------------------- —■^See speeches to 6th Annual Conference of the Ohio Federation 
of Republican Women's Organizations, October 19th, 1945,and 
to the American Polieh Association, March 20th, 1945, re­
printed in Congressional Record, 91, Appendix, pp. 4424, 
2413. ;----
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As far as Taft himself was concerned, he was not pre­
pared to pay the price of perpetual war. In World War I, 
he had never had any illusions about the "war to end wars" 
although he had supported the allied cause, and ¡Joined a 
preparedness parade in 1916. Like Herbert Hoover, under 
whom he worked in Paris in the American Relief Administra­
tion, and whom he was to revere throughout his life, Taft 
had been horrified by what he regarded as European selfish 
ness, as well as by the morally debilitating results of 
total war. His own experience then, cautioned him against 
those who seemed to believe the United States could put 
the world to rights, and intensified his opposition to 
intervention in World War II. Even in his difficult re- 
election campaign of 1944, he was prepared to admit only 
that he might have been wrong in opposing fighting Hitler 
before Pearl Harbor. In short, Taft had no enthusiasm 
for war, or for the use of force to put right the ills of 
the world. Sincerely Interested in preventing the recur­
rence of war, he was out of step with the nostrums of the 
times: Willkie's "One World"; Lippmann's balance o’f power 
theories, which he felt Dewey swallowed in calling for an 
Anglo-American alliance in 1943; Luce's "American Century" 
Taft's views were closest to Herbert Hoover; in 1942, he 
wrote to Hoover of the way in which the latter's America's
First Crusade had brought back "the complete shamelessness
36with which the Allies went after our money".
-^Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 69-71, 76-77, 79, 277. 
36Ibld., pp. SB5-91.
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If Taft was the most Important political spokesman for 
the Nationalists, strong intellectual and. political support 
came from the Republican Party's elder statesman, Herbert 
Hoover. Despite his seventy years, Hoover showed no in­
clination to quiet retirement, and in fact after Roose­
velt's death,he was to come to play a more important part 
in public life than he had done since his election defeat 
in 1932. He was sent on missions abroad by President 
Truman, served as chairman of the Commission on the Re­
organization of,the Executive Branch of the Government, 
and handed out a stream of not always unsolicited advice 
to Republican Congressmen. Although still a controversial 
figure because of his public image in the Depression, Hoover 
was ceaselessly defended by a number of loyal friends who
shared his sensitivity to what they regarded as the endless
37sures on his name. Dewey in particular -was to incur the
•^There is as yet no scholarly study of Herbert Hoover's 
career, although there are a number of works of hagio­
graphy, e.g., Eugene Lyons, Herbert Hoover; A Biography 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1964). President 
Truman received some criticism for calling on Hoover's 
services; in 194-7 one correspondent suggested that the 
problems of inflation might be connected with his re­
appearance on the national scene: ''Had Her by been 
President another term Mathatml Gandl (sic) would have 
been the best dressed man in our country". Howard N. 
Norton to Harry S. Truman, September 12th, 194-7, O.F. 3 15, 
Truman MSS., Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, 
Missouri. Truman himself reportedly told David Lilienthal, 
head of the Atomic Energy Commission, that Hoover didn't 
understand what had "happened in the world since McKinley: 
and that"he was to the right of Louis the Fourteenth" but 
he also gave him credit for his work for the Administra­
tion on food problems overseas. David E. Lilienthal, 
Journals; Volume II: The Atomic Energy Years 194-5-50 (New 
York7-Karper, 19657, ~ 5 ^ T :---  ---- --- -
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hostility of Hoover’s friends for the^way in which he 
made no secret of his desire to have nothing to do with 
Hoover.-^® It is indeed extremely ironic that the man who, 
in the aftermath of World War I, had seemed to symbolize 
all that .was modern and enlightened in the United States, 
should within two decades come to be seen as an unrecon­
structed reactionary. The "liberal" and "internationalist" 
of the 19 20’s who, as late as 19 3 2, had been accused by 
Franklin Roosevelt of being more concerned about the 
starving overseas than those out of work at home, was 
firmly fixed by World War II as an"isolationist" in the 
public mind. The changes in perception were not the re­
sult of Hoover's own vagaries, for his whole career was 
one of Intellectual consistency to the point of rigidity.
Ideologically, Hoover was, like Taft, a classical 
39liberal. His dimensions were "International" in the sense
that he believed in the superiority of liberal ideals, and
wanted to see them spread throughout the world; but his
experiences at Versailles in particular had intensified
his belief in the superiority of the American way'of life,
and had convinced him that the gap between the Old and Hew
Worlds was so great, that there was little chance for the
United States to bring about a new, liberal order in 
AOEurope. This did not mean that he felt that the United •*
•* Q
 ^John Callan O'Laughlin to General MacArthur, December 4th, ,q1944, O’Laughlln MSS, Library of Congress.
■^Eor this analysis of Hoover's ideology, see William Apple- 
man Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 2nd ed.
(Hew York: DelT^ 1962;, pp. 10b-9, and the same author's, 
Some Presidents: Wilson to Nixon (New York: New York Re- . view, 1$?2), pp. 33-49.
^uJoseph Brandes, Herbert Hoover and Economic Diplomacy: 
Department of Commerce Policy 1§5T-192b) (Pittsburgh: 
University 57 Pittsburgh,~19o2j, pp. 27, 214; Herbert Hoove: 
Tiie Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure 1874-1920 (London: Hollis and Carter, 1952"), pp7"473^97^------ --- —
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States should not try to promote change in the world, and 
in particular to oppose collectivism and "bolshevism and to 
try to promote peace, but it did mean that at all costs 
the United States should avoid getting drawn into another 
European war. Sharing with Taft the view that the United 
States was secure .from Invasion, he opposed the notion of 
another crusade, or recurrent crusades, to make Europe a 
better place.
Given these beliefs, Hoover could not accept that in­
volvement against Hitler was necessary for American se­
curity; neither could he accept the conclusion that the 
solution for the future was purely the revival of an In­
ternational Organization with collective force to keep the 
peace; and finally, neither could he accept the notion that 
the United States, by retreating into"isolation", was pri­
marily to blame for World War II. To the contrary, he 
argued that the real responsibility for the failure of 
the League and for World War II, lay in the failure of 
liberalism and representative government on the continent, 
and the rise of illiberal forees such as bolshevism and 
fascism. He was extremely critical also of Prance, both 
at Versailles and after, for in his view having called into 
being the forces which took over Germany and threatened the
Alwhole of European civilization*. In Hoover's view, modern
21-1 Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson, The Problems of Lasting 
Peace_ (1942), reprinted in Prefaces to Peace*: A Symposium 
(New York: Cooperatively published by Simon & iJchuster, 
Loubleday, Doran and Co., Reynal & Hitchcock, and Colum­
bia University, 1943), pp. 155, 250-3, 275-6.
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history was composed of a struggle b&tween slavery and
freedom: libeTty had been on the ascendency after the
American Revolution, but had been on the wane since World 
42War I. Hoover was not prepared to allow the trend to 
continue, but like Taft he was concerned that they should 
not use methods to defend liberty which in his view would 
themselves be destructive of liberalism as he understood 
it.
Hoover's view of the past wa^ /an integral part of his 
fcrelgn policy thinking. In his view, the United States 
had in the inter-war years, and especially under Republi­
can leadership, played a constructive role in international 
affairs: it had helped to build representative govern­
ment in Germany, especially in taking the lead in the 
Dawes. and Young Plans, and the Hoover Moratorium and Stand­
still agreement; it had pursued policies of disarmament 
through international cooperation, and had provided moral 
leadership through the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Stlmson
Doctrine; finally, in Latin America, it had shown by ex-
43ample the way towards wider international cooperation.
Hoover then saw the foreign policy of th® 1920's as basically 
sound, he saw the United States also as the strongest power 
and as Invulnerable to attack, and he was opposed from con­
viction and experience to war except in cases of a threat 4
4glbld., pp. 179-83.
45lbid.. pp. 249-53, 275-6, 282-3; 
letter from Hoover to Alfred M.
1943, Hoover MSS.
memorandum attached to 
Landon, February 2nd,
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to vital American interests. In addition, he was concerned 
about the damage, as he saw it, which the New Deal and 
World War II had already done to American individualism, 
and was impatient with the "amateurs' who were arguing for/ 
a radical re-appraisal of American foreign policy: in 
his view, they were innocents by comparison with the Old 
World politicians. A man of considerable intellectual 
arrogance, Hoover stood out amidst the utopianism of World 
War II, for his gloomy view of the future of the United 
States and western civilization; he could take no comfort 
from a climate of opinion which encouraged the formulation 
of grandiose international schemes which in his view were 
based on ignorance of the external realities, and were 
dangerous to the United States, the one bastion of liberty 
left in the world.
The Nationalist position, as exemplified by Robert 
Taft and Herbert Hoover, shared with the Internationalist 
position the assumption that the American political-economic 
system was of universal applicability. It differed, however, 
in its rejection of the concept of the indivisibility of 
liberty, and in its acceptance of the alternative assump­
tion that the United States was free from major danger from
overseas, and that the major danger to the survival of liber-
44ty came in the United States Itself. Although this posi­
tion had been discredited since Pearl Harbor, its proponents
44Robert E. Osgood described this as "Conservative isolationism" 
and linked it to the concept of "Portress America" in the 
period before Pearl Harbor, Ideals and Self-Interest in 
America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1953J, PP. 377-B, 380.
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could not be ignored, certainly not'“by those concerned 
with developing a Republican foreign policy. The Nation­
alists' fears about the domestic implications of foreign 
policy, their unwillingness to consider the use of force 
as a prime instrument of American policy in Europe and 
Asia, were to be important domestic factors encountered by 
American policy-makers in the post-war years. Ultimately 
the Nationalists could not Influence American policy to 
their liking, but they represented a continuous challenge 
to American leaders to show "what is in it for the United 
States" and to base policy on a clear conception of national 
interest.
The Internationalist Challenge.
The most forceful spokesman for the Internationalist 
position within the Republican Party was Wendell Willkie. 
Willkie's surprise nomination in 194-0 had never been wel­
comed by the Party's GLd Guard, and his Independence of 
mind as well as his identification with the Administration 
during the war, completed his isolation, from them.^
Willkie's vigorous support of lend-lease in 194-1 marked the 
beginning of his estrangement from the Party of which he was 
the "titular" leader; thereafter, he devoted his energies 
to winning Republicans over to his view of America's world 
role, and to opposition to any suggestion that the Republi­
can Party should try to reap partisan reward from the anti-
46cipated post-war disillusion. Within the ranks of Re-
^See especially, Joseph Martin, Jr., My; First Fifty Years 
.,-in Politics (New.York: McGraw Hill, 1960), pp“ 1Ö5-5T 
4o13arnard, pp. 326-7; Donald Bruce Johnson, The Republican 
Party and Wendell Wlllkle (Urbana: University of Illinois, 
T96ÖT, p. 5ÏÏ3-:
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publican Congressmen, Willkie had few influential supporters, 
and his attempts at foreign policy leadership were consis­
tently opposed by Robert Taft. Despite this, the Republican 
Internationalists made up what they lacked in numbers by 
a greater volume of publicity. On their side was the 
almost irresistible feeling that they represented the wave 
of the future, whilst men like Taft and Hoover seemed by 
comparison to be relics of a world that was fast disap­
pearing.
Willkie's foreign policy ideas can most easily be de­
monstrated in relation, to his book, One World, which gives 
important insight into the idealistic internationalism of
47the war years, of which Willkie was the best knowi spokesman. 
Largely an account of Willkie's travels in the Middle East, 
the Soviet Union and Ghinu, the central thesis of the book 
was, as the title suggests, that of interdependence and 
the necessity for the United States to provide dynamic 
leadership to help create a truly liberal world. Seeing 
American "withdrawal from world affairs" as at least a 
contributory factor both to inter-war economic instability 
and to the onset of World War II, and arguing that even 
America's "relative geographical Isolation" had been ren­
dered obsolete by air transport, Willkie presented three 
alternative courses of action: i) narrow nationalism; 
ii) international imperialism; iii) the creation of a world 
in which there should be equality of opportunity for every
^As an indication of its popularity, 1-1/2 million copies 
were sold between April and August 1943.,Barnard, p. 412.
-21
race and nation. Convinced that Americans would choose the 
latter course, Willkie argued the need for immediate plan­
ning, on a global acale, for the extension, of political and
economic freedom, and for the United States to commit it-
48self in guaranteeing such a world order.
Although Willkie was certainly aware of the imperfec­
tions of the American political and economic system,he 
was nevertheless convinced of the fundamental soundness of 
the philosophy on which it was based, and especially con­
vinced that the existence of a large free trade area had 
been crucial-.to American progress. His travels demonstrated 
to him the inevitability of change in the world, especially 
the non-European world, and he wished to use the great re­
servoir of good-will which he found to influence this de­
velopment along American lines. The creation of a world 
based on political and economic freedom would, he was cer­
tain, bring about greater prosperity, and ultimately world 
peace.^ Willkie’s philosophy then was one of perfect 
liberalism; its imperfections at home did not lead him in 
any way to question the society’s philosophical roots, 
whilst his experience of collectivism overseas in the Soviet 
Union did not apparently cause him great concern. For 
Willkie certainly, liberalism wJls the wave of the future, 
provided the people of the United States recognized their 
responsibility and opportunity. For, he warned, narrow 
nationalism would inevitably mean the ultimate loss of
^Wendell Willkie, One World (London: Cassell, 1943), pp. 165-6. 
^ Ibld.. pp. 16-18, 167-9; see chapter 13» "Our Imperialisms 
at Home" for his acknowledgement of domestic flaws in appli­
cation of the philosophy of freedom.
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American freedom. There could be no peace in any part of 
the world unless there was a secure peace in all the world. 
Even the American standard of living could not be maintained 
unless the exchange of goods flowed more freely throughout 
the w o r l d . T h e  importance of Willkie’s liberalism for 
his foreign policy ideas lay in his conviction that free­
dom was not and could not be maintained in one country or 
geographical area: freedom in his view was indivisible.
On his grave in Rushville, Indiana, the following words 
bewere to/lnscribed: "There are no distant points in the 
world any longer- our thinking in the future must be world 
wide. . .Freedom is an indivisible word - we must be pre­
pared to extend it to every one. . .Only the productive 
are strong, only the strong are free. It is inescapably 
true that to raise the standard of living of any man any­
where in the world is to raise the standard of living by
5 1some sLight degree of every man everywhere in the world."
The idea of the indivisibility of freedom, and accep­
tance of its full implications for foreign policy, was the 
essential feature of the Internationalist position, or the 
"One World" position,as its opponents occasionally referred 
to it. Because of this premise'., the Internationalists often, 
to the unconverted, seemed to be putting too much emphasis 
on American responsibilities, both for past failure and 
future performance. In response to such doubts, the Inter-
5°Ibld., pp. 165-8.
51 Leland D. Baldwin, ed., Ideas in Action». Documentary and 
Interpretive Readings in American History. Volume ~II - 
from 1877 (Hew 1'crk: American Book Company,’" 1969 j, pp. 7-8.
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nationalists sought to hammer home that they too were con­
cerned about American interests, but their perception of 
them was different. Thus, fellow Internationalists Harold 
.Stassen argued that ’’Throughout the world we must constantly 
emphasize basic human rights more than American rights. . . 
if we follow such a broad policy. . .it will not result 
in our impoverishment - it will not result in our own weak­
ness. In fact we shall thrive and grow and be happier 
under the challenge of this course. We shall find that 
after the decade goes by we have a healthier economy. We 
shall find that we have access to more raw materials and 
greater markets than we otherwise would. We shall find 
that we have a greater measure of good-will throughout the 
world; that we have more Jobs at home; that we are at
peace.” One of Willkie's greatest admirers and supporters
put it even more succinctly. "One World,” he wrote, meant
that the United States had a vital interest in peace,
"because war anywhere in the world means war for us. It
applies economically because depression anywhere in the world
means eventual depression here. And it applies politically
because the maintenance of freedom here requires its main-
53tenance elsewhere.”
A key proponent of Republican Internationalism was the 
proprietor of the Time publishing empire, Henry Luce. Luce
|2Wew York Times, November 9th, 194-5.
53k.uss£TT""W. Davenport, "The Ordeal of Wendell Willkie", 
Atlantic Monthly 176 (November, 1945), reprinted in Con­
gressional Record. 92, Appendix,pp. 4374-5.
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was himself an influential figure in eastern Republican
circles, whilst his wife, Clare Boothe Luce, was a F.e pub-
54.lican Congresswoman from Connecticut (1943-1947). Both 
Luces had been very much in favour of American support for 
the allies before Pearl Harbor. J Both had also given 
support for Willkie’s candidacy in 1940, and Henry Luce 
gave the editor of Fortune. Russell Davenport, leave of
jr C.absence to help Willkie’s campaign. Luce’s The American 
Century (1941) pre-dated Willkie's book, and revealed cer­
tain differences of emphasis: Luce, for example, put for­
ward a more explicitly American programme of "internation­
alism" than Willkie did in 1943; to Luce and his wife,
"WlUkle came to seem rather utopian, especially because
(57of his friendly attitude to the Soviet Union. Despite 
their differences, however, the published writings of Luce 
and Willkie were in basic agreement. To Luce, writing in 
194t, it was essential that the United States face up to 
the fact that it was the most powerful and "vital" nation 
in the world, and that it also dispel the notion that it 
could make democracy work on a purely national basis.
^Uesterfield, p. 261-2.
-’■-’Stephen Shadegg, Clare Boothe Luce: A Biography (New York: 
Simon & Schuster,' 1970), p. 115. Henry Luce was vaguely 
associated with the interventionist Century Group, Mark 
Lincoln Chadwin, The Hawks of Norid War II (Chapel Hill: 
^University of North Carolina, 1968), pp.~6’3# 113-4.
Shadegg, pp. 116-18. 
gjbld.. p. 193. ,-^Henry R. Luce, The American Century (New York: Farrar & 
Rinehart, 1941), pp. 22-3, 25.
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Enlist attacking the Republican Party for its "isolationism," 
Luce was also critical of Franklin Roosevelt, who he be­
lieved had been more of an "isolationist" than Hoover 
during the first seven years of the Hew Deal. Luce re­
gretted the fact that the United States had in 1919 bungled 
its first chance of world leadership, and he wanted to make 
sure that this time it took the initiative in defining war
aims and that it recognized the fundamental indivisibility 
egof the world. Luce wanted an Internationalism which 
was based on the recognition of the inter-relation between 
freedom, prosperity and American leadership. In his view, 
American Internationalism already existed in 194-1 in terms 
of jazz, films, slangs, technology; America was already the 
intellectual, scientific and artistic capital of the world, 
he argued, and this, combined with its Ideology and the 
prestige it already enjoyed gave it a unique opportunity 
to make the next 100 years an "American Century".
Despite its imperialistic overtones, Luce’s tract must 
be seen against the background of 194-1; it represented 
Luce’s attempt to appeal to the ideals, the self-interest 
and the tradition of the American people in the great debate 
over America's relation to the Second World War. The kind 
of ’’internationalism’’ he wanted, he said, was "a sharing 
with all peoples of our Bill of Rights, our Declaration
^9Ibld.. pp. 17-20, 26, 29-30.
OOTbld., pp. 29-31, 33-4.
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of Independence, our Constitution, our magnificent indus­
trial products, our technical skills".^1 InvoBdng the 
American tradition which he identified with "a love of 
freedom, a feeling for the equality of opportunity, a tra­
dition of self-reliance and independence and also of coop­
eration", Luce also saw the United States as "the inheritors 
of all the great principles of Western Civilization - above 
all Justice, the love of Truth the ideal of Charity". He
disputed, however, Herbert Hoover’s concept of the United as
Stated a sanctuary of civilization: "For the moment", he 
commented, "it may be enough to be the sanctuary of these 
ideals. But not for long." Invoking a sense of destiny 
and mission, Luce saw it as the time for the United States 
to uplift the world, not only for the sake of the world, 
but for its own sake: "Other nations can survive simply 
because they have endured so long. . .But this nation, con­
ceived in adventure and dedicated to the progress of man - 
this nation cannot truly endure unless there courses through
its veins from Maine to California the blood of purpose
f\0and enterprise and high resolve." More even than that, 
whilst admitting the validity of the conservatives’ fear 
that involvement in war would lead to the end of the Ameri­
can constitutional system, and would threaten the develop­
ment of collectivism, bureaucracy and national bankruptcy, 
Luce saw the United States as having no alternative simply 
because of his basic assumption of the Indivisibility of 
freedom. Ultimately, he did not believe that a free eco-
61 Ibid,62rET3 PP.PP. 32-3.38-40.
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nomic system, or a liberal democracy, could prevail in the 
United States unless it prevailed elsewhere; but by con­
trast, "The vision of America as the principal guarantor 
of the freedom of the seas, the vision of America as the 
dynamic leader of world trade, has within it the possibili­
ties of such enormous human progress as to stagger the
imagination."^3
One World and The American Oentury were written at 
different times for different purposes, luce's concern 
was to galvanize opinion in favour of an interventionist 
approach to the War in which America was still not in­
volved; Willkie's concern was more with the post-war world 
and especially with his worry that the major powers would 
fall out and fail to apply a lasting peace, as had been 
the case in World War I. Similarly, Willkie's Internation­
alism veered towards the utopian, which was much more in 
vogue in 194-3 than it had been in 194-1, whilst luce's 
Internationalism was, as the title of his book Implied, an 
American programme. Despite this, however, both books and 
both men shared i) the belief that the conduct of American 
foreign policy had been insufficiently vigorous and too 
insular in the past; ii) the conviction that the United 
States must play a different role in the future, commen­
surate with the power and prestige, and the opportunities 
which presented themselves; iii) the conviction that "free­
dom" was "Indivisible", and that the American political- 6
65ibld., pp. 13-14, 36.
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economy depended for its success, and ultimate survival, 
on a truly free world. The co-relationship between these 
three beliefs represented the basic Intellectual challenge 
of the Internationalists to the Republican Party. In some 
respects the beliefs of the Internationalists could be 
reconciled with those of the Nationalists, and this was es­
pecially true of Henry Luce’s ideas; but the over-all ap­
proach of the Internationalists represented a fundamental 
challenge to the more traditional approach of the National­
ists. The job of Republican leaders was to try to find a 
consensus which embraced both.
The Centre Group and the Republican Tradition
For the period 194-4-194-9, three major figures stand
out as dominant Republican leaders: Senator Arthur Vanden-
berg of Michigan , John Poster Dulles of New
York, and Governor Thomas Dewey of New York .
Arthur Vandenberg, the oldest of the three, aged 60 in
1944, supplied the vital link with the midwestern-dominated
Congressional party. A former small-town newspaper editor
from Michigan, Vandenberg’s whole career had been unre-
markably and unashamedly small-town American. Vandenberg
had, after his election to the Senate in 1928, attracted
attention as a member of the Nye committee, and was regarded
as the leading ’’isolationist'' candidate for the Republican
64nomination in 1940. By the end of the war, he w*,3 the
c 'The Nye Committee: an special investigating committee set 
up by the Senate in 1934 to investigate the munitions in­
dustry, chaired by Senator Nye of North Dakota. The major 
source for details of Vandenberg's early career is C. D. 
Tompkins, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: the evolution of 
a modern Republican. 1884^1945 l Lansing :~Michigan State 
University Press, 1970)1
-29-
dominant Republican member of the Foreign Relations Com­
mittee, though in seniority ranking below two aged members 
of his party. Nothing in his past career, however, suggested 
that he would become a prominent international figure in 
the post-war years. Apparently nearing the end of an undis­
tinguished Senate career, there was talk of opposition to 
him in the Republican primary in 194-6, but in retrospect 
it can be seen that he was being imperceptibly drawn into 
the centre of events. In 194-3, he had steered the party 
through the Mackinac Conference, in 1944 he was to continue 
his role of party broker, in which capacity he came into 
contact with John Foster Dulles, foreign affairs adviser 
to Thomas Dewey. Vandenberg's developing relationship with 
Dulles, whom he previously considered to be an ’'internation­
alist", Just as 116 was himself considered an "isolationist",
65undoubtedly appealed to Yandenberg's vanity. A loner in 
the Senate, his relationship with Dulles could only enhance 
his respectability as a former anti-interventionist (so was 
Dulles, but fewer remembered) and his claim to expertise 
in foreign affairs; for his part, his knowledge of the 
workings of the Senate and his midwestern credentials made 
him a prized political ally.^
^vandenberg's vanity has been verified from a number of 
sources, e.g., Yfesterfield, pp. 270-1; Patterson, Mr.
^^Republican, p. 341.
°°Yandenberg's closest friend in the Senate was probably the 
conservative Millikin of Colorado, who was also a friend of 
Taft's. Taft and Vandenberg were not close, especially 
in later years, when Yandenberg began to draw closer to 
two up and coming Senators, Knowland of California and 
lodge of Massachusetts. "Taft III - His Mind and His 
Methods", January 9th, 1947; Report, April 30th, 1947,
Frank MeNaughton MSS., Truman Library; Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 232-3.
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John Foster Dulles had by 1944 acquired a great deal 
of diplomatic experience, stretching back to the 1907 Hague 
Peace Conference when he had served as official secretary 
to the Chinese delegation. Like Hoover and the friend of 
his youth, Robert Taft, Dulles had attended the Versailles 
conference, where he had been chiefly involved in questions 
concerning reparations. ' In the inter-war years, he 
divided his time between law, international finance and 
diplomacy, and he represented the United States at the .
Berlin discussions on the German debts in 1934. In 1939 he 
published a major study on International relations, War, Peace 
and Change. At the same time, Dulles also began to attain 
prominence as a Presbyterian layman, and during World War 
II served as chairman of the Federal Council of Churches' 
Committee to Study the Bases for a Just and Durable Peace.
By 1944, as a result of his relationship with Thomas Dewey, 
Dulles had begun to enter the political phase of his career.
A Republican by heritage, his friendships and his voting 
habits had in the past been bipartisan, but his association 
with the rise of Thomas Dewey,fixed him firmly as a Republi­
can. For the. rest of his life, an important element in 
his foreign policy leadership was to be his perception of 
domestic political realities, and in particular his percep­
tion of and relationship with Republican leaders on Capitol 
68Hill. For, the need to be pragmatic in regard to domestic
S’ r-9
0 Dulles once proposed to the girl who later became Mrs. 
¿-oTaft, Pattefson, Mr. Republican, p. 60.
°There are two recently published studies of Dulles which 
supplant all earlier works; Michael A. Guhin, John Foster 
Dulles: a statesman and his times (Hew York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972}; Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and 
John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little Drown, 197371
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politics, was a "lesson" which Dulles drew from the experience 
of Woodrow Wilson, a man for whom, like Vandenberg and 
Hoover, he had some regard.^ This historical "lesson" 
seems crucial to an understanding of Dulles' career: as 
one of his biographers has.; pointed out, his foreign policy- 
views were similar to George E. Kennan, often regarded as
70the doyen of the "Realist" school of foreign policy theorists.
Kennan, however, as a career diplomat, had scant respect
for domestic politicians such as Vandenberg, and found
himself increasingly at odds with the direction of Ameri- 
71can policy. Dulles, on the other hand, was prepared 
to enter the political fray from 1944, and even more from 
1949, as a fully fledged partisan; his association with 
domestic politics was to bring about noticeable changes in 
his approach to foreign policy.
Dulles' relationship with Thomas Dewey is important to 
an understanding of his role in the 1940's. From the time 
in 1937 when they first met, the two developed an exception­
ally close relationship; Dulles was one of the small number 
of advisers who planned Dewey's unsuccessful campaign for 
the Republican nomination in 1940, and he was at the centre
of Dewey's later campaigns for the Presidency as his* ?.3 l..\ ‘
72foreign policy adviser. There seems little doubt that 
so far as foreign policy was concerned. Dulles was the 
dominant influence in the relationship. Although Dewey
y^Guhin, pp. 33-4; Hoopes, p. 3 2. 
iwGuhin, pp. 156-8.
' George E. Kennan, Memoirs ;1925-50 (London; Hutchinson,
1968), pp. 53, 4 0 5 ^
' Transcript, interview with Thomas E. Dewey, pp. 1-2, 4-5, Dulles „Oral History P roject, Princeton.
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always relied upon group discussion amongst his political 
advisers before committing himself to any position, he 
undoubtedly deferred to Dulles in foreign affairs; in later 
years he was unable to remember any instances of disagree­
ment.^ One of Dewey’s advisers has commented regarding 
the Dulles-Dewey relationship and foreign policy formula­
tion, that "it would be difficult to conceive a situation
in which he would take a position diametrically opposed to
lbsomething that Poster believed in. This is not to say,
as some of Dewey’s enemies in the Republican Party inferred,
that Dewey was a man completely lacking in his own views
75or convictions. Nevertheless, one not unfriendly writer 
has concluded that "in the field of foreign policy. . .
Dewey revealed the extent of his political pragmatism”,
Dulles himself was reported to have told Vandenberg in 
1948 that Dewey was "a man who acquires convictions and prin­
ciples by experience. . .but he is also a man whose ex-
77perience has fundamentally been pretty limited". Hugh
Gibson, a friend of Herbert Hoover and a neighbour of
Dewey's in Pawling, the New York community where Dewey
farmed, found during 1944 that the Dewey entourage was very
sensitive about the general assumption that Dulles was
78the dominant influence. This sensitivity, which was a 
Z?Ibld.. pp. 28-32.
‘ Transcript, interview with Elliot V. Bell, p. 24, Dulles 
yc(Oral),'^ Taft and Willkie shared this view, see Barnard, pp. 329-36; 
„¿■Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 270-2, 378.
*°Barry Keith Beyer1, "Thomas E. Dewey, 1937-1947: A Study in 
Political leadership" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Rochester, 
19 6 2), p. 419.
77Joseph U. Alsop to Martin Sommers, August 16th, 1948, Joseph 
7 otJ. and Stewart Alsop MSS., Library of Congress.
'°Hugh Gibson to Hoover, August 17th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
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feature of Dewey’s relationship with the press, as well as 
with later historians, makes it difficult to arrive at a de­
finitive Judgement. From what evidence is available, 
however, it would appear that Dewey's importance was not 
as a foreign policy formulator, but as an effective vote- 
winner, and as the head of the most efficient political 
organization in the Republican Ihrty. Despite the undoubted 
personal closeness of the Dulles-Dewey relationship, Dewey's 
importance to Dulles derived from his political expertise;
arguably the relationship was mutually beneficial, and both
79men learnt from each other.
In terms of the actual development of foreign policy 
ideas then, the principal leaders were Dulles and Vanden- 
berg; to them fell the major Job of bridging the gap be­
tween Eastern and Midwestern Republicans, and of bringing 
to an end the internicine warfare symbolized by the conflict 
between Taft and ¥illkie. For an understanding of how and 
why they were able to do this, it is useful to analyze the 
development of their ideas in the context of what may be 
called "The Republican Tradition". To do so seems addi­
tionally appropriate since, as has already been emphasized 
in this study, perceptions of history and the formulation 
of foreign policy were inextricably bound together.
In a sense there was no such thing as a "Republican 
tradition" in foreign affairs, there was an American tradi­
tion. Historically, however, Republicans had always tended
79as yet there is no biography of Dewey; his personal 
papers at Rochester, New York, are not yet available 
for general research.
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to see themselves as the representatives of true American­
ism, whilst the Democrats had been the representatives of
southern rebellion, and more latterly, of the heterogeneous
gourban ethnic groups. At the same time, the Republicans 
had dominated American politics for most of the time since 
i860 and, despite the unpleasant interlude since 1932, still 
tended to see themselves as the natural governing party.
In short, Americanism and Republicanism were regarded as 
almost inter-changeable terms.
The key figures in the development of the tradition 
were Alexander Hamilton, Captain Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, 
and Henry Cabot Lodge, plus the dominant Republican of 
the inter-war years, Herbert Hoover. In the view of C. A.
Beard, Secretary of Commerce Hoover (1921-1928) represented 
the high rater-mark of the "Federallst-Uhig-Republican" con­
cept of American national interest. As Beard saw it, this 
concept was concerned with the vigorous expansion of markets, 
especially in Asia, a strong navy, and dominance of the 
western hemisphere. It was a concept which envisaged the 
United States spreading its economic and ideological ln- 
fleunce over the world, whilst retaining to itself maximum
(but not necessarily complete) freedom of action and in- 
81dependence. This tradition was, therefore, not incompati­
ble with world leadership, but the emphasis of world
80Milton Viorst, Fall from Grace: The Republican Party and 
the Puritan Ethic (Hew York: Hew American Library, 19'68), 
o.PP. 64-7.° C. A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical 
Study in American Foreign Policy,2nd ed. (Chicago: Quadrangle. 
1966;, pp. 36-9, 48-9, 79, 133, A31. See also.Williams,The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, pp. 79-80. and Osgood, 
p. 250.
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leadership was seen in moral and economic terms, rather 
than in terms of external military and political commit­
ments. Even the Rough Rider, Theodore Roosevelt, hesitated 
at the thought of fighting a land war against Japan in 
Asia for interests that he considered less than vital.
On the other hand, Roosevelt despaired of Wilson’s atti­
tude to World War I; here he saw a clearer threat to 
American interests, and when war did come he saw it as be­
ing made necessary because Germany had murdered unarmed 
American citizens, not because the United States wished
Op
primarily to reform the world. The tradition then re­
quired, in the language of the 194-0’s, a policy which stood 
up for America, a policy which defended American interests 
and refused to compromise American principles, a policy in 
which the costs (moral and material) were carefully weighed 
against the objectives. Agreement on these fundamentals 
could not guarantee agreement on specifics; there could be 
no foolproof way of calculating national interest, nor of 
deciding the relative costs and merits of alternative 
actions. At the very least, however, Republican leaders 
had to be seen to be looking at foreign policy in these terms 
if they were to keep the support of the Party in Congress. 
Most congressional Republicans were ill-disposed to imperil 
what with Taft and Eoover they regarded as the last bastion
OpRaymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle:
University of Washington, 1966), pp. 110-11,194-5, 296-7,
306-7; Osgood, pp. 141, 14-8, 272-3.
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of liberty in the world, unless they could be convinced 
that there was something in it for the United States.
Much of the secret of Arthur Vandenberg's success 
stemmed from the fact that he shared and understood the 
thought processes of midwestern Republicans. He was a 
fundamentalist, in Republican terms, a traditionalist and 
a nationalist. In his younger days as a Michigan newspaper 
editor, Vandenberg had been a convinced imperialist, and 
an enthusiastic supporter of war once the United States 
was committed; he was even instrumental in keeping LaPollette 
from speaking in Grand Rapids against the war. As late as 
September 1918, he was a supporter of the League of nations, 
given reservations protecting constitutional process, 
immigration policy, tariffs and the Monroe Doctrine.1""
To William Howard Taft, he wrote on September 18th, 1919:
"As I see the situation, the great danger now is that per­
sistent refusal on the part of President Wilson and those 
who follow him to agree to any reservation is so irritating 
to popular opinion that the first thing we know the pendulum 
will swing to the other extreme and we shall confront a 
situation which will produce complete rejection of the 
whole undertaking - a thing which I entirely and heartily 
agree would be a dire calamity.
In 1926, Vandenberg published The Trail of a Tradition, 
in which he revealed his adherence to Nationalism, as well 
as his admiration for Alexander Hamilton. In the book he
^Tompkins, pp. 15-20, 22-If.
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outlined how he felt Wilson had departed from the American 
tradition. Contrary to Wilson's rhetoric, he argued, with 
Theodore Roosevelt, that the United States did not fight 
to make the world safe for democracy: "There was one rea­
son, and one reason only, why we made our declaration and 
took up the sword - and that one reason was the defense of 
violated American independence and the legitimate defense 
of American life and property thereunder. It is manifest
that if these rights had not been ruthlessly and persis-
84tently violated, we would not have entered the war".
He also argued that Wilson had departed from the American 
tradition when he gave way on matters of principle in order 
to secure his concept of international order, and when 
he did so without consultation with the Senate. Hot only 
had he infringed upon the prerogatives of the Senate and 
departed from American principles of Justice, he had also, 
against the advice of the Farewell Address tried to commit 
the United States to an entangling alliance. Approvingly 
Vandenberg quoted Henry Cabot Lodge: "The independence of
the United States is not only more precious to ourselves,
86
but to the world, than any single possession. . ." Like 
Roosevelt and Lodge, Vandenberg was not prepared to sacrifice
^Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Trail of a Tradition (Hew York: ocG. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926") , p. 339.* 
oJlbid., pp. 374-5.
86I H cT., p . 388.
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national interests to collective security; Woodrow Wilson, 
on the other hand, had appeared not to recognize the possible 
conflict between the two.®^
The tradition which Vandenberg elaborated was, he said, 
a tradition of "intelligent, tenacious 'nationalism1, its im­
plications and autonomies, as distinguished from emotional 
'Internationalism* in all its threats, dilutions and ^prac­
ticalities''.®® It was not a tradition of "Isolation", 
neither did it proscribe humanitarian enterprise, in certain
curcumstances "within our normal spheres of contiguity", as
8Qin the Spanish American war. Neither did the tradition,
in Vandenberg's view, exclude American action in Europe,
although it had to be recognized that the American way of
life and standards of government were totally different
from Europe, and the Old World still had "a set of primary
90interests" distinct from those of the United States. Still,
he quoted Lodge again: ". . .Whenever the preservation of
freedom and civilization and the overthrow of a menacing world
conqueror summons us, we shall respond fully and nobly, as
we did in 1917. He who doubts that we should do so has
little faith in America. But let it be our own act, and
not done reluctantly by the coercion of other nations, at
91the bidding or by the permission of other countries".
As a Senator from 1928, Vandenberg's views perhaps under­
went some change. As a result of serving on the Nye Committee, 
he became convinced that World War I had been a monumental
®^Tompkins, p. 2 2.
X:: Vandenberg, Trail of a Tradition, p. V.g9ibid., pp. vrrnr. “
X0TbTcT., pp. XVII-XIX.
91TbTd.. p. 86.
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error for the United States; it seemed to him, as to many
contemporaries, that the United States had become involved
because it had failed to follow truly neutral policies.
His disenchantment with Wilsonianism was now compete. In
1935 he visited Europe and became convinced that another
war was on the way. He was in no doubt that this time
the United States must avoid involvement. Like Taft and
Hoover, his disenchantment with World War I had a marked
impact on his conception of foreign policy; the main aim
92of policy now became the avoidance of war. If, however, 
Vandenberg now emphasized the non-entanglement side of the 
tradition at the expense of his earlier advocacy of a strong 
defense of American national rights, he still (with Taft 
and Hoover) believed in international cooperation, including 
membership of the World Court, given due reservations for 
American sovereignty.  ^ Three months before Pearl Harbor, 
although still "opposed to any sort of foreign entanglements" 
he favoured some "rational formula. . .underwritten by all 
th^major powers of the World. . ."and preferred "to Join in 
guaranteeing a Just European peace than to Join in a European 
war."9^
On the face of it, John Poster Dulles had nothing in 
common with either Vandenberg or mldwestern Republicanism.
Yet Dulles' views on international affairs were too complex 
for him to be categorized simply as a Republican Interna­
tionalist, though in his work with the Federal Council of 
Churches he did veer towards utopianism at times during 
World War II. ^  At the same time, it would be inaccurate
^Tompkins, pp. 126-7.
^Ibid., p. 124.
9£lbid., p. 191.^Hoopes, p. 56; Guhin, pp. 48-9.
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to describe Dulles as a Nationalist: despite being an
opponent of intervention in World War II, he refused to
Join the America First organization on the grounds that
96it was the product of exaggerated nationalism. Neither,
despite his later reputation, was Dulles a moralist in the
early years. His moralism was the result of his emergence
as a national political figure; only from the early 1940’s
did the concepts of moral law, righteous faith, and spiritual
97and moral power, enter into his rhetoric. In fact, in
the inter-war years, Dulles seems to have seen nationalism
98and moralism as two sides of the same coin.
Like Hoover and Taft, Dulles was disillusioned with 
the allies at Versailles, especially for their short-sighted 
and selfish attitude to reparations. He also became dis­
illusioned in the 1920’s with the United States for a policy 
too attuned to narrow self-interest: in particular, he 
was critical of the failure to Join the League, of the 
attitude to the war debts, and of American policies on the 
tariff, monetary control and immigration. Seeing himself 
as a liberal, and disenchanted with what he regarded as 
the extreme conservatism of Harding and Coolidge, Dulles 
had in 1924 supported his friend John W. Davis, the Demo- 
cratic nominee.^
^Ibld.. pp. 75-6.
Ibid. t pp. 121-2; Guhin attributes the moralism to the 
need to rally domestic support for decisions, and to Dulles' 
fear that the United States might become a complacent 
status quo nation (pp. 1-4, 124-8).
9°His objectivity and emphasis on shared guilt made him 
seem insensitive to the rise of Hitler, Guhin, pp. 46-7; Hoopes, p. 47.
^Koopes, p. 3 2; Guhin, pp. 19-21, 26-32, 43-45, 66-7.
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The central concept of Dulles' view of international 
relations was that of ; -.change. 1 v’ In his view the essence 
of international relations was the need to find some way 
of making it possible for change to take place in the inter­
national community, as in the nation, without physical con­
flict. In War, Peace and Change. he analyzed the principal 
schools of thought current at the time. The "isolationists" 
he felt, concluding that international conflict could not be 
controlled, wanted to restrict conflict by restricting all 
kinds of contact; the "Internationalists", feeling that re­
strictions of contact were impossible, wanted to create some 
kind of world authority to remove conflict; the remainder 
accepted the present system, accepting the benefits of
international contacts and accepting the burdens of what
1 00he called "the war system". Dulles saw himself as falling 
in none of the categories. "Isolationism" was an alterna­
tive he does not appear to have taken seriously, it was con­
trary to his liberal heritage and to his view of the Ameri­
can heritage; for Dulles an isolationist .America was a con­
tradiction in terms. But in the contest of 1938-41, "iso­
lationism" did not seem to him to be a bad path to follow.
In 1939, he told the Foreign Policy Association: "I dislike 
isolation, but I prefer it to identification with a sense­
less repetition of the cyclical struggle between the dynamic
100John Foster Dulles, War, Peace and Change (ITew York:
- ,Harper and Brothers, 1939), pp. 38-7.
I ':*-.hin, p. -’:3. ; - ; e -
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and static forces of the w o r l d " . H e  believed then that 
if the United States got involved it would be for the 
wrong reasons, it would not be able to extend the democracy 
and equality of opportunity which, on the international as 
the national scale, he saw as fundamental to peaceful, 
human progress. In March, 1939, he wrote, ". . .it seems 
to me best that we should concentrate upon keeping alive
10Pif we can, within our own borders, the flame of liberty".
As regards "internationalism", Dulles was always a 
pragmatist and a sceptic. In War, Peace and Change, he 
tentatively advocated a permanent agency constantly study­
ing and making recommendations on international situations 
before crises developed; but such an agency he felt should 
be based on distinctive geographical areas: hemispheres, 
continents, or even smaller units. The notion of a world 
state he saw as utopian and totally impracticable. In the 
League of Nations, he had no hope whatever, seeing it as 
having, under French influence, become an alliance to 
maintain the status quo rather than an instrument of peace­
ful change. In this regard, he was regretful that Article 
19 of the League Covenant, providing for reconsideration 
of treaties, had never functioned; had it done so it could 
have provided the flexibility which might have made peace-
inc^uhln, p. 45.'^Speech of March 22nd, 1939, quoted by Edwin L. James
in New York Times, September 3rd, 1944, Compare the fol­
lowing by Herbert Hoover in October, 1939: "Our greatest 
service to civilization is to put our house in order and 
maintain true liberty on this continent. For it may be 
that otherwise liberty will sink for centuries in the 
night of despair.", Lyons, p. 364.
-43-
ful change possible.^Where Dalles could find some com­
mon ground with the internationalists was over the question 
of sovereignty. His major prescription for peace was the 
weakening of people’s emotional dependence on the nation, 
which would prevent them seeing other nations as villians; 
the development of a spiritual ideal transcending nationalism 
would create greater international opportunities, and thereby 
lessen the frustrations which gave rise to war. To avoid 
war, then, he argued for the need for nations to give up 
certain elements of sovereignty, for a lessening of the 
paternalistic role of the state, and the creation of greater 
international opportunity. What he wanted was not the 
abolition of national boundaries, "but that safety valves 
be cut through the barriers of boundaries so that human 
energy will diffuse itself peacefully and not be suppressed 
and compressed within a rigid envelope until a bursting 
pressure is attained".
On the face of it, Dulles’ mild "internationalist" ideas 
might seem to be irreconcilable with the Republican tradi­
tion. In 194-0, he took the nation to task, for example, for 
being a status quo nation, trying to hold on to "the richest 1
1°3])uiies, War, Peace and Change, pp. 48-51, 80-85, 150-1,159; cf. Hoover and Gibson, pp. 266-72. Dulles' dis­
like of permanent treaties made him unenthusiastic about 
the proposed North Atlantic Treaty in 1948, Guhin, pp.
10485"6*^Dulles, War. Peace and Change, pp. 115-17, 155; John 
Foster Dulles" 11 The Problem of Peace in a Dynamic World", 
in the Marquess of Lothian et.al., The Universal Church 
and the World of Nations (London: Allen & Unwin. 195&).
P. 155.
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and most productive area of the world. . .as our exclusive 
preserve”. In 194-1, he asserted, that if the United States 
were to attempt to preserve the practice of self-centred
1 05sovereignty, it would and should succumb in the long run. 
Against this, it must be remembered, however, that the Re­
publican tradition was not one of narrow nationalism. Mahan, 
Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt were the Internationalists of 
their day, in so far as they advocated the expansion of 
American political, economic and ideological interest.
Herbert Hoover's career and intellectual orientation was 
very much "Internationalist” in the same sense. The 
tradition was entirely compatible with the quest for a 
liberal world order; where the exponents of the tradition 
hdd criticized Wilson was in sacrificing far too much free­
dom of action in return for obtaining far too little pro­
gress towards the liberal world order. 1
The contradictions between the Republican tradition and 
Dulles' ideas were in fact never very great. In a sense, 
as he appreciated full well, the idea of America and. the 
triumph of American nationhood had always had international 
significance. Henry Cabot Lodge in opposing the League 
had referred to United States independence as being of 
supreme importance to the world. Dulles was in agree-
¡°5Guhin, pp. 48, 77.1°°Both Hoover and Dulles had been critical of the conference 
at Versailles for having failed to counter what they re­
garded as the nationalism, militarism and plain selfishness 
of the European states, and for having allowed the League 
to become a defense for an outmoded and inherently un­
stable European state system., Dulles, "Problems of Peace", 
p. 152-4; War, Peace and Change, pp. 80-5; Hoover and 
Gibson, pp.' 249-50.
^O^See page 38 above.
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ment with this axiom . In fact, an examination of Dulles’ 
writings suggests that his view of world affairs was based 
on the desire to Americanize the globe, not in terms of old 
fashioned empire, but in terms of the dominance of American 
ideas. 1
On the American continent, according to Dulles, the 
United States had shown how diverse peoples scattered over 
a large area could live in peace and relative prosperity.
In his view, the Constitution was "a multilateral treaty" 
which had taken from the sovereign states the right to 
interfere with inter-state commerce, and to aggrandize 
themselves at the expense of others; from the American 
experience, he concluded, the Civil War notwithstanding, 
that peace did not require the abandonment of sovereignty, and 
that some International equivalent of the inter-state com­
merce clause would be sufficient to "diffuse" human energy
109and bring about a peaceful world. In some ways, he felt
that Britain's experiences with the Dominions were instruc­
tive examples to the world of peaceful change, a fact which 
he suggested had something to do with the notion of common 
law in Britain and the United States. He argued that "peace­
ful and non-disturbing evolution could occur in the world 
as a whole if we had fewer treaties, and if those which we 
had were less permanent and more conducive to the develop-
1 OftIn this respect he might seem close to Henry Luce, but 
Dulles combined his sense of mission with an enduring 
sensitivity to the dangers of empire and militarization, 
Guhin, pp. 107-8.
'^Dulles, "Problem of Peace", pp. 155-7; John Poster Dulles 
and Allen W. Dulles, "Statement of an AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY", September 6th, 194-0, pp. 1-5, Dulles MSS (Supple­ment ).
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ment of a flexible body of internationalpractice which 
might ultimately become so grounded in the mores of the 
world community as to attain the status of law."^^
Dulles' writings in the 1930's were written from the 
perspective of an objective student of international rela­
tions, seeking to deal with the problems posed by the challenge 
of the three "have-not" or"dynamic" nations, Germany, Italy, 
and Japan, who posed a threat to the status quo. They also 
reveal the impossibility of complete objectivity. They were 
in the classic liberal vein. Their spirit of reasonable­
ness and gradualness might be expected to be more appeal­
ing to those who had more to lose from the holocaust which 
everybody foresaw. Dulles himself admitted as:;much. The 
existing "war system", he said, posed an ultimate threat 
to the survival of democracy and religion; it posed far 
less of a threat to the values of either fascism or com- 
munism. He was, therefore, looking for some system of 
peaceful change which would enable gradual changes to the 
status quo; he had no patience with those who thought solely 
in defence of the situation at it existed. To the Foreign 
Policy Association in 1939, he spoke deprecatingly of 
phrases such as "sanctity of treaties", "law and order", 
"resisting aggression", and "enforcing morality"; these, 
he said, "have always been the stock in trade of those
who have vested interests which they wish to preserve
112against those in revolt against a rigid system."
jji?Dulles, War, Peace and Change, pp. 156-8.
^Dulles, ‘'Problem of Peace", pp. 167-8.
1 1 dGuhin, p. 45.
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Dalles? aim then was an open, flexible world system, 
in which vigorous individuals and groups would have the 
opportunity to prosper. This meant the establishment of 
stable monetary exchange, the removal of trade barriers, 
the removal of immigration restrictions (although safe­
guards against cheap, contract labour were, he felt, 
necessary), enactment of the mandate and open door princi­
ples in colonial areas, and the opening up of resources to 
the "have-not" nations".11  ^ On the use of sanctions, to en­
force international order, he was extremely sceptical, seeing 
sanctions as contrary to his aims of developing the exchange 
of goods, ideas and people. In 1939, he wrote to Hoover 
praising a recent proposal Hoover had made that the move­
ment of food should be uninterrupted in war. Although the 
idea lias not practical, he said, it had recognized that 
"one of the fundamental causes of nations reaching out for 
more territory and more areas of influence" was "the desire 
to free themselves from subservience to other nations 
which might be in a position to impose economic sanctions 
on them. As you will see, if you read my book, I feel that 
the threat or use of economic sanctions merely intensifies 
the efforts of certain powers to attain self-sufficiency.
I feel a good deal concerned about the present administra­
il htion’s predilection toward economic sanctions."
The concept of world order which Dulles envisaged
I^Dulles, "Problem of Peace", pp. 158-60, 163—5-
''^John Poster Dulles to Hoover, January 3rd, 1939, Hoover MSS.
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was very close Indeed to that of Herbert Hoover; what was 
not clear was exactly what methods Dulles felt the United 
States should be prepared to employ to bring it about. Ap­
parently entry into the war had already been ruled out.
The confidential statement of an American foreign policy, 
which he prepared with his brother in September, 194-0, did 
not make things much clearer. Calling for a foreign policy 
based on the principles expressed in the Federalist Papers. 
the statement lauded the Constitution as "an ’open-end' 
instrument under which peoples and areas might increasingly 
become so inter-connected as to prevent wars, improve their 
power of common defense and preserve a large measure of 
local autonomy." For 100 years, until the defeat of Taft's 
attempt at reciprocity with Canada, this had been the way 
the Constitution had worked, but since then the world had 
moved towards the system of national closed economies 
which the framers of the Constitution had "repudiated as 
inherently inconsistent with durable p e a c e " . T h e  so­
lution, however, was unclear; the statement argued that 
the Constitution was now too centralized to extend further 
but that policy should be based once more on the principles 
underlying it. These principles would have to be extended 
"to bring more and more of the world into a related area 
of common defense and of equal opportunity". But an element 
of caution was added: the United States must not take on 
commitments which made its own defense more burdensome,
John Foster Dulles and Allen U. Dulles, "Statement of an
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY", September 6th, 1940, pp. 2-3^
Dulles MSS (Supplement).
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extension must be based on geographical propinquity and 
natural economic ties.^1^
The traditionalism of Dulles’ thinking is clear. The
desire for America to lead the way in the creation of a
more liberal, inter-dependent world, was not incompatible
with traditional reservations about freedom of action or
the basic essentials of sovereignty. Dulles appeared to
have little difficulty in speaking to the Old Guard in
terms they could understand and Identify with. To Hoover's
suggestion that Dulles write a reply to Halter Iippmann's
U. S, Foreign Policy, Dulles wrote of the impending speech
he was going to deliver in the Cathedral of St. John the
Divine, to inaugurate the Federal Council of Churches'
Christian Mission on Horld Order: "The theme is a righteous
America playing its part for world order in accordance with
117our historic strength." The fusion of mission and self- 
interest, of international cooperation and self-reliance, 
was perfect. Dulles seemed to be moving towards a reconcilia­
tion of nationalism and internationalism; by the 194-0's 
whether in the Republican Party or in the Federal Council of 
Churches, he was a participant rather than an observer; 
both organizations required a degree of adaptation by him 
if he were to use them to attain the great goals he set 
for himself, the United States and mankind. Thus it was 
that he became identified as an Internationalist by many 
Rationalists, whilst many Internationalists were suspicious
PP- 4-5.11(John Foster Dulles to Hoover, October 5th, 1943, Hoover MSS.
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of him. Like ¥illkie, Dulles was a "universalist" or a
"One Worlder" in his ultimate visions, but his immediate
118foreign policy aims were more limited and pragmatic.
To a friend in 194-5 Dulles wrote that the aims of foreign 
policy were to secure the United States from attack, and 
to enrich American lives "materially and spiritually through
*1 I  I  Qtrade,investment and travel abroad. ^ To another corres­
pondent who was worried by Vandenberg's great emphasis on 
self-interest as the basis of policy, he replied equivocally: 
"Certainly the American people, as Individuals, have a 
tremendous interest in the welfare of other peoples and a 
desire to spare them suffering. Whether those in a trustee 
capacity as representatives of the American people, have 
a right to act other than in the national interest is an
120extremely difficult philosophical and Juridical problem."
The dilemma in his own mind between universalism and 
narrower self-interest, Dulles seems to have resolved by 
his faith in moral leadership, which became part of his 
stock in trade by the 1940’s: from the perspective of Re­
publican politics, such leadership had the advantage of 
being a cheap way of¿advancing less than vital American 
Interests and helping to save the World; it was also very 
traditional. On foreign aid, for example, Dulles felt that 
the United States must use it carefully to advance national 
interests, but he argued that it could do far more useful
^1®To Willkie’s widow, Dulles expressed his regret at Willkie’s 
death in characteristic terms: "He was a geat American.
His personality made him outstanding and he devoted himself 
to great goals. He did much to bring to this nation a 
vision without which the people perish.", Dulles,telegram 
1pto Mrs. Willkie, October 8th, 1944, Dulles MSS.
■'Dulles to Ferdinand Mayer, February 28th, 1945, Dulles MSS. 
'^°Dulles to Emily G. Balch, February 8th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
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things tohhelp the world: "There is a severe limit to
the material aid which our government ought to extend, and
it is small in relation to the need. There is, however,
no limit to the moral leadership which we could give, and
that is equally  needed. Our nation was designed to help
121others in that tray".
To his surprise, Arthur Vandenberg found it not at all
difficult to establish a rapport, and ultimately a firm
friendship with John Foster Dulles. Meeting for the first
time in 194-4, by January, 1945, Vandenberg was writing to
Dulles in glowing, mutually congratulatory terms: ". . .it
is the best example I know of that we must clear our minds
of old ’labels* in searching for this common ground. You
were supposed, out our -way, to have been a so-called
’internationalist'. I was supposed, out your way, to be
a so-called ’isolationist'. But after we had been together
for half an hour in our initial discussion, we discovered
122that we believed in precisely the same theme". Despite 
the seemingly large differences of background, Vandenberg 
and Dulles had a great deal in common. Both had a profound 
respect for the Founding Fathers, especially for Alexander 
Hamilton, the hero of Vandenberg's book. Both saw the 
United States in liberal, expansionist terms. Both had a 
great deal of early respect for Uoodrow Wilson. Both were
121 Draft of address to 50 Annual Congress of American Indus­
try, December 7th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
122Arthur H. Vandenberg to Dulles, January 4th, 1945, Dulles 
MSS.
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opposed to intervention in Uorld War II, although not to 
international cooperation, until Pearl Harbor removed the 
choice. Both in the war years determined that the United 
States must play a stronger role in world affairs, and 
both shared a common view of the world order it must seek: 
a world based on justice, self-determination, economic 
liberalism, but also a world in which the United States 
would not lose its sovereignty or freedom of action in 
any vital matter. Both also shared a desire to see a halt 
to the drift toward collectivism, not only in the world, 
but also in the United States,and looked to the Republican 
Party to be an instrument in this reversal. Uhat is strik­
ing is the eztent of common ground that both men also 
shared with Hoover and 'Taft. The differences between them 
were differences of emphases, not of fundamental principles.
American national interest, not abstract international 
idealism, was the basis of the Dulles-Vandenberg synthesis. 
Rationalism, of the enlightened sort,was Implicit in the 
world order they envisaged. It would be illogical to 
insist on the application of self-detemmination in Asia, 
Europe and Africa, and<feny its applicability to the United 
States. To Vandenberg a more vigorous foreign policy was 
necessary because he no longer believed that the United 
States could insulate itself from war, as he had hoped 
in the 1930's. To Dulles it was part of America's destiny 
and mission, whilst the world order of justice, freedom 
of movement and trade, was clearly also in America’s 
interests. The synthesis was intellectually satisfying:
-53-
by exerting moral leadership in the world, the United States 
would be asserting its independence and fulfilling its 
divine mission to create a better world; the creation of 
this better world would be in the interests not only of the 
rest of the World, but also the United States, spiritually, A
morally and economically, and it would keep it out of war.
The latter point was important. Quite naturally, by the 
end of World War II everybody was looking to find a way of 
avoiding another war; the Republican consensus seemed to be 
that the United States could best contribute to this by 
doing what Woodrow Wilson had failed to do, that is to 
stand up for American principles, which if applied univer­
sally could be universally beneficial; the strength of the 
Rationalists eliminated certain means to being this situation 
about, including large scale economic aid, entangling alli­
ances or the permanent commitment of troops to the Asian 
or European mainland. By comparison with these, a new 
League was uncontroverslal, although such was the memory 
of Wilson, Lodge and Harding that it was seen as all-impor­
tant in 194-4— 5.
In 194-4-5, then, the tradition was not to be severely 
strained. Arthur Yandenberg, one of the foremost exponents 
of fundamental Republicanism was well satisfied. To Dewey 
in 194-4, he wrote, "Reduced to the most elementary vernacular, 
I should say that my Republican Mid-West is perfectly will­
ing to sanction 'international cooperation' Just as long 
as it knows that we aren't going to 'haul down the flag' 
and that we aren't going to be International 'saps' in
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’giving America away1. But it demands this constant re­
assurance".^^ Vandenberg was convinced that .with Dulles 
he"had found the formula. He remained a nationalist; but
as "intelligent" nationalist and an "intelligent" inter-
1 PAnationalist were not very far apart. He was convinced
that he spoke for the average American, who he felt was 
neither an "isolationist" or an "internationalist" but 
wanted a just post-war world, and was prepared to do. his 
bit to get it. He was sure also, that the average American 
was "perfectly sure that no one is going to look out for 
us. . .unless we look out for ourselves". J According 
to his formula, he said on the eve of the 194-4- Convention, 
"He preserve America and we cooperate with a free world". ° 
In March, 194-5, he expressed the view that Clare Boothe 
Luce’s phrase, "America First Internationalism", best des­
cribed the views of the average American who had fought 
in the war.* 12^ The soldiers who had fought in the war 
would be convinced, he said, arriving at San Francisco in 
April, 194-5, that peace required collective security, and 
that it was in American interests to play its part, but 
this did not mean that they wanted to haul down the flag 
from the capital or ignore American interests in the pro-
1 “^ Arthur H. Vandenberg to Thomas E. Dewey, May 10th, 194-4, 
Arthur H. Yandenberg MSS., William L. Clements Library, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan.
12 uiinPSooth Report, "Senator Vandenberg", April 19th, 1945, 
_ MeEaughton MSS.■25Tompklns, p. 192.
; „Chicago Tribune. June 24th, 1944.
■27Rep0rt} March 16th, 1945, McHaughton MSS.
' 2t%ew York Times, April 23rd, 1945.
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The partnership between Vandenberg and Dulles was per­
fectly complementary. Vandenberg could provide the con­
tacts with the midwestern dominated Congressional Party, 
as well as the constant reassurances which he felt the 
Midwest needed. For his part, Dulles could supply a dip­
lomatic pedigree, contacts with the northeastern Establish­
ment and a general intellectural quality which was other­
wise lacking. Their rapport was undoubtedly aided also by 
Dulles' pragmatism, as well as by the fact that, despite 
his reputation as an Internationalist, his thinking on 
foreign policywas compatible with what has been described 
as "The Republican Tradition". It is clear that in 194-4, 
Dulles, despite his sense of mission, was not an Inter­
nationalist in the sense of believing in the indivisilibity 
of freedom as a first principle on which American foreign 
policy must be based. It is true that he shared the desire 
of Willkie and the Internationalists to see the liberal 
world order established; but his vision was tempered by an 
emphasis on the maintenance of internal strength, both phy­
sical and moral. Eo more than Vandenberg could Dulles take 
the "One ’World" philosophy as an act of&ith; his view of 
foreign policy,like Vandenberg’s,was based on pragmatic 
and enlightened nationalism. Both men then were ultimately 
prepared to reassure apprehensive Republican Congressmen 
that primary reliance would be placed on an independent 
strong America, and that, consistent with the "Republican 
tradition", international cooperation would be an adjunct, 
for the protection of less vital interests, and as a means 
to attain the liberal world order which all could share as
-56 -
a final aim. Such reassurance, as Vandenberg well knew, 
was essential for those who wished to guide the Republican 
Party through a re-examination of the bases of American 
foreign policy.
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CHAPTER TWO
1944, The In tern a tio n a lis t  Challenge Contained: the emergence o f  consensus"
w. . . only W illk ie packs a wallop in  both f i s t s .  R oosevelt's  r igh t arm i s  in  a s l in g  labeled  'dom estic shortcom ings'. In a s lin g  too i s  the l e f t  arm o f every Republican challenger except W illk ie , and th is  s l in g  i s  lab eled  'no foreign  p o lic y ' .  -Governor W ills (Vermont), January 8th , 1944;
"Anyone who g ra tu ito u sly  r a ise s  so much as a doubt as to the unswerving determ ination o f  our party to  bu ild  a great peace t r i f l e s  w ith the tru th  and w ith  h is  country's fu tu re."  -Thomas E. Dewey, February 12th, 1944.
The 1944 p r e s id e n tia l e le c t io n  provided the focus fo r  
the Republican P arty's war-time d e lib era tio n s on foreign  
p o lic y . Unless Republicans could fin d  a so lu tio n  to th e ir  
dilemma, then i t  was agreed on a l l  s id e s  that th e ir  hopes 
o f securing e le c to r a l success in  1944 were n o n -ex is ten t.
This problem apart, the p o l i t i c a l  omens seemed very much in  
the Republicans' favour. The Hew Deal was c le a r ly  running 
out o f steam, and even Franklin R oosevelt was reported to  
be lo s in g  the resp ect o f  many Democrats on C apitol H ill  
except as a vote g e tte r  whose popular appeal alone seemed 
ab le to  o f fe r  the chance o f v ic to r y  in  1944.1 2 Asked what 
would happen to the Democrats in  Hew England i f  R oosevelt 
were not re-nominated, a sen io r  M assachusetts Congressman 
to ld  the Time correspondent, "How you ca n 't quote me on t h is ,  
but we wouldn't carry a damned s t a t e .  . .and we'd carry
1 New York Times, January 9th , 1944; ib id . .  February 13th, 1944.2Report by Sidney .Olson, January 19tla, 1944, McHaughton MSS.
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damned few anywhere e lse ." ^  Opinion p o lls  a lso  suggested  
a p o l i t i c a l  trend back to the Republican Party.^ Outside 
the South, the Republicans were placed in  the lead in  a Feb- 
ruary Gallup P o ll. Later Gallup P o lls  in d icated  th at the 
Republicans could win in  November i f  the war was over, and 
i f  they could focus a tte n tio n  on post-war domestic problems 
rather than matters o f  world peace where they were a t a d is ­
advantage.^ In Washington i t s e l f ,  Republicans could draw 
fu rth er  comfort from the fa c t  th at the Democratic membership 
in  the House o f  R epresentatives was down to i t s  low est le v e l  
s in ce  the beginning o f  the R oosevelt era . The p reva ilin g  
view on C apitol H i l l  was th a t the Republicans were bound to  
carry Congress in  19447 In ad d ition  they could derive added 
comfort from the in creasin g  d is s a t is fa c t io n  o f  the South
Qw ith in  the heterogeneous Democratic c o a l it io n .
W hilst the p o l i t i c a l  omens were good, the fa c t  remained, 
however, th a t the Republican Party was known to be d ivided  
over the question  o f  fore ign  p o lic y . An added d i f f ic u l t y  
stemmed from the p erso n a lity  and ta c t ic s  o f  th e ir  1940 nominee, 
Wendell W illk ie , who had from 1942 begun a vigorous campaign
^Report, March 29th, 1944, McNaughton MSS.4jiorman D. Markowitz s ta te s  in  The Rise and F a ll o f  the People’ s Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism  1941-1948 (New York: C olller-M acm illan, 1^73) th at the "general trend toward the Republicans during.the war was evident in  the p o lls  in  the P resid en t's  S ecretary 's F ile ."  n o te , 2 , p. 117.|New York Times t February 26th, 1944.gNew York Times, March 26th, 1944; A pril 23rd, 1944.■ Ib id . . February 6th , 1944. Report by Sidney Olson, January J£SncT, 1944, McNaughton MSS."Hoover to W illiam E. B arrett, March 17th, 1943, Hoover MSS.For a d if fe r e n t  p ersp ective on d iv is io n s  w ith in  the Demo­c r a tic  Party, culm inating in  the r e je c tio n  o f  the re-nomination  o f  Henry Wallace as V ice-P resident in  1944, see Markowitz.PP. 92-93.
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to win the Republican Party over to h is  In te r n a tio n a lis t  
view s, and to secure the 1944 nomination. By ear ly  1944 
W iU k le's challenge had been v ir tu a l ly  r e s is te d , and the 
way was prepared fo r  the emergence o f a new s e t  o f leaders 
more prepared to compromise with the N a tio n a lis ts  than W illkie  
had been. The emergence o f  the ’Centre' group therefore  
needs to be seen ag a in st the background o f the N a tio n a list  
rea sser tio n  both aga in st W illk ie and h is  id ea s , which dated 
back a t  le a s t  to the N ational Committee Meeting a t S t. Louis 
in  December 1942.^ At that m eeting, the attem pts o f  the 
N ational Committee to e le c t  a su ccessor as N ational Chairman
to  Joseph Martin brought the f ie r c e  h o s t i l i t y  of the Old
this wasGuard towards W illk ie out in to  the open. A lthough/resolved  
by a compromise ch o ice , Harrison E. Spangler o f  Iowa, the 
fa i lu r e  o f  W illk ie to get h is  own candidate e le c te d , a l l ie d  
to  h is  in a b i l i t y  to get h is  own power base, or a t the very  
le a s t  to prevent the e le c t io n  o f Thomas Dewey as Governor 
o f New York e a r l ie r  in  the year, can in  retrosp ect be seen  
to  have se r io u s ly  undermined h is  chances o f  re-nom ination .10
The d is l ik e  which the Old Guard had fo r  W illk ie was not 
merely the r e f le c t io n  o f  an id e o lo g ic a l s p l i t .  Perhaps h is  
r e a l s in  was h is  lack o f  deference to the estab lish ed  lead ers, 
h is  u n w illin gn ess to compromise and c o n c i l ia te .  The rumours 
about him which abounded described him as a n t i-B r it is h  (not 
in  I t s e l f  a s in  among Republicans) and pro-communist, and
9Barnard, pp. 382-5; Joseph Martin, pp. 133-5.1O ^ illk ie  a l le g e d ly  asked Joseph Martin to organize a stop  Dewey movement in  New York. Joseph Martin, p. 13 1.
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above all as too close to Roosevelt. "He is the White House 
choice for Republican candidate", concluded one memo on him, 
"The future of the Republican Party lies with the Jeffersonian 
Democrats, and they will have none of Willkie." His foreign 
policy was dismissed as "One World" of love and kisses to 
Stalin, and Roosevelt's foreign policies.11 In 194-4- one par­
ticularly wild allegation, based on an apparently forged 
letter from Harry Hopkins, suggested that he had a secret 
bipartisan alliance with Roosevelt. To the Chicago Tribune 
however,'he represented simply the barefoot boy from Wall 
Street, the big business candidate for President, a mid- 
westerner by birth only, and in reality a tool of eastern 
money interests.  ^ Herbert Hoover, was prominent in organiz­
ing opposition to Willkie, along with Alf landon and former 
national chairman, John D. Hamilton. Harrison Spangler, 
the so called compromise choice as national chairman in
December, 1942, was also involved, as was apparently his pre-
14decessor, Joseph I-Iartin. The strategy of the anti-Willkie 
forces was not to focus on any particular candidate, but to en­
courage all potential candidates to go into the field to tie 
up delegates. To Raymond Buell, regarded as an eastern.in­
ternationalist , Hoover spoke favourably of the candidacy of 
Thomas Dewey. At the same time, however, he was apparently 
using vrhat influence he had in California to encourage Sari
^Undated, unsigned memo, "The Forthcoming Willkie Blitz", 
Willkie folder, Hoover M33.
12 New York Times, January 23rd, 1944.
1 ? Chicago Tribune, February 11th, .1944,
1 4Hoover to Sdward Martin, October 4th, 1943; Ben S. Allen 
to Hoover, October 31st, 1943; Hoover to Ben S. Allen, 
November 3rd, 1943; Hoover Î-I33. McCoy, Landon of Kansas, 1CPP. 503-4. Barnard, pp. 435-7.’-’"Notes on the State of the Nation", March 19th, 1943, p. 25, 
R. L. Buell file, Alexander Smith M33.
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Warren, Governor o f C a liforn ia , to  en ter  the race. In June. 
1943 he suggested th at Warren make a broadcast address to 
Republican senators and congressmen on foreign  a f f a ir s ,  which 
would enable him to g ive the "P acific point o f view" and to  
’fehow your comprehension o f  more than lo c a l  i s s u e s " .^  Not 
e a s i ly  reassured by A lf Landon, who advised him aga in st c i r ­
cu la tin g  a l e t t e r  organizing op p osition  to  W illk ie , Hoover 
in  July wrote to John D. Hamilton, "I don’t  l ik e  the W illk ie  
s itu a t io n ”. 1 By the end o f 1943 however, the Old Guard 
stra teg y  was beginning to pay o f f .  With Warren, although  
not considered a dependable a l l y ,  announcing h is  candidacy 
in  C a lifo rn ia , added to  Dewey's con tro l o f  New York, Governor 
B rlck er's candidacy in  Ohio and other midwestem s ta te s ,
Dirksen’s announced candidacy in  I l l i n o i s ,  and the announce­
ment th at Pennsylvania would remain un instructed , over a 
th ird  o f  the votes a t  the 1944 Convention were a lready out 
o f W illk ie ’s c o n t r o l ." D e s p i t e  a l l  the c la t t e r ,  W illk ie  
i s  not making any su b sta n tia l p ro g re ss ,” wrote Hoover. In 
January 1944 Hoover was w ritin g  to another friend  asking him 
to check a "weird story" that W lllk le 's  supporters, "despair­
in g  o f  g e tt in g  anywhere", were try in g  to make a deal with  
Bricker in  return fo r  a promise th at W illk ie would be made 
Secretary o f  S t a t e .19 By the early  New Year, however, i t  
seemed cer ta in  th at W illk ie 's  chances o f  g e tt in g  the nomina-
]^Hoover to Earl Warren, June 7th , 1943, Hoover MSS.' • A lfred Iandon to Hoover, June 8th , 1943, Hoover MSS;Hoover to  John D. Hamilton, July 26th, 1943, Wendell L.-W illk ie  fo ld e r , Hoover MSS.1 “Barnard, pp. 442-3.19Hoover to  Ben S. A llen , October 30th, 1943; Hoover toPaul C. Clapp, January 5th , 1944, Hoover MSS.
tio n  were extrem ely s lim . On 1st January he announced h is
a decisiond ec is io n  not to enter the C aliforn ia  prim ary,/which, a f te r
h is  exclu sion  from New York, removed the la s t  major s ta te
POfrom h is  p o ssib le  co n tro l.
W hilst party leaders were moving to  exclude W illk ie , . 
so the opinion p o lls  a lso  suggested th at he was lo s in g  popu­
la r i t y .  In March 1943, a t the height o f  h is  p op u larity , 69% 
o f Republican voters were favourable to h is  nomination. By 
January 1944 only 2J>% favoured h is  nomination as compared 
w ith 42/6 fo r  Dewey.21 A ll the signs were then that Dewey 
would get the nomination. The N ational Committee meeting
in  January reported ly  r e f le c te d  pro-Dewey and even pro-
22Bricker sentim ent over W illk ie . P ossib ly  a sign  o f  des­
peration  in  the W illk ie ranks was r e f le c te d  by a public 
a tta ck  in  January by Governor W ills o f Vermont on Landon,
Hamilton, Pew, Nye, Gerald L. K. Smith and the McCormick-
o-kPatterson a x is  for  th e ir  d estru ctiv en ess . J W illk ie fo r  h is  
part remained determined to f ig h t  on. He refuted  vehemently 
the su ggestion  that the Chicago Tribune would in flu en ce the 
Convention sin ce i t  was to  be held on i t s  home ground: not 
even "a t a in t ” o f  such in flu e n c e , he sa id , should be allowed
oilin  the P arty's platform  or candidate. In February he cam­
paigned in  12 western s t a t e s ,  making c lea r  h is  commitment 
to  in tern a tio n a l organ ization  (over which he sa id  he had
SONew York Herald Tribune, January 24th, 1944.21 Barnard, pp. 422-3 , 443.220 'Iau gh lin  to Herbert Hoover, January 15th, 1944, O 'laughlin  MSS. New York Times, January 1 st , 1944; January 11th, 1944; January 13th, 1944.23New York Herald Tribune, January 9th , 1944; New York Times, «January 9th', i~943~24New York Times, January 8th , 1944.
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l e f t  the Democratic Party) and expressing h is  d is l ik e  o f the 
governmental methods pursued by R o o sev e lt.2® But in  r e a l i ty  
he was making l i t t l e  progress. In March Herbert Hoover 
wrote to Iandon, "We are having a curious development over 
the Convention s itu a t io n . That i s ,  probably s ix  hundred 
d eleg a tes  or more are going there pledged a n ti-W illk le . As
fa r  as I can r e c o lle c t  we have never had a convention where
26the ma^or s p l i t  was a n ti some p a rticu la r  person”.
The showdown w ith the Old Guard, which W illk ie c o n s is ­
te n t ly  sought, appeared to  be in  the o ff in g  in  the Wisconsin 
Primary; th at he cSought to bring matters to a head in  un­
favourable te r r ito r y  was in  many ways ty p ic a l . But even in  
Wisconsin the is su e s  were to be blurred. Paced w ith candi­
dates pledged to Thomas Dewey and General MacArthur, W illk ie  
was exceed ingly  upset by the entrance in to  the co n test o f  
candidates pledged to  Harold S tassen , w ith whom r e la tio n s  
had been poor fo r  over a year, and whose supporters had a r ­
gued th at W illk ie was no longer a seriou s contender.2  ^ Given 
the p r o life r a t io n  o f  candidates, th at none o f  them but W illk ie  
appeared in  W isconsin, and that Dewey even tr ie d  to get h is  
to  withdraw, W illk ie ’s e f fo r t  to make the e le c t io n  a t e s t  
o f the " is o la t io n is t ” is su e  was bound to be d i f f i c u l t . 2® 
W illk ie tr ie d  to e x p lo it  the fa c t  that Dewey’s t ic k e t  in  
W isconsin was headed by a former member o f  America F ir s t ,  
and th a t Gerald K. Smith, the head o f the America P ir st  Party, 
was prepared to  support Dewey (as w e ll as e ith e r  Bricker or
25 ib id . , February 13th, 1944; February 23rd, 1944.2^Hoover to A lfred Landon, March 16th, 1944, Hoover MSS. |7B am ard,pp. 453-4.2ttDewey was s t i l l  o f f i c i a l l y  not a candidate. Hew York Times. February 24th , 1944; February 26th, 1944'."
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MacArthur). Nobody with Smith’s support could p o ssib ly  be 
e lec ted  President o f  the United S ta te s , W illk ie commented.2  ^
The e s s e n t ia l  theme o f W illk ie 's  campaign in  Wisconsin 
was th at the Republican Party had no hope o f winning in  1944 
i f  i t  turned i t s  back on him, a move which i f  i t  happened 
he would see as being a s ig n  o f  i t s  disavowal o f  in tern a tio n a l 
cooperation . In the even t, h is  d efeat in  Wisconsin caused 
him to withdraw immediately from the race; he was convinced 
th at " isolation ism " had won.-^ C ertain ly  W illk ie 's  d efeat 
was a blow to the ,,I n te m a t io n a lls t s ,, as a saddened Senator 
Austin o f  Vermont in d icated  in  h is  comments a f te r  W illk ie 's  
withdrawal; but as Arthur Krock commented, in  order to win, 
the Republicans could not a fford  to go aga in st W illk ie e s ­
p e c ia lly  in  the form ulation o f  th e ir  fore ign  p o licy  plank . ^
I f  the In te r n a tio n a lis ts  were disturbed by W illk ie 's  d e fea t, 
h is  withdrawal caused some s a t is fa c t io n  among the Nation- 
a l l s  t s .^ 2 Herbert Hoover, who undoubtedly derived great 
s a t is fa c t io n  from the event,den ied  th at i t  was a v ic to r y  fo r  
" Iso la tion ism ”: "The W illk ie people accused Dewey o f wild  
in tern a tio n a lism  fo r  proposing a m ilita ry  a ll ia n c e  w ith Bri­
ta in  (fo r  the a tte n tio n  o f  the vote o f  those o f  German des­
cen t);  Stassen  was the advocate o f the most g lob al o f  in te r ­
nation alism  ever invented; MacArthur could not be c a lle d  an
33is o la t io n i s t  in  view o f  h is  present occupation". "The people 
Just wrote th at gentleman o f f  as a phoney", he concluded.^4
2?Ib ld . . March 22nd, 1944.|? I b id . , A pril 6th, 1944.51 Johnson, p. 281; New York Times. A pril 4 th , 1944. 32o 'la u g h lin  to  Hoover, A pril 8, 1944, O 'laughlin  MSS.^H oover to  Eugene Lyons, A pril 8th , 1944, Hoover MSS.34Hoover to  Cal O'Laughlin, A pril 10th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
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As the Republican Party moved towards the inexorable  
nomination o f  Dewey, W illk ie reserved h is  p o s it io n  as to  
whether he would support the nominee. His lack o f  respect 
fo r  Dewey was no s e c r e t .35 i n the Wisconsin Primary, he and 
h is  supporters had attacked Dewey as a " p o l it ic a l ly  fa c e le s s  
candidate", and attacked the notion  th at a Republican could 
get e lec ted  without any d iscu ssio n  o f  the Issu es . Those 
who avoided d iscu ssio n  fo r  fea r  o f  offend ing divergent groups 
were not master p o l i t ic ia n s ,  sa id  W illk ie , but were amateurs 
by con trast w ith the Democrats: "We had b etter  get in to  a 
co n test which we have some chance to w in ."3^ Disturbed by 
Dewey’s compromises w ith the Old Guard, W illkie saw s im ila r i­
t ie s  between Dewey and those elements in  the Republican Party 
who in  h is  view had been responsib le fo r  keeping the United
S tates out o f  the League in  1919 and 1920; th is  he was d eter -
37mined should not happen again .
P a r a lle l w ith and re la ted  to the movement to elim inate  
W illk ie 's  in flu en ce  and to u n ite  the Republican Party fo r  
the 1944 e le c t io n , was the e f fo r t  a t  Mackinac in  September 
1943 to develop a d is t in c t iv e  Republican stance on foreign  
a f f a ir s .  To f o r e s t a l l  W illk ie 's  supporters, and to un ite  
the Party on more moderate ground, N ational Committee Chair­
man Harrison E. Spangler announced on May 3 1 st , 1943 the fo r ­
mation o f  the Republican Postwar Advisory Council, a group 
c o n s is t in g  o f  the P arty's 24 Governors, as w e ll as 6 Senators, 
13 members o f  the House o f  R epresentatives, and 6 N ational
~^New York Times. A pril 11th, 1944.3oib id . . March 19th, 1944; March 2 1 st, 1944.37Barnard, pp. 329-336, 489-90.
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Committee m e m b e r s .S p a n g le r ’s membership formula excluded  
a l l  three l iv in g  p r e s id e n tia l nominees: Hoover, Landon and 
above a l l ,  W illk ie . The fa c t  th at chairmanship o f  the a l l -  
important fo re ig n  p o licy  committee a t  the Post-War Advisory 
C ouncil’s conference a t Mackinac was to be held  by Arthur 
Vandenberg was a fu rth er blow to the I n te r n a t io n a lis ts . Bo- 
fore the announcement o f  Mackinac, Vandenberg was already  
deeply involved in  the question  o f  post-war p o licy  by v ir tu e  
o f h is  membership on the Senate Foreign R elations Subcommittee, 
which had been appointed to deal w ith  the B a ll, Burton, Hatch, 
H ill  r e so lu tio n , a b ip artisan  In te r n a tio n a lis t  reso lu tio n  
stro n g ly  supported by Wendell W illk ie and Harold S tassen .
Vandenberg's experiences on the Foreign R elations Sub­
committee helped to c la r i f y  h is  own approach to the question  
o f post-war p o lic y . He was ’’hunting fo r  the middle ground 
between those extrem ists a t one end o f  the lin e  who would 
c h eer fu lly  g ive America away and those extrem ists a t  the 
oth er end o f  the lin e  who would attempt a t o t a l  is o la t io n .
To Vandenberg, Mackinac o ffered  the opportunity to develop  
a d is t in c t iv e  Republican foreign  p o licy  founded on the bed 
rock o f  American n ation alism . Not w ill in g  to ’’pre-commit 
America in  resp ect to a peace which as yet i s  t o t a l ly  in  the 
dark” and having ”no sympathy whatever w ith our Republican 
Pollyannas who want to  compete w ith  Henry W allace,” Vandenberg , 
wanted to use Mackinacr”to  d if fe r e n t ia te  between Republican
^Report, February 1st, 1944, p. 6, McNaughton MSS; R. A.
Divine, Second Chance, pp. 105-7.
^"Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., and Joe Alex Morris, Eds., The 
Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1952), pp. 3Ö-42, 54-55, 63-65.4°lbld.. p. 55.
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and Hew Deal foreign  p o licy  by a sse r tin g  . . . (1) th a t we 
s h a ll  remain a t o t a l ly  sovereign  country. . . (2) th at we 
s h a ll  make a l l  o f  our own d ecision s fo r  ourselves by con­
s t i t u t io n a l  process; and (3 ) th at we intend to be fa ith fu l  
to American in te r e s t s ,  . . We must beat the 4th Term. I t  
i s  the " la st  roundup” fo r  the American way o f l i f e .  I do 
not b e liev e  we can beat i t  i f  we s p l i t  the Party (and i t s
Jeffersonian Democratic Allies) by going either to an iso-
41la t io n ls t  extreme or to an in te r n a t io n a lis t  extreme. .
D espite the exclu sion  o f  W lllk ie , the Mackinac conference 
was to prove a te s t in g  time fo r  Vandenberg's s k i l l s  o f  lead er­
sh ip  and compromise. Senator Austin o f  Vermont, an In ter­
n a t io n a lis t  and a W illk le supporter, and Charles Eaton o f  ’
New Jersey , ranking Republican on the House Foreign A ffa irs  
Committee, a l l ie d  with a number o f  governors to force Vanden- 
berg to hold open h earings. Austin even threatened to  w rite  
a m inority report u n less Vandenberg agreed to include in  the 
report some reference to post-war membership o f  an in tern a­
t io n a l organ ization . In the event Vandenberg made the 
n ecessary  adjustment w ithout s a c r if ic in g  the e s s e n t ia ls  o f 
h is  p o s it io n . The reference to post-war in tern a tio n a l or­
gan ization  was l e f t  d e lib e r a te ly  vague; Vandenberg would not 
go beyond "a post-war cooperative organ ization ”. He a lso  
in s is te d  on reten tion  o f  s p e c if ic  mention o f the p rotection  
o f American "sovereignty”. F in a lly , the report expressed
the hope th at se c u r ity  and peace would be "u ltim ately  estab -
42lish ed  upon oth er sanctions than force" . *
* 1 I b ld .. pp. 56 - 5 7 .
42Westerfield, pp. 152-3; Divine. Second Chance, p. 13 1 ; 
Tompkins, p. 211.
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The Mackinac conference was an important m ilestone in  
the development of Republican p o lic y . Vandenberg h im self 
was extrem ely proud o f h is  labours, and convinced th at the 
formula arrived  a t  was so u n d .^  For the f i r s t ,  but not the 
l a s t ,  time Vandenberg had disp layed  h is  s k i l l s  as a party 
c o n c ilia to r . In ev itab ly  not a l l  Republicans e ith e r  a t  Mac­
kinac or absent shared Vandenberg's euphoria: apart from 
the expected complaints from W illk ie , there were reports 
th a t 19 o f  the Republican Governors were d is s a t is f ie d  w ith  
i t .  Herbert Hoover a ls o , whose p u b lica tion  w ith Hugh 
Gibson o f The Problems o f la s t in g  Peace in  1942, had re ­
newed h is  in f lu e n c e . in  the Party and presented an a ltern a ­
t iv e  approach to th at o f  W illk ie and the I n te r n a t io n a lis t s ,
was somewhat disappointed that the reso lu tio n  he submitted ,
45to Mackinac was not considered.  ^ Hoover had wanted the Re­
publican Party to  accept h is  proposal o f  a tr a n s it io n  period, 
in  which the United S tates would be able to take a look a t  
the kind o f peace th a t emerged before committing I t s e l f  to . 
s p e c if ic  post-war s tru ctu res , and before committing i t s e l f  
to  a peace which, as in  Hoover's view had happened in  World 
War I ,  might w ith in  i t s e l f  contain  the seeds o f  fu rth er  
c o n f l i c t . ^  Told by Taft o f  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  which Vandenberg 
had had in  g e tt in g  "Austin and h is  group" in  l in e ,  and
^Vandenberg, Private Papers. pp. 59-60; TompkinaL, p. 212. ^Tompkins, p. 211-2^2.^ p o r  assessm ent o f Hoover's Influence re la ted  to h is  book, see "Notes on the S tate o f  the Nation" by R. L. B u ell, p. 25,R. L. B uell f i l e ,  Alexander Smith MSS. For te x t  o f  Hoover's r e s o lu t i o n s ) see Hoover to  John W. Bricker, August 30th,1943; Hoover to  Bricker, August 3 1 st , 1943. For h is  rea c tio n s, . s e e  Hoover to Robert A. T aft, September 25th, 1943, Hoover MSS. 4ojhe proposal r e f le c te d  Hoover's c r it ic is m  o f the tendency to  concentrate too much on In tern ation a l Organization; in  h is  view  the p o l i t i c a l ,  t e r r i t o r ia l ,  m ilita r y , economic and id e o lo g ic a l  settlem en ts which would fo llow  the war were fa r  more important. Hoover and Gibson, pp. 291«
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securing "unity on a statem ent which asserted  the continuing  
sovereign ty  o f the United S tates" , Hoover had hy October come 
to see Mackinac as having strengthened the Party: "It 
demonstrated to the country, th at we had leadersh ip  and co­
hesion  in  the P a r t y " ." A s  I see i t ,"  Taft commented, "the 
plank excludes extreme is o la t io n  on one s id e  and the Stassen  
in tern a tio n a l s ta te  on the oth er . Between those extremes 
the permanent Committee on Foreign A ffa irs  i s  expected to 
work out a more d eta iled  program fo r  the Republican Convention 
o f  1944."48
Mackinac then was important in  securing Republican 
u n ity  w ith in  cer ta in  lo o s e ly  defined g u id e lin e s . The In ter ­
n a t io n a lis t s  had been c o n c ilia te d , but the con tro l o f  the 
Party by W illk ie or Stassen  had been e f f e c t iv e ly  ruled ou t.
In terms o f Party lead ersh ip , Mackinac was c r u c ia l in  th at  
i t  assigned  to Arthur Vandenberg a cen tra l ro le  over the 
development o f  Republican foreign  p o lic y , one which he was 
to  ex erc ise  u n t i l  1949. Mackinac a lso  brought in to  the sp ot­
l ig h t  the Republican governors, who were freq u en tly  seen as 
representing  the rea l hope fo r  advancement in  the post-war 
y ea rs.^ im p ortan t among th ese was Thomas Dewey, who d esp ite  
h is  o f f i c i a l  non-candidacy was a lready becoming the favou rite  
fo r  the 1944 n o m in a t io n .lo o k e d  on k ind ly  by both landon 
and Hoover, Dewey caused a few p a lp ita tio n s  by arr iv in g  la te
^R obert A. Taft to Hoover, September 23rd, 1943; Hoover to .John ¥ . Bricker, October 1 s t , 1943, Hoover MSS.y°Robert A. Taft to  Hoover, September 23rd, 1943, Hoover MSS.49see fo r  example the e d ito r ia l  in  the New York Herald Tribune, January 8th , 1944. *
5°Barry K. Beyer, "Thomas E. Dewey, 1937-1947: A Study in  P o l i t ic a l  Leadership" (PhD th e s is ,  U n iversity  o f  Rochester, 1962), argues th at Dewey was in  August recep tiv e  to  Vanden- berg's d esire  to nominate MacArthur, but th at he came to. see the argument th at h is  own candidacy would prevent W illk ie 's  and thereby avert a party s p l i t , ( p p .  67-69;.
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a t Mackinac and appearing to advance the idea th at the United 
S tates should en ter a post-war a ll ia n c e  w ith B rita in , and 
perhaps a lso  Russia and C hina.^ Both Herbert Hoover and 
A lfred Landon were somewhat concerned a t  th is  statem ent.
"I am sorry Dewey got o f f  wrong on th is  l i n e , ” wrote Hoover. 
”I t  was not h e lp fu l e ith e r  to him or the country."^2 To John 
Poster D u lles, Robert Taft confided th at Dewey had not 
created a good im pression a t Mackinac, and th at he f e l t  that  
party leaders would p refer  a candidate they would fin d  e a s ie r  
to  work w ith . D u lles, Dewey's foreign  p o licy  ad v isor, sought 
to  reassure those whose confidence had been shaken. Dewey's 
statem ent, he wrote to  a fr ien d  in  Colorado, "did not r e f le c t  
any w ell-th ou gh t-ou t con v iction  th at we should fo r  a long 
period o f  time make m ilita r y  commitments which would. . . 
put our d estin y  in  the hands o f  some other n a t io n .” I t  had 
sim ply r e f le c te d  Dewey's goodw ill fo r  B rita in  when he had 
been "put on a rather d i f f i c u l t  spot by the rep o rters."53 
Like Vandenberg, D ulles was in  194-3 emerging as some­
th in g  o f  a party broker. In A pril he had apparently met w ith  
N il lk ie ,  S tassen , John Bricker o f  Ohio and N ational Chairman 
Harrison Spangler.5^ In September he had a fu rth er meeting 5
51Beyer, p. 51; "Notes on the S tate o f  the Nation" by R. L. B u ell, p. 25, R. L. B u ell f i l e ,  Alexander Smith MSS; McCoy, Landon. p. 497.52Hoover to  A lfred Landon, September 20th, 194-3; A lfred Landon to Hoover, September 15th, 194-3, Hoover MSS.53m illes to Mrs. Albert G. Simms, September 2 1 st, 1943, D ulles MSS (Supplement). Dewey h im self apparently a lso  wrote to Mrs. Simms on the q u estion , which suggests th at he was con­cerned about the p o l i t i c a l  consequences o f  h is  a c t io n , and a lso  makes nonsense o f  h is  o f f i c i a l  non-candidacy; D ulles to  Mrs. A lbert G. Simms, October 20th, 1943, D ulles MSS (Supplement).54tfalter S. Poole, "The Quest fo r  a Republican Foreign Policy; 1941-1951" (PhD t h e s is ,  U n iversity  o f  Pennsylvania, 1968), p. 39.
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with W lllk ie , as w e ll as w ith Taft and Hoover. Although 
m aintaining h is  own non-involvement in  p o l i t i c s  on the b asis  
o f h is  church commitments, h is  correspondence revea ls  a c lea r  
commitment to  the candidacy o f  Thomas Dewey and the Republican 
cause. Parrying W illk le 's  request th at D ulles help  him,
D ulles found a large degree o f  common ground with Taft and 
Hoover. Eoover a t  le a s t  found the meeting with D ulles enjoy-
ccab le; "sanity i s  rare", he wrote to him afterw ards. In the 
clim ate o f  1943, w ith  In te r n a tio n a lis t  pressures fo r  American 
commitment to post-war in tern a tio n a l organization  fin d in g  
expression  in  the Fulbright and Connally r e so lu tio n s , D ulles 
found i t  r e la t iv e ly  easy to ta lk  the same kind o f language 
ad Hoover, Taft and Vandenberg. Prepared to make c lea r  h is  
op p osition  to concepts o f  a "world s ta te " , which struck fea r  
in to  the middle western wing o f the Republican Party, D ulles 
b elieved  th at the only p o licy  was one o f  bu ild ing "a coopera­
t iv e  re la tion sh ip "  between n a tio n s . I f  the Republican Party 
made i t s  stand on in tern a tio n a l cooperation, thus avoiding  
the fa ls e  is su e s  o f  " iso la tion "  versus "collaboration", wrote 
D u lles , i t  could a lso  emphasize the complete lm p ra tlca lity
o f the "United S ta tes  merging i t s  id e n t ity  in to  some super-
« 5 6n a tio n a l agency". By presenting  the issu e  in  th is  way, he 
suggested , "the Republican Party might get away from the ten ­
ta c le s  o f  a fa ls e  is su e  which had been imposed upon i t  by 
i t s  p o l i t i c a l  enemies and su b stitu te  an issu e  w ith respect 
to  which i t s  p o s it io n , I am convinced, i s  th e .o n ly  p ra c tica l
55uoover to John Poster D u lles, September 30th, 1943, Hoover ,.HSS.-^D ulles to H. Alexander Smith, August 10th, 1943, Dulles MSS (Supplement),
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one, one which i s  thoroughly sound and as to which the over­
whelming m ajority o f  the American people would be in  agree­
ment."57
D u lle s’ remarks revea l h is  p o l i t i c a l  s e n s i t iv i t y  to the 
d if f ic u l t y  which i t s  fore ign  p o licy  image presented to the 
Republican Party; they a lso  revea l why he was, unlike W illk ie , 
ab le to  c o n c ilia te  the N a tio n a lis ts  and to emerge as a consen­
sus b u ild er . In the months a f te r  Mackinac, however, D ulles 
was not to p lay a major r o le , except in  an advisory capacity  
to Thomas Dewey. The p r in c ip a l job, th a t o f help ing  to develop 
Republican u n ity  p rior to the form ulation o f  i t s  platform  at 
Chicago, belonged to Arthur Vandenberg. Like D u lles, Vanden- 
berg was very much aware o f  the way in  which Republican foreign  
p o lic y  form ulation was "complicated by the ev er la stin g  re ­
currence o f  the ’i s o la t io n is t '  theme" and o f  the need, th erefo re , 
to develop a foreign  p o lic y  p o s it io n  which removed th is  p o l i ­
t i c a l  disadvantage.5Q His major concern, however,remained 
th a t o f  reassuring the N a tio n a lists  th at amidst a l l  the 
Utopian ta lk , American in te r e s ts  were being safeguarded and 
more than th a t , th at they remained o f primary importance.
In h is  n eg o tia tio n s over the d ra ft Republican Platform  
w ith Senator A ustin , the leading In te r n a tio n a lis t  spokesman 
on the Mackinac Foreign A ffa irs  Committee, Vandenberg opposed 
s p e c if ic  d escr ip tio n  o f  the nature o f  the world organization  
which the Republican Party was prepared to support. 
master o f the ambiguous phrase, Vandenberg In s is te d  on in ­
c lu sio n  in  the d raft o f  a sentence committing the Republican
57Ibid.5 °Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 55-6 .
-73-
Party to "organized in tern a tio n a l cooperation" and p roscrib ­
ing "Joining a world s ta te " .59 jo Austin he explained the 
need to keep the mldwestern wing o f  the Party content: "I 
want to go in  th is  p a rticu la r  document fa r  enough to c le a r ly  
e s ta b lish  our good fa ith  in  resp ect to post-war in tern a tio n a l 
cooperation; but I want a lso  to  remember th at th is  i s  prim arily  
a p o l i t i c a l  document which must win the approval o f  my great 
Middle Western country (as we did a t  Mackinac)".^0
Vandenberg was a lso  in  con su lta tion  w ith Dewey "as an 
important member o f  the Mackinac conference", although per­
haps more p la u sib ly  as the l ik e ly  p r e s id e n tia l nominee.
John Poster D u lles , whom Dewey con su lted , warned Dewey aga in st  
accep tin g  Vandenberg's reference to a "Just", tr e a ty , which 
was, he f e l t ,  "designed to provide an a l ib i  fo r  not Joining  
in  organized in tern a tio n a l cooperation on th e .th eory  that 
th is  would tend to perpetuate ' in ju s t ic e '" .  "That," sa id  
D u lles , "was very la r g e ly  the Republican lin e  in  1920. . .
I th ink  i t  very important to avoid g e tt in g  th is  'Joker' in to  
the p la tform ."61 In ad d ition  Dulles and E l l io t t  B e ll recom­
mended a number o f  other changes in  the d ra ft, including  
the d e le tio n  o f  s p e c if ic  m ateria l on in tern a tio n a l organiza­
t io n  which had been put in  a t A ustin 's in s is te n c e . Vandenberg 
in  rep ly  sought to  emphasize the degree o f common ground 
between them, and he "emphatically" agreed with the comments
^Memorandum attached to l e t t e r  from Vandenberg to Warren A ustin, May 8th , 1944, Vandenberg MSS.|°Vandenberg to Warren A ustin , May 8th , 1944, Vandenberg MSS. o1v«ndenberg to  Thomas E. Dewey, May 10th, 1944. Vandenberg MSS; D ulles to  Thomas E. Dewey, May 16th , 1944, D ulles MSS (Supplement). ■
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made by D ulles-B ell-D ew ey su ggestin g  "that we must maintain  
a strong United S tates a t  home in  order to be e f fe c t iv e  
abroad". Undoubtedly Vandenberg was surprised  to receive  
such strong support fo r  the bed rock o f a strong America 
from New York. He d id , however, express the hope th at the 
platform  should r e fe r  to the importance o f  an " effective"  
(rather than the prev iou sly  suggested "enduring") peace.
"I th ink i t  i s  important that we should thus emphasize the 
fa c t  th a t not even a good league can survive a BAD p ea ce ."62 
To Dewey as to A ustin, Vandenberg wrote o f  the n e c e s s ity  o f  
s a t is fy in g  the Midwest: " . . .  I should s.ay th at my Repub­
lic a n  Mid-West i s  p e r fe c tly  w ill in g  to  sanction  ’in tern a tio n a l  
cooperation’ ju st  as long as i t  knows th at we a ren 't going  
to  'hau l down the f la g '  and th at we a r e n 't  going to be 
in te r n a tio n a l 'sap s' in  'g iv in g  America away'. But i t  demands
this constant reassurance".^ To Governor Green of Illinois,
however, he wrote reassu rin g ly  o f  the way in  which Eastern  
Republicans had been prepared to compromise, regarding the  
d ra ft platform  as b e tte r  from the Midwestern point o f view  
than Mackinac. He had, he sa id , expected some trouble over 
h is  In c lu sio n  o f  the statem ent barring membership o f  a world 
s ta te :  "Personally, I th ink our view point (yours and mind) 
(s i c ) i s  com pletely p ro tected " .64
62ifemorandum accompanying le t t e r  o f  D ulles to Thomas E. Dewey, May 16th, 1944; copy o f  l e t t e r  from A. H. Vandenberg to Thomas E. Dewey, May 22nd, 1944; D ulles MSS (Supplement). 
o3a . H. Vandenberg to Thomas E. Dewey, May 22nd, 1944, D ulles  MSS (Supplement).64yandenberg to Governor Green o f  I l l i n o i s ,  May 26th, 1944; Vandenberg to Governor Green o f  I l l i n o i s ,  June 10th, 1944, Vandenberg MSS.
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By the time o f the Republican Convention in  June, Van- 
denberg had secured wide agreement on the d raft fore ign  p o licy  
plank to be presented to  the R esolutions C om m ittee.^ His 
co n su lta tion s did not include W illk ie , however. D espite  
press reports th a t Senator Austin was s a t i s f ie d  w ith the d raft 
fo re ig n  p o lic y  plank, a number o f  In te r n a t io n a lis ts , in ­
cluding Governors Edge (Hew J ersey ), Sew all (Maine), and 
Senator B a ll (Minnesota) were su sp ic io u s . Edge announced 
h is  in ten tio n  to oppose a "wishy-washy” foreign  p o lic y  plank. 
Sew all asked the reso lu tio n s committee to express firm ly  a 
w illin g n ess  to g ive up some sovereign ty  in  order to achieve  
a worthwhile in tern a tio n a l organ ization . Senator B all wanted; 
Vandenberg's phrase, "and not by Joining a world s ta te " , 
om itted from the p la tform .66 I t  was c le a r  that the main 
stumbling block was the is su e  o f  commitment to In tern ation a l 
organ ization . The In te r n a tio n a lis ts  wanted a commitment to  
American p a r tic ip a tio n  in  post-war c o l le c t iv e  se c u r ity . 
Governor Sew all to ld  the foreign  p o licy  subcommittee th at 
any d ec la ra tio n  which c losed  the door on the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  
p o lic in g  the peace would be m ea n in g le ss .^  The draft p la t ­
form prepared by Vandenberg and Austin went no fu rth er than 
supporting "peace force" , how ever.' "What the d e v il i s  ’peace 
fo r c e ’ ?" demanded Governor Edge. "If i t  i s  fo rce , i t ’s force  
and i t ’s b e tte r  to  t e l l  the public about i t ,  and not kid  
them ."68 Senator Vandenberg warned Edge th at i f  he tr ie d  to 
take h is  f ig h t  to the Convention f lo o r , he might w e ll get 
the very kind o f  plank he most feared . Edge was unimpressed:
65vandenberg to Charles Eaton, May 26th, 1944; Vandenberg to Charles Eaton, June 10th, 1944; Vandenberg MSS.° 6New York Times. June 23rd, 24th, 25th, 1944.6T lb id ., June 23rd, 1944.68Z5H«> June 26tli, 1944.
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'•Either we take the r e s p o n s ib il ity  to maintain the peace, 
or we do n ot, and a l l  th is  ta lk  o f  'peace fo rce ' i s  s i l l y .
We cannot escape a very leading p o s it io n  in  world a f f a ir s .
I t  i s  b e tter  to be a party to preventing war than a party  
to  war w ith i t s  mass murder, and I b e liev e  th at the eastern  
c o a s ta l s ta te s  f e e l  th at way about i t .  I ’m sorry about the
Midwest. But l e t ’s g ive our nominee a platform  that the
6Qeastern  and c o a sta l s ta te s  w i l l  be proud o f" . .
Although not a t the Convention, W illk ie added h is  c r i t i ­
cism to those o f Governor.Edge. The platform  was, he sa id , 
very lik e  th a t o f  1920, ambiguous, and capable o f being used 
to  prevent e f fe c t iv e  world cooperation .^0 Meanwhile 16 Republi­
can Governors f e e l in g  apparently th a t a Congressional dominated 
"oligarchy" had presumed to speak fo r  i t s  party, w h ilst they  
them selves had spearheaded the Republican resurgence sin ce  
1941, demanded a le s s  * ambiguous platform  and in  p articu lar  
th a t i t  express an unequivocal commitment to in tern a tio n a l  
sa n ctio n s. Senator T aft, chairman o f the R esolutions Com­
m ittee , r e s is te d  th e ir  d e m a n d . I n  the even t, the re v o lt  
blew over very q u ick ly . Austin reassured the In te r n a tio n a lis ts . 
Edge decided not to  take h is  f ig h t  to  the Convention f lo o r ,  
having been reassured by Austin that "peace forces" included  
m ilita r y  fo r c e , i f  n ecessary , to keep the p e a c e . S o  e f fe c t iv e  
in  fa c t  were A u stin ’s reassurances, th at a number o f In ter -
g lb ld . ,Zyib ld . . June 27th, 1944.• * Ib id . . June 27th, 1944; McNaughton Report; "Overall conven- tion " , June 29th, 1944, pp. 6 -7 , McNaughton MSS.72flew York Times. June 28th, 1944.
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nationalists promptly disassociated themselves from Willkie's 
public criticisms of the platform.^3
The Republican platform agreed upon at Chicago was a 
victory for consensus politics. As at Mackinac, the Inter­
nationalist challenge had been contained; the Internationalists 
had to defer to the sensibilities of the Midwest as articu­
lated by Yandenberg. The Chicago Tribune in its editorial 
on the opening of the Convention had triad to set the mood:
. . We see an egotism so great that it cannot be satisfied 
within a single continent, seeking to pledge the power of 
the American nation, in perpetuity, to the service of other 
nations without compunction and without regard for the in­
terests of the American people whose sons and dollars must 
redeem those pledges." "This Convention must be sternly 
American. It is useless to attempt to appease the noisy, 
sectional minorities that would put America second".^
The platform and the speeches revealed a dual concern: 
on the one hand, Republicans were concerned that they should , 
not be identified with opposition to the war and with ob- . 
structionism in foreign policy; on the other hand, they were 
concerned that the United States should not because of mis­
placed idealism neglect its own interests. Governor Green 
of Illinois, in welcoming the Convention, denied that there 
was any"win the war"party and suggested that military leaders 
would get less interference from Republicans; Earl Warren, 
in his keynote address listed the important contributions
73ibld.. June 27th, 1944.
74chlcago Tribune. June 26th, 1944.
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which 'Republican states' were making to the war efforti
76% o f  the sh ip s , Q]% o f  a l l  a ir c r a f t ,  and r e ite r a te d  the
importance, i f  the United S tates was to re ta in  resp ect among
the re s t  o f  the world, and " if  we are to be able to keep
our commitments and to compel r e c a lc itr a n ts  to keep th eirs"
75to  ". . . keep America ever strong and s e l f - r e l ia n t" .
The most s ig n if ic a n t  statem ent o f  Rationalism  a t the 
1944 Convention came from Herbert Hoover, who, according to  
the New York Times brought an en th u sia stic  response from the 
audience when he commented th at R ationalism  was the m otivat­
in g  force  behind Russian and B r it ish  p o lic y , and re itera ted  
th a t when Republicans came to power they did not intend to  
liq u id a te  the economic w elfare or the independence o f  the 
United S ta te s . P u llin g  no punches in  h is  a ttack  on the Ad­
m in istra tio n , Hoover a lso  re-echoed a phrase o ften  quoted 
by Vandenberg: "A good league can never cure a bad peace".
He proposed again h is  idea o f  a tr a n s it io n  period u n t i l  the 
shape o f  the peace had emerged, as w e ll as the view that under 
the proposed new in tern a tio n a l organ ization , primary respon­
s i b i l i t y  fo r  peace-keeping should devolve on reg ion a l coun­
c i l s .  Anne O'Hare McCormick commented in  the Rew York Times: 
"In Chicago i t  i s  p la in  th a t the undertow o f nationalism  i s  
stron g . Rothing appeals to th is  assembly o f worried Americans 
so su re ly  as even an o r a to r ic a l promise to end the war quickly  
and g et the boys home. But a promise to  keep the boys from 
going to war again has even stronger p o l i t i c a l  appeal";76
Given the strength  o f  R a tio n a list  sentim ent a t the
75new York Times, June 27th. 1944. .76r&rdT7Tu5S~gBth, 1944.
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Convention and in  the Republican con gression al party , i t  i s  
c le a r  that the Old Guard turned to Dewey fo r  purely pragmatic 
reasons: he was b e tte r  than W illk ie , whom the Old Guard 
had worked c e a s e le s s ly  to defeat,- and he had shown h is  vote  
g e tt in g  p o te n t ia l. At the same tim e, and v a s t ly  important, 
fu rth er  stru ggle  to agree on a nominee would have been 
f a t a l  to chances o f  v ic to r y .77 S t i l l ,  however, the Old Guard 
embraced Dewey w ith l i t t l e  enthusiasm. Both General MacArthur 
and Governor John Bricker evoked more excitem ent, but n e ith er  
would have been acceptable to eastern  Republicans. MacArthur 
would have been a popular choice among Congressmen, many o f  
whom f e l t  he was being starved o f  su p p lies by R oosevelt, who 
was fo llo w in g  a misguided Europe f i r s t  p o l i c y .^  C ertain ly  
MacArthur had a strange fa sc in a tio n  fo r  many Republicans both 
during and a f te r  the war: he was, rec a lled  Joseph Martin, 
the most recognizably Republican o f  the war-time gen era ls , 
a man who shared Republican b e l ie f s  and i d e a l s . ^  Amongst 
h is  best known supporters fo r  the 1944 nomination, u n t i l  the 
r e lea se  o f  correspondence c r i t i c a l  o f  the A dm inistration in
80A pril e f f e c t iv e ly  ended h is  chances, was Arthur Vandenberg. 
D espite the a ttr a c tio n s  o f  nominating MacArthur for  what 
Clare Luce c a lle d , the "party o f  the P a c ific" , MacArthur's
77For lack  o f  enthusiasm fo r  Dewey p erson a lly , see New York Times. June 18th, 1944. See a lso  J. P. D ulles to Mrs. Albert G. Simms, September 2 1 st , 1943, fo r  account o f ta lk  with  Taft regarding Dewey's lack  o f  personal appeal, D ulles MSS„Q(Supplement).7«Roland Young, Congress io n a l P o l it ic s  in  the Second World War (New York: Columbia U niversity  Press) pp. 153 ,  1 5 0 . See a lso  comment by Senator Nye (North Dakota) in  Chicago Tribune January 4 th , 1944.79Joseph Martin, pp. 199-200. See a lso  Samuel Lubell, Revolt o f  the Moderates (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 7 5 .80The b est account o f  the attempt to d raft MacArthur in  1944 i s  in  Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 7 5 - 8 9 .
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chances were probably never very great, p r e c ise ly  because 
o f the d if f ic u l t y  o f waging an e f fe c t iv e  campaign fo r  him 
w ithout becoming involved in  open denunciation o f  the Ad­
m in istra tion  in  w a r - t i m e . A t  the n ation al Committee meet­
in g  in  January, by which time Dewey had emerged as the 
fa v o u rite  candidate, there was l i t t l e  evidence o f support 
fo r  MacArthur's candidacy.®2 A fter h is  withdrawal, a t le a s t  
one o f  h is  supporters s t i l l  held  out the hope th at he might 
n everth eless be appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief, presum­
a b ly  to compensate fo r  Dewey's inexperience and to provide 
a genuine Republican command.®^
The candidacy o f  John Bricker, although only h a lf ­
h earted ly  supported by Robert T aft, who had no love fo r  h is
Ohio co llea g u e , was a more ser iou s effort.® ^  Popular in  the amongMidwest and /  Republican Congressman, Bricker was con tin u a lly  
encouraged and supplied w ith m ateria l by Herbert Hoover, and 
many o f  Hoover's foreign  p o licy  ideas appeared in  the Bricker 
campaign.^5 Bricker in  fa c t  developed in  h is  campaign fo r  
the nomination the essence o f  the N a tio n a list  p o s it io n . 
America could, he sa id , cooperate w ith the r e s t  o f  the world, 
"But not a t the expense o f  her p r in c ip le s , her honor, her 
Id ea ls  or  her form o f  government". America had never been
S^This was Vandenberg's assessm ent by the end o f  A p ril, 1944, i b i d . , p. 86 .. One sen io r  Democratic Congressman Interpreted  Vandenberg's advocacy o f  MacArthur as." a  sa fe  and popular th ing to  do, so he can m aintain freedom o f a c tio n  in  the convention". Report, March 29th, 1944, McNaughton MSS. For Clare Luce's d escr ip tio n  o f  the Republican Rarty in  terms o f  i t s  id e n t if ic a t io n  w ith the P a c if ic , see New York Times. January 8th , 1944.§2New York Times, January 12th, 1944.o30'Laughlin to General MacArthur, A pril 29th, 1944, O'Laughlin MSS. .o4])ulles detected  the lack  o f  enthusiasm which Taft had for  Bricker, J. F. D ulles to Mrs. A lbert G. Simms, September 21st 1943, D ulles MSS (Supplement). See a ls o , Patterson , Mr. Republican, pp. 156, 206-8, 377.^ Statem ents from 100 Congressmen supporting B ricker's v iew s,
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an " is o la t io n is t  nation", he sa id , the term " in tern a tio n a list"  
was a lso  absurd: the United S ta tes must seek world lead er­
sh ip , but nobody could say in  advance what post-war commit­
ments the United S ta tes  should en ter in to , except th at such 
commitments would not be a t the expense o f  American sover­
e ig n ty  and freedom o f  a c tio n . In h is  campaign he pushed 
a lso  the idea o f  a tr a n s it io n a l arrangement, which Herbert 
Hoover had advocated, and lik e  Hoover he blamed the Adminis­
tr a t io n  fo r  appeasement in  the 1930’s ,  as w e ll as p u b lic ly  
ca stin g  doubts on the commitments being made a t  the various 
war-time con ferences.8 6 ; jn February, a f te r  Bricker had made 
a speech to the N ational Press Club, Hoover wrote to encourage 
him: "I Just want you to  know th at I rece ive  many sign s th at  
the t id e  i s  turning in  your direction".® ^ In fa c t ,  the Dewey 
"draft" was a lready forg in g  ahead by the time Hoover wrote. 
Probably one o f  the Old Guard concerns, which perhaps made 
B ricker’s candidacy a l l  the more welcomed, was the fea r  that 
i f  Dewey got the nomination by d e fa u lt, he might prove too 
independent.88 Dewey in  fa c t  began in  the pre-Convention 
period to make lim ited  c o n c ilia to r y  gestures to the in te r -
were obtained fo r  c ir c u la t io n  a t  Chicago; c lip p in g  from C incinnati Enquirer. June 18th, 1944, Clarence Brown MSS,Ohio S tate H is to r ic a l S o c ie ty , Columbus. For evidence o f  dependence on Hoover, see H arriet W. Bricker to Hoover, December 18th, 1943, Hoover MSS.8ospeech a t  P h ilad elp h ia , September 17th, 1943; copy inBricker f i l e ,  Hoover MSS. Speeches in  Washington, (February, 1944), New York (A pril) and Milwaukee (May); New York Times. February 12th, 1944, A pril 26th, 1944, May 14th, 1944.87Hoover to John W. Bricker, February 12th, 1944, Hoover MSS.88o 'lau gh lin  to General MacArthur, A pril 6th , 1944; A pril 29th, 1944, O’ lau gh lln  MSS.
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n a t io n a lis t s ,  presumably on the assumption th at he already  
had the nomination sewn up, and that mldwestern Republicans 
would vote the Republican t ic k e t  whatever the circum stances 
in  the f a l l .
An in d ica tio n  o f  th is  was the ma^or foreign  p o lic y  speech 
to the American Newspaper Publishers A ssociation  in  A p ril, 
a speech which he la te r  claimed was designed to see i f  the 
Republicans s t i l l  dared to  nominate him a f te r  hearing h is  
p o s it io n .®9 prio r  to th is  speech, h is  ad v isor , John Poster  
D u lles , s o l ic i t e d  the advice o f  Walter Idppmann, who apparently  
urged Dewey to speak out on the questions o f post-war r e la ­
t io n s  w ith Germany and R ussia. "He f e e ls ,"  wrote D u lles,
"that i f  you can cover these two p o in ts , you w i l l  have done 
more than any other prominent p o l i t i c a l  f ig u r e , but th at i f  
you do le s s ,  on account o f  the public im pression that has 
been created about you, the im pression created w i l l  be one 
o f negation  and o f strong tendency toward i s o la t io n ."9° The 
speech duly committed Dewey to support o f  organized in te r ­
n a tio n a l cooperation "backed by adequate force to prevent 
future wars", and to "durable cohesion between Great B rita in  
and o u rse lv es, togeth er, I hope with Russia and China."91.
Dewey's apparent move toward the In te r n a tio n a lis ts  caused 
some concern amongst the N a tio n a lis ts . The Chicago Tribune 
took him to  task  fo r  acceptin g  R oosevelt's  concept o f  the 
Big Pour, and ca lled  fo r  a ringing attack  by Republicans on
Beyer, p. 7 2 .9°D ulles to  Thomas E. Dewey, March 30th, 1944, D ulles MSS (Supplement).
91 New York Times. A pril 28th, 1944.
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R oosevelt’s diplomacy. I t  la te r  suggested th at had Dewey
been more fo r th r ig h t before the Wisconsin Primary, he would
not have done so w e l l .92 By the time o f the Convention, the
Tribune had come to f e e l  th at Dewey's nomination might be a
r e p e tit io n  o f  194-0: "If the d elegates should nominate him
they face  the p o s s ib i l i t y  that they w i l l  have bought another
p ig -in -a -p ok e" .93  Arthur Sears Henning, the Tribune's Washing
ton correspondent, and freq u en tly  a r e f le c to r  o f  the views
o f Republicans on C apitol H i l l ,  commented that Dewey's hopes
o f  a f i r s t  b a llo t  nomination seemed to be fading from the
04peak reached before the New York address. Not fo r  the la s t  
tim e, however, the Old Guard was to fin d  i t s e i f  buried by 
the s lic k n e ss  and p rofession a lism  o f the Dewey organ ization . 
B rlck er's supporters succumbed a t the Convention to pressure 
to make the nomination o f  Dewey unanimous by withdrawing 
B rick er's name. "Now," said  Senator Burton, " if  Mr. Dewey 
lo s e s ,  i t  won’t  be Ohio's f a u lt .  We are going a l l  out fo r  
him, and i f  he lo se s  i t  won't be because o f  anything Ohio , 
did to h im ."95 Dewey was received  without enthusiasm: chosen  
fo r  h is  a b i l i t y  to compromise and h is  e le c to r a l p o te n tia l, 
rather than fo r  id e n t if ic a t io n  with any p articu lar  se t  o f
id e a s .95
92chicago tr ib u n e , A pril 29th, 1944; May 9th , 1944.93giipp lng from Chicago Tribune. June 22nd, 1944, Thomas E. Dewey f i l e ,  Democratic. N ational Committee lib ra ry  MSS, Truman Library.94-ghlcago Tribune. June 12th, 194-4.95neport, June 29th, 1944, McNaughton MSS.leaders o f the draft Dewey movement reported ly  stressed  h is  vote g e ttin g  p o te n tia l a t  the Convention, New York Times, June 26th, 1944.
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Like the platform  then, Dewey's nomination was a v ic to r y  
fo r  consensus. He had got the nomination because he offended  
the Old Guard le s s  than W illk le , and had a much b e tter  chance 
of g e tt in g  e lec ted  than Bricker. His d i f f ic u l t y , - however, 
was to continue to keep the Party united in  a campaign 
where the whole s e n s it iv e  question  o f  the war, fo re ig n  p o licy  
and " iso la tion "  was l ik e ly  to be dragged up. Of n e c e s s ity  
t ie d  to the fundamentals o f  tra d itio n a lism  ou tlin ed  in  the 
party platform , he had a t  the same time to prevent w holesale  
'I n te r n a t io n a lis t '  d e fec tio n . Apart from the inherent d i f ­
f i c u l t i e s  o f  f ig h t in g  the Commander-in-chief in  war-time, 
Dewey's campaign was a lso  l ik e ly  to be fought aga in st the 
background o f  Harding, Lodge and 1 9 2 0 . 9 7
In h is  acceptance speech, which Prank McNaughton o f Time 
described as "one o f  the most c le v e r ly  drafted p o l i t i c a l  
speeches i t  has been the country's fortune to read in  a long 
time ", Dewey la id  down the g u id e lin es o f  h is  campaign*^®
His in ten tio n  appeared to be to remove the war as an is s u e ,  
in so fa r  as p o ss ib le , as w e ll as to  concentrate a tte n tio n  on 
the dynamism and e f f ic ie n c y  o f  the Republicans, by contrast 
w ith  the bureaucratic bungling o f  the New Deal. On the
97in February the p u b lic ity  o f f ic e r  a t N ational Committee Headquarters reported ly  described the fe e l in g  that the commander-in-chief was unbeatable in  war-time as "a public  psych osis" . Report, February 2nd, 1944, p .1 , McNaughton MSS. A Gallup P o ll in  A pril had in d icated  that Dewey could win in  November i f  the war was over, New York Tlme s^. A pril 23rd, 1944.9oMcNaughton Report: "Overall convention", June 29th, 1944, p. 5 , McNaughton MSS. Dewey’s c a re fu l d ra ftin g  was w e ll-  known; he la te r  admitted th at fo r  the 1944 campaign he spent an hour o f  preparation fo r  every minute o f a c tu a l speaking tim e. T ranscript, Thomas E. Dewey Interview , p. 30, D ulles (O ral).
p o te n t ia lly  d iv is iv e  issu e  o f  in tern a tio n a l organ ization  
lie took a c h a r a c te r is t ic a lly  cautious l in e :  "There are only  
a few, a very fe w ,” he sa id , "who r e a l ly  b e liev e  th at America 
should remain a lo o f  from the world. There are only a r e la ­
t iv e  few who b e liev e  i t  would be p r a c tic a l fo r  America or 
her a l l i e s  to renounce a l l  sovereign ty  and Join a su p ersta te ."  
The Republican Party, he sa id , was firm ly  united  in  favour 
o f  in tern a tio n a l cooperation, but he added: the United 
S ta tes could not p lay i t s  part in  world a f fa ir s  u n less i t  
was strong, h ea lth y  and vigorous a t  hom e.^  And so , h is  a r ­
gument returned f u l l  c i r c le ,  back once more to  the Hew Deal, 
which was portrayed as d iv ided , quarrelsome and lacking in  
fa i t h  in  America's fu tu re , and to the Republican Party, 
w ith i t s  r is in g  leadersh ip  o f  young governors, exem plified  
by the young nominee h im se lf . 100
In the campaign i t s e l f ,  Republicans seemed agreed that 
in so fa r  as they could d ea l la r g e ly  w ith problems o f  peace, 
rath er than w ith  the conduct o f  war, they would p o l i t i c a l ly  
be on much sa fer  te r r ito r y . In ear ly  September, Herbert 
Brownell, Dewey's campaign manager, con fid en tly  predicted  
th a t the approach o f peace was one fa c to r  which would lead  
the country to  e le c t  the Republicans. They r e a liz e d , he sa id , 
th a t the G.O.P. would be b etter  ab le to cope w ith peace-tim e 
co n d itio n s . 101  Brownell's view , which was in  accord both
99New York Times, June 29th, 1944.
1 OOihis a n a ly s is  fo llow s very c lo se ly  that o f Frank McHaughton's report from Chicago to Time magazine; MoHaughton Report, "Overall Convention", June 29th, 1944, pp. 1-5 , McHaughton:MSS.
101  Hew York Times, September 2nd, 1944. See a lso  fo r  e a r l ie r ,  p r iv a te e x p r e ss io n  o f  same view, Herbert Brownell to Hoover, August, 17th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
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with opinion p o ll  f in d in g s , and with the stra teg y  which Dewey 
had revealed in  h is  acceptance speech a t  Chicago, was to be 
repeated during the campaign. Dewey, whose fa ith  in  opinion  
p o ll  .tech n iq u es was second to none, sought during the cam­
paign to try  to hammer home th at the American people were 
not being asked to .d ec id e  on basic questions o f  foreign  
p o licy  or the conduct o f  the war, but th at the next adm inis­
tr a t io n  would be la r g e ly  a peace time adm inistration; i t  f o l ­
lowed o f course, from Republican philosophy that a strong, 
productive America w ith fa ith  in  i t s e l f  was e s s e n t ia l  to an 
e f f e c t iv e  foreign  p o lic y . 1 0 2  In October, to a lla y  doubts 
about changing horses in  mid-stream, Dewey’s advisors l e t  
i t  be known that Dewey would wish Secretary o f State Cordell 
Hull to help  to maintain co n tin u ity  in  the conduct o f  foreign  
r e la t io n s  fo r  a period o f  time a f te r  Dewey's in au gu ration .1°3 
As part o f  the stra teg y  o f  removing the Republican 
P arty 's disadvantage over the war and fore ign  a f f a ir s ,  Dewey 
and D ulles n egotiated  w ith C ordell Hull a lim ited  b ipartisan
104agreement during the conference a t  Dumbarton Oaks in  August.
The agreement came a f te r  Dewey had in i t ia te d  an a ttack  on 
the conference, by re ferr in g  to rumours that i t  was planning 
to  su b ject a l l  the nations o f  the world to the four p a r t ic i ­
pants: the United S ta te s , Great B rita in , S oviet Union and 
This wasChina, p o s s ib ly  devised  in  order to Id e n tify  Dewey with the 10
10^See fo r  example speech a t P h iladelph ia , New York Times.September 8th , 1944. For Dewey's f a ith  in  opinion p o l ls ,  and e sp e c ia lly  In the work o f George Gallup, a Republican whose base o f  operations was in  Princeton, see Beyer, pp. 114-121. ] °?New York Times, October 9th , 1944.
1 0 4 £eyer, p.
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in te r e s ts  o f sm all n a tio n s, and as l ik e ly  to pay o f f  with  
P o lish , I ta lia n  and Greek Americans, Dewey eagerly  took the 
opportunity o f  gaining fu rth er  id e n t if ic a t io n  with ’In ter ­
n a tio n a l is s u e s '  by s e iz in g  on a remark by Cordell H ull at
in ordera press con ference/to  send John Poster D ulles as h is  repre­
sen ta tiv e  to  Washington to try  to so r t th ings o u t .1®^  prom 
the whole a f f a ir  Dewey and D ulles gained a great deal o f  
p u b lic ity ;  and in  the ensuing weeks, Dewey and h is  advisors  
were not slow to take cre d it  fo r  having taken the I n it ia t iv e  
in  try in g  to remove the question  o f  in tern a tio n a l organization  
from the p o l i t i c a l  arena. Herbert Brownell, fo r  example, 
claimed in  Chicago that Dewey had gained a great d ea l o f  
p op u larity  fo r  h is nonpartisan a tt itu d e  to in tern a tio n a l or­
g a n iza tio n ,a s  w e ll as fo r  h is  in s is te n c e  on keeping the 
American people informed on peace plans (a reference to the 
s e c r e t  nature o f  war-time diplom acy,including Dumbarton Oaks 
i t s e l f )  and fo r  h is  defence o f sm all nations and m in o r it ie s .10  ^
The la t t e r  was a point which was worth mentioning in  Chicago. 
Dewey h im self was not too modest to point out that ". . .1
have tak en .th e unprecedented a c tio n  o f  promoting the non-
107p artisan  character o f  the conferences now in  progress".
Whether the manoeuvre was t o t a l ly  su ccess fu l i s  doubtfu l.
The attempted rapprochement with W illk ie p rior to the meet­
in gs w ith Hull and D ulles proved a b ortive . He and•D ulles
105HU11 was asked by"Scotty"Reston i f  he would be w ill in g  to ta lk  th in gs over w ith Dewey, Report, August 17th, 1944, MeNaughton MSS.; New York Times. August 20th, 1944; R. A. D ivine, Second Chance, pp. 216-219.106flew York Times, September 2nd, 1944.,1°7 lb id . . September 9th , 1944.
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met,somewhat r e lu c ta n tly  on the part o f  W illk ie , who had. 
e a r l ie r  refused to meet Dewey and D ulles a t  Albany, and saw 
the meeting as a p lo t to a sso c ia te  h is  name w ith Dewey's 
candidacy. They d isagreed , however, over W illk ie 's  a sser tio n  
th a t the United S tates should seek to e s ta b lish  an in te r ­
n a tio n a l p o lic e  fo rce . In a public statem ent, W illk ie a lso  
rebuked Dewey fo r  h is  a ttack  on Dumbarton Oaks; he h im se lf, 
he sa id , had a lso  been concerned about the r ig h ts  o f  sm all 
n a tio n s, but had made a private enquiry about i t .  "I have 
been eq u ally  concerned," he added, "that there should not 
a r is e  among our A ll ie s  the notion  that our party would in  
any way obstruct or endanger the success o f  an in tern a tio n a l 
conference . ° 8  Therefore, in so fa r  as the move was intended  
to win over In te r n a tio n a lis t  op in ion , i t  fa i le d  because o f  
W illk ie 's  r e fu sa l to g ive h is  su p p ort.10^
At the same tim e, the meetings with W illk ie and with  
H ull, caused apprehension amongst the fr ien d s o f Herbert 
Hoover as w e ll as w ith other N a tio n a lis ts . Much o f  the d is ­
s a t is f a c t io n 1 came as a r e su lt  o f the fa c t  th at Dewey had 
made i t  c le a r  that he did not wish to  be id e n t if ie d  with  
Hoover during the campaign. One o f  Hoover's fr ien d s commented:
108New York Times, August 2 1 st, 1944; D ivine, Second Chance.
p. 218.
1 °9 w illk le  and D ulles put out a ^olnt statem ent which was s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  what i t  l e f t  out: "We have conferred ex­te n s iv e ly  about various in tern a tio n a l problems bearing on world organ ization  to assure la s t in g  peace. There was a f u l l  exchange o f  views not animated by partisan  con sid eration  or having to do with any candidacy but by the d esire  o f  both o f us th at the United S tates should play a con stru ctive  and resp on sib le  part in  assuring  world order. "''Joint Statement o f  Mr. W illk ie and Mr, D u lles, August 2 1 st, 1944, D ulles MSS (Supplement).
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"I think th at Dewey made a mistake in  kowtowing to W illkie  
and g iv in g  him an opportunity to refuse to confer w ith him 
a t Albany. . .w hile Dewey was eager to ta lk  with W illkie  
he did not seek Hoover's views on the secu r ity  program. I t  
i s  c lea r  he w i l l  have nothing to do with the C hief, and thus 
avoid g iv in g  substance to the Democratic charge that he i s  
running as another Hoover" . 1 1 0  In genera l, the N a tio n a lists  
were apprehensive o f the im p lica tion s o f too c lo se  t i e s  
w ith the A dm inistration. The Chicago Tribune gave public  
expression  to these concerns. W hilst applauding Dewey's 
a tta ck  on power p o l i t ic s  and secre t diplomacy, i t  c r i t ic iz e d  
h is  acceptance o f  in tern a tio n a l organ ization  and the Big Pour. 
The conference between Hull and D u lles, i t  sa id , ". . .p re ­
sages nothing b e n e f ic ia l fo r  America. Mr. H ull. . .represented  
the view s o f  the B r itish  fore ign  o f f i c e .  Mr. Dulles i s  the 
Impersonation o f the big dough o f  Wall S tr e e t" . 1 1 1  Senator 
Brooks o f  I l l i n o i s ,  a member o f  the fore ign  a f fa ir s  sub­
committee a t  the Chicago Convention, w h ils t  congratulating  
Dewey and D ulles fo r  th e ir  determ ination not to  enter any 
t r e a t ie s  designed to coerce m in orities  and sm all n a tion s, 
a lso  p u b lic ly  urged them to continue to maintain American 
sov ere ig n ty , c o n s t itu t io n a l p rocesses, and American m ilita ry
and economic strength  in  a l l  n eg o tia tio n s , as w ell as to
112demand more ou tly in g  bases. Senator T aft, too made i t
1 1 ° 0 ' lau gh lin  to Charles H ll le s ,  August 30th, 1944, O'Laughlin MSS.; Hugh Gibson to Hoover, August 18th, 1944, August 30th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
? 1 1  Chicago Tribune. August 18th, 1944; August 2 1 st, 1944. 
1 1 2 I b id .,  August 23rd, 1944. ,
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c lea r  th at w hile Republicans might agree "to the setup o f  
a v eh ic le  fo r  in tern a tio n a l cooperation", they were "not 
going to condone New Deal d iss ip a tio n  o f  American resources 
thru lo a n s, peacetime len d -lea se  and s im ila r  proposals from 
the White House".115
The d issen t o f  the N a tio n a lists  h igh ligh ted  the dilemmas 
o f the Republican campaign; i t  seemed to su b stan tia te  the 
Democratic argument that fo llow in g  the e lim in ation  o f  W illk ie. 
the ' i s o la t io n i s t '  Old Guard were in  the sad d le .^ 1^ R ep eated ly  
Democratic orators were to portray Dewey as a front man fo r  
the Old Guard, as a man o f youth and no s ig n if ic a n c e  beside  
the commander-in-chief. He i s ,  sa id  Senator Pepper, "a 42- 
year-o ld  boy who has never commanded anything but the N ational 
G u a r d " . A s  pa r t o f  the same theme, a tte n tio n  was focussed  
on Congress, and on men such as Senator Hiram Johnson, Rep­
resen ta tiv e  Joseph Martin and oth érs who would ex erc ise  power
1 1 ?Ib id ., August 2 5th , 1944.11^Senator Thomas o f Utah was quoted a t  the end o f  June as commenting, the "shoving o f  W illk ie in to  the background and bringing Herbert Hoover in to  the fron t means the Re­publican Party w i l l  remain the GOP o f  the Nineteen Tw enties"., New York Times, June 29th, 1944. Sidney Hillman o f the CIO described Dewey as the "mouthpiece o f  Herbert Hoover and the GOP Old Guard"., I b id .,  July 12th, 1944.115 lb ld . , October 11th, 1944. Dewey's convention speech in  which he put the emphasis on youth and dynamism by con­tr a s t  w ith a t ir e d  and worn out Adm inistration was an attempt to  n u l l i f y  th is  a n tic ip a ted  lin e  o f  a tta ck , Me Naughton Report, "Overall Convention", pp.,4-5, McNaughton MSS. An amateur ca rto o n ist sen t to  a Democratic Congressman in  May a cartoon d ep ictin g  a d im inutive, puzzled-looking  Dewey s i t t in g  round a conference ta b le  with S ta lin , Churchill and Chiang Eai Shek; the cartoon was meant to i l lu s t r a t e  "what happens to ' l i t t l e  boys' when they undertake to play  in tern a tio n a l p o l i t i c s  w ith masters in  the game". Jules  Schatzman to R epresentative John J. Cochran, May 11th,1944, w ith accompanying cartoon, Thomas E. Dewey f i l e ,  Democratic N ational Committee Library MSS.
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over fore ign  p o licy  le g is la t io n  should the Republicans win 
the e le c t io n ; and who i t  was assumed would provide a repe­
t i t i o n  o f 1920. The Democratic v ic e -p r e s id e n tia l nominee 
even ca lled  upon Dewey to oppose the r e -e le c t io n  o f e igh t  
' i s o la t io n i s t '  sen ators, including T aft. I f  he d o esn 't, sa id  
Truman, "the people must assume he i s  another Harding". 
R oosevelt, toward the end o f the campaign, in  Chicago, a lso  
s k i l l f u l l y  ra ised  doubts about the Republican Party's con­
v ersio n  from 'Iso la tio n ism '; the Republicans, he sa id , were 
claim ing to support new p o lic ie s  designed to bring about 
la s t in g  peace, "But," they whisper, " w e'll do i t  in  such a 
way th at we won't lo se  the support o f even Gerald Nye or 
Gerald Smith, and, and th is  i s  very important, we won't lo se
the support o f  any I s o la t io n is t  campaign contributor. Why
117we w i l l  be ab le to s a t is f y  even the Chicago Tribune".
At Minneapolis in  October, Dewey read out telegrams 
from Republican Congressional lead ers, White, Vandenberg, 
A ustin , T aft, Whery, Martin, supporting Dewey and backing 
up h is  plans fo r  world lead ersh ip . ^ 8 E a r lier , in  a le t t e r  
released  to the p ress , D ulles had w ritten  that on the b asis  
o f ta lk s  with Republican members o f the Foreign R elations  
Committee, he thought they would go a long way to back up a 
Republican P resident, "but I'm p retty  sk ep tica l as to what 
w il l  happen i f  Mr. R oosevelt i s  e le c te d , in  view o f the very  
bad r e la t io n s  which e x is t  between him and both houses of
11%ew York Times. October 24th, 1944. See a lso  speech by Franklin R oosevelt in  New York a t the Foreign P olicy  A ssocia tion , I b id .,  October 22nd, 1944.' ' ¿Ib id . . October 29th, 1944.
1 1 8 Ib ld . . October 25th, 1944.
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Congress".11  ^ D espite the e ffo r ts  o f the Congressional leaders 
to assure th e ir  support and D u lles' comment, the Dewey cam­
paign was on d i f f i c u l t  ground in  matters o f  foreign  p o lic y . 
Dewey h im self was convinced that R oosevelt had broken the 
b ip artisan  agreement by questioning Republican s in c e r ity  over 
in tern a tio n a l a f f a i r s . 1 2 0  U ltim ately  the Republicans could 
not g et away from the n egative foreign  p o licy  image. I f  
Dewey attacked Adm inistration foreign  p o licy  he would f a l l  
fo u l o f  the ' I n te r n a t io n a lis t s ' , ' who would come to see him 
as an ' I s o la t io n i s t ' .  I f  he sought too c lo se  an a sso c ia tio n  
w ith the A dm inistration, he would a lie n a te  the Old Guard as 
w e ll as f a i l  to g ive the party a d is t in c t iv e  image. For the 
most p art, the stra teg y  was to play down foreign  a f f a ir s .  
Taft, w ritin g  in  the New York Times Magazine. emphasized that 
apart from a few d e ta i ls ,  there were no major d ifferen ces  
between the p a rtie s  over foreign  a f fa ir s ;  the major d if f e r -  
en ces, he sa id , were in  domestic a f f a ir s .  ' This was in  
co n tra st to Senator Pepper, who was in v ited  to w rite the 
Democratic Party a r t ic le ;  "The Republican Party i s  the party 
o f b ig  business and is o la t io n . The Democratic Party i s  the - 
party o f the people and in tern a tio n a l co lla b o ra tio n . The 
sim ple question  to  be decided by the e lec to ra te  o f  the coun­
tr y  in  November i s ,  S h a ll the mistake made a t  the end o f  
World War I be repeated -  the Republican Party su b stitu ted  
in  power fo r  the Democratic Party and the United S tates se t  
again upon a course which led la s t  time to depression and 
war? " 1 22
1 1 fIb id . . October 9th, 1944.120Walter M il l i s ,  e d .. The F orresta l D iaries (New York;Viking Press, 1951). p. 332-4; T ranscript, Thomas E. Dewey Interview , pp. 13-14, D ulles (O ral).
121  New York Times Magazine, September 3rd, 1944.
1 2 2 IbTd~
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Dewey h im self seemed on far  happier ground when d is ­
cussing domestic a f fa ir s  and peace time problems. At times 
he seemed to be charging that the Democrats preferred war 
because they had no peace-tim e so lu tio n s: they were, he 
a lle g e d , a fra id  to re lea se  s o ld ie r s , because they could not 
provide Jobs. In a d d itio n , they proposed to "try to buy the 
good -w ill o f  the world out o f  the goods and labor o f the 
American people. They propose to buy fo r  them selves in te r ­
n a tio n a l power out o f our pocketbooks”; they wanted ”an 
AmericanWPA fo r  a l l  o f the rest o f  the world”. By con trast, 
the Republicans offered  th e ir  dynamic approach, centred in  
th e ir  domestic competence: they would by restor in g  fa ith  
in  America, by ‘ conduct and example, g ive leadership  and 
Im agination to a l l  the world”. The D ullesian  rh etoric  
was c le v e r , i t  synthesized  the g lob a l v is io n  o f  the In ter ­
n a t io n a lis t s  w ith the r e s tr ic t io n s  Imposed by the N ational­
i s t s '  unw illingness to use the p h ysica l resources o f  the 
United S ta tes fo r  g lob a l ends.
But u ltim a te ly  the issu es  o f  foreign  a f fa ir s  could not 
be avoided in  the way in  Which Dewey wished. The determina­
t io n  o f  the In te r n a tio n a lis ts , Republican, Democratic and 
Independent a l ik e ,  to  avoid what they saw as the tragedy  
o f  1920 was too strong. The New York Times announced i t s  
endorsement o f  R oosevelt in  October, la r g e ly  because i t  f e l t  
th at Dewey’s fa ilu r e  to stand up to  the ’i s o la t io n is t s '  had 
l e f t  doubts as to whether the 'in te rn a tio n a l' fa c tio n  was 
in  complete c o n tr o l .12  ^ Walter Lippmann, hardly a Wilsonian
^^Speeches at P h iladelph ia , September 7 th , and L o u isv ille ,  September 8th , New York Times. September 8th , 1944; Sep­tember 9th , 1944.
1 2 4Ib ld . ,  October 1 6 th , 1944.
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in te r n a t io n a lis t ,  was upset by an attack  by Dewey on the
Rumanian a rm istice , and endorsed Roosevelt because he f e l t
125Dewey was too inexperienced fo r  the n eg o tia tio n  o f peace. 
Lippmann's endorsement annoyed D u lles, e s p e c ia lly  because 
of Lippmann's comments on Dewey's a tt itu d e  to Poland and 
Rumania. D ulles concluded that Lippmann did not share th e ir  
b e l ie f  in  u n iversa l moral force; "you do not b e l ie v e ,” 
wrote D u lles, "that the United S ta tes  should have any p o l i ­
c ie s  a t  a l l  except in  r e la t io n  to areas where we can make 
those p o lic ie s  good through m aterial fo r c e ”. 12^
More damaging, however, was the d is a ffe c t io n  o f cer ta in  
Republicans, in clu d in g  Senator B a ll o f  Minnesota, a Stassen  < 
supporter, one o f  the B2H2 sen ators, who had in  fa c t  seconded 
Dewey's nomination a t Chicago. In September,- B all ca lled  
fo r  the d efeat o f  11  ' i s o la t io n i s t '  sen ators, e igh t o f whom 
were members o f  h is  own party. 1 Subsequently he expressed  
h is  u n w illin gn ess to support Dewey u n t i l  Dewey's a tt itu d e  to 
c e r ta in  foreign  p o licy  matters had been c le a r e d u p . In par­
t ic u la r  he wanted Dewey to make i t  c lea r  where he stood on 
the question  o f  whether the U. S. should Join an in tern a tio n a l 
organ ization  before the peace settlem en ts were reached. He 
a lso  wished to know h is  reaction  to the question o f  whether 
Congress should ex erc ise  a v ir tu a l veto over world secu r ity  
co u n cil d ec isio n s to meet a ggression .^ ®  In r a is in g  these  
i s s u e s ,  B all was ch allen gin g  head-on the Republican consensus.
125(jlipping from New York Herald Tribune. October 2 1 st, 1944, • Thomas E. Dewey f i le ,D e m o c r a t ic  N ational Committee Library ' MSS. : ' ' :12°D ulles to Walter Lippmann, October 22nd, 1944, D ulles MSS (Supplement).127New York Times. September 25th, 1944.
1 2 oib ld . . September 3° th , 1944; October 5th , 1944. D ivine, Second Chance, pp. 237-9.
-95-
Both Vandenberg and Hoover in  p a rticu la r  had urged that le s s  
a tten tio n  should be given to the structure o f in tern a tio n a l 
organ ization , and prime a tte n tio n  be given to the structure  
o f the peace; the consensus a lso  stood firm  on the American 
C on stitu tion , including the Congressional r ig h t to declare  
war. B all was, however, su sp iciou s o f both p o s it io n s , seein g  
them both as devices by which American membership o f  a new 
league might be prevented or watered down. U ltim ately , 
d esp ite  pressure from other I n te r n a tio n a lis ts , includ ing  
Henry lu ce , B all endorsed Franklin R oosevelt. To Luce he 
rep lied  th a t, although he was confident o f D u lles' v iew s, 
he did not know ex a ctly  where Dewey and h is  campaign manager, 
Herbert Brownell, stood, and he was extrem ely worried by the 
" stra ig h t is o la t io n is t"  appeals o f John Bricker and Everett 
Dirksen ( I l l i n o i s ) . 129
Added to the d is a ffe c t io n  o f  Senator B all was the fa c t  
th a t Wendell W illk ie died in  Hew York in  October leav in g  a 
q u estion  mark over whether he would have supported Dewey.
A number o f h is  supporters had already come over to Dewey, 
but a number s t i l l  held  out, adding to doubts about Dewey's 
' in te r n a t io n a lis t '  c re d e n tia ls . In C aliforn ia  and Hew York, 
Republican organ izations fo r  R oosevelt were organized by 
former W illk ie supporters. In Hew York the Independent Re­
publican Committee was chaired by W illk ie 's  old  a s so c ia te ,  
R u sse ll Davenport, who was openly c r i t i c a l  o f  Dewey and cast 
doubts on h is  a b i l i t y  to d ea l w ith in tern a tio n a l s i t u a t io n s .150
12^Henry R. Luce to Joseph H. B a ll, October 2 1 st, 1944; Joseph B all to Henry R. Luce, October 23rd, 194-4; cop ies in  D ulles MSS (Supplem ent)..^O^dyertisem ent in  Hew York Times. October 24th, 1944; Ib id . . Hovember 7 th , 1945T
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Faced w ith  the d efec tio n  o f B all and other In tern ation ­
a l i s t s ,  Dewey h it  back in  B a ll's  home s ta te  towards the end 
o f October, 1944. Repudiating the la b e l o f  iso la tio n ism , 
which the Democrats were pinning on the Republicans, he re ­
c a lle d  the three "great" Republican se c re ta r ie s  o f s ta te  o f 
the 1920*s j  Hughes, Kellogg and Stimson, and reminded h is  
audience th at in  1933 R oosevelt had in h erited  a p eacefu l 
world s itu a t io n . In the 1930's, sa id  Dewey, the in tern a tio n a l  
cooperation o f  the 1 9 2 0 's  was eroded, p a rtly  because o f  the 
p o lic ie s  o f the United S ta te s , e sp e c ia lly  R oosevelt's  sc u t­
t l in g  o f  the 1933 London Economic Conference, which Dewey 
described  as "the most com pletely i s o la t io n is t  a c tio n  ever 
taken by an American President in  our 150 years o f h i s ­
t o r y " .^  "I thought Dewey's speech in  Minneapolis was a 
winning speech -  perhaps the winning speech." wrote Henry 
Luce to  D u lle s . 1 ^2 The New York Times. however, was unimpressed: 
Mr. Dewey was now try in g  to prove that "the people whom he 
used to c a l l  nth e 'in te r v e n t io n is t s ’1, u. . .have been the
isolationists all along".^3
In the course o f the campaign, Dewey had clung ten aciou sly  
to  the middle ground developed by Hoover, Vandenberg and 
D u lle s . Prepared to c o n c ilia te  the I n te r n a t io n a lis t s , he 
was not prepared to make the w holesale repudiation o f  h is  
P arty's tr a d it io n s , and.many o f  h is  Party's candidates, which 
many o f  the In te r n a tio n a lis ts  appeared to want. Although he; 
lo s t  the e le c t io n , i t  i s  doubtful whether other ta c t ic s
1 ? !Ib id . .  October 25th, 1944.
1 32Henry R. Luce to John Foster D u lles, October 25th, 1944, D ulles MSS (Supplement).133new York Times. October 26th, 1944.
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would have won. I t .  Taft a t le a s t ,  although not enamoured 
o f Dewey, and d is tre ssed  a t  fin d in g  that there was "too 
much Dew York atmosphere around headquarters" and th at Her­
bert Brownell did not know "much about n a tion a l p o lit ic s "  
was s t i l l  not disposed to blame Dewey fo r  d efea t. In 1944 
he f e l t ,  w ith  many o th ers, th at the commander-in-chief was 
u n b eatab le .1^  Some o f  the Old Guard d isagreed. Herbert 
Hoover f e l t  th at the e le c t io n  could have been won w ith d i f ­
feren t is su e s  and t a c t ic s .  Having seen the e le c t io n  as a 
t e s t  as to "whether the American people are going down the 
world-wide s lid e  to the le f t " ,  he could derive "some sad 
co n so la tio n  th at the New Deal w i l l  have to take the bumps 
fo r  4 years". "We do need fo r  our younger Republicans to stop  
f ig h t in g  th e ir  e ld ers ,"  he wrote to A lf Landon.155 ihe Chicago 
Tribune not su rp r is in g ly  blamed Dewey’s d efeat on h is  having 
fa i le d  to a ttack  R oosevelt's  foreign  p o lic y . 1^  Jou rn a list  
Arthur Krock, whose Republican sympathies were no s e c r e t ,  
a lso  f e l t  that Dewey could have won by exposing the fa c t  
th a t the A dm inistration had no foreign  p o l i c y .1-^
I f  the Old Guard were unhappy w ith the Dewey campaign, 
eastern  Republicans took an opposing view . The Dew York 
Herald Tribune f e l t  th a t many Republicans had been a m il l­
stone round Dewey's neck in  fo re ig n  a f f a ir s ,  and that the
1 3^Datterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 270-2, 283; R. A. Taft to  Henry P. F letch er, henry Prather F letcher MSS., July 27th, 1944, Ohio S tate H is to r ic a l S o c ie ty , Columbus, Ohio. 135goover to John Cowles, October 10th, 1944; Hoover to A lfred  Landon, November 14th, 1944; Hoover to-M rs. Adele Smith, January 17th, 1945; Hoover MSS. ;
1 3ochlcago Tribune, November 11th , 1944.
1 37charles H ille s  to O 'laughlin , November 13th, 1944,0 ' lau gh lin  MSS.
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Party had not shown i t s e l f  in  a very good l ig h t  in  the con­
fu sion  th at had surrounded i t s  foreign  p o licy  plank a t Chi­
cago . 1 38 The Dewey entourage were reported as f e e l in g  the 
same way, but took some pride in  the fa c t  th at the Party 
was more united  than fo r  many years. Some o f  the most ; 
'o b s tr u c t io n is t 1 members o f  Congress had been defeated , w h ilst 
the Congressional leadersh ip  had endorsed Dewey's foreign  
p o lic y  leadership.159 John Foster D ulles was not surprised  
by d efea t and was g r a t if ie d  that they had esta b lish ed  an 
important precedent in  keeping the issu e  o f in tern a tio n a l  
organ ization  la r g e ly  out o f  the e le c t io n . 1 ^ 0
Arthur Vandenberg had played v ir tu a lly  no part in  the 
campaign, but a t  le a s t  had been consu lted , and did not share 
the outrage which many, o ld er  Republicans f e l t  about not hav­
in g  been c a lle d  upon. D espite h is  agreement that the cam­
paign had been "too fa r  to the le f t " ,  and h is  lack  o f per­
sonal warmth fo r  " l i t t l e  Tom", he f e l t  th at Republicans must 
continue to be co n stru ctiv e , not n e g a t i v e .A l t h o u g h  a 
fundam entalist by con v ic tio n , Vandenberg was pragmatic enough 
to  trim  h is  s a i l s  to the wind; he could see no p o l i t i c a l  or 
any kind o f future in  negative t a c t ic s .  Many o f the Old 
Guard d issen ted  from Vandenberg. Hoover could fin d  comfort 
only in  the campaign o f  v ic e -p r e s id e n t ia l nominee, John
1 38ffew York Herald Tribune. November 9th , 1944.139uew York Times. November 9th , 1944. Senators Danaher (Conn.)and Nye (North Dakota) had lo s t  th e ir  s e a ts , as had Repre- : sen ta tiv e  Hamilton Fish o f  New York. Arthur Kroek noted  th at o f  the 1 4  o r ig in a l opponents up fo r  r e -e le c t io n  to the Senate, only 5 were r e -e le c te d , and Senator Taft only  narrowly so . Ib id . » November 10th, 1944.HOjokn Foster D ulles to A llen  W. D u lles, December 20th , 1948; D ulles MSS. ;'41Vandenberg to  S. R. Banyon, December 4 th , 1944; Vandenberg to James H. Sheppard, January 2nd, 1945; Vandenberg MSS.
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B riefer, who lie f e l t  "saved, a much worse d efeat" . "There 
Is  much to do," he wrote to B riefer , " if  we are to save the 
country . " 1 ^ 2
W hilst in  the campaign afterm ath the Chicago Tribune 
was leading Dewey out o f  the party, Senator Wherry o f  Nebraska 
p u b lic ly  c a lle d  fo r  Herbert Brownell to res ig n  as N ational 
Chairman, or to devote a l l  h is  time to the job. Like other  
Senators, in clu d in g  probably Taft and Vandenberg, he wanted 
a fu ll- t im e  chairman who was not regarded as the devotee o f  
any p a rticu la r  p r e s id e n tia l a s p ir a n t .1^  in  December, Dewey 
in v ite d  T aft, Vandenberg, Wherry and White, and three House 
lea d ers , to h is  New York apartment to  try  to get agreement
on a statem ent o f  party p r in c ip le s  to be issu ed  in  advanceaddresso f the S tate o f the Unioni Congressional leaders were, how­
ever, as r e s is ta n t  to Dewey's leadership  as they had been 
to W l l l k i e . T h e  Old Guard were c le a r ly  not in c lin ed  to 
b e liev e  Dewey's d en ia l o f  P resid en tia l a m b ition s.1^5
In the afterm ath o f  the 1944 e le c t io n , news from over­
seas seemed to suggest th at the b ip artisan sh ip  developed  
during 1944 had been a m istake. Controversies between the 
a l l i e s  over I ta ly , Greece and Poland, not to mention a m il i ­
ta ry  reverse on the western fr o n t, revealed  th at the d i f f i ­
c u lt ie s  which Hoover in  p a rticu la r  had long predicted  were
1 ^ H oover to John W. Bricker, November 8th , 1944; Hoover MSS.l4 3 chlcago Tribune. December 20th, 1944. See a lso  New York Times. December 17th, 1944.l44sest account o f  the meeting o f Congressional leaders w ith  Dewey i s  in  Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 126-7; see a lso  New York Herald Tribune. December 22nd, 1944; December 25th, 19^4; McNaughton Keport, December 29th, 1944, McNaughton MSS.145"i4y p red ic tio n  i s  th a t Dewey w i l l  not re lea se  the re in s ,"  wrote Charles H ille s  to O’Laughlin, December 26th, 1944,0 'Laughlin MSS.
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not to be e a s i ly  surmounted.146 In tern ation a l developments 
then tended to d isc r e d it  the d irec tio n  o f Republican lead er­
ship in  1944. The Chicago Tribune commented in  the New Year 
"Mr. R oosevelt's  vaunted fore ign  p o licy  carried  him only as 
fa r  as the p o lls  and then blew up. Poland and Greece demon­
stra ted  i t s  emptiness and fraud. The Republican opposition  
in  Congress should be making p o l i t i c a l  c a p ita l o f  t h is ,  but 
the m ajority o f the Republican members are s t i l l  cowed and 
bewildered by the beating they took a t the hand o f  th e ir  own 
P resid en tia l cand idate" .147 Welcoming the re fu sa l o f Congres­
s io n a l leaders in  December to s ig n  Dewey's proposed p o licy  
d ec la ra tio n , the Tribune had commented, "It i s  no answer to 
say on Mr. Dewey's behalf that he d id n 't know th at Europe 
was to  be d ivided  in to  spheres o f  in flu e n c e . Shrewder and 
more experienced observers than he i s  to ld  him what was the 
making and he rejected  th e ir  inform ation and th e ir  ad vice .
He cannot expect them to have any more use fo r  him as a 
le a d e r " .148 Even a s e lf -c o n fe sse d  In te r n a tio n a lis t  such as 
Raymond B u ell was looking in  the p o s t-e le c t io n  clim ate fo r  
a move away from nonpartisanship towards the development o f  
a d is t in c t iv e  and con stru ctive  "party a ttitu d e"  to fore ign  
as w e ll as domestic is s u e s , though i t  i s  u n lik e ly  th at he 
would have found'much agreement w ith those o f  the Tribune * s 
p ersu a sio n .149 A ll conservatives could see a f te r  the e le c t io n
" ^ J o u rn a lis t  David Iawrence suggested th at in  view o f these  developments, Dewey was lucky he had lo s t .  New York Times. December 23rd, 1944.
1 47Chicago Tribune. January 6th , 1945.14olb ld . 7 December 27th, 1944.l49Raymond 1 . B uell to Frederick E. Baker, December 15th,1944, copy in  Alexander Smith MSS.
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was a world which, the United S tates included , was steadily- 
moving to  the l e f t .  150 Herbert Hoover, who saw the only- 
sa lv a tio n  fo r  the United S tates and the world in  the opposite  
d ir e c tio n , was "considerably in  the dumps", seein g  "no is lan d  
o f sa fe ty  in  the world" and fea r in g  th at "we s h a ll  edge fu r­
th er in to  a c o l l e c t i v i s t  system in  th is  next four years".
His hopes were pinned, " if  th is  country is , to be saved", on 
a " co a litio n  o f  the conservative fo r c e s " . ^ - 1
In many ways then, the 194-4- e le c t io n  had been a turning  
p o in t. Up to the 194-4 e le c t io n , the main impetus o f the 
R a tio n a lis ts  had been to d efeat W illk ie and to check what 
they  considered the t o t a l ly  u n r e a lis t ic  d esires  o f the In ter ­
n a t io n a lis t s  fo r  th e ir  "world s ta te " . By the end o f  1944, 
the debate was beginning to change, away from m echanistic  
in te r n a tio n a l organ ization s, to the stru ctu re o f the peace.
In the Republican Party, 1944 had seen the emergence o f  the 
pragm atists, Yandenberg, Dewey and D u lles, who were concerned 
to  forge party u n ity  and to develop the common ground between 
eastern  and midwestern Republicanism .152 D espite t h is ,  however, 
the stren gth  o f  the R a tio n a lists  had been revealed during 
the campaign, and in  the afterm ath in  the blunt re jec tio n  
o f Dewey's attempt to define a coherent party programme.
The e s s e n t ia ls  o f  the R a tio n a list  p o s it io n  had been protected
150«. . .we, w ith England, are about the la s t  bulwark aga in st a communistic s ta te .  And I'm not so sure o f  e ith e r ."  Prank C. Eage to  Harry C. Butcher, Rovember 18th, 1944, Harry C. Butcher MSS., Eisenhower Library, A bilene, Kansas.¡51 Hoover to Homer B. Mann, Rovember 20th, 1944, Hoover MSS.'52Rote that to Hoover's reg ret, Taft declin ed  to take a sea t  on the Foreign R elations Committee. Hoover to Robert T aft, December 12th, 1944; R. A. Taft to Hoover, December I4t^ 1944, Hoover MSS.
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“by the Chicago platform , p a rtly  as a r e s u lt  o f  the spokes- 
manship o f Arthur Vandenberg. Yandenberg h im self had so fe r  
done nothing to  cause rev is io n  o f h is  image as an unremark­
a b le , sm all-town, midwestem Republican, extrem ely s e n s it iv e  
to  the in te r e s ts  o f  the United S tates amidst a l l  the Utopian­
ism o f 194-3-1944. He had, however, forged the beginnings 
o f  a r e la tio n sh ip  with John Poster D u lles, which was to be 
a cen tra l featu re o f  Republican leadersh ip  in  the immediate 
post-war years.
-1 0 3 -
CHAPTER THREE
"A Strong America” and a Multilateral Peace
A u se fu l and much-used r h e to r ic a l phrase which affords  
In sigh t in to  the Republican consensus on foreign  a f fa ir s  
i s  th at o f  "A Strong America". The phrase was a kind o f  
p o l i t i c a l  code-word, used by those who wished to affirm  
that they were not In te r n a tio n a lis ts  (or "One Worlders" <r 
New D ealers) who wished to "give America away". "A Strong 
America" was, th erefo re , a code-word fo r  the N a tio n a list  
p o s it io n . I t  was used by those who fo r  the most part took 
as th e ir  basic premise the b e l ie f  th at the United S tates  
could b est serve the world by m aintaining the fundamentals 
o f the American p o litica l-eco n o m ic  system; that th is  system  
was superior was unquestioned, as was the unanimous agree*  
ment th at i t  had been weakened by the New Deal. To Nation­
a l i s t s ,  Henry W allace's c a l l  fo r  the in te r n a tio n a liz a tio n  
o f  the New Deal, o ften  referred  to s a r c a s t ic a l ly  as the 
estab lishm ent o f  an " in tern ation a l W.P.A.", could serve 
no u se fu l purpose, and would in  fa c t  weaken the e s s e n t ia l  
fa b r ic  o f  American l i f e  s t i l l  fu r th er . 1 Before the United 
S tates could save the world, so the argument ran, i t  had
1 Henry W allace, the Republican bogeyman, who m istakenly  was taken to be the spokesman fo r  the New Deal, in  the view o f Markowitz put h is  f a i t h  in  "the union o f an ex­panding progressive American cap ita lism  with a world so ­c ia l  r ev o lu tio n ." , (p. 5 6 ). Others have seen Wallace as a more tra d ito n a l advocate o f American expansion over­seas through promotion o f  the "Open Door"; Ronald Radosh and Leonard P. L iggio , "Henry A. Wallace and the Open Door" in  Thomas G. Paterson, e d ., CoId War C r lt lc s i A ltern atives to American Foreign P o licy  in the Truman Years (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971).
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f i r s t  to put i t s  own house in  order, by resto r in g  i t s  
system to tru ly  American p r in c ip le s , which alone could
be the b asis  fo r  a healthy system , a t home and overseas.
Thomas Dewey, in  h is  u n su ccessfu l P resid en tia l campaign 
in  1944, had pressed the same theme. ^  In h is  major p o licy  
speech a t  L o u isv ille , Kentucky, for  example, he had ca lled  
fo r  a renewal o f fa ith  in  America, and fo r  an*end to the 
1 2  years o f defeatism  which he saw as ch aracteriz in g  the 
New Deal: "Good-will cannot be bought w ith gold . I t  
flow s to the man who su c c e ss fu lly  manages h is  own a f fa ir s ,  
who i s  s e l f - r e l ia n t  and independent, y e t who i s  in tere sted  
in  the r ig h ts  and needs o f  o th ers."  "We s h a ll  want to 
h elp ,"  he continued, ", . .we w i l l  seek to work out condi­
tio n s  th at w i l l  lead to an ever-w ider exchange o f  goods 
and se r v ic e s  without in jury to our own people. We look  
toward a more general access to the raw m aterials o f the 
world as to an ever-w idening opportunity fo r  a l l  to c o n tr i­
bute most e f f e c t iv e ly  th e ir  best to the production o f the 
goods needed by a l l ."  But having affirm ed h is  basic p rin ­
c ip le s ,  h is  b e l ie f  in  independence, s e lf - r e l ia n c e  and help  
fo r  o th ers , and h is  b e l ie f  in  world economic expansion, 
he returned to the core theme:
2
^Hoover was the most co n sis ten t a r t ic u la to r  o f th is  th e s is ;  in  h is  view , world peace could only be assured i f  the United States committed I t s e l f  to economic freedom both a t  home and overseas; Hoover and Gibson, pp. 298-9.5In 1940 he had in  h is  f i r s t  attempt a t  the nomination em­phasized the importance o f  America remaining stron g, eco­nom ically and d e fen s iv e ly , and had opposed in terven tion  in  the war; Beyer, pp. 421-2. Whether he thought through the economic im p lica tion s o f the Nazi conquest i s  unclear; p o ssib ly , as in  D u lle s ’ ca se , he saw " iso la tion "  as a tem­porary expedient.
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"Beyond th a t, we know th at we s h a ll  be ab le to help  In keeping th is  long peace we pray fo r , only  i f  we are strong a t home. We can no more separate  our armies in  the world from our domestic a f fa ir s  than our armies can f ig h t  without our production  a t  home. I f  we a t  home are to be torn by in te r ­n a l s tr id e ;  i f  we are to havesleaders who s e t  groups o f  Americans aga in st other groups o f Americans; i f  we are to be governed by the philosophy that America i s  overb u ilt and i s  done; i f  we cease to  be a land o f opportunity fo r  our own people, then we s h a ll  f a i l  both a t  home and abroad."
To th is  he had added the charge th at the New Deal, a fra id
o f peace and the unemployment th at i t  a n tic ip a ted , pre-
ferred  to keep men in  the armed forces a f te r  the war.
I t  i s  p o ssib le  that by 1944 Dewey h im self had changed h is
views on fore ign  a f fa ir s  a great deal from h is  1940 advo-
5cacy o f  a "Strong America". As a pragm atist, however, , 
in  a Party in  which the N a tio n a lis ts  were dominant, h is  
rh eto r ic  was understandable even i f  h is  view o f the Ad­
m in istra tio n  was not t o t a l ly  p la u sib le : the conservative  
d ir e c to r  o f  the O ffice o f  War M obilization , James Byrnes, 
chided th at some people "talk as i f  i t  were more Important 
to  put an end to the New Deal than to put an end to the
For purposes o f  a n a ly s is , the concept o f  "A Strong 
America" may be subdivided in to  four components: 1) p rotec­
t io n  o f  the American C on stitu tion , i i ) p rotection  o f American
^New York Times, September 9th , 1944.^In la te r  years, Dewey claimed that he and Dulles had fewer adaptations to make in  th e ir  p o sitio n  than most, tra n scr ip t, ¿in terview  w ith Thomas E. Dewey, p. 51» D ulles (O ral).“New York Times. October 3 1 st , 1944.
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se c u r ity , i l l )  p rotection  o f  the American s o c ia l  and eco­
nomic system , iv )  p rotection  o f American moral In te g r ity .
A ll were con stra in ts which had to he borne in  mind, e s p e c ia lly  
in  the f in a l  year o f  the war, by those concerned with de­
velop ing Republican p o lic y . The f i r s t  three con stra in ts  
were domestic in  o r ien ta tio n , and r e f le c te d  the deep Ration­
a l i s t  concern that the United S tates should not in  i t s  
fo re ig n  r e la tio n s  im peril any o f the e s s e n t ia ls  o f  freedom 
a t  home. Thus, sh o r tly  before the San Francisco Conference 
e s ta b lish in g  the United Rations in  194-5, a midwestern con­
gressman wrote to Vandenberg o f the need to ensure four 
foundations o f  peace: I -  American secu r ity  must be s a fe ­
guarded; II  -  American solvency must be preserved; I I I  -  
American "sovereignty" must be safeguarded; "should we 
lo se  our id e n t ity  as a Ration, we lo se  our opportunity for  
world leadership"; IV -democratic processes must be pre- 
serv ed .' A Pennsylvania R ational Committeeman put i t  even 
more sim ply in  o ffe r in g  a fo o l proof guide to both domestic 
and fo re ig n  p o licy  form ulation: "Is i t  c o n s titu tio n a l  
and can the nation  afford  i t ?  The essence of Republican 
co n v ic tio n  on a n a tio n a l p o lic ie s  i s  expressed in  these two 
q u estio n s. What runs counter to them are proposals which 
the Republican Party cannot accep t, however a ttr a c t iv e
Othey may seem". The fourth  con stra in t was one which 
the R a tio n a lis ts  could to a large degree share with the
oKarl E. Mundt to Vandenberg, A pril 3rd, 194-5, Vandenberg MSS. °G. Mason Owlett, speaking a t reg ion a l conference o f Repub­lic a n  R ational Committeemen from Rew England and Middle A tla n tic  S ta tes; Rew York Times. June 19th, 194-5.
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In te r n a tio n a lis ts :  th at in  i t s  ex tern a l dealings the 
United S tates should operate w ith in  a moral code o f  be­
haviour, based on the perception o f  the United S ta tes as 
a b astion  o f  l ib e r ty . In the eyes o f  Republican lead ers, 
Franklin R oosevelt had offended a l l  the precepts o f "A 
Strong America". He had spread American resources around 
the g lob e, he had ridden rough-shod over the C onstitu tion  
by undermining the d iv is io n  o f powers, and e sp e c ia lly  by 
the use o f personal diplomacy and executive agreement, and 
he had not revealed  s u f f ic ie n t  concern e ith e r  fo r  the fun­
damentals o f  American se c u r ity , or fo r  the establishm ent 
o f  a world based on American moral p r in c ip le s . "I do not 
know why we must be the only s i l e n t  partner in  th is  grand 
a llia n c e "  Vandenberg to ld  the Senate in  the speech in  
January, 1945, that was to be taken by the press as s ig n a l-
Ql in g  an end to h is  " iso lation ism " . The assumptions behind 
Vandenberg's c r itiq u e  o f  R oosevelt were recognizably those 
o f  the R a tio n a lis ts :  u n fa ir ly  or n o t, R oosevelt was not 
seen  as a man who would put American in te r e s ts  and moral 
p r in c ip le s  f i r s t .
The 1944 platform , so la rg e ly  the work o f Vandenberg, 
b u ild in g  on h is  Mackinac triumph, contained a l l  the fun­
damentals im p lic it  in  "A Strong A m erica".^
^Congressional Record . 91, January 10th, 1945, p. 16 5 . lu Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, N ational Party Platforms 1840-1964.(Urbana: U n iversity  o f I l l i n o i s .  1966). PP. 407-13. *
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Thus Republicans committed themselves to fight the 
war firstly for American security and welfare, secondly 
in order to render the Axis powers Impotent, and thlrdly 
to attain "Peace and freedom based on justice and. security".
It is unlikely that the order was accidental. To emphasize 
primacy of self-interest, the section on general foreign 
policy aims concluded with a re-iteration of the first 
proposition - "We shall at all times protect the essen­
tial interests and resources of the United States". The 
section on national security reflected similarly careful 
drafting: Republicans would maintain adequâtè military 
strength to defend the United States, its possessions, and
the Monroe Doctrine, as well as meeting any further mill-
11 *tary commitments "determined by Congress".
References to protection of both sovereignty and the 
Constitution were scattered through the platform. Repub­
licans would (contra P.D.R.) keep the American people in­
formed of all agreements with foreign powers, and would sus- 
tain the treaty-making power of the Senate. Vandenberg's 
disclaimer of any Intention to ;]oin "A World State" was 
included, and the platform recommended that peace and security 
be attained through the use of public opinion, re-
lllbld., pp. 407-8.1^ Ibld.. p. 407. The section on domestic affairs similarly 
committed Republicans to a reversal of the centralization 
of power in the Presidency which, if continued, would 
make the United States "a Republic only in name", (p. 408)
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c ip ro ca l s p ir itu a l  values and in tern a tio n a l law. Such 
means posed no th reat to the C on stitu tion , American se c u t ity , 
or i t s  economy, they were in  sh ort, compatible w ith tr a ­
d it io n a l reservation s about extern al commitments.
Economically the Republicans committed them selves to 
sound fin an cing  as a fundamental: in te r n a lly  and ex ter ­
n a lly  they would cut out the waste and in e f f ic ie n c y  o f  
the New Deal. They were prepared to advance emergency 
r e l i e f ,  and cred its  to  enable foreign  countries to buy 
American goods so as to bring about th e ir  own economic r e ­
v iv a l;  they were prepared to try  to bring about the r e ­
moval o f  trade b arriers, "always remembering th at i t s  p r i­
mary o b lig a tio n . . . i s  to our own workers, our own farmers, 
and our own industry . . Committed then to a re s to ra ­
t io n  o f  the United S tates to a time when government took 
le s s  in  taxes and balanced i t s  budget, i t  was lo g ic a l  
th a t they should in s i s t  th at fore ign  p o licy  should be 
based on the same p r in c ip le s . Governmental expenditure 
overseas they saw as l ik e ly  in  the long run to be a cure 
worse than the d ise a se , in  so fa r  as i t  would weaken the 
s o c ia l  fa b r ic  both o f  the benefactors and o f  the United 
S ta tes  i t s e l f .
The commitment to moral p r in c ip les  was not stressed  in  
the platform  as much as in  the Convention by Herbert Hoover: 
the main fu n ction  o f , the platform  was to a ct as a r e s tra in t  
on utopian In tern ation alism  by a rea sser tio n  o f  tr a d it io n a l  
co n stra in ts on p o lic y . The commitment to a l ib e r a l  world 
order was, however, a part o f  the tr a d it io n , and on th is
1 3 Ib ld . . pp. 408, 411, 413.
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note the 194-4- platform  had ended: "The e s s e n t ia l  question ,"
I t  sa id , a t  home and overseas, was "whether men can organize
togeth er in  a h igh ly  in d u str ia liz e d  s o c ie ty , succeed, and
s t i l l  he free" . The party o f  Lincoln, th erefore , "when
moral values are being crushed on every s id e ,"  pledged
i t s e l f  "to uphold with a l l  our stren gth  the B i l l  o f R ights,
the C on stitu tion  and the law o f the land. We so pledge
ourselves that the American tra d itio n  may stand forever
14as the beacon l ig h t  o f  c iv i l iz a t io n ."
The Administration and a Multilateral Peace
W hilst Republican leaders were developing a consensus 
based on the concept o f "A Strong America", the Adminis­
tr a t io n , or a t le a s t  the S tate and Treasury Departments,
were engaged in  more d eta iled  planning for  the post-war 
1 5world. The e s s e n t ia ls  o f the peace for  which the Admin
l^ Ib id . ,  p. 413.i:5Day to day r e la tio n s  w ith foreign  governments were con­ducted la r g e ly  by R oosevelt. Dean Acheson was la te r  to argue th at the d iv is io n  between diplim acy and post-war planning l e f t  Cordell H ull, Secretary o f S ta te , "absorbed in  p la ton ic  planning o f  a u top ia , in  a so r t  o f m echanistic id ea lism ". Dean Acheson, Present a t  the Creation (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p. 6 8 . Acheson's judgement seems rath er harsh: the planning o f  H ull and others took place  on the b asis o f  w idely accepted "lessons" drawn from previous experience o f  World War which taught i )  th at  the United S tates had been unprepared a t  V ersa ille s ;  i i )  th at i t  had been a ser iou s mistake not to jo in  the League o f  Mations; i i i )  th a t the major cause o f  the break­down o f  the peace constructed a t V ersa ille s  was economic; Richard N. Gardner, S te r lin g - D ollar Diplomacy: Anglo-  American C ollaboration in  the R econstruction o f M ulti-  lateral~~Trade (Oxford: cTarendon Press, i $56), p. 4 .
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is tr a t io n  planned were no d if fe r e n t  from those which Re­
publican leaders wished to see e sta b lish ed . The aim was 
a l ib e r a l  world, based on the Four Freedoms o f June, 194-1, 
and on the more d e ta iled  p rovisions o f  the A tlan tic  Charter. 
The term o ften  used to describe the world order aimed a t ,  
i s  that o f  m u ltila ter ia lism ; used more o ften  in  the eco­
nomic than in  the p o l i t i c a l  con tex t, the term in  i t s  simp­
l e s t  suggested a worldjn which d ec ision s would be taken 
by nations in  concert, rather than by the development o f  
lim ited  a ll ia n c e s  and agreements (b ila tera lism ) or by u n i­
la te r a l  a c tio n . Such a concept meant that the United S tates  
would be required to surrender a degree o f freedom o f  a c ­
t io n , although i t  would remain e a s ily  the stron gest and 
most in f lu e n t ia l  power in  the world. Most Adm inistration  
c r i t i c s  could concede that such a  world order would bene­
f i t  a l l  the world, in clu d in g the United S ta tes; d i f f ic u l t y  
however stemmed from reservation s as to i t s  p r a c t ic a b il i ty ,  
and from the s a c r if ic e s  which would have to be made by the 
United S ta tes in  order to try  to bring i t  about.
The cornerstone o f  American planning was the proposed 
new In tern a tio n a l orgainzation , which, though Franklin Roose­
v e l t  was u n en th u siastic  about i t ,  had formed the basis of 
planning even before Pearl Harbor.1  ^ By the end o f 194-3,
1^See Ruth B. R u sse ll, A H istory o f the United RationsCharter: The Role o f the United States~1946-194-5 (Washington D .C .: Brookings I n s t itu t io n , 195S77 R oosevelt personally  put more fa ith  in  the concept o f  the ’4 policem en', D ivine, R oosevelt and World War I I ,  p. 65; i t  i s  u n lik e ly  however th at he had any c le a r ly  cTefined view o f the nature o f  the peace he expected to emerge, any more than he had had in  terms o f domestic p o licy  in  1932.
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as a result of public pressure, Congress had declared In 
favour of membership in such an organization through the 
Fulbright and Connally resolutions, whilst the Republicans 
had made a nod towards the concept at Mackinac, and Stalin 
had given his assent to it at Teheran. At Dumbarton Oaks 
in the summer of 1944, a series of meetings between the 
United States, Britain, the U.S.S.R. and China secured 
basic agreement on the structure of the international or­
ganization, but left unresolved the question of voting pro-
17cedure in the Security Council. Subsequent discussion 
in 1945 at Yalta and San Francisco preserved the unanimity 
rule in cases of United Nations action, but blocked a Soviet 
attempt to require it also prior to discussion of threats 
to the peace. A blend of the idealistic and practical, 
the United Nations retained the essentials of American 
sovereignty, whilst at the same time it afforded a poten­
tially useful instrument for the attainment of a liberal 
world. At the very least, the United Nations could not 
weaken American attempts to attain a liberal world order, 
and it was a less costly instrument than unilateral force, 
economic loans, or political and military alliances.
Scarcely less important than the United Nations were
the proposals for post-war economic order developed by the
1 ftTreasury Department. Under this planning, international
^For background to public discussion on post-war inter­
national organization, see Divine, Second Chance, passim. 
1°R. N. Gardner argues that the "exaggerated emphasis on 
economic policy" was a sympton of the unreality of post­
war planning; he does, however recognize the fundamental 
importance in Cordell Hull's philosophy of the belief that 
trade expansion was necessary to avert war, and also of 
the Importance which Treasury Department planners assigned 
to it from the standpoint of American economic Interests; 
(pp. 8-12). Recent writers have seen the emphasis on
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institutions were designed to preside over a world in which 
barriers to trade and to exchange and convertibility of 
currencies would be reduced to a minimum, and in which all 
such barriers should be non-discriminatory. Such a world, 
it was argued, would increase total world production by 
promotion of an international division of labour, thereby 
strengthening free enterprise, in the United States and else­
where, and at the same time creating political doncitions 
conducive to world peace.^ As a first step in its economic 
planning, the United States sought the agreement of Britain, 
whose Imperial Preferences and controls on convertibility 
posed a major obstacle to the achievement of the multilateral 
world. In addition to its efforts to secure freer trade, 
the Administration also secured British agreement to the 
International Monetary Fund, largely the brain child of 
Harry Dexter "White, Assistant-Secretary at the Treasury 
Department, who saw fixed exchange rates banked by an inter­
national institution with the power to make short terms 
loans, as the remedy for the economic fluctuations which
economic planning as reflective of American priorities, 
and of a tradition in American diplomacy of "Open Door" 
expansion dating back at least to 1898. See William A. 
Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy; Lloyd 0. 
Gardner, Edbnomlc Aspects of Hew Deal Diplomacy (Madison: 
University of 'Wisconsin Press, 1964), and Gabriel Kdlko, 
The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign 
lollcy, 1945-1-945 "(New York: Random, 19o8 ).
1 9r . u . Gardner, pp. 13-15. A major part of this was be­
gun in 1934 with the establishment of the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Program, designed to give the President 
authority to negotiate tariff reductions to increase 
exports (pp. 21-2). See also, Lloyd C. Gardner. Ecnnomlc 
Aspects of Hew Deal Diplomacy, p. 25.
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had led to international economic breakdown in the inter­
war years. Alongside the 11®, which was created at the 
Bretton Woods conference in 1944, was added the World Bank,
an ambitious proposal to provide funds for world economic
2 0reconstruction.
The central characteristic of post-war planning was 
its reliance on mechanistic international organizations 
in which the United States was prepared to invest both 
resources and freedom of action, in return for the commit­
ment of other nations to basic American political and eco­
nomic principles. Although there was an element of 
idealism in the planning,the over-all concept was hard- 
headed, a fact which caused some resentment in British 
governmental circles. The advocates of the post-war 
policies were aware of the difficulties, but they were pre­
pared to accept that as the world’s strongest power, the 
United States must take the lead, and bear most of the 
initial burden of reconstructing the kind of world they 
wanted; ultimately, however, perhaps in order to win 
support at home, they raised hopes too high. In the poli­
tical sphere, mechanistic internationalism was to be ren­
dered impotent by Big Power disunity by 1946. By the end 
of 1945, the economic programme had to be supplemented with 
a major financial loan to Britain: the advocates of multi­
lateralism were to find themselves advocating a bilateral 
loan agreement in order to keep alive hopes for a multi­
lateral world.
2°R. it. Gardner, pp. 72-7, 110.
2 'See, for example, the account of war-time diplomacy over 
lend-lease, air routes and other economic matters, Lloyd 
C. Gardner. Economic Aspects of Uew Leal Diplomacy, pp. 
2 7 0-8 0 . '
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The concept of multilateralism was not irreconcilable 
with that of a "Strong America", broadly speaking the
State and Treasury planners wanted the same kind of world
22order as Republican leaders. The difference was largely 
one of emphasis. Sceptical of the possibility of creating 
the multilateral world, most Republican leaders tended to 
stress the dangers of over-commitment by the United States 
in seeking to bring it about; to them it seemed that the 
Administration had made the world order an end in itself, 
rather than seeing it as one, and not the most vital, of 
the aims of American foreign policy. An added difficulty, 
was that the Treasury Department planners, Henry Mor- 
genthau and Harry Dexter White, seemed to be determined 
to erect an international economic structure in which the 
American government, through international agencies,
became the financial centre of the world, supplanting
23private finance in both London and Wall Street. This 
they saw as necessary to achieve a liberal world order 
which would avoid the weaknesses of the pre-war international 
system, and to create a climate of economic expansion«
As Richard N. Gardner commented: ". . .the liberal system 
could no longer be automatically achieved. After the havoc 
wrought by two world wars and the Great Depression, the 
reconstruction of a liberal world economy was bound to re-
PPLloyd C. Gardner argues that after its Initial experimen­
tation, the New Deal followed foreign economic policies 
in line with those pursued by Herbert Hoover in the Re­
publican era, ibid., pp. 7-1 3 .
23r . N. Gardner, p. 76.
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quire government intervention. Such an effort, especially
if it involved active participation by the United States,
would arouse determined opposition from the same American
groups who opposed the extension of government activity
24in the domestic sphere.”
The framework .of contemporary debate then was not over 
the nature of the world order that the United States should 
aim at, but over the degree of commitment the United States 
government should or could afford to make to further its 
attainment. An important factor in shaping Republican atti­
tudes was the image the Nationalists in particular had of 
the New Deal,for the term implied extravagance and a lack 
of real concern for the welfare of the United States. "New 
Dealers” (and "One Worlders") were suspected both of selling 
out American interests and of harbouring notions of world 
domination for which the American people would ultimately 
have to pay. ^ Thus J. Reuben Clark, Jr., author of the 
Clark Memorandum, wrote to Herbert Hoover in 1943: "One 
of the things that disturbs me very much is the plan which 
seems to be in the making for us to occupy militarily, for 
a period of years, the whole world after this thing is 
over, with the sublimely egotistical thought that our 
present mode of national life is a glorious success and that 
we should now bring to the world our way of New Deal life. 
From all that I hear I feel very sure that this thought 
permeates the Army personnel, at least the officers. . .
PP. 2 -3 .-’oee Chicago Tribune comments at beginning of Republican 
Convention in 19^4, Junb..-26th, 944.
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I note that the other day the lady who has no responsibility 
but apparently speaks with authority, made some comment 
about the great sacrifices that we are called upon to make 
after the war with the intent of carrying out such a 
program. The monumental self-sufficiency and self-compla­
cency in such an attitude breeds in me a feeling akin to 
26despair.” So strong was this notion, that Herbert 
Hoover's first reaction to the news of the explosion of the 
first atom bomb in 1945 was to dwell gloomily on the pros­
pect that the New Dealers would now use it to erect their 
"world state".2^
Arthur Vandenberg, the emerging architect of the Re­
publican foreign policy consensus, deferred to no-one in 
his opposition to and suspicion of the global illusions 
of the Administration. In 1945, during the debate over 
the renewal of lend-lease, he gave vent to suspicions widely 
held by his Republican colleagues:
"I suggest no Intention that we shall not do our 
full part in helping the United Nations to re­
construct a healthy, happy world. But I do sug­
gest that we are neither big enough nor rich 
enough to become permanent almoners to the whole 
earth. I add that we face no such obligation, 
moral or otherwise, despite a tendency in some 
places, at home and abroad, to assign us auto­
matically to this role almost as though we owed 
reparations to our allies in return for having 
made colossal contributions to their victory.
I speak in no spirit of complaint. I speak only 
in a spirit of candor which believes that our 
very precious international friendships will best 
survive the post-war strain if we frankly under­
stand each other's problems before they come to crisis.”2«
2^J. Reuben Clark, Jr. to Hoover, January 15th, 1943, Hoover
P7MSS-^'O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, October 12th, 
-„1945, 0'laughlin MSS.
¿QCongresslonal Record. 91, April 9th, 1945, p. 3199.
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Vandenberg's concern that American policy be explicitly 
attuned to American interests, that it "stood up for 
America", represented both conviction as well as under­
standing of the nature of his own party. The multila­
teral world could best be sold to Republicans in Congress, 
apart from the Internationalists, if it were harmonized with 
tradition and fundamental American principles, and if it 
could be shown that the advantages of such a world order 
to the United States, outweighed the costs of setting it 
up. This was to prove easier in the political than in 
the economic sphere. As finally constructed, the United 
Nations cost little, in terms of traditional reservations 
about foreign entanglements and the Constitution, or in 
economic terms. The financial institutions created at 
Bretton Woods, and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme 
proved less palatable. To the majority of Congressional 
Republicans, there appeared, in the words of Senator
Brooks o f I l l i n o i s ,  a d isp o s it io n  "to g ive America away
29on the basis of an hysteria of good will." So also 
Representative Dewey Short commented, . .1 realize in 
these strained and troublesome day3 it is unpopular for any 
of us to speak a word for America or in defence of our own 
country. The fashionable thing in these trying times, 
particularly in pink-tea circles and among the striped- 
trousered boys in the Diplomatic corps, is to think of 
the ills of all the world and to ignore our people at 
home. . .One would gather the final impression that we 
are responsible for most of the world's ills and woe".^°
gglbld.. July 18th, 1945, p. 7677.
5°Ibld.. December 6th, 1945, P. 11571.
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To many It seemed that the United States, out of some mis­
guided guilt-feeling, was being asked to make undue sac­
rifices. They wanted the United States to show more con­
cern for its own interests. "Only a sound, solvent, free 
America can command the respect and deserve the leadership 
of the world," Joseph Martin, minority leader, told the 
House in May, 1945. "If those who would serve the world 
recklessly weaken this Republic, the best hope for en­
during peace and the future freedom and progress of man 
will come to naught. " ^ 1 In 1945, the vision of a multi­
lateral world could not,in the eyes of most Congressional 
Republicans, supplant the more traditional vision of a 
"Strong America" as the best hope for peace.
The United Nations
Under pressure from the Internationalists, and sensitive 
to electoral realities, the Republican leadership had by 
the end of 1944 come to accept the notion of American mem­
bership in post-war international organization. To the 
historian, Mackinac and Chicago, and the meetings between 
Hull and Dulles during the 1944 campaign seem Inexorably 
to lead to San Francisco and the founding of the United 
Nations. In reality, however, there seemed no such cer­
tainty at the time. The Mackinac Charter after all had 
not specifically committed Republicans to membership of 
an International Organization, and it had spelled out the 
hope that peace and security would be based on means 
other than force. Arthur Vandenberg, the architect of
31 Ibid.. May 24th, 1945, p. 4983.
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Mackinac, whilst making claims for the courageous states­
manship of his Party, was also regarded, with some justifi­
cation, as a potential opponent of international organiza­
tion. Extremely suspicious of the shape of the peace 
which was emerging from the military campaigns and Head of 
State diplomacy, he was unwilling to appear to give the
Administration a blank check to negotiate with its allies,
32over the United Nations or anything else. His insis­
tence that lone Progressive. Senator laPollette of Wisconsin, 
a Nationalist in foreign policy, be a member of the secret 
bipartisan committee on international organization in 1944 
was a sign of hisunease. That he was less than enthusiastic 
about the action of Senator Connally in placing on the
committee of eight;, the Internationalist . Warren Austin,
33was a further sign of his unease. In the event he was
surprised that the Administration's proposals were very
34"conservative" from a nationalist standpoint. Never­
theless, as late as August 1944, he and IaPollette re­
portedly gave the timid minority leader, Internationalist 
Wallace White, a rough going over on the question of whe­
ther he was prepared to vote for military sanctions to be 
decided by the United States representative on the Security 
Council. ^
Increasingly in fact, the biggest problem for Repub­
lican leaders was the build up of support for an inter­
national organization which was not to be merely a con-
^Vandenberg, Pnlate Papers, pp 
IJlbld., p. 95.
■^Poole, pp. 54-5.
91-5.
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dilatory and Judicial body, but which was equipped with 
the means to ensure peace. The concept of an international 
police force, which was strongly supported by Willkie and
the Internationalists, had from opinion polls appeared in
i 3619^3 to command widespread support among Republican voters.
Apart from Wlllkie and Stassen, however, it received little 
support from leading Republicans. At Chicago the Inter­
nationalists had threatened to rebel over the unwilling­
ness of Taft and Yandenberg to make explicit reference to 
the development of such a force. In the event, they accepted 
the straddle developed by Vandenberg: the new league
should "develop effective cooperative means to direct peace
37forces to prevent or repel military aggression". It had,
however, in the spirit of Mackinac, added, that "peace
and security do not depend upon the sanction of force alone,
but should prevail by virtue of reciprocal interests and
spiritual values recognized in these security agreements".
The League should "promote a world opinion to Influence
the nations to right conduct, develop international law
and maintain an international tribunal to deal with Jus-
38ticlable disputes".
In succeeding months, there was a noticeable tendency 
by leading Republicans to play down the "force" aspect of
^Charles John Graham, "Republican Foreign Policy 1939-1952", 
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois, 1955), p. 96.
3'Porter and Johnson, p. 407. To Dulles, Vandenberg in­
sisted that the word "direct" should be used Instead of 
"mobilize", which, he said, sounded too much like inter­
national police force; Vandenberg to J. F. Dulles, June 14th, 
1944, Vandenberg MSS.
3°porter and Johnson, pp. 407-8.
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the proposed organization. Dulles , for example, told 
the Federal Council of Churches in November that the "force 
proposals" were mere "scenery'], .Hbat''he:.diSUnit think
they would prove effective, and that they should not there­
fore be regarded as an obstacle to acceptance of the Dum­
barton Oaks proposals.39 Vandenberg clearly shared Dulles’ 
doubts. During the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, he commented,
"I am one of those who do not believe that our greatest 
hope for peace lies in trying to put peace in a steel straight- 
jacket. I doubt whether any hard and fast international 
contracts looking toward the automatic use of cooperative 
force in unforeseeable emergencies ahead will be worth any 
more, when the time comes, than the national'consciences
of the contracting parties when the hour of acid test 
40arrives". Clearly both Vandenberg and Dulles saw the
new League as a device for mobilizing world opinion in
favour of certain principles, rather than as an instrument
of collective security: in this regard it would be a far
less costly means.of attaining the liberal world order.
Dulles, in particular, had come to put great emphasis on
the development of moral force to exert American influence
41in areas where it could not bring military power to bear.
It is also relevant to note that Hoover and Gibson in their
book published in 1942 had argued that the international
42community was too divided to act as a "policeman". 70
70^Address to Biennial Meeting of Federal Council of Churches 
in Christ in America, Pittsburgh, November 28th, 1944, ..Dulles MSS.
40Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 114.
41 Dulles to Yfalter Lippmann, October 22nd, 1944, Dulles MSS 
. (Supplement).
42Hoover and Gibson, pp. 263-4, 331-2, 33^-5, 337-8.
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Although most Republican leaders could agree in giving 
the idea of international military force a very low priority, 
the issue could not be suppressed. At their meeting in 
August, 1944, Willkie and Dulles found themselves in dis­
agreement over the issue, whilst it, and the related issue 
of whether Republicans were prepared to empower the United 
Rations representative on the Security Council with the 
power to commit the United States to military action, were
to be raised in the campaign by Senator Ball, the much pub-
43licized, dissident Republican Internationalist. Dewey, 
after his nomination, made clear his opposition both to 
the concept of an international police force, as well 
as to any surrender of the right of the United States, in 
Congress, to make war. Although he later made clear his 
belief in membership of an International Organization with 
the means, including force, to prevent or repel aggression, 
his insistence that "Congress, and only Congress, has the 
constitutional power to determine what quota of force it 
will make available and what direction it will give our re­
presentative to use that force", was not enough to free
44the Republicans of a crucial, but probably false, issue.
The question of Congress' right to declare war was one 
which could not be avoided. Defense of the Constitution 
was a fundamental of a "Strong America". In line with 
the Party's heritage as the custodians of the Whig tradition,
^Divine, Second Chance. p. 218, 238-40.
^Graham, pp"! ilJ2, 99-100; Rew York Times, October 25th,
1944.
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most Republican leaders could not easily accept the notion 
that an appointee of the President should have the authority 
to commit the United States to collective military action. 
Vandenberg, however, was looking for compromise. Well 
aware of the fact that the President had often in the past 
used force without a declaration of war in the Caribbean 
area, he was prepared to accept that under the United Na­
tions, the United States might accept the western hemis­
phere as its primary responsibility; only for declaration
of war outside the hemisphere would he insist on a refer-
45ence to Congress. By the end of 1944, however, no ready 
solution to thelfoblem had been found. Writing to Dulles 
shortly after the 1944 election, Vandenberg declared:
". . . 1  still lack a practical formula to implement the 
constitutional requirement that only Congress can declare 
war. I fear that this point may be crucial in our public 
discussions - although as a practical matter. . .the ul­
timate use of force against a major aggressor- . .shall
46become quite remote." The tone of his letter indicated 
that a change had come over Vandenberg since the spring: 
for whatever reasons, he was by the end of 1944 less con­
cerned about the threat which the proposed international 
organization posed to the fundamental traditions of the 
United States, and far more concerned about its potentiali­
ties as a still relatively cheap instrument for attaining 
the liberal world order. Rather than emphasizing, as he
Ac¿¿Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 115-19.
°Vandenberg to John Poster Dulles, November 1st, 1944, 
Vandenberg MSS.
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had In the past, that a good league could not cure a bad 
peace, he was coming to see how the right kind of league 
might indeed help to bring about the kind of peace he de­
sired.
Whilst Vandenberg was undergoing his not unusual con­
version from sceptic, to increasingly enthusiastic and con­
structive supporter, his public image remained unaltered. 
Despite the results of the 1944 election, which saw the 
Republican Internationalists in the Senate strengthened by 
the election of Alexander Smith (N.J.), Wayne Morse (Oregon), 
and Leverett Saltonstall (Massachusetts), nobody saw member­
ship of a new league as a foregone conclusion: the memory 
of Henry Cabot Lodge was too strong. Despite the coopera­
tion already achieved, the Administration was distrustful
of Republicans such as Vandenberg who had in the past been
47highly critical of national policy. Roosevelt in particular 
disliked Vandenberg, and wanted Senator Austin to be the
48Republican representative at the Sanlianclsco Conference.
It was against the background of fears that 1945 would 
see a repetition of rejection of the League of Nations, 
that Vandenberg rose in the Senate in January to make the 
speech which in the public mind was to signal his conversion
^Representative Celler of New York, speaking at a Forum 
for Democracy meeting listed some 12 remaining "isola­
tionists" amongst Senate Republicans; on his list were 
Vandenberg as well.as two who in the post-war years were 
to be classed as Internationalists, Aiken (Vermont), Tobey 
f,g(New Hampshire).., Congressional Record. 91, Appendix, p. 20. 
Divine, Second Chance, p. 270-1. Note that Austin was very 
much an administration favourite: Senator Connally had put 
him on the committee of eight, and he was in 1946 to be 
appointed to the U.N. Security Council by Truman. In 
April, 1945, Austin was sent a letter by the President 
designed to continue to secure his support on foreign 
policy matters, Truman to Warren Austin, April 25th, 1945, 
and attached memo, W.D.H. to Mr. Connally, PPF 322,
Truman MSS.
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from "isolationism". Some of the Internationalists re­
mained sceptical, perhaps regarding him as a Johnny-come- 
lately, and perhaps also because they still could not de­
tect a prime commitment on his part to American membership 
of an international organization, nor a willingness to give 
the representative on the Security Council authority to 
vote for action without resort to Congress. Despite these 
reservations, however, they were aware that Vandenberg's
support could probably carry another eight or ten Repub-
49licans in support of a new international organization.
Senator Smith, who was taking a leading part in organizing
freshmen Senators in support of international organization,
recognized that Vandenberg's speech had made him a poten-
50tial Republican nominee in 1948.
Although the main intention of Vandenberg's speech had
probably been to criticise the policies of the Soviet Union
51this was not the way in which it was interpreted. In pro 
posing a treaty to keep Germany and Japan disarmed, thereby 
removing any excuse for Russian domination of the Baltic 
or Eastern Europe, Vandenberg appeared to be making a major 
break with tradition. John Foster Dulles, however, whilst 
praising Vandenberg for being "constructive and positive" 
and for having avoided "the easy way of merely criticizing 
the Administration", pointed out that, "his proposals are
49Report, January 12th, 1945, McNaughton MSS. Raymond L. 
Buell to.Alexander Smith, January 13th, 1945, Smith MSS. 
50uew York Times. January 21st, 1945.
51 Tompkins, p. 238.
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not sporadic but coalesce with and push forward a pre­
existing Republican program." In essence, Vandenberg's 
proposal would, if implemented, separate the Job of polic­
ing the Axis from that of establishing the new International 
organization. By so doing,the international organization 
would be brought more into line with Republican thinking: 
it would not be so subject to Big Power domination, it would 
not primarily be concerned with force or collective security. 
Dulles, whose relationship with Vandenberg had begun to de­
velop, penetrated right to the heart of this: "The more 
we free our minds of fear of the German and Japanese menace,
the more we will practice the idealism which is an essen-
52tial ingredient of any worthwhile victory".
As Dulles remarked, the idea of separating international
organization and policing activities was not a departure
from Republican policy. Dewey had in fact advanced the
55idea during the campaign. The idea was also implicit 
in Herbert Hoover's concept of a "transition period". What 
Dulles, Dewey, Hoover and Yandenberg had all opposed, was 
the Internationalist notion that all that was necessary 
to prevent a recurrence of the cycle of the last twenty 
years, was to secure membership of a new League. Disturbed 
by rumours of the peace that was emerging, a number of Re­
publicans had in 1944 echoed Hoover in urging that the *7
5^Press release, January 11th, 1945, Dulles MSS.•^Ibld.; Divine, Second Chance, pp. 217-8; the idea of a 
division between the policing and International Organiza­
tion had been developed at the Dewey-Dulles press confer­
ence, August 19th, 1944; State of New York, Public Papers 
of Thomas E. Dewey, Fifty First Governor of the State
o7 ife~~r!F, W & ~  “--- -------------- ““ ------ ~
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United States hold off from committing itself to any 
International organization until it had seen the shape 
of the peace. Such urgings, however, were far too reminis­
cent of 19 19-20, and widely interpreted as "isolationism"; 
in response to pressure, Thomas Dewey had gone beyond this 
in his commitment to international organization in the cam­
paign, whilst also advancing the notion of a separate treaty 
to keep the peace.
The attractiveness of the idea of separating the 
keeping ot the peace from the United Nations was then that 
it was in harmony with the concept of "A Strong America". 
Vandenberg, in offering the Russians a defense treaty, had 
not, as some Internationalists readily understood, suddenly 
become converted to the philosophy of "One World". He 
certainly had no more desire than ever to see American 
identity and interests subsumed in an all-powerful inter­
national organization. By his formula, Yandenberg seemed 
to have found a way of maximizing American influence and 
bringing about the kind of liberal world order all wanted.
In all essential matters, the United States would still re­
tain freedom of action; he was neither ready to disavow in­
dependence or self reliance, any more than he was ready 
to commit large scale resources to attain the liberal world, 
but a treaty to disarm Germany and Japan, was a small price 
to pay if it woulc ensure a "^ust" peace, and an lnter-
5^ Viayne Morse described Vandenberg's speech as "sloppy 
thinking". Report, January 12th, 194-5, Me Naught on MSS.
The Internationalists, led by Austin, were worried that 
Vandenberg’s and similar initiatives might block Dum­
barton Oaks; Diary, January 10th, 194-5, Smith to John 
Poster Dulles, Smith MSS, January 19th, 194-5.
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national organization concerned primarily, not with, collec­
tive security, but with the pursuit of international jus- 
tice.  ^ Reportedly, Bhnklin Roosevelt was impressed, but 
sceptical: "I'm in favor, too, of a treaty for perpetual
disarmament of Germany. . .but it's a lot easier to write
5 6in a speech than on a paper with a seal on it."
Vandenberg's speech marked his emergence as the
principal Republican spokesman on foreign affairs, a role
which undoubtedly appealeddto his vanity, as well perhaps
as giving him an opportunity to remove his "isolationist"
image, and to counter the opposition he was likely to meet
in the 1946 primary. Although it would be uncharitable
to seek to explain conduct solely in those terms, it would
be foolish to ignore the fact that Vandenberg was up for
re-election in 1946, that he had seen in 1944 what happened
to Senators with an Isolationist reputation, and that there
were some 400,000 Poles in Michigan to whose Interests he
57had for some time been sensitive. In December, he had 
written to a political associate in Michigan regarding 
rumours that he was not going to run, and rumours of op­
position to him. "I do not intend to make it easy for any
58other Republican to undermine me," he wrote. In early 
January, before his Senate speech, Vandenberg wrote with
is unlikely that Vandenberg envisaged a major poicing 
role under his proposed treaty; the Republican platform 
and Dewey's campaign had in 1944 committed Republicans 
to bringing the troops home as soon as possible; at Yalta, 
Roosevelt intimated that they would not stay in Europe more 
K^than two years.
■^Report, January 12th, 1945, McEaughton MSS. 
jjllbld.-^Vandenberg to S. R. Banyon, December 4th, 1944, Vandenberg 
MSS.
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regard to Dulles’ impending visit to the Economic Club 
in Detroit, that he would "selfishly" like his constituents 
to hear from Dulles that he (Vandenberg) was "highly placed" 
on the small special committee cooperating with the State 
Department and was "trying to take a thoroughly constuc- 
tive viewpoint in respect to it. I frankly (and probably 
selfishly) hope that you can refer to our relationship as 
a fine example of the fact that there is a sound middle 
ground (between extremists at the right and left) upon 
which vie can hope to proceed in organizing the postwar 
world for p e a c e . I n  becoming a "statesman", Vandenberg 
did not abandon his skills as an astute politician.
In his Senate speech, Vandenberg had taken his beloved 
"middle position". What he might lose in support from 
followers of the Chicago Tribune. disturbed at his advo­
cacy of an entangling alliance, he had partially offset 
by the emphasis he had put on the speech in standing up 
for American interests and principles, as well as in his 
thinly disguised criticism of the Soviet Union. Such, 
however, was the mood of the time, that the speech was seen, 
not as a pragmatic reassertion of American national in­
terests, but as a sign of Vandenberg's conversion from 
"isolationism", and as a good omen for American membership 
of a new league.^ Vandenberg himself was surprised by 
the effect the speech had; like Dulles he did not see it 
as a radical departure from previous positions, and he ex­
pressed to his wife the quaint wish that "somebody would
^Vandenberg to Dulles, January 4th, 1945, Dulles MSS. °°Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp, 138-44, deals with press 
reaction; the Chicago Tribune felt that the Republican 
Party was breaking up, January 12th, 1945.
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psychoanalyze" it. ^ 1 Psychoanalysis, although outside the 
scope of this study, might perhaps have been more profitably 
applied to the Journalists who publicized the speech. It 
is ironic in the extreme that Dewey in 1944 should by ad­
vancing a fundamentally similar position in relation to 
America's allies and international organization, have 
been seen as potentially another Harding, whilst Vandenberg 
was now inclined to be seen as another Wilson. The only 
way in which Vandenberg had gone further than Dewey was 
in his proposal that under the treaty to disarm Germany, 
military enforcement would not be dependent on Congress 
declaring war. Even this, however, had not been precluded
fiPby Dewey in 1944. Prom the Nationalist viewpoint, Van- 
denberg’s proposal had advantages, for a limited treaty 
circumventing Congress was preferable to an international 
organization in which all collective action was exempt 
from Congressional assent.
Vandenberg's speech was probably most important because 
of the fact that it confirmed his emergence as a leading 
Republican spokesman on foreign policy. By making him a 
figure to be bargained with, it forced Franklin Roosevelt 
to include him as a delegate to the San Francisco Confer­
ence despite Roosevelt's personal preference for the 
Internationalist, Narren Austin. Two Republican Internation-
%jjVandenberg, Private Papers, p. 144.
°^Dewey, at Minneapolis in' October, 1944, had left the matter 
open, emphasizing that the decision on the quota of force 
and the discretion Congress would give the United Nations 
was for Congress alone to decide. All he had warned 
against was any attempt to ride rough-shod over Congress 
as he alleged had been tried in 1919., New York Times, October 25th, 1944.
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alists were, however, invited, Charles Eaton of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, and Harold Stassen. The latter’s
appointment was controversial: he ostensibly was chosen to
represent young servicemen, but his appointment was seen
as a slight on the Dewey entourage, and it also caused some
concern to the nationalists who were hostile to Stassen’s
advanced Internationalism. Stassen himself reportedly
regarded his selection as a political liability, but to
confirm his party regularity let it be known that he would
consult with leading Republicans, including Vandenberg and 
64Dewey. The invitation to Vandenberg, though unavoidable, 
put Vandenberg also into a quandary. Aware that he could not 
afford politically to refuse, he was also concerned that he 
should not go along as a stooge, and was especially sensitive 
to the Polish situation. "lie is sweating plenty," Senator 
Burton Hheeler (Dem. Montana) was reported as saying, "He 
doesn’t like it, but he'll have to go along now". To Dulles 
he wrote, undoubtedly embarrassed by the failure of the 
President to invite either Dulles or Dewey, "I do not 
think the Republican Party can make a graver blunder than 
to decline Senatorial cooperation (under appropriate cir­
cumstances) when it is tnndered by the President in a
66critical case of this nature and at such a critical moment." 
"The fact is," commented Cal O’laughlin, "he could not be 
kept away from San Francisco."0^
^Jlrthur Xrock column, Hew York Times, February 23rd, 194-5; 
Report, February 22nd, 194-5, Me Haugh10n MSS; Chicago Tribuna, 
March 11th, 194-5» O'laughlin to Herbert Hoover, February 17th, 
(■¡A 945, O’laughlin MSS.
/-r?ew York Times. February 21st, 194-5.
92Report, February 16th, 194-5, McEaughton MSS.
DDVandenberg to John Foster Dulles, February 17th, 194-5, 
-Vandenberg MSS.
O'laughlin to Herbert Hoover, February 17th, 194-5, O'laughlin
MSS.
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Vandenberg’s stipulation that he be given assurances 
of freedom of action at San Francisco, especially in view 
of his concern at the Polish situation, was initially ig­
nored by Franklin Roosevelt. Vandenberg, however, delayed 
acceptance until he had received explicit assurance early
¿TOin March! At the same time, Vandenberg helped to engineer 
the appointment of his by now close friend, John Foster 
Dulles,as an adviser to the delegation. To accentuate the 
political nature of his appointment, Dulles resigned as 
chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, 
and made it clear that he was not attending as a church re­
presentative.^ Thus, by holding out for full freedom of 
action, and by securing the appointment of Dulles, Vanden- 
burg had significantly altered the balance of the Republi­
can delegation at San Francisco away from the Internation­
alists; the manoeuvrlngs with Franklin Roosevelt had con­
firmed what the 194-4- election and Vandenberg’s January 
speech had suggested, that Republican cooperation could 
not be attained if the Internationalists were to be taken 
as representatives of the Party.
Vandenberg’s attitude to international organization had 
undoubtedly developed since early 1944, but this did not 
represent a fundamental change in his conception of foreign 
policy. Agreeably surprised even in 1944 by the ’’conserva­
tism” of the Administration’s thinking, he had come to see 
international organization as a useful instrument to help 
to bring about the liberal world order, rather than as a
6®Vandenberg, Private Papers. pp. 149-54; Report, March 1st, 
. 1945, McRaughton MSS.
°°Divine, Second Chance. p. 273.
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threat to the enduring fundamentals of "A Strong America".
To a friend in March, he defended his decision to cooperate 
with the Administration in terms of the national interest:
"I agree with you that America must consult her own 
self-interest in all these ramifying postwar inter­
national enterprises which are on the trestle board.
I do not intend to see the whole picture before we 
proceed. I do not intend to sacrifice America to 
a world dream. I do not propose to part with any 
essential Sovereignty1 and I do not say that any 
such surrender is involved so far as Dumbarton 
Oaks is concerned. I heartily join you in the 
thesis that we are not rich enough to endow the 
earth. I shall hope to continue on guard against 
any such'jeopardies. At the same time, I cannot 
make it too clear that I think America has a sup­
remely great 'self-interest1 in preventing World 
War 3 and I am prepared to go a long way in the 
prevention of that calamity. " ' 0
Convinced that the United States could not by purely uni­
lateral action, insulate Itself from another war, which 
technology would make even more of a threat than the pre­
sent war, Vandenberg had come to see international cooper­
ation as the best solution. In addition, he had gone some 
way towards the internationalist position in his willingness, 
as he indicated in the above letter, to commit some resources, 
as opposed to mere words, to international cooperation; but 
the other side of the coin was to be his Insistence that 
the United States protected its own Interests, and no longer 
hesitated before expressing its point of view. In this 
sense, Vandenberg had not departed from the concept of "A 
Strong America": as he repeatedly made clear to those of 
his associates who questioned his action, he was not going 
to San Francisco to betray his principles.
?°Vandenberg to Harry G. Hogan, March 26th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
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Increasingly, in fact, in the face of criticism, Vanden-
berg sought to emphasize that he and other Republicans in­
tended to make "justice" their contribution to the Dumbar­
ton Oaks proposals: "If there is any difference in the 
approach of the two major parties towrad this new Peace
League," he wrote, "I have been trying to identify "JUSTICE"
71as the Republican demand and the Republican con tribu tion ."
In the aftermath of Yalta, this was a sound political tactic,
72which was echoed by both Dulles and Dewey in public. By 
participating, Republicans could avoid what Vandenberg 
described as "just about equivalent to committing suicide 
in public"; by identifying themselves with "justice",they 
could claim both to the Rationalists and to distressed 
ethnic groups, that they had not sold out their principles.^ 
The pursuit of justice overseas was both politically 
sound and consistent with the Republican tradition. Dulles 
in the 1930's had been sceptical about its place in diplo­
macy, describing phrases such as "enforcing morality" as 
the "stock in trade" of those seeking to defend vested 
interests; at the same time, he had seen the development 
of an intelligent public opinion, "as a moral force" as
valuable, and the use of moral condemnation by governments
74as useful at times for protecting a nation’s interests.
Vandenberg to James S. Kemper, April 13th, 1945, Vanden­berg MSS.
‘^ See Dewey's;Lincoln Day speech in Washington D.C., Feb­
ruary 8th, 1945, New York Times. February 9th, 1945. Dulles 
told the Foreign Policy Association in March that Dumbarton 
Oaks should be amended by the addition of "an ethical 
spirit of justice"., March 17th, 1945, Dulles MSS. 
'^Vandenberg to Harry G. Hogan, March 26th, 1945, Vandenberg _. MSS.
™Gahin, p. 45; Dulles, War. Peace and Change, pp. 87-8.
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By 1944 his apparent earlier contradictions had been re­
solved: to Walter Lippmann, he had written of his convic­
tion of the necessity of the United States using moral
75force, even where it could not use physical power. In 
fact, Dulles’ earlier analysis was more honest: concepts 
of "justice” are not universal, in so far as any nation 
or group of nations seek to extend its or their concept of 
"justice", it will inevitably bring itself into conflict 
with other organizing principles. This was essentially 
what was at issue in 1945. By insisting that the United 
States amend Dumbarton Oaks to satisfy its concept of 
"justice", Vandenberg and other Republicans were insisting 
that the Administration do what, in their verdict, Wilson 
had failed to do, that is, stand up for American interests 
and principles. In return, Vandenberg could assure the 
Administration, and other nations prepared to cooperate, 
that under his leadership the Republicans would not ob­
struct American participation in the new league. Since there 
was no real disagreement in the United States over what 
constituted "justice", Vandenberg had little difficulty 
in securing the assent of the State Department and the 
Administration to the amendments he proposed. He also re­
ceived support from the British and Australian Foreign 
Ministers. The question mark, however, hung over the 
attitude of the Soviet Union, which saw Vandenberg’s iden­
tification with "Justice" not unnaturally, as an expression 
76of hostility. "Ten days ago," wrote Vandenberg towards 
See page 95 above.‘“Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 1 5 7, 163-4, 168-71. A 
number of Senators, including Connally (Dem. Texas) and 
George (Dem. Georgia) reportedly felt that "...to expect 
that Russia will bow to Vandenberg is stretching the imagina 
tion"., Report, March 16th, 1945, McUaughton MSS.
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the end of March, "Moscow radio spent fifteen minutes In
a personal attack exclusively on me as being the greatest
'menace' at Frisco. Perhaps this is the Russian response
to my well advertised point of view regarding 'Justice' as
the basis for permanent peace. Perhaps it is a preview of
San Francisco. If it is the point becomes all the more
77important. We shall see what we shall see."
Apart from the desire to introduce the concept of 
"Justice" into Dumbarton Oaks, the Republican leadership 
was concerned both to strengthen the proposed General As­
sembly, and to secure acceptance of the principle of treaty 
revision. In so far as they tended to play down the peace­
keeping elements of Dumbarton Oaks, the attempt to increase 
the significance of the Assembly, which had no endorsement 
functions, was consistent. As the "town meeting" of the 
world, where all nations would have an equal voice, the 
Assembly might be expected to counter the tendency of the 
Security Council to be dominated by "power politics". The 
concern for small nations was central to the concept of 
"Justice"; Republican leaders could apparently see no 
possible conflict between the United States' role as a 
Big Power and its championing of the rights of small 
nations.Republican leaders believed in unity amongst 
the major powers as a basis for peace; but they also wished 
to alter the balance of major power agreement In their fa­
vour. Ihradoxically, and whether by intention or otherwise,
"^Yandenberg to Harry G. Hogan, March 26th, 1945, Vandenberg
—gl-ISS.
'°Dulles reportedly told James Forrestal that he did not 
think small nations should be allowed to express opinions 
on all international matters, MiIlls, pp. 57-8.
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a strengthened General Assembly could only strenghten the 
United S tates among the major powers.
Treaty revision was seen as of fundamental importance, 
in view both of the widespread suspicion of agreements 
already made, as well as in the light of "lessons” drawn 
from World War I. Commenting on Yalta, Dulles Said that 
", . .decisions taken in the heart of war will inevitably 
fall short of high principles". It was, therefore, all 
the more neces ary to get "the right kind of world organi­
zation. It must be an organization which, in addition to
having power to prevent aggression, must also seek to cor-
79rect in the future, the inevitable.mistakes of the past."
The idea of treaty revision had of course long been em­
phasized by Republican leaders as the basic cause of the 
failure of the League. Seeing international organization 
more as an instrument for peaceful change than for collec-
COtive security, the concept of treaty revision was central.
It had the added advantage of promising an eventual way out 
of the peace which was emerging in 1945; to the Poles in 
particular Vandenberg offered this hope: a stiffer United 
States policy, combined with the right kind of international
81
organization, might eventually be of use to Poland. To
^Press release from Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, 
„February 25th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
°°Hoover and Gibson,saw the failure to make Article 19 of 
League Covenant a reality, as one of the most serious 
„failures of the League of Nations, op. clt.. pp. 266-72. 
Vandenberg to Frank Januszewski, May 15th, 1945, Vandenberg 
MSS.
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Walter Lippmann's charge that he was confusing "peace 
keeping" -with "peace making", Vandenberg replied: ". . .1 
seek only to make certain tha t. . .we are not intending 
to make the colossal blunder of putting peace in a strait- 
jacket and of offering no means of correcting injustice, 
if there be such, in the present peace settlements (or in
any other situation) except by the very process (war) which
82we presume to discourage"^
By the time of San Francisco, the odds in favour of 
Senate ratification of the proposed new league were very 
high. On the Republican side, the acceptance of Vanden­
berg Ts amendments was crucial; yet even before that,many, 
including Vandenberg himself, were aware of the consequences 
of seeming to be an obstructionist. In February, Herbert 
Hoover sketched out the alternatives to Alf Landon; accepting 
that the "yearning" for peace was becoming stronger, he 
saw the establishment of an international organization as 
certain: "As it is planned now it has many faults and
weaknesses that are dangerous both to peace and to our 
country. But to remedy things we must try to amend the 
faults and weaknesses, not go out in just blind and futile 
opposition to the central thing we all want - a workable, 
effective machinery that will at least help preserve 
peace".^ On the problem of the liberated nations, he 
offered advice similar to that which Vandenberg was to
®2Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 157-8.
°5noover to Alfred Landon, February 18th, 194-5, Hoover 
MSS.
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offer critics: "Nothing you and I can do will get them
free, hut perhaps if Dumbarton Oaks was a court to which
they could appeal they may have a chance for the future.
To take this attitude of withdrawing from the whole mess
at this time would get no support from the American people,
84and it would be only a futile gesture to urge it."
Such in fact was the strength of "International" con­
viction in 1945, that only the very brave or the foolhardy 
could envisage opposing it. With some annoyance at the 
high pressure methods the Administration and press were 
using to sell multilateralism to the American people, the 
majority of Republicans in the Senate seemed to be moving 
towards support of the new league. Even the revelation
that Stalin had been promised three votes in the General
86Assembly could not slow the momentum. The death of Roose­
velt and the accession of the hapless Truman, made the out­
come less uncertain. Inspiring less fear or hatred than 
his predecessor, Truman could better count on the nation 
to unite behind him in a time of crisis. Vandenberg for 
one endorsed Truman's decision to go on with the San 
Francisco Conference. To postpone San Francisco, wrote 
Vandenberg, "would have confessed to the world that there
Qj
is an 'indispensablenan' who was bigger than America". '
jj4Ibld.
°5por Taft's criticisms of propaganda, as well as statement 
of intention to vote for Dumbarton Oaks proposals, Con­
gressional Record, 91. May 3rd, 1945, p. 4128.
°°For account of this, see Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp,159
°'Ibid.. p. 168.
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On April 21st, he and Senator Conally (Dem. Texas) set
off with the good wishes of most of their Senate colleagues.
At San Francisco, Vandenberg was to be in the happy 
pos.ltion of being regarded as essential to Senate ratifica­
tion. Although ratification seemed almost inevitable, 
Vandenberg could probably have defeated it had he wished, 
albeit at a cost to himself and the Ihrty. That he had no 
intention of doing : 3. sordid not seriously weaken his bar­
gaining position. On arrival, he declared that his mail 
had shown him that the G.I.'s wanted collective security, 
and felt that it was in the Interests of the United States 
to play its part. At the same time, they were "equally 
insistent that they do not want the flag hauled down from 
the dome of the capital and they do not want America's 
legitimate self-interest hauled down in the process".'3” His 
re-statement of what, borrowing from Clare Luce, he called 
America First Internationalism, was an' accurate description 
of the Republican consensus which he had helped to shape, 
and of which he was the principal representative at San 
Francisco. All the aims which he and Dulles set for them­
selves at San Francisco were designed to strengthen the posi­
tion of the United States. The new league he saw within 
the framework of American interests; he was looking for a 
commitment to "justice" as the aim of the United Nations 
Charter, increased authority for the General Assembly, 
treaty revision. He also was a strong opponent of the 
Russian attempt to secure a veto over Security Council
88Ibld., p. 171.
88
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discussion, as well as concerned to provide an outlet for
89regional security arrangements. Above all, he wanted 
to bring an end to what he regarded as the appeasement of 
Stalin. On Russia he was consistent to the point of 
rigidity: impatient with Harold Stassen who appeared to 
want to step down ower the veto dispute, he saw the issue 
as "symbolic of an infinitely larger problem involving 
American international prestige" . ^ 0 "America Wins!" he exuber­
antly recorded in his diary when the veto dispute was re­
solved: "In my opinion, this victory this afternoon far 
transcends the limited sphere of the actual decision it­
self. I think it restores a sinking American prestige at 
home and abroad; that it gives the new Peace League a chance; 
and that it recommends an American Foreign Policy which 
stands up for our viewpoints, our ideals, and our purposes.
I think it also shows just how we can get along with Russia. " ^ 1 
Vandenberg's underlying assumption was consistent with the 
imperative of a "Strong America". Whether he was telling 
Ed Stettinius "to_ be_ the Secretary of State", or, in another 
context, writing to his wife, ". . .Americans can't surrender," 
he did not deviate from the conviction that America must 
operate from strength. ^  Convinced of his country’s recti­
tude, an American and an "appeaser" were to him contradic­
tions in terms.
®^Ibid_., pp. 173-4; Vandenberg to Edward Stettinius, May 5th,1 $45, Vandenberg MSS.
9°Vardenbers, Private Papers, pp. 203-9.
9J[lbld., p. 208:
^ Tbid.. pp. 192-219.
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The American performance at San Francisco pleased Van- 
denberg. He exultantly told the press, even before the 
conference had finished, that he expected no trouble over 
Senate ratification. "I got much more in this charter than
Q7I came out here to get, " he said.  ^ Much of the credit 
for the liberalizing of the charter he attributed to his 
friend John Foster Dulles, whom he described in his diary 
as ’’the most valuable man in our entire American set-up.
. . .nominally just an 'adviser', he has been at the core 
of every crisis. His advice and his labours have been in­
dispensable. I do not know what we should have done wlth-
94out him. . .He would make a very great Secretary of State."
As a result of San Francisco, Vandenberg felt that not 
only had he and Dulles succeeded in liberalizing the Char­
ter, but they had witnessed a changing attitude to the 
Soviet Union established by President Truman and Secre­
tary Stettinius. In his diary he wrote, "It has been the 
crowning privilege of my life to have been an author of 
the San Francisco Charter. It has an excellent chance to
save the peace of theworld if America and Russia can learn
95to live together and if Russia learns to keep her word."
In his euphoric mood, Vandenberg could even find it in his 
heart to forgive Harold Stassen, who had opposed him at 
crucial stages of the American delegation's discussion
%?New York Times, June 15th, 1945.
y Tandenberg, Private Papers, p. 215; see also, Alexander 
Smith to Dulles, July 2nd, 1945, Smith MSS.; Transcript, 
interview with Andrew U. Cordier, pp. 2-5, Dulles (Oral). 
^^Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 216.
- 144-
of regional security and the veto and who was suspected
9 6by some of seeking a political issue with Vandenberg.
For his part, Dulles expressed his satisfaction with the
Charter and reciprocated Vandenberg's admiration. It was,
he said, a far more "human” charter, than that proposed
97at Dumbarton Oaks. '
The work of Dulles and Vandenberg, irrespective of 
whether they were as important as they assured each other, 
ensured the endorsement of the Charter by leading Republi­
cans. Dewey, after a conference with Dulles, called for 
full Senate ratification. Hoover also endorsed It; though
not completely satisfied, he shared the feeling that it was
98better than Dumbarton Oaks. Even the Chicago Tribune 
found it difficult to oppose: "The San Francisco Charter, 
altho' a fraud, is probably for the most part an innocuous 
one,” it commented. An Associated Press Poll published 
in June indicated that resistance to the United Rations 
Charter amongst Senate Republicans was waning. Amongst 
those revealed as "probable” supporters were Senators Brooks 9
96Ibid., pp. 215-6; Vandenberg Diary, May 30th, 1945, Van- 
cl eh berg MSS. After San Francisco, however, he appeared 
to take some pleasure from the fact that the section of 
the Charter on Trusteeship, which Stassen had been re­
sponsible for, provoked a great deal of unease in Con­
gress; Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, July 3rd, 1945, 
Vandenberg MSS.
97Hew York Times, June 26th. 1945; John Foster Dulles to 
QoVandenberg, July 10th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS. 
yoTestimony to Foreign Relations Committee, July, 1945, Dulles 
MSS; Rew York Times, July 2nd, 1945; Divine. Second Chance, 
qqP• 303.„99ghjcag0 Tribune, June 27th, 1945.
'0UHew York Times, June 24th, 1945.
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(Illinois), Hawkes (New Jersey) and Millikin (Colorado), 
all of whom had previously been numbered amongst the likely 
opponents. 101
Undoubtedly Dulles' efforts at San Francisco to ensure
that an amendment was acdepted which specifically precluded
United nations interference in domestic matters had helped
1 02to allay some remaining fears. Still, however,there re­
mained the question of military or sanctions enforcement, 
which had never been settled by Republicans in 1944, and 
which involved the question of Congress' right to declare 
war, and the degree of latitude to be allowed the American 
representative on the Security Councill10  ^ Even Harold 
Stassen did not believe that the American representative 
on the Security Council should have complete freedom to
104commit American forces and materials to collective action.
The question of collective security then remained the key,
divisive issue as it had in 1944. At the short Foreign
Relations Committee hearings it was persistently raised
by Senator Millikin, who took advantage of the invitation
1 05extended to all members of the Senate to attend. Dulles, 
called by Vandenberg as "our ablest and most valuable ex­
pert", made it clear that though he himself was not in 
favour, he accepted the right of the United States to impose 
conditions on he use of forces put at the disposal of the
]®pReport, June 21st, 1945, MeNaughton MSS.
1u^New York Times, June 16th, 1945; transcript, interview 
.n,with Harold Stassen, pp. 3-4, Dulles (Oral).
] ,Vandenberg to J. F. Dulles, July 3rd, 1945, Vandenberg MSS. 
1~4New York Times, July 3rd, 1945.
1°5i)ivine, Second Chance, p. 305.
-146-
Security C ou ncil.10  ^ Vandenberg, who l ik e 1.D ulles had
n o ticea b ly  changed h is  p o s it io n  sin ce 1944, defended the
Charter provision  for  the use o f troops in  peace keeping
operations aga in st charges that i t  circumvented Congress’
r ig h t to declare war by p oin tin g  out th at the President
had the r ig h t to do th is  anyway, and had done so 72  times 
1 07in  150 years. Against t h is ,  however, Hoover, in  a radio 
broadcast, w h ilst urging r a t i f ic a t io n  o f the Charter, and 
p oin tin g  out that i t  involved l i t t l e  commitment beyond any 
th a t the rep resen tative  on the Security  Council might enter 
in to , a lso  said  th at Congress must nat part with i t s  power
.  ^ i 108to declare war.
Much o f the heat was taken out o f  the controversy  
during the Senate debate in  July by v ir tu e  o f the fa c t  
th a t r a t i f ic a t io n  o f the Charter was a separate matter 
from the question  o f m ilita ry  commitment: under the Char­
te r , m ilita r y  agreements were to be n egotiated  sep ara te ly ,
and they would th erefore be subject to further congressional 
1 09con sid era tion . For the most part, the N a tio n a lis ts ,
quoting an inadvertent endorsement o f  th e ir  view by D ulles 
in  h is  Foreign R elations Committee testim ony, argued that 
m ilita r y  agreements must come before the Senate in  trea ty  
form, and be su b ject to the required tw o-thirds v o t e .110
106 3rd, 1945, Vandenberg MSS; 
Divine.Second Chance,
Vandenberg to J. F. Dulles, July 
New York Times. July 14th, 1945;
1fy7P. -&TTChicago Tribune. July 11th, 1945.
I ^ New York Times. July 19th, 1945.
luyThere was some disagreement whether such agreements should 
come in treaty form or should pass through both branches 
of Congress by simple majority. Congressional Record, 91.
_  July 24th, 1945, pp. 7987-91.
110Ibld., PP. 7999-8000.
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Taft, however, while supporting the latter view, made it 
clear that in his view the Senate was in good faith boutd 
to ratify any "reasonable agreement" to implement the force 
proposals of the Charter.111 Taft's comment, though lending 
itself to different interpretation if and when the military 
agreements materialized, was indicative of the smoothness 
with which ratification of the Charter went through the 
Senate. Senator Millikin,for example, who had been full 
of Initial doubts,announced on July 16th, before actual 
Senate consideration began, that his main worries, retention 
of American control of its armed forces, concern about Mon­
roe Doctrine and retention of powers of President and
Congress, had been allayed by the existence of the veto
112and by the Foreign Relations Committee hearings. Speak­
ing during the debate, he explained that the existence of 
the veto meant that it was Inconceivable that the United 
Nations would ever undertake major military action, and
that the force proposals would be confined to minor dis-
* 113putes.
Vandenberg had no doubts as to the limited gesture many 
Senators were making in voting for Senate ratification. To
H I  Ibid.. July 25 th, 1945, p. 8028.
112Ibid.. July 16th, 1945, P. 7553; Cal O'laughlin wrote 
in March that the Big Power veto over the use of force 
"has taken a good deal of wind out of the sails of the 
isolationists"., O'laughlin to Hoover, March 10th, 1945, 
O'laughlin MSS. See also, Vandenberg, Prlva-te Papers.p. 200. 
113congresslonal Record. July 25th, 19^5, P. 8032.
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D ulles and to S te tt in iu s  he urged the n e c e ss ity  o f empha­
s iz in g  th at the forces mentioned in  the Charter would be 
very sm all, and lim ited  to ’'p o lic in g ” rather than war, 
otherw ise he predicted there would be trou b le . The "rea l 
debate," he sa id , would be over the use o f  force and the
a u th o r ity  to be given the d elegate on the S ecurity  Council,
114rather than over the Charter i t s e l f .
Eow fa r  Vandenberg and D ulles were them selves prepared 
to  go in  support o f c o l le c t iv e  secu r ity  i s  unclear. Both 
were pragmatic enough to begin by asking what was p o ssib le  
rather than by seeking unattainable g o a ls . Vandenberg in  
p a rticu la r  could not afford  to get a reputation  as an "ad­
vanced” in te r n a t io n a lis t :  were he to do so the b asis o f  
h is  power would van ish . I f  Vandenberg could not continue 
to  d e liv e r  votes in  the Senate, he would be o f  no in te r e s t  
to  the A dm inistration, or conceivably, to h is  fr ien d  John 
P oster D u lles. Both pragmatism and probably con viction  
d ic ta ted  a cautious approach.
Perhaps the most Important in s ig h t in to  the con stra in ts  
which were on Vandenberg and D ulles i s  o ffered  by an analy­
s i s  o f  Taft.'s speech on the United N ations. T a ft's  p o s itio n  
d iffe r e d  from many o f the N a tio n a lis ts  in  so far  as he pro­
fessed  to be a keen supporter o f  In tern ation a l organ ization , 
which he argued was worth a tr y  to prevent another world 
war. For Taft the avoidance o f  war was o f  fundamental 
importance, for  he doubted th at l ib e r ty  could survive  
another: "The very money co st o f  such a war would c e r ta in ly
1 Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, July 25th, 1945; Van­
denberg to Edward Stettinius, July 26th, 194-5; Vandenberg MSS.
-149-
destroy freedom In the United S tates as we understand i t ,
115as w e ll as our whole business and f in a n c ia l structure" .
He disagreed w ith those who thought o f  the United Nations 
as an embryo su p e r -sta te . For him the essence o f  the 
Charter, was that i t  was based on the p r in c ip le  o f sover­
e ig n ty  o f  a l l  i t s  members. He was, he sa id , prepared to  
s a c r if ic e  some "external" sovereign ty , but he was not pre­
pared to have "America. . .ru led  by a m ajority o f people
who have no conception whatever o f  American Id e a ls , American
1 1 6standards o f  l iv in g  or American government". Given 
T a ft's  fundamental d esire  to maintain the independence o f  
the United S ta te s , and given h is  continued b e l ie f  in  the 
v ir tu a l im pregnability  o f the United S ta te s , i t  follow ed  
th at fo r  him commitment to the United Nations did not Jus­
t i f y  commitment to world-wide c o l le c t iv e  se c u r ity , for  
". . . in  sp ite  o f  much propaganda to the contrary, the 
oceans are s t i l l  a great b arrier which, w ith an a ll-p o w erfu l
Navy and Air Force, can p rotect th is  country from foreign  
117attack " . Taft saw the United Nations then as a "con­
s u lt in g  body"; given  th at concept, he regretted  the accep­
tance o f  the veto , which he sa id  made nonsense o f  the idea  
th a t a system o f  in tern a tio n a l law was being esta b lish ed .
A ll the United S tates could do, he concluded, was to show 
the world by example how i t  should develop p eacefu l prin­
c ip le s  o f  a r b itr a tio n , and help  to mould world opinion be- 
hind law and J u stice . lo On the cru c ia l is su es  th at
! ^ c o n g ress io n a l Record. 91. July 28th. 1945. p. 8152.6ra£ripr8T5CT~11¿Ib id . .  p. 8152.11 ° IM d . ,  pp. 8153-4.
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Vandenberg was seeking to r e so lv e , Taft was unprepared to 
g ive  the United S tates rep resen tative on the S ecu rity  Coun­
c i l  the r ig h t , w ithout recourse to Congress, to commit the 
United S tates to p o lic in g  operations outside the western  
hemisphere. In the western hemisphere, h is to r y  suggested  
th a t the United S tates would always use force to defend 
i t s  in te r e s t s ;  in  th is  area then, tr a d it io n , United S ta tes ' 
v i t a l  in te r e s t s ,  and American o b lig a tio n s to the wider world 
community would co in c id e . ** Beyond th a t, i t  was doubtful, 
th a t Taft was prepared to go in  h is  commitment to c o l le c ­
t iv e  secu r ity ; any other m ilita ry  action s would not be 
ruled out according to h is  philosophy, but they would have 
to be approved by Congress.
. P u b lic ly  a t le a s t ,  Taft and Vandenberg did not appear 
fa r  ap art. Like T aft, Vandenberg could support the Charter 
in  the hope th a t i t  might bring about a b e tter  world; he 
could a lso  agree th a t the basic aim o f  the United Nations 
was the development o f ju s t ic e . At the very le a s t ,  he to ld  . 
the Senate on h is  return from San Francisco, sm all coun­
t r ie s  would be b etter  o f f  w ith the United N ations, even i f  
i f  did r e f l e c t  the r e a l i ty  o f  Big Power domination; so
a lso  the United S tates i t s e l f  had "everything to gain  and
120nothing to lo se  by g iv in g  i t  support". • This, in  a nut­
s h e l l  was the low est common denominator which formed the 
b asis o f  the Republican consensus. Framed by Hull in  1944 
in  conservative terms, amended by Vandenberg to try  and
I^ K irk  and McClellan, p. 169; D iv in e ,Second Chance, p. 187.'2UCongresslonal Record. 91, June 29th, 194^, pp. 6981-5.
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secure the concept o f  " ju stice" , the United Nations offered  
much, promised nothing and cost ;very l i t t l e .  Given t h is ,  
and given  the widespread enthusiasm fo r  "internationalism "  
th a t was current in  1945, i t  was not su rp risin g  that only  
two Senators, Ianger (N. Dak.) and Shipstead (M inn.),
Joined in  s p ir i t  hy the a i l in g  Hiram Johnson ( C a l i f . ) ,  
could fin d  e ith e r  the courage or the con v ic tion  to vote  
n a y .121
The whole Republican approach to the United Nations 
had been to play down the "force" aspects o f  the Charter, 
an approach which created far  fewer problems. The issu e  
could not be t o t a l ly  avoided in  th is  way, because s t i l l  
to be resolved  was the le g is la t io n  Implementing the Char­
te r ,  in  which the question  o f  the au th ority  o f  the repre­
se n ta tiv e  on the Secu rity  Council had to be d efin ed . Van- 
denberg had f i r s t  sketched out h is  ideas on the su b ject  
in  July: he f e l t  th a t the United S ta tes rep resen tative  
on the Secu rity  Council should be allowed to vote for  sanc­
t io n s  on ly  on the in stru c tio n s  o f  the President, and th at  
such in stru c tio n s  should be communicated to Congress which 
m ight, though he was uncertain  about the c o n s t itu t io n a l
is s u e s  in vo lved , vote by concurrent re so lu tio n  to r e c a ll
122the rep resen ta tiv e . To Secretary o f  State Byrnes, Van- 
denberg made h is  p o s itio n  c lea r  in  a public le t t e r  in  August. 
They must, he sa id , have a s ta tu te  d efin in g  the powers of
¡ 2h b ld . .  July 28th, 1945, p. 8190.12fiVandenberg to John Poster D u lles, July 3rd, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
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the Security  Council rep resen ta tiv e , in  the in te r e s ts  o f  
e x e c u t iv e - le g is la t iv e  cooperation, as w e ll as o f  preserving  
" co n stitu tio n a l process". He was, he sa id , w illin g  to give  
the President a free  hand on the Security Council to commit 
the agreed American quota o f fo r c e s , but beyond th at i t  
would be necessary to get Congress to declare war to im ple­
ment a Security  Council enforcement d ec is io n . He a lso  sug­
gested  th at the President should send immediate reports to
Congress whenever he instructed his representative on the
123Secu rity  Council to vote fo r  force or sa n ctio n s. He a lso
la t e r  l e t  i t  be known th at in  h is  view the rep resen ta tive
should have the rank o f  ambassador, to emphasize that he
had to carry the President’s orders out and that he was
124not free  to act on h is  own in i t i a t iv e .
When the b i l l ,  S1580, implementing the United N ations,
was introduced into Congress in November, Vandenberg made
i t  c lea r  th at i t  had h is  f u l l  support; i t  was, he sa id , a
t e s t  o f  America’s good f a ith ,  and w ith d eter io ra tio n  in  the
world s itu a t io n , i t  was Important th at America spoke with  
125one v o ic e .  ^ T aft, however, was not s a t i s f ie d .  Although 
denying rumours that he intended o ffer in g  an amendment pre­
ven tin g  the S ecu rity  Council from using armed force without
123a . H. Vandenberg to James P. Byrnes, August 5th, 1945,New York Times, August 6th, 1945. He a lso  suggested that the t/, S.' and i t s  Latin American a l l i e s  take on exc lu sive  r e sp o n s lb lity  fo r  p o lic in g  in  the Western Hemisphere: "I doubt whether we s h a ll  ever want other armed forces to enter th is  area."1 ¡^Report, October 20th , 1945, McNaughton MSS. ^ ^ Congressional Record, 91, November 26th , 1945, p. 10975.
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reference to Congress (through, the United States veto),
he nevertheless was, as always, concerned about careless
1 2Ód eleg a tio n  o f power to the ex ecu tiv e . Taft therefore
offered  an amendment designed to la y  down the gu id e lin es
reg u la tin g  a United S tates vote on the Security Council
fo r  sa n ctio n s, e sp e c ia lly  s t ip u la tin g  that any such vote
should be "in accord with international Justice as well
127as In tern ation a l peace and secu rity" . Although h is  
amendment was lo s t ,  18-41, the m ajority o f  Republicans
present supported him, w ith only f iv e  Joining Senator
1 28Vandenberg in  votin g  a g a in st.
Hot lik in g  what he regarded as the preoccupation with  
the use o f  fo rce , Taft a lso  o ffered  other amendments, in ­
clud ing anamendment requiring the R epresentative on the 
S ecu rity  Council to urge immediate a c tio n  to lim it  arma­
ments and p roh ib it the use o f atomic bombs»rocketry and 
129poison gas. F in a lly , he o ffered  an amendment to lim it  
the P resid en t's  power in  cases o f  economic sanctions to 
three months; he feared that by d elegatin g  th is  power +j 
Congress gave the President unprecedented powers to con­
t r o l  American a f fa ir s :  includ ing censorship and regu la­
tio n  o f  economic r e la t io n s . I t  was, he argued, "probably
the g r e a te st  d e legation  o f  regu latory  power Congress has
1 "50ever been asked to g ive the President". Other amend-
}^ Ibld.. p. 10966; ibid.. November 28th, 1945, p. 11083. 
I^Zlbld.. November 29th, 1945, p. 11166.
1¿°Ibid.. p. 11167; one further Senator (Smith, N.J.), was 
-paired against.
12^Ibid., December 4th, 1945, P. 11406.
130lbTd.. p. 11408.
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ments were o ffered , which su ffered  s im ila r  fa te s  to T a ft 's .
I t  was c lea r  th at the b ip artisan  consensus had the v o te s , 
although there had been s ig n if ic a n t  support fo r  some o f  
the amendments, only s ix  Republicans and one Democrat 
(Burton Wheeler o f Montana) opposed f in a l  passage o f  S1580.
To the two o r ig in a l opponents o f the United Nations were 
now added Moore (Oklahoma), Revercomb (West V irg in ia ),
Senate Republican Whip, Wherry (Nebraska), and Taft him­
s e l f . * 1-^ 1 Despite Vandenberg's perpetual f e a r s . i t  was s t i l l  
considered impopular to vote aga in st " international"  mea­
su res . In the House o f R epresentatives, Hoffman o f M ichi­
gan admitted the d i f f i c u l t i e s  confronting d issen ter s:  "I 
r e a l iz e  th at one who votes aga in st th is  measure today i s  
about as popular as a carpetbagger in  the South immediately 
fo llo w in g  the C iv il War. But th a t i s  no overwhelming rea­
son , so fa r  as I am concerned. I r e a liz e  too , th at our great 
statesm en from Michigan are supporting th is  measure, that 
the sen ior  Member from Michigan representing the s ta te  in  
the other body, sa id  that th is  was the great adventure.
I t  i s ,  and i t  w i l l  be. But n e ith er  he nor I w i l l  ever bear
1 32arms to carry out any d ec is io n  o f  the S ecu rity  Council".
In the House, which had not been required to vote on 
the Charter i t s e l f ,  passage o f the enabling le g is la t io n  
proved le s s  co n tro v ersia l than in  the Senate. Opposition  
there lacked the r e s p e c ta b il ity  which Taft could g ive i t  
in  the Senate. The r e s u lt  was an overwhelming 344-15 vo te ,
] 31Ib id . ,  p. 11405.
1 32rb ld . , December 18th , 1945, p. 12277.
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with 14 dissenters coming from Republican ranks, and one
133sole Progressive joining them. Pew could take seriously
the charge of Jessie Sumner of Illinois, that the enabling
legislation "gives congressional authority for surrendering
the American people to an all-powerful supergovernment
which will be controlled by imperialistic foreign govern-
1 34ments, England and Russia". Such fears were things of 
the past.
The party consensus which Vandenberg had developed 
at Mackinac had stood up well. Sensitive to the Nationalist 
case, Vandenberg had made sure in all his negotiations with 
the Administration, that American interests should not be 
sacrificed to the new league. To his critics,he reiterated 
his determination not to sacrifice America to utopian dream­
ing. Given this basic reassurance, he could to some groups 
try to sell the United Nations as an instrument to attain 
American objectives, especially in the case of Poland. In 
such cases the United Nations offered a welcome auxiliary 
in an area where American physical power was unlikely to 
be employed. Ultimately, as Vandenberg frequently empha­
sized, the United Nations could not function as a world 
policeman: the veto and Big Power disunity could be ex­
pected to take care of that. In the final analysis, from 
Vandenberg's perspective, but not necessarily that of the 
Internationalists, the United Nations was not of vital 
Importance. It is true that he was proud of his work at *154
133ibid.. p. 12288.
154Ibld., p. 12281.
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San Francisco, and s in cer e ly  desirous o f making the United 
Nations work; but he was a lso  r e a l i s t i c  enough to b e liev e  
in  keeping h is  powder dry. One o f h is. main tasks a t  San 
Francisco had been to persuade the United S tates d elega­
t io n  to n ego tia te  provision  for  inter-Am erican mutual defense  
arrangements to be allowed by the Charter, pending the 
wider system o f c o l le c t iv e  secu r ity  then envisaged. By 
19^5 Vandenberg was le s s  confident than T aft, and probably 
Hoover, o f  the m ilita ry  sa fe ty  o f  the United S ta tes; but 
l ik e  them, he saw the main hope o f the World in  terms 
o f  the su rv iv a l o f a "Strong America". The United Nations 
he saw as being no r e a l threat to such a su rv iva l; and in ­
deed, he had come to see i t  as a p o ssib le  way o f  maximizing 
the in flu en ce o f  the United S ta tes , and the p r in c ip les  o f  
world order fo r  which i t  stood. The advantage o f the 
United Nations then was that i t  demanded l i t t l e  s a c r if ic e ;  
as f in a l l y  n e g o t ia te d ,it  was not in c o n s is te n t  w ith the fun­
damentals o f tra d itio n a lism .
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CH A PTER POUR
"A Strong America" and Overseas Economic Expansion
Post-war economic expansion was a central aim of the 
multilateral peace which the Administration was planning 
during the war. Economic expansion, it was assumed, would 
help to bring about a more prosperous and peaceful world, 
would counter collectivist tendencies which had challenged 
liberalism since World War I, and would contribute to full 
employment in the United States. Such aims posed no challenge 
to the Republican tradition.1 The difficulty, however, lay 
in the fact that the Treasury Department planners in par­
ticular seemed prepared to invest a significant amount of 
American resources and freedom of action in pursuit of their 
goal. As R. N. Gardner commented: "They considered that 
the United States, as the world's foremost economic power, 
should bear the primary responsibility for reconstructing 
a freely flowing system of international trade. Perhaps 
most important, they were prepared to devote a considerable 
amount of American wealth, influence, and energy toward the
pachievement of that end". It was, therefore, the costs of 
multilateralism, in all aspects, which were to prove an 
obstacle to Republican leaders. The Internationalists were 
for the most part prepared to follow the Administration in 
pursuit of the liberal world economic order, and some saw
^Beard, pp. 419, 431.2R. N. Gardner, pp. 12-13.
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th is  as being co n sis ten t w ith the Republican tr a d it io n .  
R u ssell Davenport, fo r  example, argued th at . .th e  
c la s s ic a l  Republican fore ign  p o licy  grew d ir e c t ly  out o f  
th e ir  domestic p o lic y . We must now go to work on th is  a l l  
over again . I f  we are to revive a free  economic system , the 
fo re ig n  p o licy  must p lay 'a  major r o le . That i s  what the 
Republican era (as I  have ca lled  i t )  understood so w e ll”. “* 
Fortune magazine put i t  s im ila r ly  in  194-6: ". . . i f  we s e t
a sid e  the p etty  promises o f  le s s e r  Republicans and concen­
tra te  on the major promise o f  th e ir  party, th a t promise 
comes down to t h is :  b e l ie f  in  a dynamic and expansive Ameri 
can ca p ita lism  can yet be welded to the s p ir i t  o f  broad 
In tern ation a lism . But more: a dynamic cap ita lism  may in ­
deed be the one way in  which U. S. in tern ation a lism  can be 
given  p r a c t ic a l exp ression ”.^
The N a tio n a lis ts , however, were unimpressed. In the 
whole f i e ld  o f fore ign  economic p o lic y , the major c r i t i c  was 
Senator T aft. C r it ic a l o ften  o f  the p o l i t i c a l  asp ects o f  
p o lic y , Taft could n everth eless avoid a major part; foreign  
economic p o lic y , however, impinged more d ir e c t ly  on domestic 
p o lic y  which he considered h is  p reserve. The reaction  o f  
Taft and the N a tio n a lists  to economic m u ltila tera lism  was 
to  serve as an important lim ita tio n  on the development o f  
post-war fo re ig n  p o licy , fo r  T a ft's  views were shared by v ir  
tu a lly  a l l  sen io r  Congressional Republicans who were to be 
put in  s tr a te g ic  p o sitio n s  as a r e su lt  o f  the 1946 e le c t io n s
3R u ssell W. Davenport to  Alexander Smith, May 22nd, 1943, Smith MSS.^Fortune, July 1946, p. 2.
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T a ft's  reservation s about the foreign  economic programme 
.stemmed, in t e l le c t u a l ly  i f  not p o l i t i c a l ly ,  from h is  u n w ill­
ingness to accept the premise o f  the in d iv i s ib i l i t y  o f fr e e ­
dom. Rather than seeing the pursuit o f the l ib e r a l  world 
order as being v i t a l  to the United S ta te s , Taft was in c lin ed  
to see i t s  pursu it as being f a t a l  to domestic freedom, as 
he defined  i t .  His fea rs  about the dangers o f  such a pro­
gramme to the United S ta tes  led  him to question  every assump­
t io n  o f the exp a n sio n ists . He questioned the view , fo r  ex­
ample, th at economic fa cto rs  were l ik e ly  to cause fu ture wars, 
su ggestin g  th at the Balkans, the B a ltic  and Poland were more 
l ik e ly  causes o f  c o n f l ic t  than was poverty in  India and China. 
He denied a lso  that expanding overseas economic commitments 
were l ik e ly  to create good -w ill; with the growth o f so c ia lism  
and communism overseas, he f e l t  i t  was more l ik e ly  to be r e ­
sen ted . The U. S .,h e  fe lt ,w o u ld  become im p e r ia lis t ic , con- 
trary  to i t s  whole tr a d it io n  and way o f  l i f e .  Aside from 
th ese  larger q u estion s, he was s c e p t ic a l  as to whether foreign  
trade was as important to the United S ta tes in  terms o f narrow 
s e l f - in t e r e s t  as the In te r n a tio n a lis ts  claimed; and rather  
than fea r in g  th at unemployment would be the great scourge 
o f the post-war years, he feared th at there would be in f la t io n  
as a r e s u lt  o f  unsound f i s c a l  p o l ic ie s .^  l ik e  a l l  h is  genera­
t io n , T a ft's  views derived from h is  experiences and perception
5Congressional Record. 91, July 12th, 1945, p. 7441; I b id ., July 26th, 1945, p. 8 1 5 6 ; Kirk and McClellan, p. 1 6 3 . ^Congressional Record. 91, July 12th, 1945, p. 7442.«Ib id . .  A pril 4th . 1945, pp. 3219-3221.
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o f World:War I .  Reading Hoover's war-time study, America's
F ir s t  Crusade,brought back "the complete sham elessness with
: ■ 8which the A ll ie s  went a f te r  our money". In view o f h is  
perception  o f  the Hew Deal, h is  fears about post-war economic 
p o lic y  were not su rp risin g .
An in s ig h t in to  T a ft's  cr itiq u e  o f  post-war fore ign  
economic p o lic y  i s  afforded by a study o f  Henry H a z lit t , W ill 
D ollars Save the World?, which Taft apparently sen t to h is  
fr ien d s as required reading.^ H a z lit t ’s book argued th at  
the p o l ic ie s  European countries them selves pursued were o f  
fa r  more importance than any economic a ss is ta n c e  the United 
S ta tes  gave, and in  fa m ilia r  terms sta ted  th at the b est con­
tr ib u tio n  the United S ta tes could make to world economic re ­
v iv a l  was by "making i t s  own economy sound and strong and 
f r e e . . . ."  Amongst i t s  proposals was th at in tern a tio n a l  
lend ing to be restored  to p rivate fin an ce , which was con­
trary  to the plans o f  war-time Treasury planning, and a 
vigorous defense made o f cap ita lism  aga in st both communism 
and s o c ia l is m .^  H a z litt  a lso  sought to defend h im self and 
those who thought lik e  him from the charge o f " Iso la tio n is t"  
in  ways which undoubtedly appealed to Taft and Hoover:
". . .th o se  who b e liev e  th a t , in  place o f  government lo a n s, the b arriers should'be-removed <■ to p rivate  lo a n s, and th at our private  lending markets should be f r e e ly  opened up to fo re ig n  borrowers, are in  fa c t  the true in te r n a t io n a lis t s .  They see economic in te r ­n ation alism  as the freedom o f in d iv id u a ls  in  a l l  lands to deal f r e e ly  with each o th er, to buy from and s e l l  to each oth er, and to do a l l  th is  without having to run to  some n ation a listic -m in d ed  government bureaucrat fo r  a s p e c ia l l ic e n se  fo r  every tra n s­a c t io n .
Q°J . T. Patterson , Mr. Republican, p. 285. yI b id . , p. 584.I^Henry H a z lit t , W ill D ollars Save the World? (Irvington  on Hudson, Hew York: The Foundation fo r  Economic Education, I n c .,  1947), pp. 85-9 .
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"It i s  a com pletely fa ls e  in tern ation a lism  that sees  d ea lin gs between nations as prim arily dealings be­tween the governments o f those n a tio n s, as dealings between d if fe r e n t  groups o f  n a t io n a lis t ic  bureaucrats, each preventing th e ir  own c it iz e n s  from buying in  the cheapest market, s e l l in g  where they can s e l l  most p ro fita b ly , lending where th e ir  c a p ita l can be w idely used and properly safeguarded, and being allowed to indulge in  th e ir  own ch aritab le  in s t in c t s  in stead  o f  those o f  the bureaucrats in  charge o f  them.
"It i s  a fa ls e  in tern ation a lism  which can only in te r ­pret ’in tern a tio n a l cooperation' as meaning that the United S tates must be the perpetual innocent Candide among n a tio n s, or must a c t  toward other  n ation s lik e  a rather soft-headed Santa Claus. I t  i s  a fa ls e  in tern ation a lism  that looks upon 'cooperation ' as a wholly one-sided  a f f a ir  in  which one n ation  must lend or give without having anything  to say about how i t s  loans or g i f t s  s h a ll  be used.I t  i s  a fa ls e  in tern ation a lism  that ignores or r e ­p resses the freedom o f in d iv id u a ls in  one n ation  to buy or s e l l ,  lend or borrow, or cooperate as they  p lease with in d iv id u a ls in  another n a tion . I t  i s  a f a ls e  in tern ation a lism  that assumes i t  to be the r e s p o n s ib il ity  o f  the government, rather than o f  the in d iv id u a l im porter, to get the fore ign  ex­change necessary to make h is  purchases."1T
To Taft the f i r s t  v i t a l  step  in  the attainm ent o f  a 
prosperous world was the resto ra tio n  o f  freedom a t home by 
p u ttin g  an end to the New Deal. The la t t e r ,  in  h is  view, 
was synonymous w ith w aste, h igh  ta x es , unsound monetary 
p o l ic ie s ,  and the expansion o f  government a t  home and over­
se a s . Given h is  prime aim and h is  disavowal o f  the concept 
o f  the in d iv i s ib i l i t y  o f l ib e r ty , h is  in a b i l i t y  to compromise 
w ith  the A dm inistration over foreign  economic p o licy  i s  
understandable. For in  h is  view , the r e s u lt  o f  the Admin­
i s t r a t io n ’ s p o lic ie s  would be lo s s  o f  freedom and economic 
chaos at home, and no good purpose would be served abroad.
In A p ril, 19^5, he sa id , "I do not b e liev e  th at a nation  
which r e l ie s  on another nation  to a s s i s t  i t  in d e f in ite ly  i s
11 Ib id . ,  pp. 78-79.
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doing i t s e l f  any good. In sh ort, I do not b e liev e  that 
American d o lla rs  can make the world go round; and any gov­
ernment that has th at idea can e a s i ly  wreck the finances
o f th is  country and destroy our own standard o f l iv in g ,
1 2without doing anyone e ls e  any good .”. So once more, the 
bed rock o f  T a ft’s fore ign  p o lic y  was "A Strong America". 
"Nothing in  the economic f ie ld " , he to ld  the Senate in  July, 
19^5, "can be so h e lp fu l to peace as the adoption o f  sound 
f i s c a l  p o lic ie s  and sound p o lic ie s  fo r  the development o f
1 -Zindustry  and employment in  the United S ta tes ."  J
To a large degree, T a ft’s reservation s about New Deal 
economic and f i s c a l  p o lic ie s  a t home and abroad were shared 
by Herbert Hoover. Both men I n i t ia l ly  had high hopes that 
President Truman would change the course on which the United 
S ta tes  had been s e t  sin ce 1933; but both were soon to be d is ­
appointed. In May, 1945, Taft expressed h is  d is i l lu s io n  to 
Hoover: "Truman," he wrote," w i l l  be as much a New Dealer 
as R oosevelt. . . .E sp ec ia lly  he seems to be embracing the 
spending p o lic ie s  o f  the New Deal and the making o f huge loans 
abroad to keep up our employment in  th is  country. I can only  
hope th at he does not acquire the popularity  o f R oosevelt 
fo r  e le c t io n  p u rp o ses" .^  In October, 194-6, Herbert Hoover 
expressed s im ila r  fea rs  to  General MacArthur, whom he hoped 
would return and save the country: ". . .We are in  a muddle 
between le ft-w in g  and right-w ing th in k in g . The le ft-w in g
1 C o n g ressio n a l Record. 91, A pril 9 th , 1945, p. 3222.| ? Ib id . . July 28th, 1$45. p. 8155.1 «1. T. Patterson , Mr. Republican, p. 302. Por business percep t lo n  o f  Truman as a con servative , see L is le  A. Rose. A fter  Y alta : America and the Origins o f  the Cold War (New York: S cr ib n er 's , 1973), p. 96.
163
regim entation o f recent years has created a m illio n  b o t t le ­
necks in  production and d is tr ib u tio n  and i s  a t la s t  breaking 
down in  shortages o f food and other supplies in  the midst 
o f p len ty . The Adm inistration s t i l l  holds to the R oosevelt 
notion  that i t  i s  p o ssib le  to have to ta l i ta r ia n  economics 
and a t  the same time preserve other freedom s.. . .Yet the 
Government goes on spending as i f  the economic system could 
carry th is  burden o f taxes forever".
In the In te r n a tio n a lis t  c lim a te .o f  the immediate p o st­
war years, the views o f  Taft and Hoover were unfashionable. 
Walter IAppmann found Taft i l l o g i c a l ,  n a tion a l Republican 
lea d ers , sa id  Lippmann, were w e ll aware that the Party 
would get nowhere as long as Congress was dominated by men 
l ik e  Taft and Joseph M a r t in .S e n a t o r  Smith (N. J . ) con­
fid ed  in  h is  d iary th at post-war economic r e la tio n s  and not 
the U. N. would be the b ig post-war issu e  in  the Party; i t  
was, he wrote, a question  o f  whether the United S tates desired  
"to expand economic r e la t io n s  with other countries or con­
tr a c t? " ^  The fa c t  was however, th at in  Congress the Taft 
p o s it io n  was the dominant one. I t s  strength  in e v ita b ly  im­
pinged upon the p o lic ie s  and preferences developed by Dewey, 
D ulles and Vandenberg. Although D ulles and Dewey were com­
m itted , i f  not in  d e ta i l  in  p r in c ip le , to  post-war economic 
expansion, Vandenberg had s t i l l  h f t  h im self p len ty  o f room 
fo r  manoeuvre. Considering h im self a fundam entalist, he was
15Hoover to  General MacArthur, October 17th, 1946, Hoover MSS. 16T/fa shington P ost. June 12th, 1945, reprinted  in  Congressional Record? 9T, P. 5966.17j)iary, July 2 1st, 1945, Smith MSS. See a lso  en tr ie s  fo r  February 1 6 th , February 20th, May 3rd, December 2nd, 1945.
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very much in  sympathy w ith N a tio n a list  reservation s about 
the New D eal's perceived in ten tio n  to "give America away", 
and he was as determined to prevent th is  in  the economic as 
in  the moral and p o l i t i c a l  spheres.
In tern a tion a l F inancia l S ta b il iz a t io n :
The foundation o f  American post-war economic planning 
was the In tern ation a l Monetary Fund, an in tern a tio n a l body 
equipped w ith  funds to make temporary loans to members whose 
exchange rate came under pressure, which i t  was hoped would 
provide the s ta b il iz a t io n  between currencies which had been 
lack in g  in  the in ter-w ar years, and which was an e s s e n t ia l  
o f  the l ib e r a l  world order. Negotiated a t  Bretton Woods 
in  1944-» the same conference a lso  agreed upon a World Bank, 
an organ ization  designed to lend funds fo r  economic r e ­
co n stru ction .
Unlike the United N ations, the IMF and IBRD were not
the product o f  ex ten sive  b ip artisan  n eg o tia tio n s , although
1 8u n in flu e n tla l Republicans had attended Bretton Woods. 
I n i t i a l l y  a t  le a s t ,  not even eastern  Republicans were en­
th u s ia s t ic  about the Bretton Woods arrangements. Their 
scep tic ism  was probably a r e f le c t io n  o f  op p osition  o f the 
New York banking community, which preferred a b ila te r a l  
agreement w ith B rita in  lin k in g  the d o lla r  and the pound, 
plus a large loan or grant to meet B r ita in 's  immediate
1®Yandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 108-110.
165
1 Qfinancial needs. 17 The Nationalists,on the other hand, were 
concerned both about the large initial outlay which the 
I.M.F. in particular involved, as well as the fact that 
the United States would not have complete control of the 
money it put into the organization. Taft, in particular, 
was a prominent early critic of the scheme, feeling that 
the establishment of such a fund before the world situation
POhad sorted itself out was "to put the cart before the horse". 
Vandenberg also was initially sceptical, fearful that con­
trary to intention, the I.M.F. might simply prop up "printing 
press" currencies, and therefore, promote instability. 21
Aware of the difficulties that Bretton Woods would 
bring in Congress, the Administration made minor adjustments 
in 1944-45, and also initiated an extensive propaganda cam­
paign to create popular support by linking the I.M.F. and 
I.B.R.D. to the universal desire for peace. 22 Although ef­
fective, the campaign was much resented by Senator Taft, who 
felt that it was unconstitutional for the executive to spend 
public money to put pressure on Congress. In making his case, 
Taft quoted a witness before the Banking Committee who had 
described the country as "pathological internationally".
Some senators, said Taft, had said there was no point in 
opposing the plan since it had so much popular support.2^
u . Gardner, pp. 132-133.20New York Times. July 12th, 1944. Robert A. Taft to Fletcher, 
July 27th^ 1$44, Fletcher MSS.
21Vandenberg to Jesse P. Wolcott, July 27th, 1944, Vandenberg MSS.
22R. N. Gardner, pp. 129, 134-5, 140-1.
^ Congressional Record. 91, July 16th, 1945, pp. 7578-80, 
75b3-4: ibldT. May 3rd, 1945, pp. 4129-30.
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One opponent of Bretton Woods in the House complained about 
the way in which those who ". . .give some thought to the
welfare of America are branded today as ’isolationists' and
24-are condemned to the nethermost hell of public scorn".
Although no major Republican leader was prepared to 
oppose the legislation, there was an absence of enthusiasm 
for the Bretton Woods package. John Foster Dulles, for 
example, declined Dean Acheson’s request to testify in 
favour, since, as he told Vandenberg, he could not support 
the proposals "without considerable reservation".2^ Publicly, 
however, opposition was muted. Governor John Bricker (Ohio), 
the 1944 vice-presidential nominee, announced his opposition 
in April, citing Bretton Woods as evidence that the United 
States was being guided by Keynes, "the putative father of 
the spending philosophy".2^ Dean Acheson, Under Secretary 
of State, was meanwhile trying to build up bipartisan sup­
port for the package.27 By the end of May, the House Banking
Committee had reported out the Bretton Woods legislation
28with only three Republican dissenters. At the request of 
Acheson and fellow Under Secretary of State, William 0.
Clayton, Herbert Hoover evidently interceded with his 
friends in Congress to pass the legislation as a nonpartisan 
measure.29 Introduced into the House whilst the San Francisco 
Conference was in session, the bill was quickly and over-
ffobld.. March 6th, 1945, p. 1824.
25Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, March 12th, 1945, Dulles MSS. 
2oFew York Times. April 6th, 1945.
27Dean Acheson to Alexander Smith, March 12th, 1945, Smith MSS. 
28iiew York Times, Mhy 25th, 1945.
29Kerbert Hoover to O'laughlin, June 8th, 1945, O'laughlin MSS.
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whelmingly passed by the House, with only 18 opponents, all 
Republicans.3° With emotional internationalism at its height, 
the Republicans had been out-manoeuvred by the Administration. 
Acheson, delighted with the result, put the size of the mar­
gin down to "the panic of the Republicans over their absurd 
performance on Trade Agreements. They simply couldn't afford 
to be against every international measure, so they flocked 
to a man to vote for Bretton Woods". ^1 On the day the House 
voted, Dewey announced his support for the whole programme 
of post-war economic internationalism.32
Taft, however, remained unimpressed, and in the Senate 
led a vigorous opposition to Bretton Woods. Writing a minority 
report from the Banking Committee (signed by four of the 
seven Republican members), which described the I.M.F. as 
"merely a waste of money" and the I.B.R.D. as "an extension 
to the world of the theories so vigorously advanced by Henry 
Wallace", Taft's major tactic was to argue for delay, to wait 
until the shape of the post-war world became clear. The 
six-billion dollars the U. S. was committing to Bretton 
Woods could, he argued, be a useful bargaining factor in 
negotiating the peace. ^  In essence, Taft's case was simple: 
the Bretton Woods proposals were costly, badly thought out,
^ Congressional Record. 91, June 7th, 194-5, P. 5723.31Acheson, p. 108. The report of the House Banking Committee 
carefully linked Bretton Woods to the broad international 
situation: "The rejection of the fund or the bank would make 
impossible any further progress on international economic 
cooperation; and, as many witnesses testified, failure to es­
tablish the fund and bank would hamper the efforts now being 
made by the United Rations to establish an enduring peace 
structure". Congressional Record. 91, June 5th, 1945, p. 5547.
32ifew York Times, June 8th. 1945.
33lbid., July 15th, 1945; Congressional Record, 91. July 12th, 
T555’, p. 7440-7441; ibid.. July 16th. 1945, P. 7567.
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and not geared to the national interest. He could also argue 
with some Justification that the United States was being asked 
to put up its money in faith that other countries would agree 
to remove currency restrictions: he preferred to withhold 
the money until the world had shown its real intention to 
cooperate in the establishment of the liberal peace. Taft's 
attempt to delay final consideration on Bretton Woods re­
ceived enthusiastic support from many of his colleagues, 
although unsuccessful, 28 Republicans voted for his motion 
to postpone until November and only eight (including Vanden- 
berg) opposed.^4 On a further amendment motion, designed to 
change the articles of agreement of the I.M.F. by making 
withdrawals contingent upon compliance with the removal of 
exchange restrictions, Taft again carried more than a majority 
of Republicans.^5 jn presenting his amendment, Taft attacked 
Britain and the Soviet Union as economic isolationists and 
indicated his particular concern at Britain's currency res­
trictions.^ Although fighting a hopeless battle in terms 
of defeating the bill, Taft was clearly representative of 
majority opinion amongst Senate Republicans, and probably 
in the House. Senator Ball, an Internationalist who never­
theless had some sympathy with Taft's position, sought to 
patch up a compromise. Accordingly he offered an amendment 
directing the U. S. governor on the I.M.F. to propose to the 
Board an amendment restricting the drawing on the fund by 
those nations who retained exchange restrictions after 
three years.37 On this he was supported by Vandenberg, who
&bid.,
H i m - .37ibid.,
July 18th, 1945, p. 7680. 
July 19th, 1945, p. 7774. 
p. 7753. 
pp. 7776-7777.
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welcomed the proposal as underlining that ultimately those 
who made use of the fund, would have to "complete their end 
of the bargain".Vandenberg's support was consistent with 
his own philosophy, and politically astute: as always he 
was prepared to use Americantargaining power more than the 
Administration seemed inclined. He was prepared to support 
constructive amendments, but not those which would in effect 
imperil the whole enterprise.
In the course of the Senate debate, only four Republican 
Internationalists had supported Bretton Woods against every 
amendment, but on the final, 21 Republicans voted for the 
bill, whilst 14 voted against and three were paired against.39 
But Taft's defeat did not signal even a majority conversion 
to Internationalism. Some Senators were undoubtedly pre­
pared to go along, as Taft had alleged, because they saw no 
point in incurring unpopularity by opposing a measure which 
was bound to pass. The votes on the amendments had revealed 
the full extent of reservations about the whole foreign spend­
ing programme. Those who, with Senator Smith of New Jersey, 
were prepared to accept the whole International programme 
propounded by the Administration as an act of faith were in 
a very small minority. Smith wrote that his disagreement 
"with Bob Taft's able analysis was in the premise that there 
was no necessary connection between the political setup of 
the San Francisco Charter and these economic proposals.
In my own Judgement, most of the basic causes of wars are 
economic, and unless we are willing to tackle our trade
38iT3ia., p. 7779. The amendment was lost 29-46, but only 7 
,Republicans voted against it; ibid.39Ibid., p. 7780. ----
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problems and our monetary stabilization problems in a coop­
erative way with the other nations of the world, I doubt 
very much we will make very much progress toward the ultimate 
goal of world peace" Although Vandenberg had voted with 
the Internationalists, with whom he was increasingly identi­
fied, he had played a minor role in the debate on Bretton 
Woods; deferring to Taft, he had showed himself willing to 
compromise with Taft’s position. In his willingness to 
combine the vision of the Internationalists with the nation­
alists’ concern'that American interests be made explicit, 
Yandenberg was the perfect broker. Vandenberg’s relationship 
with Taft over matters of foreign economic policy could never 
be easy; yet he was ideologically close enough to Taft to 
be an authentic Republican spokesman, and an increasingly 
indispensable figure in the development of American foreign 
policy.
The Tariff
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme, which Secre­
tary of State Cordell Hull had developed since 1934, played 
an equálly important role in the conception of a multilateral 
peace. This programme was designed to increase American ex­
ports by the delegation of power to the President to reduce 
tariffs in agreement with other nations on the most favoured 
nation principle: the programme was designed to use American 
bargaining power to create a world economic system in which 
bilateral agreements, and agreements between limited groups
^Alexander Smith to W. Randolph Burgess, July 24th, 1945, Smith MSS.
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of nations, such as the Imperial Preference, would he out­
lawed. ^
The Administration's attempts to secure tariff revision, 
were arguably the most controversial of the whole foreign 
economic package so far as Republicans were concerned. His­
torically the Republican Party had always been associated 
with high tariffs. 2*2 In the 1920's, at the height of Ameri­
can overseas economic expansion, Herbert Hoover has defended 
the protectionist American tariff at the same time as he was 
striving to acquire free international access to raw materials 
and to push overseas investment.2*^  The Republican tradition 
then encouraged trade and economic expansion, but not the 
import of goods which the United States could produce itself. 
Although Republicans had originated the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements policy in the nineteenth century, it had been de­
signed then in bilateral terms for use against member nations
44to secure trade concessions for the United States. The major 
disagreement that Republicans had with the Hull programme, 
was that it was not explicitly enough linked to American 
trade interests, that it was too universal and visionary in 
its concept.
The 1944 platform expressed the traditional policy on 
the tariff. Whilst looking in general terms to the expansion 
of world trade "to repair the wastes of war and build an 
enduring peace", it also reiterated the need to protect 
farmers, workers, industry and livestock producers by a
JlR. N. Gardner, pp. 16-22; Lloyd 0. Gardner, p. 25.
42Beard, p. 431. '
ft3lbld., p. 210; Brandes, pp. 16, 215.
^Beard, p. 209.
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fair protective tariff, so that living standards should not 
be lowered by competition with cheap labour. This, said 
the platform, represented the "primary obligation", although 
the Party would "join with others in leadership in every 
cooperative effort to remove unnecessary and destructive 
barriers to international trade". But the conclusion reiter­
ated that Republicans would "always bear in mind that the 
domestic market is America's greatest market and that the 
tariffs which protect it against foreign competition should 
be modified only by reciprocal bilateral trade agreements 
approved by Congress".^5 The last sentence was a clear ra- 
jection of the Hull trade programme, with its emphasis on 
delegation of power to the executive, and its most-favoured 
nation agreements. In his first press conference after 
winning the 1944 nomination, Dewey had announced that he 
favoured reciprocal trade agreements: "You mean the Repub­
lican reciprocal trade agreement program which Secretary 
has been carrying out. That has always been a Republican
policy, which Secretary Hull has carried out ably, and which
46I hope the Republicans will continue to carry out'.' It was 
apparent, despite the attempt by Thomas Dewey in 1944 to 
paper over the cracks, that the R.T.A. programme would cause 
difficulty. The Administration's decision in early 1945 to 
press Congress for a three year extension to the programme, 
to give.the President authority to reduce or increase rates 
by 50%, inevitably posed problems for the Republicans.
^5porter and Johnson, p. 411.
4i>Cited in House of Representatives, May 22nd, 1945; Con­
gressional Record. Vol. 91, p. 4873. It was a recurring 
trait of Dewey*s to claim Republican credit for policies 
he approved of; thus the Moscow Declaration was once des­
cribed as the implementation of Mackinac, bipartisanship was 
his own creation, whilst the end to "appeasement" of the 
Soviet Union was the work of Vandenberg and Dulles, 173
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As it quickly became apparent, the Nationalists, 
firmly entrenched in Congress, were not disposed to sacri­
fice their traditional position on the tariff. The fact that 
the debate took place against the background of the San Fran­
cisco Conference and a general disposition in the country 
towards "internationalism” in the summer of 1945, appeared 
to make little difference. Harold Knutson (Minnesota), 
ranking Republican on the House Ways and Means Committee, 
and an implacable opponent of the whole multilateral peace 
appeared to reflect the dominant sentiment. To him it was 
a prescription for unemployment in the United States, for 
it would open the country to competition from cheap labour.
In 1934-, he chided, the proponents of the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Programme had argued that it would solve the prob­
lem of unemployment, in 1937 they had said it would help 
preserve peace, now they said it would restore peace. To 
the argument that a failure to pass the bill would mean a 
breach of faith with the world, Knutson supplied the usual 
answer: ". . .America can best help the world by being 
prosperous and strong and we can remain neither if we sur­
render our home markets to the pauperized labor of all the 
world".47 Like many of his Party, he was rankled by the in­
ference that anybody who opposed this and other "international"%
measures was an "isolationist": "An isolationist is one who 
believes in looking after his own country and his own people 
first. Churchill is one of the biggest isolationists of the 
day, and so is Stalin, and I hope to God I am, because I 
believe in looking after the American people. I believe in
A?Ibld.. p. 4884-5.
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the full dinner pail just as I believed in it 40 years ago." 
Only one Republican was brave enough to speak on the floor 
of the House for the bill, and he was given a rather rough 
ride by his colleagues.^9 tariff was debated in an acri­
monious, partisan atmosphere, with only seven Republicans 
joining the Democrats against a Republican motion to re­
commit the bill, which was lost by 212 votes to 181. The 
majority of Republicans held out to the end, voting heavily 
against final passage, which was carried on May 26th by 239 
votes to 15 3.^°
The Senate also appeared unlikely to offer any comfort 
to Republican Internationalists, for there alio the Republi­
can members of the Finance Committee voted with Democratic 
dissidents to strike out the discretionary 50$ authority in 
the tariff bill.Commented Cal O'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover,
". . .it was apparent that Dewey’s endorsement of the measure 
failed to influence them. This shows where he stands with 
the Party of which he is nominally the titular leader. 
Internationalist Republicans were, in fact, distressed at 
the situation which was developing. At one point, Senator 
Smith of Hew Jersey began to develop doubts as to the wisdom 
of trying to get R.T.A. through in 1945. He argued, in an 
analysis reflecting the optimism of the time, that if they 
waited a year, the high tariff people would be on the defen­
sive because of the high prestige of San Francisco.^2
5?Ibid., p. 4878.
49lbld.. May 25th, 1945, p. 5090.
50lbld.. May 26th, 1945, p. 5165-6; ibid., May 27th, 1945, Appendix P. 2600,
5l0’Iaughlin to Herbert Hoover, June 9th, 1945, O’Laughlin MSS. 
52Alexander Smith to Raymond L. Buell, May 2nd, 1945, Smith MSS.
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Smith's friend, Raymond Buell, although not committed to 
R.T.A. specifically, had in February stressed to Herbert 
Brownell, National Chairman, the fundamental importance of 
tariff reduction, "to prevent foreign trade all over the 
world from falling into the hands of government trade mono­
polies, which means economic totalitarianism". Without tariff 
reduction, he had argued, Dumbarton Oaks would not succeed.55 
Not surprisingly then, he disagreed with Senator Smith, ar­
guing that the United States could not afford to wait, for 
it would only create uncertainty. He felt that if leading 
Republicans, including Dewey and Stassen, and he thought Hoover, 
who had all attacked high tariffs, "allow Republican policy 
to be dictated by the isolationists in Congress, the results 
to the party I think will be serious".5^ He argued plausibly 
that the "old guard protectionist wing in the Republican 
Party has no other place to go. The strategy of the Repub­
licans should be to go after the independent international­
ists and liberals".55 However much Buell might have been 
able to harden the resolve of Senator Smith, and perhaps 
other Republican Internationalists, his arguments were un­
likely to affect the Nationalists. Senator Smith was to 
find re-election in New Jersey in 1946 more difficultt because 
of his support of Reciprocal Trade Agreements.5°
53copy, Raymond L. Buell to Herbert Brownell, February 27th, 
1945, Smith MSS.
54Eayniond L. Buell to Alexander Smith, April 30th, 1945,
Smith MSS.
55Raymond L. Buell to Alexander Smith, June 5th, 1945, Smith 
MSS.
-^Chairman of New Jersey Republican Finance Committee to 
Alexander Smith, September 10th, 1946; Smith to Maxwell 
M. Upson, February 19th, 1946, Smith MSS.
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As in  the other elements o f  the m u lt ila te r a l peace, the 
main Senate opponent was Robert T aft. As usual h is  arguments 
were p ersu asive. Every point made in  favour o f  R.T.A. he 
met: he could not accept that the U. S. needed the bargain­
ing power i t  would derive from R .T .A ., s in ce i t  already had 
p len ty  because o f  the r e h a b ilita t io n  needs o f other nations; 
he could not accept th at R.T.A. was n ecessary  to prevent 
England going in to  the c o l l e c t i v i s t  b loc , and thereby dim­
in ish in g  the prospects o f  a world-wide free  economy; he was 
unimpressed by the argument th at i t  was sa fer  to d elegate
ej7power to President Truman than to h is  predecessor. A l­
though p rofessed ly  an opponent o f  high t a r i f f s ,  Taft tended 
to  see R.T.A. as a measure supported by le ft-w in g ers  to de­
s tro y  the balance o f the American economy, and then to  argue
egth a t in d u s tr ia l concentration required greater regim entation. 
Thus Taft disputed the In te r n a tio n a lis t  th e s is  that R.T'A. 
was e s s e n t ia l  to the su rv iv a l o f  the free  economic system: 
l ik e  the other " international"  measures proposed, i t  was 
more l ik e ly  to im peril freedom in  the United S ta te s , which 
was, as always h is  f i r s t  concern. Like many Republicans in  
both Houses o f  Congress, Taft resented  what seemed to him 
the u n r e a lis t ic  and ir r a t io n a l way in  which the United S tates  
developed i t 3 fore ign  p o l ic ie s .  B rita in , he pointed ou t, 
showed no in te n tio n  o f  surrendering Im perial Preference, but • 
"we are to ld  to guide our economic p o lic y , not in  our own 
in t e r e s t s ,  but in  favour o f  in tern a tio n a l cooperation, i f  
you p lease" . He e s p e c ia lly  d is lik e d  the im p lica tion , pre-
57con gresslon al Record. 91, June 13th, 194-5, PP. 6022, 6029-30,
£U5o"I
58ibld.. June 19th, 1945, p. 6255; ibid., June 13th, 1945, 
p. 6O36.
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valent in the summer of 1945, that "anything proposed by 
the State Department must be supported, or else we are not
cooperating internationally".^
With Vandenberg away in San Francisco, the job of re­
futing Taft lay with the small group of unlnfluential Inter­
nationalists, one of whom sought to invoke Thomas Dewey and
/T r\Alf landon in Support. w The group included Smith of New 
Jersey, who after wavering for a time, spoke strongly in 
support.^1 In his diary he confided that his speech had "made 
a real hit" and had shaken up the Party. "God is guiding 
me," he concluded. Despite Smith's perception, however, 
he appeared to make few converts, at least among his own 
Party. On the vital attempt by Taft to eliminate the 50% 
discretionary authority, Taft secured a total of 29 Repub­
lican votes recorded and paired for. Only nine Senators voted 
against;^ 16 Senators, including Taft, opposed final pass­
age, with another five paired against.^
At a later time, Senator Smith was to refer to the 
vote over R.T.A. as decisive in dividing liberal Republicans 
from the rest, and to provide an insight into the thinking 
of the group of Internationalist Republicans, of which he 
was proud to be a member:
59Ibid., June 19th, 1945, p. 6255.
60rbid., June 13th, 1945, pp. 6041-6042.
61T5ld.. p. 6025.
o^Diary, June 16th, 1945, Smith MSS.63'jbe nine were Aiken (Vermont), Austin (Vermont), Ball 
(Minnesota), Buck (Delaware), Ferguson (Michigan), Morse 
(Oregon), Saltonstall (Massachusetts), Smith (New Jersey),
Tobey (New Hampshire); Congressional Record. 91, June 19th,
1945, p. 6258. o4ibld.. p. 6364.
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"There are many Republicans today, especially in the 
Senate who share my view that the world situation is 
entirely changed since World War II, and we must 
face the future with a new, clean page. Who those 
Republicans are can be surmised from the vote in 
the 79th Congress on the Reciprocal Trade Treaty 
extension. . . As I recall the Reciprocal Trade 
vote in the 79th Congress, the Republicans were 
divided about evenly, with the so-called inter­
national Republicans all voting for the extension 
of the Act without the Presidential limitation, and 
practically the same group voted for the Bretton 
Woods Monetary Plan.
"What motivated us was not so much the; merits of 
the legislation, as our insistence that we must sup­
port every measure that showed the United States 
as ready and willing and eager even to collaborate 
in any international movement for the preservation 
of peace. For example, take my own case. I never 
understood the implications of the Bretton Woods 
proposals clearly enough to have sound Judgement 
on those proposals from the standpoint of their 
scientific value, but I did vote for those proposals 
because they evidenced the willingness of the 
United States to go along with other nations of the 
world in trying to set up an over-all program for 
monetary stability."65
To the Internationalists, international cooperation had 
seemingly become an end in itself; their opponents, they 
were convinced, were living in the past. Thus Smith was 
later to represent himself and his group as "upholding the 
program of international cooperation to preserve the peace, 
with all that implies, as opposed to the old reactionaries 
who have tried to pull us back into a blind ostrich isola­
tionism'.'.^ -
Still, however, the Internationalist perspective was 
a minority one in the Congressional party; the majority of 
Congressional Republicans remained convinced of the prime 
importance of a ’Strong America’. In the course of the
^Alexander Smith to Otto T. Mallery, July 11th, 194-7,
Smith MSS.
°°Alexander Smith to Philip LeBoullllier, December 8th, 1948, 
Smith MSS.
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Reciprocal Trade Agreements debate, Senator Wiley of Wis­
consin, summarized this position:
"Around the corner there is peace or ■war. I believe 
that America should be made as strong economically, 
as strong militarily, and as strong politically as 
it is humanly possible to make it. I believe that 
only in that way can America become the real light­
house of the world, with its gleams of light radiat­
ing through the nations of the earth. Peace will then 
come. If we weaken American industry we do not help 
the world. All the world is looking to us, not 
simply for the dollar, but to see whether, in peace, 
the American idea will stand as it stood in war: 
or whether in peace, collectivist or totalitarian 
ideas which have come out of Europe can overcome 
the American idea. A healthy America Will permit the American idea to remain supreme.H67
The debates and roll calls in Congress revealed that Inter­
nationalism as an act of faith left most Republicans unmoved, 
especially when questions of appropriating American money 
were concerned. To get majority Republican support, foreign 
policy required to be framed in a more explicit Nationalist 
framework, a fact which increasingly made Vandenberg indis- 
pensable as a broker both to Republican Internationalists 
and the Administration.
Post-War Loans
The major emphasis of American post-war planning was 
on mechanistic international institutions and multilateral 
tariff production to provide a framework for peace and pros­
perity. At the same time, however, it was also recognized 
that in the period after the war, before the emergence of 
the stable political and economic order necessary for a 
multilateral system, there would be numerous demands from 
American allies for grants and credits to aid reconstruction.
^ Congressional Record. 91, June 13th, 1945, p. 6045.
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Rumours of such loans abounded from the time of the Quebec
Conference in 1944, when to the dismay of Cordell Hull and
Secretary of War (and former Republican) Henry Stimson, the
President agreed to make some six billion dollars available
68to Britain, partly through post-war lend-lease. Apart 
from the rumours of post-war aid to Britain, there were 
similar reports of a Russian request for post-war aid, and 
in February, 1945, a lend-lease agreement with France was 
published which looked suspiciously like a post-war measure.^ 
The rumours, inevitably exaggerated, caused a great 
deal of concern amongst Republicans from all sectors of 
the Party, and seemed to corroborate the suspicion that the 
New Dealers intended to establish their world W.P.A. and, 
that they were unaware of the limits to American resources.^ 
Cal O'laughlin had reported to Hoover that the proposal to 
aid Britain was likely to rim into trouble: "Indeed, if the 
anti-British sentiment which now exists should be intensi­
fied - and Republicans do not forgive Churchill for aiding 
the President's reelection - the proposal is apt to be 
thrown into the Legislative discard”. B e f o r e  this even,' 
Arthur Vandenberg had sounded a cautious note about post­
war loans in general: "Beyond primary relief, I think our
^^Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in 
Peace and War (New York: Harpers. 19477, p. 593; R. N. 
Gardner, p. 181.
&^G. C. Herring, Jr., "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins 
of the Cold War 1944-5” (Journal of American History. LVI, 
June 1969), PP. 93-114.
'uSee, for example, comments of Mr. Woodruff (Michigan), 
Congressional Record. 91, March 13th, 1945, PP. 2142-3. 
O'laughlin to Herbert Hoover, November 4th, 1944, O'laughlin 'MSS. .
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participation in foreign rehabilitation should be on a 
strictly business basis in the post-war period. We should 
extend credits; but they should be sound credits and not a 
mere bookkeeping (sic) device by which we find ourselves 
ultimately paying for our own exports (as in 1920-8). We 
have a very rich country; but it Is not rich enough to permit 
us to support the world".^2
Because of the rumours, and underlying concerns, both 
about the wastefulness of the Administration and the increas­
ing debt, the renewal of lend-lease in 194-5 was to prove con­
troversial. In order to remove the doubts, the Administra­
tion appeared willing to compromise, and accordingly accepted
an amendment by the minority members of the House Foreign«
Affairs Committee precluding the use of lend-lease for post­
war relief and reconstruction.73 Acceptance of the amendment 
assured a relatively easy passage in the House, with Rep­
resentative John Vorys of Ohio, a Nationalist, almost fulsome 
in his praise of the majority for having been prepared to 
adjust its views. In his view, "any foreign policy in order 
to have general support in this country must have the sup­
port of the kind of people, the kind of Congressmen, who 
were against going to war, and who are determined not to
turn over vast, unlimited powers to the Executive in peace-
74time, before or after a war". lend-lease was accordingly 
passed by an overwhelming 354-28 majority, with 27 of the 
dissidents coming from Republican ranks.75 Among the select 7
72Vandenberg to A llen  S h oen fie ld , July 3rd, 1944, Vandenberg MSS. '^con gression al Record. 91, March 13th, 1945, PP. 2120-2121. Z^Ib ld . . p. 2121.75TblT.. p. 2152. ' "
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group was Representative Knutson of Minnesota, who proclaimed, 
"you can go up to Canada and get all the beef you want, 
without points, without any restrictions. The reason is 
that Britain is not buying much beef up in Canada. She 
likes American beef with that lend-lease flavor. *76
In the Senate, Taft.provided far more formidable op­
position. Unlike the majority of House Republicans, he was 
not satisfied with the amendment that had been put in at 
their request, since it was nullified by a clause which, in 
effect, excepted any agreement made before the end of the 
war. He cited the recent lend-lease agreement with Prance, 
which he argued would almost certainly prove to be a post­
war loan, since it was unlikely that any of the goods would 
reach Prance before the end of the German war.77 Taft's main 
objection to the extension oftlend-lease in 1945 was on 
constitutional grounds: he felt that it delegated to the 
President a virtual blank cheque to make post-war loans.7®
In the course of debate it also became clear, as in the 
other foreign economic legislation in 1945, that he was 
fundamentally at odds with many of the assumptions of post­
war planning. Professing not to be opposed to post-war 
lending, he was prepared to be specific about the amount the 
United States could afford: two or three billions in the 
first year, two billion in the second, and one billion in 
the third year after the war.79 He then proceeded to disagree 
with the economic theories being used to justify post-war
Zglbld.. p. 2139.771'bid., April 9th, 1945, p. 3202. Under the agreement, Prance 
was to pay for any materials that arrived after the end of 
_Qthe war over a period of 20 years.7®lbld.
79lbld.. p. 3220.
183
economic expansion overseas: he could not accept that 
foreign trade was as important to the United States as was 
assumed; he did not “believe that foreign lending was a
solution for unemployment, the fear of which he detected
thebehind/spending philosophy; the real danger in the post-war
years would, in his view, be inflation, not depression and
unemployment. Taft's solution was simple and predictable:
post-war progress could only be based on "sound finance".
00The United States must get back to a balanced budget.
Although not all Senate Republicans necessarily shared 
Taft's overall view of post-war economic policy, on the ques­
tion of lend-lease he received almost complete support in 
194-5. Especially important was the position of Vandenberg,
who like Taft was opposed to any loophole which allowed
81lend-lease to be used for post-war reconstruction. Although 
inclined to put more faith in the word of the lend-lease 
administrator, Leo Crowley,than Taft was prepared to do, 
Vandenberg was adamant that Congress must have the opportunity 
to deal separately with post-war reconstruction. Whilst 
speaking of America's responsibility towards European recon­
struction, he also urged the Administration to prepare an 
estimate of the total commitments, balanced against a study 
of domestic taxes and expenditures. It was important, he 
said, that everybody knew what was contemplated, not least 
so that the world outside should not ultimately be disappoint- 
ed. £ As always, Vandenberg was careful to accomodate him­
self to prevailing party concern: "There is a bottom to
jjQibid.-. p p . 3218-3223. 
o * April 10th, 1945, p. 3244.82I H d .. April 9th, pp. 3199-3200.
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every barrel, even America's. There is a last straw which
can break any camel's back. A bankrupt America can be of
no ultimate help to the world".Taft's amendment to the
19^5 bill extending lend-lease was lost by the casting vote
of Vice-President Truman, who three days later was to succeed
Franklin Roosevelt. By carrying the overwhelming majority
of Republicans with him, Raft had demonstrated to the man
shortly to be President the need for the Administration to
84tread warily in foreign economic policy. In the first few 
weeks of the new Administration, a number of Republican 
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who had 
approved the compromise amendment to lend-lease, warned the 
President in a letter that any attempt to aid the allies 
through any loopholes in the lend-lease act would have
"disastrous consequences".^
From the debates in Congress, it was apparent that the 
overwhelming majority of Republicans were not prepared to 
oppose loans for post-war reconstruction in principle. At 
the same time, however, the Republican consensus required 
that such loans should be geared to the national interest, 
and that they should be closely scrutinized by Congress.
On these fundamentals, Taft, Vandenberg and the House leader­
ship were united. Where Vandenberg was almost certainly 
drawing away from Taft was over his estimation as to the 
amount the United States should be prepared to spend. Less
8?Ibld.
°4ibid.. April 10th, 1945, pp. 3246-3247; Harry 3. Truman,
Memoirs. 2 vols. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955), Vol. 1: Year of Decisions. 1945, pp. 47, 101.
°5Letter, May 31st, 1945 from Representatives Chperfield,Vorys, Mundt, Jonkman and Lawrence H. Smith, in records of 
the Foreign Economic Administration, cited in Herring, p. 111, note 80.
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certain than Taft of the self-sufficiency, either economically 
or strategically, of the United States, he was prepared to 
devote a significant amount of resources to influence the 
development of a friendly and peaceful world. Still, however, 
he judged policy from the "standpoint" of "enlightened self- 
interest". Still he would require a balance sheet to be 
drawn up, to balance commitments and resources, and to demon­
strate the self-interest of the United States. To the com­
mitted Internationalist, Vandenberg's thought processes 
appeared quaint and perhaps even dangerous. One of them, 
a State Department official, commented in later years, "The 
Conservative prefers a balance-sheet approach to world 
affairs even in an age when his ledgers, the,metal filing 
cases that enclose them, and the concrete and steel buildings 
that house them have a remarkably good prospect of being 
reduced to radioactive dust during his lifetime".®^ In his 
view, "the limits of our foreign policy are on a distant and 
receding horizon; for many practical purposes they are what 
we think we can accomplish and what we think it is necessary 
to accomplish at any.given time".®? Vandenberg, however, was 
never to lose his "conservative" approach to foreign policy. 
Like Taft, he had been brought up in an environment in which 
the innocence of the United States in relation to old world 
diplomats was an undisputed article of faith. He still 
required great assurances that the United States was not 
being an "international sap". Unless he could be convinced
86joseph 1!. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York; Harcourt, 
Harbinger edition, 1964-), pp. 261-62.
®?Ibid.
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of this, -lie would, always find It difficult to defend Admin­
istration policies to fellow Repuhlicans.
Herbert Hoover, who many Republicans looked to as the 
greatest, living expert on relief, reinforced the caution 
and scepticism of Congressional Republicans toward post­
war reconstruction. Hoover, who was Invited to the White 
House in May for the first time since the inauguration of 
Franklin Roosevelt, could throw all his experience behind
OOthose who urged caution in post-war lending policies. In
September, Hoover outlined his 12 point plan for foreign
89aid in a speech in Chicago.  ^The thinking underlying it 
was recognizably consistent with his known position as the 
dominant Republican in the inter-war years; he had not been 
appreciably affected by the multilateralism of the Treasury 
planners. Hoover advocated that all loans or credits should 
be reduced to commodity terms, that so far as possible sur­
pluses be exchanged with foreign countries, and that this 
be done through crediting the United States with local 
currencies to be used to purchase commodities when needed.
In addition,he urged, the United States should not forget 
the assets of European countries in the United States.
While he agreed on the necessity of a food and fuel programme 
before the winter, he felt that the United States must let 
the dust settle before committing itself to new aid; to 
help, he suggested a 5-year moratorium on inter-governmental 
debts. It was clear then, that Hoover was arguing for ex-
88por the efforts of Henry Stlmson to get Hoover to come to 
Washington, and his refusal unless explicitly invited by 
President Truman, see undated, untitled two-page memorandum 
in Henry L. Stimson folder, Hoover MSS.
^ Executive Club News (Chicago), September 28th, 1945, accom­
panying letter, P.J. Bowman to M.J. Connelly, October 4th, 
1945, OF 315, Truman MSS.
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tremely tough bargaining on the part of the United States.
He wanted total commitments to be limited, and for the 
United States to secure demonstrable advantages, for example, 
by insisting that there be no discriminatory tariffs, no 
dumping, no cartels, and no propaganda against the American 
system. His old belief in disarmament remained as strong 
as ever: lend-lease weapons should be destroyed, general 
loans should be avoided because they might be used for 
armaments and propaganda. Finally, he felt that an agree­
ment should be signed to reconsider the world situation at 
the end of ten years, to avoid the recriminations of the 
1920’s .90
Hoover’s statement was significant both as the state­
ment of an influential Republican leader; it also articu­
lated a mood which was sweeping Washington in the autumn 
of 194-5, which was reflected in the lack of sympathy which 
Keynes found for Britain's problems when he arrived to 
negotiate a loan in September,9  ^ To Hoover, like Taft and 
the majority of Congressional Republicans, foreign loans 
were not an economic necessity for the United States.He 
could not accept the complete identity of world economic 
interests which the One Woriders seemed to accept. He had 
no doubt that the United States must help (he of all people 
would not deny the humanitarian element in the American 
tradition) but he was adamant that ”we should limit our 
help to what our taxpayers can afford; we should consider 
our own employment situations; we should limit our aid to the
yiR. U. Gardner, pp. 190-1, 202-5.
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minimum necessary” and also "should do it with the knowledge . 
that we are doing it at a loss to ourselves but to aid man­
kind from the greatest disaster of all history".Like Van- 
denberg, and all the Congressional leaders, Hoover emphasized 
that there was a bottom to the .barrel, and that the United 
States owed it to itself and the world to look after its 
own interests: "American recovery and financial stability 
is the first need of the world. Unless we recover, no one 
will recover".93 Rfcat is more, Hoover was concerned that . 
if by its foreign economic policies the United States impaired 
its self-sufficiency, that would represent a serious danger
to its security.94
In the concluding months of 1945 then, the signs were 
that Republican leaders in Congress, reinforced by Herbert 
Hoover, were ill disposed to any further overseas expendi­
ture for matters other than humanitarian relief, beyond that 
already committed through Bretton Woods and the other minor 
agencies. Many in Congress had been restless for some 
time. With the war over, they were impatient to get the 
United States back on to a pre-war and preferably pre-Uew 
Deal footing. Attention in particular became focussed on 
United States foreign relief policies because of criticisms 
of the inefficiency of the United Rations Relief and Re­
habilitation Administration, which was financed to the ex­
tent of 70% by the United States, and in particular of allega-
92Wew York Times, September 18th. 1945.93iHd;— —  - 94ibid.
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tions that it was being used to consolidate communist control 
in eastern Europe. In the House, Republicans voted with 
only two of their members opposed, to cut off United States 
contributions under U.N.R.R.A. to:any country which prevented 
the American press reporting U.N.R.R.A. activities.95 yanden- 
berg, while opposing the House amendment, tools: note of the 
criticisms of U.N.R.R.A., and indicated that it must be 
the last year it operated; if further relief was needed, 
new arrangements must be made.96 The debate on U.N.R.R.A. 
revealed not only disquiet with Russia, but also the deter­
mination of Congress to keep fuller control of future Ameri­
can expenditure. It was in this climate that Britain and 
the United States signed their loan agreement in December. 
After the votes over lend-lease and U.N.R.R.A. in 1945, the 
omens for its passage were far from good, since the odds 
were that insufficient Republicans would vote for it to 
compensate for Democratic defections. "Ue have given our 
coat, vest, shirt and pants," said one Representative,"and 
soon we will have to Join a nudist colony."97
Summary
Congressional debate in 1945 revealed then that the 
majority of Republicans,either through conviction or a real­
istic appraisal of the requirements of party loyalty,were 
less than enthusiastic about the economic aspects of multi­
lateralism. Desiring to cut government expenditure, sus-
95congresslonal Record. 91, November 1st, 1945, p. 10305. 
96lbid.. December 17th, 1945, p. 12160.
°7ibid.. December 6th, 1945, p. 11572.
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picious both of the Administration and America’s allies, 
they were very sensitive to the possibility that again the 
United States would be taken for a ride, which was how those 
who spoke frequently regarded World War I. In the House in 
particular the leadership was conservative, and eager to 
take issue with the extravagance and weakness of Adminis­
tration foreign policy. In the Senate, nobody could challenge 
the leadership of Taft. Vandenberg certainly did not seem 
disposed to do so in economic matters: he still shared 
many of the concerns of Taft and the Nationalists about the 
dangers of foreign expenditure, as was to be revealed by 
his misgivings about the British Loan. With Roosevelt dead, 
the war over and the 1946 elections on the horizon, the 
Naitonalists sensed the opportunity to put America back on 
the right track. The prospect of a Republican Party led 
by Taft seemed suicidal to Internationalists. Thus Senator 
Smith was trying to persuade Vandenberg to be minority leader 
if Senator White, the purely nominal leader resigned.Luckily 
for the Internationalists, Senator White remained; it is 
unlikely that Taft could have been set aside. The strength 
of Taft and the Nationalists in the Congressional Republican 
Party was a fact which other Republican leaders, and ultimately 
the Administration, had to come to terms with.
^Diary, December 2nd, December 3rd, 1945, Alexander Smith 
MSS.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Russian "Menace"
Roosevelt and the Russians
The controversy engendered by Franklin Roosevelt's war­
time diplomacy with the Soviet Union has not ceased, even 
if the grounds of the debate have changed in the three 
decades since his death. Some writers, along with Republi­
can partisans, have charged him with lack of foresight about 
Russian intentions, with having.been duped by Stalin. Others 
have argued that by the end of his life he was coming round 
to the view of the Soviet Union that was to dominate official­
dom in the United States in the post-war years. Others have 
appeared to argue that he genuinely struck up a useful re­
lationship with Stalin, which had he lived, would have pre­
vented the Cold War. Still others, emphasizing the continuity 
in United States' policy in the 1940's, have traced the Cold 
War to Roosevelt's own war-time diplomacy, and his desire 
to extend United States economic and political interests 
especially in eastern Europe.1 None of these interpretations
1 The historiography of the Cold War defies easy classification; 
certainly the attempt to divide material into "revisionist" 
and the rest (unspecified) is unsatisfactory, although it is 
still in vogue. The current analysis has found the following 
recent books, of varying interpretation, to be the most 
useful: John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins 
of the CoId War, 1941-1947 (New York:Columbia, 1972)*Thomas G. ihterson. ed.. Cold War Critics (Chicago: Quadrangle, 
1970); Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of illusion: men and 
ideas in American foreign policy. 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quad­
rangle , 1975Tr"^brieTKo’lko, The Politics of War: The 
World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: 
Random, 19SSTT""James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier 
of Freedom (London: Weldenfield and Nicolson, 1971); Robert 
S7 Divine, Roosevelt and World War II (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1969j; Lisle A. Rose, After Yalta: America and 
the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Scribner*s, 1973).
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are totally satisfactory, and ultimately none are verifiable. 
There is ample evidence to substantiate each thesis, provided 
one is prepared to overlook the conflicting evidence. Two 
major difficulties, however, stand in the way of satisfactory 
verification of the hypotheses suggested: 1) Roosevelt died 
in 194-5, yet all the interpretations are based on a knowledge 
of and a positive attitude to later developments; ii) each 
of the interpretations r;.> lends an orderliness to Roosevelt's 
actions that overlooks both his pragmatism, and even the 
near chaotic nature of his administration of affairs.
If the larger issues are historically unanswerable, there 
are some things which can be said with certainty about Roose­
velt's policy toward the Soviet Union. As the war developed, 
he came to see America's relationship with the Soviet Union 
as being of increasing importance, not because he desired 
friendship with Stalin more than with Churchill, but precisely 
because he was aware of Stalin's suspicion of the Anglo-
pAmericans. At the same time it is apparent that his cautious 
attitude to domestic pressures combined with the military 
strategy of the war, prevented any settlement with Stalin 
of the festering Polish and Baltic problems, and therefore 
reduced American bargaining power without increasing Soviet 
good will. Exactly how he envisaged the post-war status of 
Poland and the Baltic States is unclear. Arguably he did 
not accord the matter first priority, and certainly there 
is nothing to suggest that he ever intended to use military
2Burns suggests that Roosevelt did not always see the impli­
cations of Stalin's suspicion, especially as related to 
military decisions, pp. 367, 373-4, 455-9, 582-7; he con­
cludes that Roosevelt was both a practical man and a dreamer, but failed to connect the two, pp. 607-9.
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force to impose an American settlement on the area; his 
awareness of domestic pressures against land commitment in 
Europe was too strong to envisage that as a serious alterna­
tive. The most logical explanation is, as numerous critics 
said in 19^4 and after, that he had no clear policy, that, 
as Burns suggests, he had an ultimate goal, hut no real con­
ception of how to get there. His ultimate goal involved a 
world in which the large powers, including the Soviet Union, 
cooperated in keeping the peace. Such a goal, as he may have 
perceived, would involve the United States making domestically 
unpopular adjustments, for ultimately the liberal world and 
close collaboration with the Soviet Union were contradictory: 
this was the fundamental problem of American post-war plan­
ning. 5
It is apparent that a major determinant of policy towards 
the Soviet Union was Roosevelt's perception of the domestic 
political climate, and especially of the sensitivity of the 
various ethnic organizations, most significantly, the Polish 
Americans. In the face of the perceived threat from Hitler, 
public opinion in the United States swung wildly pro-Russian, 
a fact whichjlike Roosevelt's postponement of the settlement 
in eastern Europe,was full of danger for the future. The 
illusion of a democratic Soviet Union, where, according to 
Life magazine, "Russians look like Americans, dress like
■^ Dean Acheson was critical of the unreality of Cordell 
Hull's planning, see page }X1 above; George Kennan was simi­
larly critical of the unrealistic views held of the Soviet 
Union by the Treasury Department, which seemed to think 
that the Soviet Union would willingly become part of the 
multilateral economic system*Kennan, pp. 293-295.
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Americans and think like Americans” was a distortion which
may have satisfied the needs of war-time unity, but was not
4a reliable basis for post-war Soviet-American adjustment.
A rose-tinted image of the Soviet Union was part of the
"internationalist” syndrome of the time (just as after the
war the counter-image of the Soviet Union was to be), with
critics of the Soviet Union naturally suspected of being
"isolationists”. Joseph Davies, former ambassador to Moscow,
apparently welcomed the controversial film, Mission to Moscow.
because "within six weeks after the first showing. . . all
of the leaders of the Republican Party. . . made public
declarations against Isolation, which the picture so elo-
5quently preached against".
An important aspect of the domestic political situation 
was, however, the attitude of the leading Republicans to 
the Soviet Union. It was important to Roosevelt because of 
the 194-4- election, his sensitivities towards the ethnic 
groups, and because of his fear that he might run into the 
same domestic problem as Woodrow Wilson. After Roosevelt’s 
death, the importance of the Republican attitude towards the 
Soviet Union was to Increase. "History" suggested the need 
for a bipartisan policy, which would have to be formulated 
in such a way as to win Republican support. It also suggested, 
with the outcry against the continuance of war-time restric­
tions, and public demands for demobilisation, the probability
¿Gaddis, p. 38.
•^Ibld., p. 4-5. For an account of the way in which Stalin 
replaced Hitler after the war, see Leo K. Adler and Thomas 
G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and 
Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 
1930’s-1950's", American Historical Review, LXXV (April 1970), pp. 1046-5TI
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of a return to "normalcy" and the restoration of Republicans 
to political power.
Republican Leaders and the Soviet Union; To 1944
The attitudes of Republican leaders to the Soviet 
Union, at least for the duration of the war, may best be 
analyzed within the framework already established. In 
terms of the Republican tradition, of which the Nationalists 
were the custodians, there was no doubt how Republicans should 
view the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1920's, Republican 
Presidents had resisted any idea of diplomatic recognition 
of the Soviet Union. In the eyes of many Republicans, Roose­
velt's recognition of Russia and his domestic policy were 
two sides of the same coin: both were considered the result 
of left wing influence, and a challenge to true liberalism.
Among the most steadfast opponents of the Soviet Union 
was Herbert Hoover, a grim observer of the process in 1941 
by which the United States had become involved in support 
of Britain and then the Soviet Union, against Hitler. When 
the Germans attacked Russia in 1941, he was quoted as saying, 
it "makes the whole argument of joining the war to bring 
the Four Freedoms a gargantuan jest".^ In his view it pro­
vided "one-half a dozen more reasons for the United States 
to stay out of the European war".^ The announcement that
^Quoted by D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins.
1917-1960. 2 vols. (London: Allen and Unwin, 19ol ) 1:136.
Taft saw a victory for communism as being more dangerous 
to the United States than a victory for fascism, ibid.
»Quoted by Robert Kuhn Jones, The Roads to Russia: United 
States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union ’("Borman, Okla; fr-ñl var­
sity of Oklahoma, ), p. 35. ,
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lend-lease was being sent to the Soviet Union he greeted with 
the comment that to align the United States on the side of 
"Stalin and his militant communist conspiracy" would be 
"as great a violation of everything American as to align 
ouselves with Hitler". Victory, he commented, would simply 
consolidate Stalin’s hold on Russia, and provide further 
opportunities for the extension of communism in the rest of
Othe world. To Henry Stimson, Hoover wrote that the United
States should at least secure agreements from Stalin to give
independence to those countries taken in agreement with Hitler,
but he feared "the administration will not approach this
situation in the light of grim reality but in the light of
our left-wing lamps".9 To Bruce Barton's sarcastic comment
that since Stalin was now their ally they should "apologize
to Earl Bfowder for having put him in jail and let him out
to lecture at Columbia and attend Bishop Manning's church",in
Hoover replied: ". . .Certainly it is notAeeping with our/ ^
national policy to keep him in Jail when we are trying to 
establish that particular brand of human kindness".1® In 
August, 19^1, along with Alfred landon, Charles Dawes, Felix 
Morley and other leading Republicans, Hoover put his name 
to a manifesto urging Congress to stop the slide into war, 
especially since Russia's entry meant that it was no longer 
a clear-cut struggle between liberty and democracy. 11
^Quoted by Lyons, p. 366.
^Ibld., p. 367.
1°Bruce Barton to Hoover, June 30th, 1941; Hoover to Bruce 
Barton, July 7th, 1941, Hoover MSS.
11 Johnson, p. 189; McCoy, Landon. 472-3.
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In 1941 then, Hoover was absolutely clear on the Issue 
of relations with the Soviet Union. He could not see how 
support of Stalin against Hitler could serve American in­
terests. He was not reconciled to the continuance of communism 
in the Soviet Union, let alone to its possible spread else­
where. Given these convictions, it is hardly surprising 
that he began to look with less than enthusiasm on the notion 
of the United States as forming a more permanent association 
with the Soviet Union as upholders of order in the post-war 
world. By 1943, with Russia*s military position considerably 
improved, both Hoover and Alf Landon were both becoming 
apprehensive about Russian post-war aims.^ 2 Landon even 
went so far as to advise Republicans not to endorse the 
Moscow Declaration in October, a statement which Hoover 
helped to clarify for public consumption: *'The Governor is 
deeply interested in securing a lasting peace but has rightly 
objected-to advance pledges of Republicans to commitments 
on peace settlements until those proposals are made known.
I should expect every sensible citizen, irrespective of 
party to hold that attitude".^ ideologically committed to 
nationalism, to self-determination and economic freedom, 
congenitally suspicious both of Roosevelt's secret diplomacy 
and of the Soviet Union, the Old Guard were by the end of 
1943 convinced that they were being proved right by events.
^2Eoover to John Cowles, October 9th, 1943, Hoover MSS;
McCoy, landon. p. 500.
1’Statement by Hoover, December 8th, 1943, Hoover IISS.
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The opportunity to express themselves publicly on the matter 
was limited by the climate of opinion which tended to identify 
criticism of Russia (or Britain) with "isolationism". But 
their suspicion of the Soviet Union was reflected in their 
suspicion of the proposal to put forward an identical foreign 
policy plank with the Democrats for 1944, and in their 
opposition to ¥illkie and the Republican 'One ¥orlders'.
In their view, ¥illkie merely mirrored what they regarded 
as Roosevelt's weak kneed subservience to the Soviet Union.^ 
In 1944, in the wake of rumours about Teheran, the first 
of the conferences between the three allied leaders, criticism 
of the Soviet Union became more outspoken. Loudest in con­
demnation was the Chicago Tribune. which concluded in an 
analysis in January that the decision by Roosevelt and 
Churchill to postpone political settlements meant that they 
"have actually agreed to accept the Russian map". J Perhaps 
not overly concerned about this, the Tribune was concerned 
about the prevailing notion of post-war cooperation with the 
Soviet Union: "Any pretense that Josef Stalin has any social 
or political consanguinity with the Englishman or American 
is absurd and dangerous altho Mr. Roosevelt came home with 
Just that affectation. It is possible to use such an illusion 
in fighting a war. As ingredient in a scheme of post-war 
collaboration an incongruity of such limitless range may 
fatal". ^  The Tribune had no doubt in 194-4 that Russia had 
effectively won the war, for which it blamed Roosevelt for
j^See page 61 above.
1 Chicago Tribune. January 3rd, 1944.
16lbld., January 18th, 1944.
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having neglected America's war and fought Europe’s. Roose­
velt's actions it explained in terms of electoral considera­
tions in New York State, and his relationship of "utmost 
intimacy" with Communists.^
Although seemingly extreme in its views, Col. McCormick's 
Tribune was an index to the concerns of Congressional Re­
publicans. Its respected representative on Capitol Hill, 
Arthur Sears Henning,reported in May all the rumours that 
were circulating concerning the Teheran conference held the 
previous December. The rumours, which seem prescient in 
hindsight, suggested that Franklin Roosevelt had agreed to 
divide Europe at the Elbe, that Russia and Britain would in­
sist on American troops remaining on German soil as long as 
their own, and that they would also want post-war lend-lease 
and relief from the United States. Henning reported that 
there was much talk on Capitol Hill of a Republican plank
to commit the Party to bringing home all the troops as soon
1 flas Germany was defeated. Approving the reports of its 
Washington correspondent, the Tribune hoped that Republicans 
would get a candidate and a platform which enabled them to 
make Teheran an issue in the coming election: "Americans 
who do not wish their sons to remain in an army of occupa­
tion overseas for an indefinite term of years are looking 
to the Republicans to prevent this from happening. Americans 
who do not wish their country to underwrite an unstable and
17lbld.. January 31st, 1944, February 15th, 1944, March 9th,
1944.18ibid., May 23rd, 1944.
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dishonorable peace from which new wars will inevitably 
spring are also praying for a. . .choice between alternative
foreign policies".^
In early 1944, suspicion of Head of State diplomacy 
was intense amongst the Nationalists. Taft in early May 
at Cleveland had reportedly described American policy as hav­
ing been "based on the delightful theory that Mr. Stalin 
in the end will turn out to have an angelic nature and do 
of his own accord the things which we should have Insisted 
upon at the beginning". According to Henning, it was 
widely regarded as foreshadowing the line Republicans would 
take at Chicago. Earlier in an article in the New York 
Times Magazine. Taft noted that the United States had no in­
tention of insisting on "the freedom of India or, apparently, 
even the freedom of the Baltic states or eastern Poland".
That, he believed, they were "not fighting for democracy 
except for our own" clearly did not prevent him from trying 
to get political mileage out of the issue. For Herbert 
Hoover, meanwhile, the announcement by Stalin of the division 
of the Soviet Union into 16 Republics meant the "Communistic 
enslavement of five - and possibly nine - formerly indepen­
dent nations". The Atlantic Charter, he concluded, had been 
abolished, add the world was left with three power centres 
committed to sheer imperialism.2^
l9Ibld.. May 24th, 1944.
20Chlcago Tribune. May 9th, 1944.
21 Ibid.
22New York Times Magazine. February 6th, 1944. ,23Herbert Hoover to O'Iaughlin, February 7th, 1944, O'laughlin 
MSS.
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The Nationalists then, were confirmed in their Nation­
alism "by their perception of Soviet policy. Ultimately 
not convinced of the vital importance of Poland or the Bal­
tic, they did not envisage fighting for it any more than 
did Roosevelt, but they blamed Roosevelt for having got in­
volved on Russia's side, for having neglected the Pacific 
war, and for giving Russia support without even getting 
political concessions. In their view, Roosevelt had ignored 
American interests and principles, and given way to Stalin 
out of a desire for some kind of permanent peace-time rela­
tionship between the United States and the Soviet Union.
To the Chicago Tribune the very concept of permanent rela­
tionships of that sort was fantastic, for "...any one who 
counts upon permanent friendships among great nations hasn't 
read history".2^ At the 1944- Convention, Herbert Hoover 
gave full expression to the underlying hostility of the 
Nationalists to the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Charter, he 
said, "has been sent to the hospital for major amputations 
of freedom among nations". He was greatly applauded for 
his references to British and Russian imperialism, and to 
the Republican determination to follow American self- interest 
also.2^
If the Nationalists approached the question of relations 
with Soviet Russia from a highly critical position, derived 
both from general scepticism about the notion of Big Power 
collaboration as well as from extreme hostility to communism, 
the Internationalists were seemingly more prepared to seek
^ Chicago Tribune. May 27th, 1944.
^ Hew York Times. June 28th, 1944.
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a working relationship with the Soviet Union. Most prominent 
in this respect was Willkie, who made no bones during his 
19^2 visit about the fact that he wished to improve the 
Soviet Union’s image in the United States: he apparently 
told his hosts that he would remain silent about anything
p/Tthat would create an unfavourable impression in the U. S.. ■
One World was in fact to be one of the most powerful argu­
ments for post-war cooperation with Russia that appeared in 
World War II. Confident of the vitality of democracy, Wlllkie 
apparently had no fears about communism. The United States, 
he believed, had no choice but to work with the Soviet 
Union: ”. . .knowing that there can be no enduring peace,
no economic stability, unless the two work together, there 
is nothing I ever wanted more to believe. And so deep is 
my faith in the fundamental rightness of our free economic 
and political institutions that I am convinced they will 
survive any such working together". ' Fellow Internationalist 
Harold Stassen. reviewed the book for the Hew York Times, 
and created some ill'feeling by criticising it for failing
to stress the dangers of Russian communism as much as the
28evils of British colonialism. Ironically Stassen himself
was to be seen by Vandenberg as.being pro-Russian during
29the San Francisco conference.. It was undoubtedly One World ' 
which gave Wlllkie his reputation of being pro-Russian, a
26Gaddis, p. 39.27willkie, pp. 84-5.
28johnson, p. 236.29vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 203,' 206-7, 215-6. !
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charge which was to he increasingly levelled at him in the 
year before the 1944 Convention.
Willkie's belief in cooperation with Russia did not, 
however, in any way modify his belief in dynamic liberal- 
capitalism; nor did it reconcile him to a Russian sphere 
of influence in eastern Europe. What he was equally opposed 
to, however, with memories of 1920, was the Republican Party 
seeking to make political capital out of the idsue.-^ As 
much as the Nationalists, he disliked the way Roosevelt con­
ducted his diplomacy. On the eve of the Republican Conven­
tion in 1944, he called on the Party to frame a policy which 
would "recapture America’s lost leadership". Roosevelt, 
he argued, had squandered America's moral and political leader 
ship through Ineptness, delay and expediency. Nd-4dr.thele.sa: lie 
stULavoided open criticism of Russia. He, unlike the Nation­
alists, believed in the Grand Alliance, and wanted it to con- 
tinue, for the sake of the United States and the world; he 
also wanted the United States to take a stand on the Atlantic 
Charter. ^ 1 The two aims would seem to be contradictory, but 
Willkie was not to live long,enough to be forced to make a 
choice between the two. On Russia, as on other matters, 
Willkie was virtually isolated amongst Republican leaders.
His desire to bring about good relations with the Soviet 
Union was shared by a few other Internationalists. Senator 
Austin, for example, resisted the overwhelming hostility
3^New York Times Magazine. January 2nd, 1944.
31 See Willkie's suggestions for Republican foreign policy 
platform, New York Times. June 18th, 1944.
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towards the Soviet Union for a long while after Willkle’s 
death. Harold Stassen was to have a famous interview with 
Stalin in 1947, but was to compensate:by an extremely re­
pressive stance on domestic communism. Uobody of any con­
sequence became associated with the Russian alliance in the 
way that Willkie did; in terms of the political realities 
in the Republican Party this is not surprising.
More important both for the future of the Republican 
Party and for the development of American policy were the 
attitudes of the centre group towards the war-time alliance. 
Of these, the man with the most clear-cut attitude was 
Arthur Vandenberg. In his newspaper days, he had supported 
the Palmer raids and taken an extremist line against internal 
communism and radicalism in the 1920’s.32 He had,in 1933 
been one of two Senators to vote against reeagpltiohfofi of 
the Soviet Union.Consistently anti-Soviet in the 1930’s, 
in 1940 he had called on Roosevelt to give assistance to 
Finland, and to recall its diplomatic delegation from Russia. 
Significantly, he had called on him to take no such action 
against Germany or Italy.34- Vandenberg’s background,then, 
indicated that he would defer to nobody in his suspicion and 
hatred of the Soviet Union. His sensitivity on this matter 
was heightened by the existence of a large Polish group in 
his constituency.
3^Tompkins, p. 26-7. He also prevented Robert La Follette from speaking in Grand Rapids against the war, ibid.. p. 20. 33yandenberg, Private Papers. p. 3 1.
34iompkins, p. 17o.
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Virtually from the beginning,of the war, Vandenberg 
had reservations about the shape of the peace that would 
emerge. At the time of Molotov’s visit to Washington in 
June, 1942, he confided in his diary, "Moscow has always 
been a shrewd trader - for Moscow. Will there be any ’four 
freedoms' left by the time this show is over? Will there 
be a paraphrase of the 'secret treaties' in World War 
Number One by which the Allies divided up the spoils in 
advance of victory and without any knowledge?" At the same 
time, however, he was mindful of the Russian contribution 
to the war effort: "I wonder if Russia isn't in position 
to force almost any 'price' upon us during the balance of 
1942 if she really wants to do so! How could either Britain 
or we refuse? Russia is doing a magnificent Job".35 The 
realization'that the Russian military contribution to the 
war inevitably strengthened Russian bargaining power was 
an important factor in shaping Vandenberg's war-time posi­
tion. He was not prepared, any more than Roosevelt, to 
take the risk of alienating Russia and fighting Hitler alone; 
he was not, however, contemplating a sacrifice of American 
ideals once the war was over; he was regretful that the exact 
shape of the peace had not been settled by the Allies at the 
beginning, but "I do not want to wind up fighting this war 
all alone. If we must quarrel with our Allies, I'd rather 
do it after victory".3° Vandenberg, then, was from past 
experience disposed to distrust the Soviet Union, he was
3|vandenberg, Private Papers. p. 32.
3°lbld.. pp. 45-6; see also, ibid.. pp.41-2.
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extremely sensitive about Poland and the Baltic, and his 
•whole inclination was to insist that the United States stood 
up for itself in its international dealings. Against this, 
was his realization that the United States needed Russia 
as a military ally* in realpolltlk terms it made good sense 
not to rock the boat until the United States was in a 
better position to do without Russian cooperation, and this 
was precisely what Vandenberg was arguing. Por him the 
Russian alliance was a military arrangement; he had no in­
tention of allowing that arrangement to commit him once the 
war was over. He was, because of his "constant reservations 
regarding the undisclosed commitments" of the Administration, 
determined also that the Republican Party should:maintain 
its freedom of action to enable it to criticise Roosevelt's 
dealings with Stalin.37
The positions of Dulles and Dewey were somewhat less 
clear-cut. Neither man had perhaps given the matter as 
much thought as Vandenberg, either in the pre-war or war 
years. Dulles apparently had favoured recognition of the 
Soviet Union without reservations or conditions before
Q
Roosevelt brought it about in 1933. His various writings, 
however, contained relatively little reference either to 
Russia or communism. On a war-time visit to Britain, Dulles 
was concerned at the pro-Russian atmosphere he found there.
In March, 1943, he publicly called for decisions in Finland,
3?a . H. Vandenberg to Alexander Smith, November 22nd, 1943, Smith MSS.
38(juhin, pp. 91-2.
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the Baltic and Poland to be based on values other than power 
politics.39 evidence,such as it is,is inconclusive.
Por certain, neither Dulles nor Dewey. wasrc regarded as 
friendly to the Soviet Union, Such a reputation on Dewey's 
part would have imperilled political advancement in any case. 
Neither, however, is there any evidence of great hostility.
If the matter of relations with the Soviet Union did exer­
cise their minds before 1944, there is no evidence of any 
firm conclusions being drawn, though Dewey later claimed
that "neither Poster nor I ever shared Roosevelt's delusions
40that the Russians were going to lie down and be nice boys".
By comparison, asserted Dewey, Roosevelt was "convinced 
that he was immortal and that he would be able to get along 
well with Stalin".41 Despite Dewey's claims, it is diffi­
cult to find evidence to support the view that Dulles was 
any more prescient than anybody else about United States- 
Sovlet relations. In March, 1944, replying to a corres­
pondent who gave him a pessimistic analysis of Russian policy, 
he agreed that the analysis might be correct, "but I think
42we must try to find some way to avoid the clash you foresee".
^^Address delivered to Federal Council of Churches of Christ 
.in America, New York City, March 18th, 1943, Dulles MSS. 
^Transcript, interview with Thomas Dewey, p. 50, Dulles (Oral). 
4*Ibid., p. 51. Dewey's later Judgements appeared to be 
distorted by hindsight; he credited Dulles with having 
kept the Federal Council of Churches on the straight and 
narrow by neutralizing the influences of men such as 
"Bishop Oxnam who was practically for having a merger 
.-between the United States and Russia. . ibid., p. 9. 
4^Dulles to Nelson B. Gaskill, March 8th, 1944, Dulles MSS.
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More reliably, evidence that he had not made up his mind in
March, 194-4-, comes from a letter to Dewey after, on Dewey's
behalf, he had been picking Lippmann's brains: "As regards
Russia, . . .1 do not-think anyone can have a very clear
conviction as to what Russian policy really is. Certainly
the Poles and a large majority of the Catholics feel that
the policy is essentially an evil one which we cannot get 
43along with". Mot surprisingly Dewey's New York speech 
in April, 1944, for which Dulles'advice was intended, was 
similarly cautious. The policing of Japan and Germany, he 
said, would not have "permanent value unless they fall 
within the setting of a durable cohesion between Great 
Eritain and ourselves, together, I hope, with Russia and 
C h i n a R u s s i a n  relations had not been good in the past, 
he said, although they were improving; but if they relapsed 
into the old suspicions after the war, the future would be 
dark.^ His speech was presumably designed to meet lipp­
mann's reported warning that if he did not speak positively 
of relations with Russia and Germany, "the impression created 
will be one of negation and strong tendency toward isolation".^ 
The manner of his treatment of the issue was, however, char­
acteristically cautious.
In their negotiations with Vandenberg over the 1944 
Platform, Dulles and Dewey were prepared to be pragmatic
^3pulles to Thomas E. Dewey, March 30th, 1944, Dulles MSS 
.,(Supplement).7_New York Times. April 28th. 1944.
4°Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, March 30th, 1944, Dulles MSS 
(Supplement).
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over the question of self-determination. The draft platform
Vandenberg had sent them had committed Republicans to the
restoration of self-government "to those who have been for-
47clbly deprived of them and seek their restoration". 1 
Commenting on Vandenberg's draft, Dulles and Elliott Bell 
wrote: "This adopts the most questionable language of the 
Atlantic Charter. We ought not be and probably will not 
be indifferent to the forms of government Germany and Japan 
will choose. It is doubtful whether the platform should 
seem to commit the Republican Earty to restore the prewar 
status of Poland and the Baltic States and not to divide
h Qup Germany". 1 Yandenberg was not entirely happy with the
Dulles-Be11-Dewey position; although prepared to exclude
Germany and Japan from the benefits of self-determination,
he felt that the general "wish" to restore sovereign rights
should be expressed: "I do not consider it a commitment
to 'restore the pre-war status of'Poland and the Baltic 
r
States'. It is, however, a gesture in this general direc­
tion so far as practicable; and I think we are entitled to
49take advantage of this tremendous political potential." 
Vandenberg's letter was written against the background of 
rumours about Teheran and other war-time conferences. In
^Memorandum, p. 4, accompanying letter, Dulles to Thomas 
,0E. Dewey, May 16th, 1944, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
Yglbld.
H. Vandenberg to Thomas E. Dewey, May 22nd, 1944, copy 
in Dulles MSS (Supplement). See also Gaddis, p. 146.
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early May, Vandenberg had made, reference to this in a 
Senate speech: "The cause of Poland needs something more 
than anniversary speeches. It needs constant, relentless 
sponsorship and fealty in high places. It needs them at 
Casablanca and Quebec and Moscow and Teheran, and at other 
supreme conferences to come".5° The day after Vandenberg's 
letter to Dewey, Senator Bridges of New Hampshire delivered 
a vitriolic attach in the Senate on Roosevelt’s foreign 
policy, and challenged the whole notion of the Russian 
alliance: ". . .any attempt to corner control of the inter­
national organization. . . is doomed to failure at the outset 
if appeasement of a lawless and ostracised totalitarian 
state is made the cornerstone of such-a policy". 1^ Dewey 
was not prepared to damn the whole Big Pour concept, which 
alone would have satisfied the Nationalists; but apparently 
his supporters let it be known that he would withhold any 
commitmentt of United States forces to maintain a peace
settlement, pending an agreement by the Soviet Union to
cpbring about a just peace in eastern Europe. At the Con­
vention itself, the Resolutions Committee amended the plat­
form to eliminate the phrase inserted by Vandenberg at 
Dulles’ suggestion, to except the Axis from the benefits 
of self-determination. This meant that the platform as
^°Chicago Tribune, May 4th, 1944.
51 Ybid., May 24th, 1944. ' * ■
52ibid., June 7th, 1944.
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finally approved committed Republicans to restore "sover­
eignty and self-government" to all "the victims of ag- 
gression", not just the victims of the A2cis.-^ At the time 
this was interpreted as having special relationship to Rus­
sian post-war aims, especially in Germany, eastern Poland, 
the Baltic States and Bessarabia.^ If the latent hostility 
to the Soviet Union did not come to the surface much during 
the Convention, this was understandable in the light of Re­
publican leaders’ desires not to be associated with a negative 
anti-war, "isolationist" image, but the reaction to Herbert 
Hoover's speech demonstrated the potential of anti-Soviet 
rhetoric among the Republican rant and file.^ Vigorous 
opposition to the Soviet Union was thoroughly in keeping with 
the concept of a Strong America which underlaid the foreign 
policy platform agreed upon at Chicago; that this opposition 
was not explicit was understandable in view of the fact 
that the United States was fighting a major war with the 
Soviet Union as its principal military ally. Other than 
Willkie, few Republicans appeared to see the maintenance of 
post-war friendship with the Soviet Union as being of 
prime importance to the United States or the world; of more 
importance was the belief that any Russo-American relation­
ship should be on terms more deferential to American interests 
and ideals.
For Republican leaders the question of relations with 
the Soviet Union was difficult to handle in the 1944 campaign.
53porter and Johnson, p. 408.
54New York Times, June 28th, 1944.
55see page20"2 above.
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The nationalists, who had no doubts about Russian untrust­
worthiness, were a major limitation on any over-enthusiastic 
embrace of the Big Pour idea. At the same time, however, 
the majority of Americans were apparently in a mood to trust 
the Soviet Union: an August poll found that only 20% expected 
the Soviet Union to try to spread communism after the war.^ 
At the same time, Internationalists regarded criticism of 
either major ally as a litmus test for identifying isola­
tionists. Ona; of the "lessons" from World War I was that 
the war-time allies must not allow their differences to 
divide them in the pursuit of a lasting peace, and there 
was, in view of memories of 1920, an added peril for Re­
publicans to seem to be the protagonists of allied dlsiinity. 
The charge made by the Soviet periodical, War and the Working 
Class. that Hoover and the Republican Old Guard "do not want 
the kind of foreign political alliance that now exists be­
tween the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union" 
was accurate, and potentially damaging to Republican hopes. ^  
These opposing factors inevitably limited Dewey's freedom 
of manoeuvre, although the ethnic vote was a further factor 
which inevitably impinged on attitudes to the Soviet Union.
In the event, Dewey taok the characteristic way out: he 
avoided any pointed criticism of the Soviet Union, but by 
numerous comments on tangential issues he let it be known 
where his sympathies lay.
Relations with Russia, as such, were not an is sue" in 
felted in Gaddis, p. 56.
5 'Quoted in New York Times. September 23rd, 1944.
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the 1944 campaign. Nevertheless Dewey’s emphasis In 1944
on attacking the complex of issues embraced by the terms,
secret diplomacy, power politics and big power domination,
and his attempt to identify himself with the rights of small
nations, was a fair guide to his Inclinations. In a Polksh
and Llthuraniste area in Pennsylvania, for example, Dewey
attacked Roosevelt for his secrecy, whilst hinting at what
he suspected was the reason for the secrecy: "He has not
told us the nature of his secret conferences with Marshal
Stalin. . .The small nations are being disposed of without
the American people being told about what is happening to 
59them”. Also of some relevance was the continuous exploita­
tion of the "issue" of domestic communism by vice-presidential 
candidate, John Bricker, and other lesser orators. Roose­
velt was evidently sufficiently worried by this to repudiate 
communist support, to which Bricker commented, "The American , 
people will believe him in that, statement when he fires 
from high office the last Communist who draws Federal pay".^ 
At Cleveland, in the final address of his campaign, Bricker 
said that the greatest issue of the election was the ques­
tion of whether communist influence was to take control of 
the United States government.^1 More subtly, Dewey used the 
same issue. At Muncie, Indiana he spoke of his determination
^Gaddis, pp. 58-9; Westerfield, pp. 188-9.^ New York Times, November 3rd, 1944.
^ New York Times, October 7th, 1944.
°'Ngw York HeraTd Tribune. November 5th, 1944.
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to remove the infuence of Earl Browder from national affairs,
and referred to Browder as "the head of the Demo - I mean
Communist party".  ^ In Boston in November, Dewey again dealt
with the issue of communism, although mating it clear that
his opposition to domestic communism had no connection with
relations with the Soviet Union. J Despite Dewey’s disclaimer,
the fact that such a speech was made in a strongly Catholic
area was undoubtedly designed to exploit ethnic sensitivity
to European developments. Privately Dewey gave pledges to
64leaders as to his support for their cause. The attack on 
domestic communism and secret diplomacy did not meet their 
demand, for an outspoken denunciation of perceived Soviet 
intentions, but it was as far as Dewey could safely go in 
the delicate situation of 1944. "I-would not for the world 
make any specific promises to our American Poles unless and
until I could see the way clear to make good on the promises,"
66wrote Vandenberg. "Yet I cannot escape the conviction that 
the relationship between Roosevelt and Stalin must be 
interrupted and broken if there is to be a fair chance for 
Polish post-war equities as you and I conceive them. I 
cannot escape the conviction that the real fight for Poland 
will have to be made by Republicans regardless of whether 
they are in the majority or minority.”^  Although he did
^ New York Times, September 28th, 1944.
“-^ Gaddis, p. 59. Evidently, as had been the case with Hoover's 
Convention speech, Dewey’s reference to communism was en­
thusiastically received by his audience, John Richardson 
,^,to Hoover, November 13th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
^Gaddis, p. 147.
°^Vandenberg to George M. Montross, August 2nd, 1944, Vanden­
berg MSS. Vandenberg, Private Papers. pp. 122-23.
°°Vandenberg to Prank Januszewski, October 31st, 1944, Vanden- 
^berg MSS.
6?Ibid.
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not want to play politics with the issue, and felt it would 
be unfortunate if Polish-Amerlcan organizations endorsed 
Dewey, nevertheless, "If there 3Ls_ any spokesman in this cam­
paign for the smaller countries of Europe (and particularly
68for Poland) it certainly must be Governor Dewey".
An insight into the difficulties presented by the issue 
can be gained by reference to the press conference held by 
Dewey and Dulles after the attack by the former on the Dum­
barton Oaks conference. Asked about their position on the 
question of the post-war policing of Germany, Dulles spoke 
of the fact that neighbouring countries might be asked to 
share: an important point in view of the stated Republican 
desire to bring United States troops home as soon as possible. 
Asked whether Poland, Lithuania and Estonia would participate, 
he replied: "Well, their future is subject to vicissitudes 
not present in the case of others". At this point the more 
politically experienced Dewey cut in, "You'd mean Poland 
to have a full share". "I'd suppose Poland would want a 
full share," said Dulles, "Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
would play a part either as states themselves or as states 
of the Soviet U n i o n . F u r t h e r  insight is afforded by 
Dewey's attack, later in the campaign, on the armistice 
agreement which the Soviet Union signed on behalf of the 
Allies with Rumania.^ To Dulles' annoyance, Walter Lipp- 
mann used the attack to announce his endorsement of Roose-
^New York Times, August 20th. 1944. 
' °Ibld7T (Tctober 19th, 1944.
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velt on the grounds of Dewey’s inexperience.^1 Idppmann’s 
endorsement of Roosevelt revealed the extent of the diffi­
culties Inherent in any attack on the Soviet Union. Dulles 
°hided Lippmann that "all Poles who want their country free 
will be heartened by knowing that some of us still believe 
in what Mr. Roosevelt professed, in 1941, were our ’prin­
ciples’".^ In 194-4, Internationalism embraced the con- 
/cept of the Big Four alliance. The mass madia, purveyors 
of the prevailing ideology, were very sensitive to anything 
which might imperil the brave new world which seemed about 
to dawn.^3 Democratic orators were not slow to attack Re­
publican leaders for their attitude to the Soviet Union, 
and to warn of the dangers of putting into office a man , 
who had opposed recognition of the Soviet Union as late 
as 1940,and who might have difficulty in persuading Stalin 
to cooperate in the defeat of Japan.^
In conclusion then, the centre group of Republican 
leaders embraced the Russian alliance without enthusiasm 
and full of doubts. If the centre group did not share the 
dire forebodings of Nationalists such as Hoover, neither 
did they share the enthusiasm which Willkie had previously 
manifested for closer relations with the Soviet Union.^5
^1Clipping from New York Herald Tribune, October 21st, 1944,
Thomas E. Dewey file. Democratic National Committee Library MSS.72]Duiles to Walter Lippmann, October 22nd, 1944, Dulles MSs(Supp. ).
73Ros’e, pp. 4-10; for general account of war-time optimism,
Ekirch, on. clt.743peec]ies by Franklin Roosevelt and James Byrnes, New York 
Times, October 22nd, 1944 and October 31st, 1944.
7^By August, 1944, Hoover was full of forebodings: . .the
Stalin form of communism seems certain for Poland, Estonia, 
Iatvla, Lithuania, Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria and Roumania. De 
Gaulle looks like the introducer of it to France, and if 
the 'Free Germany Committee' in Moscow is Installed in Berlin, 
it probably will pervade there also. The Communist sections 
of China seem to be a base for its extension there." Hoover 
to William E. Barrett, August 4th, 1944, Hoover MSS.
217
To an English friend, Dulles wrote in September, ”1 am 
afraid that nothing inspiring will come out of Dumbarton 
Oaks, largely because the idifferent Russian philosophy makes 
it extremely difficult to produce anything which Anglo-Saxons 
would regard as fundamentally sound and inspiring" jf 
he was not pessimistic, neither did he see the Russian re­
liance in optimistic terms. In an interview with a French 
journalist after the campaign, Dulles expressed his confidence 
that an amicable relationship could be worked out, and express­
ing an idea that was to become well-known later, said that 
friendly competition would be advantageous. Vandenberg, 
closer to the Rationalists, to the Midwest, and to his Polish 
constituents, was always more sceptical. The only hope he 
had seen for Poland, and the U. S., was for Roosevelt to be 
defeated thereby breaking his relationship with Stalin. Amongst 
the conclusions he drew from the election was that the majority 
of the electorate were not very worried about communism.
But he did not accept this as the final verdict.
1945: Vandenberg and the Soviet Union
Despite the election defeat, Republican leaders, and 
especially Vandenberg in the;Senate, were in a strategic 
position to.influence the general direction of American 
diplomacy. With so many hopes pinned on American membership 
of post-war international organization, the two-thirds rule 
in the Senate made it essential that the bipartisan foreign
^°Dulles to Lionel Curtis, September 19th, 1944, Dulles MSS 
__(Supplement).
''Transcript accompanying letter from Yvonne Daumarie to 
Dulles, December 21st, 1944, Dulles MSS.
?sGaddis, p. 61.
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policy consensus be extended beyond the small group of Re­
publican Internationalists. As things nationally and inter­
nationally seemed to be going wrong in the final weeks of 
1944, the nation seemed headed for another partisan wrangle 
over the structure of peace and America's relation to it 
such as had split the nation after World War I. Dulles, in 
a telegram to a meeting of Boston women Republicans in 
January, commented:
"You are meeting at a time when some feel discouraged 
because our party, by a narrow popular margin, fell 
short of taking over the national administration.
That failure was, in part, due to the feeling of many 
that President Roosevelt had a unique capacity to deal 
with foreign affairs and had attained a harmonious 
working relationship with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin which ought not to be disturbed. 
Evidence to the contrary was hidden from most, by the 
veil of secrecy.
Wow the truth is beginning to come out so that all 
can see. That truth is so serious the Republicans 
cannot afford themselves the luxury of taking par­
tisan satisfaction out of it. During the campaign 
the Republican Party said that it could better lead 
this nation to victory in war and to lasting peace.
If we have that capacity, and I believe we do have 
it, then we have a subsisting duty. A party which 
in the national campaign polled nearly forty-eight 
percent of the popular vote can surely find a way 
to make the contribution of which it is capable to 
the attainment of these two great ends which trans­cend partisanship."79
Dulles' comments reflect the disillusion and uncer-
Oqtainty of the period before Yalta. In the wake of Chur­
chill's visit to Moscow to meet Stalin, and his report to 
the House of Commons on their bilateral talks, Republican 
leaders (and many Democrats) were outraged. Taft commented
"^Telegram, Dulles to Mrs. Katherine G. Howard, January 9th, 
1945, Dulles MSS.°03ee page 101 above.
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that they were seeing "the end of the Atlantic Charter and
8lthe beginning of power politics". Vandenberg, although 
prepared to admit that factors of expediency would have to 
be consulted, felt that "it would be a shocking thing if so 
fundamental a question" as the future of Poland "were to 
be determined to suit the self-interests of Moscow and 
London. . He was critical of the Administration for
its apparent lack of concern; "¥e should not be the only
82silent partner in this high command". A few days later, 
he returned to the attack, complaining that "mere sympathetic 
words are not enough to stop the next partition of heroic 
Poland. The chiefs of state are speaking in other countries 
in complete denial of the Atlantic Charter.Referring 
to Churchill’s comment that Roosevelt had been kept informed 
of developments, he commented, "Under such circumstances 
silence gives consent. It is for our chief of state to tell
OAus what are our commitments and our purposes".
It was, therefore, against the background of mounting 
concern Tilth the fate of Poland in particular that Vandenberg 
prepared to deliver his celebrated speech of January 10th, 
1945. On January 7th, Arthur Sears Hennings had written 
of a likely "full dress" debate on foreign policy, with both 
Vandenberg and Shlpstead (Republican, Minnesota) planning 
an attack on Roosevelt for being outwitted by Churchill and
§1Chicago Tribune, December 16th, 1944.
§llbid.y ibld.. December 19th, 1944.
82*Tbid. Rote that Herbert Brownell’s attempt to identify 
Dewey with the prevailing criticism brought a fierce 
attack from the Chicago Tribune, hearkening back to his 
failure to attack Roosevelt's foreign policy during the 
campaign, ibid., December 19th, 20th, 27th, 1944.
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S t a l i n . T h i s ,  not a renunciation of "isolationism", was
the purpose of the speech which Vandenberg rose to deliver.^
✓
The Daily Worker not surprisingly viewed it as an anti- 
Soviet s p e e c h . xn the State Department also it was ap­
parently viewed largely in the light of the proposals it
88put forward for dealing with the Soviet Union. The Inter­
nationalists, Austin, and Warren,also did not see it as a 
sign that Vandenberg had suddenly joined their ranks. The 
leading Republican Internationalist in the Senate, Austin, 
whilst welcoming the speech largely in terms of Vandenberg's 
progress along the road to "international cooperation", 
felt that Vandenberg had put the cart before the horse by 
putting the questions of disarmament of Germany and Japan 
above the new League.^ Austin's comment offers a key in­
sight into the contrasting thought processes which still 
divided Vandenberg from the Internationalists.
One major result of Vandenberg's speech is that:it 
confirmed him as the leading Republican spokesman on foreign 
policy. For the next four years at least, he could not be 
ignored either by the Administration or by foreign countries.
It meant then, that a significant role in policy approval, 
and even formulation, was as henceforth to be accorded to 
a.Republican who, although a pragmatist, was in the same
^ Ibld., January 8th, 1945.
°°The best analysis of this speech, although it differs
on some points from the present approach, is in Rose, pp. 16-
o7 2 ° .Vandenberg. Private Papers, pp. 143-44.
88Russell, pp. 485-6.89Report, "Add Vandenberg", January 13th, 1945, Mcllaughton 
MSS.
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Nationalist tradition as Henry Cabot Lodge. It also meant 
increased power to a man who had always been amongst those 
most hostile to the Soviet Union. Prom this it should not 
be inferred that Vandenberg wanted to bring about a break 
with the Soviet Union. All the evidence would suggest that 
in fact he saw cooperation with the Soviet Union as desirable. 
The point, however, was that he viewed Soviet-American rela­
tionships from the standpoint of American self-interest, and 
he was determined in so far as he was able, to change the 
terms of the relationship, which, he felt with good military 
justification, had veered too much towards the Soviet Union 
during the war. In the final analysis, however, he pre­
ferred a break with the Soviet Union to a continuance of 
what he regarded as a one-sided alliance.
In early 194-5 the other members of the centre group, 
Dulles and Dewey, took a cautious, though not hostile, line 
on the question'of post-war relations with Russia. In 
Detroit in February, Dulles gave what he perceived to be the 
Russian side of the case: ". . .The Soviets on their side 
have little reason to trust us. We opposed their revolution. 
We gave military aid to the counter-revolutionists. For 
many years we sought to prevent their having economic and 
diplomatic intercourse with the rest of the world. Our 
public leaders denounced them up to the moment when Germany's 
attack made us perforce comrades in arms.’’^ 0 To writer Eugene
9°Address, Economic Club of Detroit, February 5th, 194-5,
Dulles MSS.
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Lyons, who took issue with this statement, Dulles replied,
"The very fact that millions of Americans share your view 
that we should distrust Russia is, I think, a reason why 
Russia should distrust us. Trust only thrives in an atmos­
phere of mutuality". ^  In the same address in Detroit,
Dulles did speak, however, of the need for the United States 
to establish long-range goals in keeping with its ideals, 
to battle for those Ideals, and even where "partial defeat"
seemed inevitable, to ensure that "no particular defeat is 
92final". Thomas Dewey, in his first appearance in Washington 
since his election defeat, gave general assent to interna­
tional cooperation and the conference then taking place in 
the Crimea, but was also critical of policies towards the 
liberated areas in Europe. The American people, he said, 
wanted to be sure that they had in fact crushed out "war­
breeding totalitarianism" and that they had "not fought 
this war in vain".^ Dewey’s oblique criticisms were about
as far as any Republican leader dared go in the early months
94of 1945, or indeed through to the end of the war. Hoover, 
the least trusting of Republican leaders, gave some insight 
into the restraints which prevented criticism: he predicted 
Roosevelt "will come back with a lot of Uncle Joe's promises
Eugene Lyons to Dulles, February 7th, 1945; Dulles to 
Eugene Lyons, February 14th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
92Address, Detroit, February 5th, 1945, Dulles MSS. See 
also speech at National Study Conference on "The Churches 
and a Just and Durable Peaces", Cleveland, Ohio, January 16th, 
1945, Dulles MSS.
93ijew York Times, February 9th, 1945.
94^ee Athan Theoharis, The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S.
Politics 1945-1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
1^7 0 ), pp. 25-35.
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which will fade out as fast as the so-called Moscow Declara­
tion faded. Atthe moment it is useless to say anything 
wihhout being Justifiably accused of creating difficulties,
QCso I am keeping still". The Yalta communique, to he the
subject of so much controversy later, accordingly got a googL
reception from Republican leaders. Yandenberg, although
reserving Judgement on details, described it as "by far the
best that has issued from any major conference". ^  Dulles
also welcomed it as a sign that the Big Three were going to
cooperate, and felt that the decisions were not as important
97as the procedure of consultation. Even Hoover was quoted 
as welcoming the Yalta agreements, provided they were carried
Inevitably, however, greater scrutiny of the Yalta 
agreements caused doubts. In the hot seat was Arthur Yanden­
berg, desirous of attending the San Francisco Conference,
yet politically unable to be seen to be turning his back 
99on Poland. Enough doubts were raised by Republican Congress­
men, including Congressmoman Luce, and conservative Journalists,
such as David Lawrence to imperil Vandenberg's reputation
100as a friend of Poland. Privately Alfred Landon wrote
to Hoover: "It looks to me as far as benefitting a democratic 
settlement of European problems it is locking the foor after
^Hoover to Ray Lyman Wilbur, January 28th, 194-5, Hoover MSS. 
9°Chlcago Tribune, February 13th, 194-5.
^statement dated February 13th, 194-5, Dulles MSS.
-'^Theoharis, Yalta Myths, p. 2 7.
Chicago Tribune, February 14th, 1945; Report, February 16th, 
nn1 94-5, McNaughton MSS.
100por Clare Luce's criticisms see New York Times. February 14th, 
1945; for David Lawrence's successful attempt to convince 
Senator Smith of New Jersey that Poland had been betrayed, 
see Smith Diary, February 23rd, 1945, Smith MSS. For various 
attacks in Congress, see Congressional Record. 91, February 13th, 
1945, pp. 1045, 1070; ibid., February 26'tii, T§45, pp. 1423-7.
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the horse is stolen" . 101 Already Vandenberg was coming to 
see the solution to his and to Poland's difficulties in a 
review of all interim decisions, assuming that Roosevelt 
had not committed the United States Irrevocably. 102 John 
Poster Dulles also took a slightly different attitude once 
the reality of Yalta had sunk in. Speaking from the Head­
quarters of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, he 
took issue with "cynics" who would say "that the United States 
merely accepted the inevitable and that the Soviet Union 
allowed the United States to agree only on Soviet terms''.10  ^
Instead, maintained Dulles, a "new era" in U. S. - Soviet 
relations had been opened in the Crimea. Having echoed the 
Internationalists in his optimism, however, he then proceeded 
to admit that Yalta revealed "a discouraging gulf between 
what we practice and what we preach". Although "an indis­
pensable prelude to. . .San Francisco," in that it reversed 
the decline in cooperation of 1944, it had nevertheless 
reached decisions not in accord with the Atlantic Charter.
In short, Crimea pointed up the need to get a world organiza­
tion which,"in addition to having power to prevent aggression, 
must also seek to correct in the future, the inevitable mis­
takes of the past."10^ Between them masters of pragmatism, 
Dulles and Vandenberg had found a temporary solution to their 
problems. Vandenberg was able to preserve his independence 
as a delegate to San Francisco, he was also able to secure
¡^Alfred Iandon to Hoover, February 14th, 1945, "UHojcCveaberg MSS. 
102Vandenberg to Frank Januszewski, February 13th, 1945,
.n Vandenberg MSS.lu-pPress Release, February 25th, 1945, Dulles MSS.,o4ibid.
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the appointment of Dulles as an adviser. Debate in Congress 
in March and April over the foreign economic programme re­
vealed the difficulties that could lie' in the path of the 
Administration if it failed to secure Republican cooperation.
Por his part, Vandenberg could argue to questioning supporters 
that the interests of America, the Republican Party and even 
Poland demanded that he did not spurn the cooperation offered
by Roosevelt.^05
The price of the cooperation of Vandenberg, and his by 
now close friend Dulles, was a~stiffening of American policy 
towards the Soviet Union. Roosevelt was reported’ by Vanden­
berg to have told him in March, "Just between us, Arthur,
I am coming to know the Russians better, and if I could name 
only one delegate to the San Prancisco Conference, you would 
be that delegate".10  ^ But still, neither Vandenberg nor 
Dulles wanted a break with the Soviet Union, though Vandenberg 
at least did not flinch at such a possibility. Basically, 
both men wanted cooperation to be more on American terms, 
but both recognized that a break with the Soviet Union could 
not advance American aims in Poland or elsewhere.Dulles
1 Vandenberg to Harry G. Hogan, March 26th, 19^5, Vandenberg 
MSS. In March Dulles cautioned Vandenberg against talking 
"so much about Poland that the American people got the im­
pression that our policy was consideration of Polish rather 
than American welfare". Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, March 12th, 
_-19^5, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
105Vandenberg, Private Papers. p. 15 5. If accurate, this state­
ment is susceptible of more than one interpretation, but 
Vandenberg clearly saw it as a sign that Roosevelt was 
prepared to stand up to the Russians.
1Q7ibld.. PP. 155-56.
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made this point in an address to the New York: Foreign Policy- 
Association in mid-March: "Many do not like the sample of 
reality which Yalta produced. Certainly some of the decisions 
there taken were very imperfect. But that is Because the 
collaborators are themselves imperfect. Their defects will 
not be removed by breaking up the collaboration. On the con­
trary, that would intensify the defects. Then each of the 
great powers would be actuated by fear. Fear brings out the 
worst in men. No one can contemplate with satisfaction the
fate of the small nations if the great powers start girding
1 nfithemselves for possible war against each other". Per­
haps more than Vandenberg, Dulles, who was yet to go through 
what Guhln describes as his mid-century re-orientation, was 
prepared to be optimistic about United States-Sovlet rela­
tions.1®^ Arguably however, Vandenberg too was optimistic 
that the relationship could be re-ordered on terms more 
deferential to American ideals and interests. Initially, 
Vandenberg’s desire to change the balance of Soviet-American 
relations was to be met with scepticism both amongst influen­
tial Senators and the San Francisco delegation.11® In his 
view, however, he was to have a great deal of success in 
convincing people that firmness was the key to handling the 
Soviet Union. The day of Roosevelt’s death, but before he 
heard of it, Vandenberg confided to his diary that the "revolt
1^Address, New York Foreign Policy Association, March 17th,
ino1945, Dulles MSS. . 
10'Guhin, pp. 1.31-32.
11°Report, March 16th, 
April 12th, 1943.
1945» McNaughton MSS; Chicago Tribune,
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against any further Soviet appeasement is growing”. 111
Whether the accession of President Truman made any
fundamental difference to the conduct of relations with the
112Soviet Union is beyond the scope of this study. Cer­
tainly, however, Republicans had high hopes that President 
Truman, although not a man of great ability, was a conserva­
tive who would change the direction in which the United 
States had been headed, at home and overseas, since 1933.11  ^
Vandenberg, preparing to go to San Francisco, although won­
dering whether they had not lost their strongest spokesman 
"through which we could hope to argue Russia out of some of 
the mistakes” which it seemed determined to make, also re­
cognized that both the Secretary of State and the,San Fran­
cisco delegation would now have far greater freedom than 
would otherwise harve been the case.112*- In his view it "wiped 
the slate clean of whatever undisclosed commitments” Roosevelt 
had made? "The 'Big 3* no longer exists as a monopoly in 
respect to world•destiny".1 1 5. 1
1 |^Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 165.
1i2For a recent, thorough analysis of Truman's diplomacy in 
this period see Rose, pp. 31-48, who argues that basically 
Truman tried to continue Roosevelt's policy. Clearly Roosevelt's death must have had some effect, precisely 
because he did not appear to have any well-defined policy 
laid down for his successor to follow, but it was only 
one of several developments transforming international 
relations in the early summer of 1945.
115Hoover to Julius Klein, April 28th, 1945, Hoover M3S; Henry 
Luce to Harry S. Truman, April 17th, 1945, PPF 928, Truman 
I-IS3. Rose, pp. 90-91.1^Vandenberg, Private Papers. p. 167.115Ibid
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In his initial dealings with the Soviet Union, Truman 
helped to foster the impression that the nature of the re­
lationship had changed. At his first press conference, asked 
about Molotov's impending visit, Truman drew spontaneous 
cheers by the terse comment, "He is going to stop by and pay 
his respects to the President of the United States. He
<• a ¿Tshould". This, and reports of his meeting with Molotov, 
helped to create a perception of Truman as a tough talking 
nationalist. Even before his initial meeting with Molotov, 
Arthur Sears Henning had reported that Truman was "deter­
mined to end the policy of absolute appeasement toward 
Russia". Henning Indicated that the dispute was over 
the Russian treaty with Poland (signed April 22nd) and the
1 1 Qattempt to seat the Lublin government at San Francisco.
During the San Francisco Conference the Chicago Tribune edi­
torialized on Molotov's conduct: "Perhaps, also, Mr. Molotov 
has become so voluble in San Francisco because he found 
out in Washington that President Truman is a fellow who can 
push back".119 ¿t the en(j 0f April, it carried a report 
that the President was now listening to those men arguing 
for a tougher policy with Russia, and that Harry Hopkins, 
Henry Morgenthau, Henry Wallace and others were no longer
1 POinfluential. After the meetings with Molotov, Secretary 
of State Stettinius flew off to San Francisco where, accord­
ing to Vandenberg's diary, he was the bearer of "a thrilling 
message".121 Reportedly, Truman had told Molotov that 1
1 ^ Lockett Report, April 17th, 1945, McNaughton MSS. 
117Chlcago Tribune. April 23rd, 1943.
11®Ibid. See Truman, Memoirs I. pp. 78-85.
119April 28th, 1945.
120Ibid., April 29th, 1945.
121Vandenberg, Private Papers. pp. 175-6.
229
"future Russian aid from America depends entirely upon the
temper and the mood and the conscience of the American
people - and that Frisco is his last chance to prove that
he deserves this aid". Vandenberg also recorded Stettinius
as having said that not even he (Yandenberg) could have
122"made a stronger statement than Truman did".
In part perhaps, Stettinius was saying what he knew 
Vandenberg wanted to hear. But the significance is that 
Vandenberg's perception was widespread. It did seem as if 
policy was changing, that "appeasement" was over, and that 
he and Stettinius were being given a chance to formulate 
policy at San Francisco in a way in which Franklin Roosevelt 
would not have allowed. From his San Francisco experience 
Yandenberg had no doubt that he knew how to handle the 
Russians; he hoped that Journalists, commentators, and even 
some in the White House would take notice.12-^ San Francisco 
and the United Nations marked the high point of Vandenberg's 
influence in 1945. With developments at Potsdam he had no 
part;,the appointment of James Byrnes as Secretary of State 
he resented bitterly,.and interpreted as a return to the pre- 
San Francisco policy towards the Soviet Union.^2^ Stettinius 
himself, extremely upset at his dismissal, attributed it to 
the fact that he was a Republican.^2^
San Francisco, then, had marked the apex of Vandenberg's 
power. With the close collaboration of John Foster Dulles 
and Secretary of State Stettinius, he had come to feel that
122Ibid.
]2^Ibid.. pp. 208-9. 
fflbld., pp. 224-5.
'^Transcript, interview with George E. Allen, p. 7, Truman 
Library.
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he was exercising considerable influence over the direction 
of American diplomacy. For a number of months after San 
Francisco, however, he was to be excluded from the centre 
of policy making. Within two weeks of San Francisco, Presi­
dent Truman and his entourage, including his new Secretary 
of State, slipped unannounced out of Washington enroute for 
Potsdam and a meeting with Churchill and Stalin. There was 
already some evidence that after his initial show of tough­
ness he was preparing to take a more conciliatory line to 
the Soviet Union. The idea of sending Harry Hopkins to see 
Stalin during the San Francisco Conference was a sign of
4 o  £this. ° Herbert Hoover,invited along to the White House 
at the end of May, had given Truman the benefit of his stead­
fastly held opinion that "the Russians were Asiatics; that 
they had the characteristics of Asiatics; that they did not 
have the reverence for agreements that was current among 
Western nations; that we must Just take them as they were; 
that we could not go to war with them and we should never 
bluff. Our position should be to persuade, to hold up our 
banner of what we thought was right and let it go at that.
A,war with Russia meant the extinction of Western civiliza­
tion or what there was left of it. I stated I had no patience 
with people who formulated policies in respect to other nations
'short of war'. They always lead to war". Hoover also 
—  *
12^From the office of Fred Vinson, close to Truman, and shortly 
to replace Morgenthau as Secretary of the Treasury, came the 
comment that Truman now feared he had been too stiff in his 
relations with the Russians, and wanted to create a better 
relationship prior to the Big 3 meeting. Report by Ed Lockett, 
June 1st, 194-5* McNaughton MSS.
^^Memorandum on meeting with President Truman, May 28th, 194-5* 
pp. 6-7, Hoover MSS.
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recorded that he gave Truman the benefit of his views on the
Par Eastern situation, and his proposal for a peace. But
Hoover had no illusions about the influence he exerted over
Truman: "My conclusions were that he was simply endeavouring
to establish a feeling of good will in the country, that
nothing more would come out of it so far as I or my views
1 oPwere concerned”. Hoover's disappointment in Truman was 
already shared by Taft.12^
The doglHanT element^in...the^.political climate by .the ,time*> * •
of Potsdam was the personaT^popularity'of‘the^Bresident. Arthur 
Sears Henning commented that he enjoyed "the confidence 
of the American people to an unprecedented degree".1^0 
The Chicago Tribune wondered whether, having recognized 
the Lublin government, Truman was going to bring back another 
Yalta.^ Hoover wrote to minority leader, Senator Wallace 
White, expressing his concern: "The country, I find, is 
greatly concerned over the forthcoming Berlin Conference.
. . .There is almost universal suspicion of Russia originat­
ing, I believe arising mostly from Communist activities in 
the United States".1^2 On July 18th Hoover signed an appeal 
by 40 distinguished United States citizens, including Landon 
and Raymond Leslie Buell, warning Truman that the Polish 
issue still had not been settled. Potsdam in fact made
|^Ibld., pp v 7-9.'^Pattersonj-gBepublican, p. 302; Taft also went along to 
see Truman to argue for a negotiated peace with Japan; 
like Hoover he was prepared to let Japan keep Formosa,
, -.^ Ibld., p. 301 .
:i.Chicago Tribune, July 23rd, 1945.
]^llbld.. July 7th, 1945.
'32Hoover to Wallace H. White, July 12th, 1945, Hoover MSS; 
presumably he was referring to the Amerasla case, in which 
6 people had been arrested in June, Uaddis, pp. 257-8. 
133ghlcago Tribune. July 19th, 1945.
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remarkably little impact on domestic politics. The initia­
tive in foreign affairs clearly remained with the President. 
Senator Taft, who was critical of the cession of part of 
Germany to Poland, felt that at Potsdam Truman had helped 
lay the seeds for another war: "He really is a very limited 
and superficial statesman but up to date his moves have been 
popular, largely, I think, because he is such a contrast
to R o o s e v e l t " .  ^ 4  Politically, then, Republicans were in 
a very low state of morale. The victory of the British 
Labour Party, suggesting a world-wide leftward trend, did 
not help m a t t e r s . D i v i d e d  in Congress over much of the 
multilateral package, Republicans were finding it difficult 
to r :- adjust'J ^  themselves to the new national and international 
situation. The strivings of Mackinac and Chicago no longer 
seemed relevant to the problems they faced in the last months 
of 19^5; neither did the slogans of 1944 about "tired old 
men" and "starry-eyed dreamers". James Reston commented 
that Truman had become a figure to be reckoned with, and 
that Republicans were looking for new issues for 1946.^6 
Developments since Yalta had, however, revealed the possi­
bility of uniting the party in a get tough with Russia policy.
The Reassertlon of Republican Leadership
The political situation in late 1945 was exceedingly 
complex. On the domestic front, the Truman honeymoon was
^^Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 303.
135vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 219; Chicago Tribune.
July 27 th, 194!T
13oNew York Times, August 26th, 1945.
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over; Congressional Republicans, with the war over, were 
determined both to restore the United States as quickly as 
possible to normalcy, and to create a coherent party posi­
tion for the 1945 elections. In the international field, 
the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, the 
atomic bomb, and the negotiation of the British Loan had 
created a new situation. To add to the complexity, Senator 
Vandenberg, the architect of Republican consensus since 
19^3, and the principal practitioner of bipartisanship, was 
privately extremely distrustful of the Administration, which 
he felt had been psfecretly trying to cut him down to size 
since San Francisco.1^7 Apart from his personal vanity, 
Vandenberg was not disposed to fight hard for Administration 
measures over which he had not been consulted. As Senator 
Smith of New Jersey was finding, abstract 'internationalism1 
was not a likely source of pupularity or influence smongst 
Congressional Republicans.^^ Tlbe two main pressures emana­
ting from Republicans by the fall of 194-5 were i) a desire 
to return the United States to 'Normalcy'; ii) a strong 
hostility to the Soviet Union and concern about developments 
in central and eastern Europe. Herbert Brownell, Republican 
National Chairman and political associate of Dewey, led the 
way in August with an attack on the Administration for not 
having kept the country informed on diplomatic developments.
137Report, October 6th, 1945, McNaughton MSS; Vandenberg, .Private Papers, p. 225.
138i)iaryf September 16th, 1945, Smith MSS.
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Republicans, he said, would urge that American Influence be
used to secure her ideals.139 He also promised that in the
coming Congressional session Republicans would demand a
clarification of American foreign policy and a disclosure
of commitments made at war-time conferences.1^  Herbert
Hoover and House minority leader Joseph Martin were also
critical of developments in eastern Europe. "Can we honestly
say that we have not surrendered these peoples on the altar
of appeasement?" asked Herbert Hoover in mid-October.1^ 1
Joseph Martin called a meeting of the Republican steering
committee in the House, predicting that it would approve a
proposal to prohibit use of relief funds for nations not per-
142mitting freedom of the press. His analysis of opinion 
among House Republicans was to prove aecurates, as was to 
be shown during the debate on U.N.N.R.A. in November.1^
Amidst the suspicion, uncertainty and downright partisan 
ship, Secretary of State Byrnes did seek to perpetuate some 
form of bipartisan contacts by inviting John Foster Dulles 
to attend the meeting of Foreign Ministers in London in 
September. This gesture, however, misfired. The conference 
broke up in disagreement, and Dulles returned to refuel sus­
picions already held about Byrnes. Publicly Dulles main­
tained a united front, arguing that allied disagreements
J^new York Times, August 25th, 1945.
'ilTblcT!, October 14th, 1945.
¡«IHJT.
^^See page236 below.
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were healthier in the open, expressing confidence that they 
could ultimately find agreement with the Soviet Union. 
Privately however, his criticisms of Byrnes were widely 
ventilated. He felt that he had been used to give a bipar­
tisan cloak to the conference without being actually con­
sulted in advance.1^  ge aiso claimed that at the conference 
when Byrnes was considering yielding to Molotov over his 
desire to exclude Prance, that he had threatened to resign 
and go home and attack Byrnes’ action in public.1^
•i Undoubtedly the London conference heightened the percep­
tion of Republican leaders both that they were being excluded 
from genuine participation in framing the peace, and that 
they would have to provide more backbone if the United States 
was to strengthen its policy against the Soviet Union. At 
the same time, Republicans in the House expressed their dis­
approval of events in eastern Europe by an amendment to 
U.N.R.R.A. designed to make American contributions contingent 
on free reporting of distribution of relief. The amendment, 
which secured virtually unanimous Republican support in the 
House, put Vandenberg in a difficult position, especially • 
since it was very much an Old Guard sponsored amendment.1^  
Opposing it, he praised the House for having brought the sub­
ject out into the open, but said he could not support it with 
winter coming on in Europe. He agreed, however, that the 
free exchange of information was essential to peace: it 
was unthinkable, for example, that atom secrets could be 
shared until the iron curtain on information was lifted.1^ 8
144
l t i n s -  7Gaddis
147_____
^ 8Ibid‘~
New York Times. October 7th, 1945.
October 10th, 1945.
, pp. 290-91; transcript, interview with Thomas E. 
Dewey, pp. 39, 41, Dulles (Oral).
Congressional Record. 91. November 1st, 1945, p. 10305. 
November 15th, 1945, pp. 10696-7.
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He also criticized Byrnes for a recent speech in which he 
had compared the good-neighbour policy with Russian security 
interests in central and eastern Europe. Vandenberg would 
not accept the analogy: America's neighbours were her 
"partners" not her "satellites", he said.^^
Vandenberg's comments were consistent with his long , 
held prejudices about the Soviet Union. They also need to 
be seen in their domestic political context. Vandenberg was 
already learning to walk the fine line between collaboration 
with the Administration and identification as a Republican 
partisan. In the House of Representatives, the leadership 
was unashamedly nationalist and partisan, so much so that 
at the end of November a group of 39 younger Republicans, 
horrified at apparent assumptions behind the current Pearl 
Harbor investigations, announced their determination to speak 
for themselves and not let their elders speak for them.1^
To heighten the potential split in the Party came the announce­
ment by Stassen.on demobilization from the Navy, that he in­
tended to devote his time to making the Republican Party 
more liberal.*51 Finally there was the prospect of a show- 
downln the Senate over the minority leadership, which it
I C Owas rumoured Senator White wished to vacate. If White 
resigned, Vandenberg was liable to find himself pressured 
by Smith and the Internationalists into fighting Taft for 
the job, to "keep the party in the anti-isolationist column".1-^ 
All these strands combined to make Vandenberg's job more
] ^ Ibld., p. 10698.
'-^New York Times, December 1st, 1945.
]lilbid., November 16th, 1945.
152Diary, December 2nd, 1945, Smith MSS. <1
153ibid. ■ ■ ' ■  ^- :
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difficult. His collaboration with the Administration had 
not enhanced his popularity with the Nationalists, who 
were impatient for the Party to take a stand in readiness 
for the 194-6 elections. To add to the complexities of the 
situation, Vandenberg was dissatisfied with the Administra­
tion, and as he had indicated in his speech on U.N.R.R.A., 
especially with Secretary of State Byrnes.
Overshadowing Russian-American relations and Yandenberg's 
concerns by the end of 194-5» was the question of the atomic 
bomb. Indications were that the overwhelming majority of 
Congressional Republicans (and a sizeable proportion of the 
Democrats) were hostile to the notion of sharing atomic secrets 
with the Soviet Union.154- «That is America's secret,” one 
representative told the applauding Executive Club of Chicago, 
"and if America has a thimbleful of brains, she will hold 
onto it".1 a number of Republicans, largely, but not ex­
clusively drawn from the Internationalist section of the 
Party were, however, broadly in favour of some form of 
international control, as proposed by the Administration. 
Herbert Hoover, for example, had indicated his general 
approval of some form of international control, so also 
did Alfred Iandon and John Foster Dulles.15° Few, however,
154A survey of congressional opinion in September found over­
whelming hostility amongst those who replied. New York 
Times, September 28th, 194-5. It may be, however, that 
the small sample of 61 was unrepresentative; probably those 
who felt the strongest replied. If the latter assumption 
is correct, the survey would tend to bear out the state­
ment that the strongest opponents were Republicans.
155speech by Representative Dewey Short of Missouri, October 12th, 
¿.194-5, reprinted in Congressional Record. 91, Appendix p. 54-33.
15°New York Times. September 28th, 1945; speech in Kansas 
by Alfred Landon, October 25th, 194-5, reprinted in Con­
gressional Record. 91, Appendix p. 4512; statement by Bishop 
Oxnam and John Foster Dulles. New York Times, August 10th,
1945. '
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were prepared to go along with Harold Stassen's suggestion 
In a speech to the Academy of Political Science that the 
atom bomb be banned apart from 25 to be retained by a United 
Nhtla® air f o r c e . D u l l e s  openly disagreed with the sug­
gestion that the bomb should be outlawed or entrusted to a
■ 1 *58single world body with "overwhelming military power". J 
This, he said, would do nothing to end the distrust between 
nations. At the same time, however, he did not want the 
United States to give the impression that it wished to pre­
serve its atomic monopoly; he felt that this was a matter 
which the General Assembly of the United Nations should be 
allowed to decide. ^ 9
Vandenberg's initial instinct was one of caution, but 
persuaded that there was no way of safeguarding an atomic 
monopoly he was prepared to agree to international sharing 
and control of atomic secrets. The price of sharing, how­
ever, was that there be "complete and adequate international 
inspection", or, in short, that Russia drop its "iron cur­
t a i n " . B r o a d l y  speaking he was in agreement with the pro­
posal of President Truman and British and Canadian Prime 
Ministers, Attlee and Mackenzie King, to establish a United 
Nations Commission to share and control atomic energy.1^1 
He was by the same token adverse to any direct approach to 
the Soviet Union such as that advocated in Cabinet by Wallace 
and Stimson.1^2 He was reported in response to the Joint
l^jNew York Times, November 9th, 1945.15°Ibid., November 16th, 194-5.
]59ibi<i.; Lloyd Gardner, Architects of Illusion, p. 189. 
j^Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 223.
' The Joint statement of November 15th is reproduced in full 
in Truman, Memoirs I; p p .  481-3. 
l62R0se, pp. 133-35, 144-46.
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declaration as commenting, "The Russians are a hell of a 
long way from getting anything yet".1^  Secretary of State 
Byrnes, meanwhile, puzzled by the deterioration in relations 
with the Soviet Union, had come to the conclusion that the 
atomic bomb was the difficulty, and expressed the intention 
of making this a priority of his forthcoming discussions in 
Moscow.Vandenberg was not alone in being perturbed by 
what Secretary Byrnes might agree to at Moscow, and as a 
result he and the rest of Senate committee responsible for 
atomic energy went along to see the President. He was con­
vinced that the Administration intended to give Russia atomic 
secrets before agreement had been reached on inspection and 
control.1^  Vandenberg was not impressed with the Presi­
dent’s grasp of the issue: "In any event we have made the 
record - and we should hold the Executive Department re­
sponsible. It’s our unanimous opinion that the Byrnes for­
mula must be stopped".1 ^
In December Vandenberg and Dulles were invited to attend 
the forthcoming London meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly. Vandenberg claimed to be reluctant to go. He was 
disillusioned with the Administration, under pressure from 
Republicans whom he described as feeling very restless, and 
distressed at,the handling of the British Loan.1^  The official
163"congresslonal Reaction to Atomic Statement"»November 16th, 
19^5, p. 2, Me Naughton MSS.
1&z,,Report from Anatole Vission, "Byrnes on the Moscow Meeting’,’ 
.December 10th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.165yandenberg. Private Papers, pp. 228-9; Report, December 13th, 
1945, McNaughton MSS.
1®°Vandenberg, Private Papers. p .  229.16<Ibld..pp. 230-6; Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles,
December 19th, 1945, Vandenberg MSS.
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communique from Moscow on internationalization of atomic
energy had, he claimed, almost made him resign from the
1 68London delegation. A meeting with President Truman on 
December 28th, clarifying the Moscow communique, satisfied 
Vandenberg, or perhaps gave him the excuse to go to London 
without being called an ’'appeaser”.1 ^  He was, however, 
going on his own terms; the noises which had already been 
made in Congress against the British Loan can only have stren- 
ghtened his bargaining power.
Vandenberg's manoeuvring again has to be seen in the 
context of domesticplitics, as well as his disquiet with 
Byrnes' atomic diplomacy. Looking to 1946, Congressional 
Republicans were seeking to promote agreement on a broad 
statement of principles and policies. The eventual state­
ment, although described by Internationalista .Senator Smith, 
as ”a mere platitude" which would "sound rubbish", was strongly 
supported by the House leadership.1?0 It was evidently de­
signed to heighten the ideological division between the 
parties: "Today's major domestic issue is between radical­
ism, regimentation, all-powerful bureaucracy, class exploita­
tion, deficit spending and machine politics, as against our 
belief in American freedom for the individual under Just 
laws fairly administered for all, preservation of local home 
rule, efficiency and pay-as-you-go economy in Government, 
and the protection of the American way of life against either
1^Vandenberg to B. E. Hutchinson, December 29th, 1945, 
Vandenberg MSS.
1k ^ V a n d e n b e r g ,  Private Papers. pp. 233-5; Truman, Memoirs. II: 
489-90; Chicago Tribune. December 29th, 1945.
ITOgmith Diary, December 5th, 1945, Smith MSS.
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Fascist or Communist trends". ' In foreign affairs, the 
statement was general and mildly "internationalist", sup­
porting the United Rations, international relief subject to 
United States economic considerations, the rights of small 
nations and free communications throughout the world, but
172ending with the pledge of "a strong, solvent, free America".
The statement of principles was criticized vehemently 
by Governor Green of Illinois at the December National Com­
mittee meeting in Chicago: "The Republican party," he said, 
"was founded to elect, not sheriffs, but Presidents. It was 
born as a national party, has always been a national party, 
and if it cannot win national elections has lost its main 
reason for existence".^73 A,rguing that the Republican party 
had been trying to get "communist and other radical votes", 
he also deplored its failure to speak out against the "rape" 
of Java by Britain and Holland, and the "betrayal" of Poland.
He attacked the "Truman New Deal" diplomacy for its failure 
to protect the Pour Freedoms and for allowing the United 
States to be the servant of communism and colonialism. Mid­
western Republicans, he said, were concerned that the Admin­
istration had not done enough to secure vital sea and air 
174bases. The following day, Herbert Brownell, although 
managing to get the policy statement endorsed, delivered a 
similarly partisan speech, which included an oblique reference
171 New York Times, December 5th. 1945.172ibid.
¡IjTbTd., December 8th, 1945.
'74ibld.; Chicago Tribune, December 8th, 194-5.
171
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to the recent allegations made by Patrick J. Hurley 
on his resignation as Ambassador to China: Republicans, he 
said, would ensure that "at all times the State Department 
shall give honest and efficient service to the foreign policy 
of the United States. . ,"175 the same time, however, 
he was authorized by the National Committee to appoint a 
subcommittee to receive suggestions for supplementing the 
statement.17° Unity had been preserved. But as Vandenberg 
noted, the Party was in a restless mood. The perils of the 
time counseled cooperation with the Administration, but 
the logic of the argument of Governor Green, that New Deal 
diplomacy had suffered the worst diplomatic defeat in United 
States history, seemed difficult to refute.
By the end of 194-5 then, partisanship in foreign policy 
was coming to be a possibility. Not only were Congressional 
Republicans in a militant mood, and Vandenberg alienated from 
Byrnes, but Dulles also was coming to be distrusted by the 
Administration. The President detected Dulles' hand in a 
speech delivered by Dewey at the Gridiron Club, whilst Byrnes 
had no love for Dulles, having heard of the criticisms which 
Dulles had been making of his conduct at the London Foreign 
Ministers' Meeting.177 The fact that Dulles and Vandenberg 
were both invited to the United Nations session in London 
was a reflection of domestic political realities and external
lZ~?New York Times. December 9th, 1945.
1?6Ibid.
177o1Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, December 22nd, 1945; 
O'Laughlin felt that Dewey's speech had made a bad im­
pression, letter to Roger W. Straus, December 17th, 1945»O'Laughlin-MSS.
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difficulties. Opinion within the Administration was already
178mounting against Secretary of State Byrnes. The coopera­
tion of Dulles and Vandenberg effectively marked an end to 
the type of diplomacy Byrnes had conducted at Moscow, where 
he had been concerned to get agreement at almost any cost. 
Republican cooperation, which was necessary for the sake of 
national unity, could only be gained if American-Soviet re­
lations were brought more in line with Republican ideas.
Dulles and Vandenberg were both spokesmen for a tradition 
which taught that international cooperation must be on terms 
deferential to the interests and ideals of "a strong America.'’.
In London, Vandenberg and Dulles were not to go out 
of their way to hide their dissatisfaction with Byrnes. Their 
absence from a delegation press conference prior to Byrnes' 
arrival in London was publicly explained as being related
to their disagreement with him over the Moscow agreement on
179international control of atomic energy. Byrnes' memory 
in later years was that soon after arrival he had met Vanden­
berg and explained the Moscow agreement to him, and that there 
was no other disagreement; after that "misunderstanding" he
claimed that he insisted that Vandenberg went to every lnter-
1 finnational conference with him. A New York Times report 
of his meeting with Vandenberg and Democratic Senator, Connally,
181lends some corroboration to Byrnes' account. Nevertheless, 
the evidence suggests that the relationship at London was 1
1^ Gaddls, pp. 285-90; Truman, Memoirs,II: 487-493.
179yew York Times, January 8th, 1946. ..
^Ojames P. Byrnes, All In One Lifetime (London: Museum Press, 
I960), p. 348.
January 9th, 1945.
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an uneasy one. Eleanor Roosevelt observed that Byrnes seemed
1 82afraid of his delegation. On his return from London,
Byrnes told a Cabinet luncheon,if James Forrestal's account 
can be relied on, that they must face the fact that Vandenberg 
and Dulles’ activities must be seen as being based on poli­
tical considerations; Vandenberg had claimed that he was 
being accused of appeasement by his colleagues, he said.^®^
On their return Vandenberg and Dulles certainly were 
critical of the pursuit of policy at London. Before leaving 
Vandenberg had expressed the hope that in the future the 
United States would "more firmly assert its moral leader- 
ship". James Reston, close to Vandenberg, reported that 
Vandenberg and Dulles were dissatisfied with their role at 
the United Nations, and with the lack of advance briefing 
and policy planning. Both, said Reston, wanted a more active 
role for the United States, but at the same time they did 
not want to imperil the Republican Party’s chances in the 
19^6 elections by participating under the same conditions 
as had existed at London. Vandenberg's forthcoming Senate 
report was, said Reston, anxiously a w a i t e d . R e s t o n ' s  
article can only have been an inspired leak. Vandenberg's 
tactics were unchanging. By playing hard to get he could 
both cement his domestic support, and at least convince 
himself that he was getting concessions from the Adminis­
tration.
]§2(jaddis, p. 293.
gpMlllis, p. 138.
iQ^New York Times» February 17th, 1946.
185Ibid., February 16th, 1946.
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Vandenberg’s report to the Senate on the London Con­
ference must therefore be viewed within the context of dom­
estic and international politics. His son, explaining the 
speech at a later date to a political associate in Michigan, 
wrote: "The speech was delivered somewhat unexpectedly and 
principally as a result of Republican pressure within the 
Senate itself. He seemed to be in a position where he felt 
it was his duty to the Party to report to the Senate on 
UNO in an attempt to revive a laggingfeith in our foreign 
polities”. I f  Vandenberg saw it in terms of protecting 
his political position as a collaborator with the Adminis­
tration, the speech was also designed to Influence the direc­
tion of policy; the two were in fact closely connected.
The message behind the speech was clear: to get Republican 
support, the Administration must be seen to be exerting 
moral leadership against the Soviet Union.1®? London had 
convinced him (not that he reeded convincing) that the Soviet 
Union was not seriously interested in peace, and as evidence 
he reported Vishinsky’s exploitation of the dispute between
Lebanon and Syria against Britain and Prance, on a night which
188had made hlm"proud of western democracy. . If Russia
was still worried about its security, he was, he said, pre­
pared to take up his earlier offer of a defense treaty 
against future axis aggression.1®^ The fact that Vandenberg
1 ^ Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr. to Howard C. Lawrence, March 5th, 
o 1946, Vandenberg MSS.
Congreslonal Record. 92, February 27th, 1946, pp. 1692- 95; 
.nnsee also Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 241-251.
n g i b i a . .  p .  2 4 2 -' ^ Congressional Record. 92, April 27th, 1946, p. 1695.
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went out of his way to praise Bevin, Bidault and Strettinius, 
and even Vishinsky, whilst omitting Byrnes from the list, 
was not lost on the press. It confirmed the rumours of 
Vandenberg's disquiet that had been in circulation for a
number of d a y s . -' 90
The fact that Secretary Brynes delivered a similarly 
tough report on the London United Nations Meeting on 
February 28th convinced Vandenberg that he had been in­
strumental in bringing about a changed stance in American 
foreign relations.1^1 Arguably Vandenberg's view of Byrnes' 
speech was oversimplified: the speech was written before 
the 27th February when Vandenberg delivered his speech; 
President Truman told former Secretary of State Stettinius 
that Vandenberg, hearing of Byrnes' speech, had arranged to 
get his in f i r s t . W h a t  seems clear, however, is that 
Byrnes saw Vandenberg (and Dulles) as the powerful articula­
tors of a mood which was strong within the Administration 
as well as the Republican Ihrty. Byrnes had according to 
Forrestal identified Dulles and Vandenberg as partisans by 
the end of January. Both made no secret of their dislike 
with the lack of direction of American policy long before 
Vandenberg's report on February 27th. Dulles in fact had 
delivered a speech at Princeton on February 22nd in which 
he had criticized the fact that the President gave the ... 
American delegation to the United Nations no instructions.
^^Offew York Herald Tribune. February 28th, 1946; Chicago 
Tribune, February 28th, 1946; comments by Arthur Krock, 
>njNew York Times, March 1st, 1946.
See' £or example, Vandenberg to H. ¥. Smith, March 6th,
-1 947," Vandenberg MSS.
]<,Chlcago Tribune. March 12th, 1946; Gaddis p. 306, note 40,iy^aiiis, p. 13B.
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The United States,charged Dulles, was giving no leadership: 
"That would not have happened fifty years ago or 100 (sic) 
years ago. Then the American people were imbued with a great 
faith. We acted under a sense of moral compulsion, as a 
people who had a mission to perform in the world. . . That
mood has passed, with the result that at this critical time
194we may fall the world”.
Behind Dulles and Vandenberg was an increasingly mili­
tant and frustrated Party, which had never been enthusiastic 
about the war-time alliance with the Soviet Union, and which 
was longing to make "appeasement” part of its strategy of 
restoring the United States to Normalcy. In Dallas in mid- 
February Taft criticized the Administration for having for­
gotten "Justice" in its conferences at Teheran, Yalta and 
Moscow, and also especially criticized the agreement to let 
the Soviet Union have the Kurile Islands, which had only Just 
been made p u b l i c . i n  early March, Senate Whip- Kenneth 
Wherry, called in a New York address for an end to "appease­
ment". The United States must now, he said, "compete with 
Russia for the allegiance of mankind on the basis of a re­
spect for the liberty, dignity and the rights of others". 
Broadly the same criticisms as those made by Taft and Wherry 
were made in a Lincoln Day address in Tennessee by Governor 
Green of Illinois, another authentic spokesman for midwestern 
Republicanism. The United States, he said, had failed to
]pfofew York Herald Tribune. February 23rd, 1946.
Dallas, February 14th, 1946, text of address reprinted 
Qi-in Congressional Record. 92, Appendix, pp. 1050-51.
'^New York Times, March 4th, 1946.
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stand up for Its moral principles In Its dealing with Its
war-time allies, and had also failed to safeguard Its own
requirements for vital sea and air bases. Taft had made
the same point in his Initial reaction to the disclosure of
the secret Yalta agreement on the Kuriles and Sakhalin in 
198January.  ^ Given the existence within the Republican Party 
of widespread hostility both to the Soviet Union and the war­
time agreements, the call by Vandenberg and Dulles for an 
open break with the Soviet Union was politically understand­
able. It was not however simply short-term political ex­
pediency which directed their actions. The Republican con­
sensus which Vandenberg and Dulles had helped to develop up 
to the San Francisco Conference had consistently stood for 
both "firm" and "open" diplomacy on behalf of American in­
terests and principles; if disputes were brought out into 
the open, where world opinion and "moral force" could operate, 
Republican leaders had no doubts that right would be seen to 
be C n  on their side. Prom February and March 1946, Ameri­
can diplomacy was seemingly to be conducted in a way in which 
Republicans could more easily approve: the Soviet Union was 
no longer to be seen as an ally.*99
*97February 9th, 194-6, reprinted in Congressional Record, 92, 
Appendix, p. 927; Theoharis, Yalta Myths, deals with the 
mounting criticism in early 194-6,'"but argues that the 
critics were neither representative nor effective (pp. 41-4-6). 
He ignores the effect which such criticism could have on 
Vandenberg and Dulles’ attitudes to the Administration, 
especially in an election year.
198uew York Herald Tribune. February 1st, 1946.
‘99por a concise analysis of the change which took place in 
February/March, see George C. Herring, Jr., Aid to Russia 
1941-46: Strategy. Diplomacy. The Origins of the Cold 
War (Hew York: Columbia, 1973). PP. 259-o1 .
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In April-Vandenberg agreed to attend the Foreign Minis­
ters’ Meeting in Paris, having first refused to go to the 
Peace Conference in May on the grounds that it would be 
simply a "carbon Paper" for the Ministers' Conference. 
Vandenberg also received assurances that if he went, his 
independence would be maintained, whilst Byrnes agreed to 
send and publish a stiff note to Poland. To Dulles, Vanden­
berg defensively explained his decision: "Frankly, I don’t 
like any part of it. I was content with our tentative de­
cision to stay out of this bizness. But Byrnes did so well 
at New York, in line with our Russky ideas, that I didn’t 
feel like deserting him in response to his very first request 
thereafter lest he 'revert to type'. Perhaps I can keep a 
bit of the good old iron in his backbone as you did at 
London."200 201 In April 1946, then, Vandenberg still held re­
servations about James Byrnes, and his alleged propensity 
towards compromise, which he had been disposed to bold ever 
since Byrnes' appointment. Vandenberg was, however, perhaps 
both from his sense of patriotism as well as personal vanity, 
keen to be involved in foreign policy decision-making. His 
decision to attend the later Council of Foreign Ministers 
in Paris, even during his re-election campaign, he explained
in terms of Russian attacks on him and the need to preserve 
201.unity. His initial decision to go to Paris was,however, 
the result of mutual adjustment: Vandenberg, according to 
James Reston, had had to make concessions on atomic aiergy
200A. H. Vandenberg to Dulles, April 15th, 1946, Dulles 
MSS (Supplement;. .
201 Vandenberg to Arthur E. Summerfield, June 4th, 1946; 'Van!-, denberg MSS.
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and to give public support to the British Loan. Byrnes 
for his part had to talk tough.20^
At the Earls meeting, Vandenberg began to develop con­
fidence in Byrnes, The latter told him of his domestic 
difficulties with Secretary Wallace and Senator Pepper, and 
Vandenberg came to the conclusion that "Byrnes gives every 
evidence of 'no.'more appeasement' in his attitudes". In his
diary he recorded his conviction that "America must behave
204like the Humber One World Power which she is". To Dulles 
he reported that only once had Byrnes almost given in to the 
Russians, "at which point I put on one of my well-known ex­
hibitions "#2°5 After the conference he recorded in his diary 
the conviction that appeasement had been reversed: Molotov 
had been in a "trading mood", but the United States had stood 
firm.206
Whilst Vandenberg believed than that he had been in­
strumental in reversing American policy, Dulles had re-eval­
uated his ideas on the Soviet Union. He had never shared 
Vandenberg's certainty about the sources of Soviet conduct, 
but his experience in 1946 had crystallized his views. ' 
After the London Conference in 1945 Dulles had read Stalin's 
Problems of Leninism, his understanding of which Informed 
his evaluation of Soviet policy. By 13ay, 1946, he had made
202
202Hew York Times, April 23fcd, 1946.
2°3See report by Prank McUaughton, April 20th, 1946, of a 
briefing Byrnes gave the Foreign Relations Committee in 
April; MeNaughton linked it to the fact that American 
forces were being increased in Europe, which it was ex­
pected would have a diplomatic pay-off with the Soviet .Union, McUaughton MSS.
|°£vandenberg, Private Papers. pp. 266-7.
^¿A, H. Vandenberg to Dulles, May 13th, 1946, Dulles MSS. 
Vandenberg, Private Papers. pp. 285-6.
'In May he wrote, ". . .until recently I have not felt 
clear enough in my own mind about Russian foreign policy 
to feel like giving leadership in any particular direc­tion". Dulles to Dr. Rosell P. Barnes, May 8th, 1946, Dulles MSS.
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up his mind that the fact that American and Soviet alms and
208values were in conflict should now he revealed. He per- •
sonally chose to do this through a lengthy article to be
published in Life magazine.2°9 In the article he argued that
the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a Bax Sovietica, that
she regarded the United Nations as for the present merely
an instrument of the United States-United Kingdom rule,
and would rely on the veto until she had taken over the
210Nest’s influence. He argued that Soviet policy should 
be seen in terms of three zones: 1. the inner areas such 
as the Baltic States, under direct Soviet legal authority;
2. the middle zone, which would remain outside Soviet authority 
but was susceptible to Soviet power; 3. the outer zone.
Within this analytical framework the struggle in 1946 as he 
saw it was an attempt by the Soviet Union to extend the middle 
zone to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Kurdistan and South Korea. In 
the outer zone, he saw the Soviet Union as trying to promote 
purely political.objectives: prevention of western European 
unity, encouragement of colonial unrest, undermining Britain 
in the middle east and the United States in Latin America,
211opposition to Franco and incitement to civil war in Spain.
In his suggestions as to the course the United States 
should follow, Dulles echoed Vandenberg in the importance
PQgGuhin, pp. 1 3 1-2 , 135.
^"Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to Do About 
it”, Life XX (June 3*d and 10th, 1946), pp. 113-26, 118-30, 
reprinted in the Congressional Record. 92, pp. 7170-7175.
I yiMd.. P. 7 1 7 1 .d11Ibld., p. 7170.
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he attached to making the Soviet Union realize that the 
United States would no longer abandon its principles. Ameri­
can policy he was convinced, must rededicate itself to the 
faith of their forbears, whose belief in individual liberty 
had derived from their belief that "men are created as the 
children of God, in his image". This meant that the west 
must reform itself, especially get rid of imperialism, but 
it must also build up its military strength, be prepared to 
support Britain and other nations, and demonstate the success 
of freedom in the occupiedareas.^ Primarily, Dulles 
did not see the challenge as military , but more as political, 
economic and even spiritual. He was, for example, opposed 
to the United States becoming too militaristic and making 
provocative use of far-flung bases.^3 Dulles had not been 
won over to the concept of a Ihx Americana, with its mili­
taristic overtones, although he had gone further than many 
Republicans would agree in his support for the use of non- 
moral resources in diplomacy. At the same time, Dulles had 
not yet embraced Vandenberg’s more simplistic analysis of 
the situation: he could appreciate that his view of the world 
might not be shared by the Soviet Union, who might see their 
action in the middle zone as essentially defensive. In 
the long run also, he was convinced of the possibility of 
peaceful co-existence: "tie would each seek. . .to exert an 
influence in the world. . .But we would each let the :'.on
o y^id-. p. 7173. j ?Ibld.; Guhin, pp. 1] ^Congressional Recorc 7174.
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extension of our influence depend primarily on letting our 
light shine before men so that they may see our good works. 
The Soviet Union would abandon such methods as are being 
used by it in the middle and outer zone and we in turn would 
abandon methods which seem to us defensive, but which may 
seem to Soviet Leaders to be offensive. . 3
Dulles' article undoubtedly reads differently in retro­
spect. t. • 1, II'.. at the r. In the summer of 1946, it 
was seen not in terms of its ultimate optimism about American 
Russian relations, but in terms of the heightening tension 
between the former allies. Dulles’ article, followed on 
Vandenberg’s report from Paris of the development of "a 
positive, constructive, peace-seeking bipartisan foreign 
policy. . .based, at last, upon the practical necessities 
required for Europe's rehabilitation and upon the moralities 
of the Atlantic and San Francisco chapters. . . Both
were signs of the emerging, bipartisan, anti-communist 
consensus. By the middle of 1945, Vandenberg was convinced 
that the United States was well on the way to adopting a 
"Republican foreign policy", one which consisted of standing 
up for American ideals and interests in negotiation with 
the war-time allies. The snag, as Vandenberg was well aware, 
was that though he could get complete Rationalist support 
for an anti-communist stance, such a stance would require 
more than moral force to back it up. Although Vandenberg 
had been successful, and would continue to be successful in
flfold.. P. 7175.216Ibid., May 21st, 1946, p. 5325.
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demanding a foreign policy based on a calculation of American 
self-interest, rather than on the basis of abstract ’inter­
nationalism’, there was no guarantee that the majority of 
Congressional Republicans would be prepared to make the 
material sacrifices which-his calculation of the national 
interest demanded. The resistance which had been revealed 
in 1945 to foreign economic expenditure had not decreased 
in 19^6; neither had the resistance of key Congressional 
Republicans to universal military training. Although necessary 
for Republican support, the anti-communist stance of American 
policy as developed in 1946 could not guarantee that bipar­
tisan support would be forthcoming. The desire to wipe away 
the Hew Deal, to balance the budget and reduce defence ex­
penditure, in short, to return to Normalcy, was ultimately 
of more concern to Congressional Republicans than questions 
of foreign policy. The Nationalists, including Taft and 
Hoover, still put their prime emphasis on restoring liberty 
in the United States; in their eyes all other things were 
of secondary importance.
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CHAPTER SIX
Britain and the British Loan
The multilateral peace, to which Republicans, albeit 
reluctantly, had been won over in 194-5» had been pre-occupled 
with mechanistic international institutions. Its major weak­
ness was the failure to face up to the short-term problems 
of reconstruction, for multilateralism was dependent on a 
stable world, politically, economically and socially. Aware­
ness of this was implicit in Herbert Hoover's war-time advocacy 
of a transition period, and in the criticisms often made by 
Taft in 194-5 that the United States should wait to see the 
shape of post-war world before committing itself to the 
various economic aspects of multilateral planning. In the 
"international" climate of 1945, the warnings of Taft and 
Hoover were unconvincing; the argument of Administration 
supporters and Republican Internationalists was that the 
United States had got to take a lead if the multilateral 
world, which they assumed was necessary to the United States 
and world peace, was ever to come about. Thus one of the 
leading post-war Internationalists, Senator Smith of Hew 
Jersey, argued that since ". . .the post war world is a 
new chapter. . .we must take the initiative in breaking 
down barriers between nations, The old type unilateral 
tariff is a form of isolationism and we cannot follow that 
road. I am not a free trader and I expect to protect 
American industry and American living standards, but I shall 
support a foreign policy aimed to help other nations to 
help themselves - and our help must take the form of economic
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cooperation. The choice is between our international leader­
ship and another world war. And that is why I am so opposed 
to Henry Wallace’s spheres of influence theory. The inter­
nationalists cannot support Wallace”.1 The difficulty, 
however, was the fact that the multilateral world would not 
emerge unless the United States provided more than Just 
leadership and ideas. Each instrument of multilateralism 
was over-sold to the American Congress and people in 1945, 
and there was a consequent unwillingness to face up to the 
real dimensions of the problem. In fact, not until 194-7 
was there a willingness to face up to the fact that a world 
in conformity with American ideas and planning would not 
emerge of its own accord. Before 1947, the only Important 
attempt to use American resources on a large scale to in­
fluence the direction of world reconstruction was the British 
Loan. Signed in December, 1945, the Loan was designed to 
mate available to Britain the estimated amount of its de­
ficit until 1948, by which time it was assumed its economy
pwould have revived. As the most important trading nation 
with which the United States had to deal, Britain was seen 
by Administration spokesmen as a special case. The Loan,it 
was assumedjwould enable her to fall in with multilateral 
trading and exchange policies.^ Designed then, as an essen­
tial step on the way to thé multilateral peace, the British 
Loan posed severe political problems to Republican leaders; 
problems which need to be viewed in the light of the domestic
Diary, September 21st, 1946, Smith MSS.2r . N. Gardner, p. 202.
5lbld.. p. 210.
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political situation in 194-5-6, in light of the Republican 
tradition, and also in the light of perceptions of the dev­
eloping hostility between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.
As argued in previous chapters, the Republican tradition 
was a tradition of self-interest and Independence, a tradi­
tion which scorned sentimentality in foreign relations. 
Historically the great Republican statesmen of the turn of
the century had seen a certain mutuality of interest between
4the United States and Britain. Vandenberg had also in his 
Trail of a Tradition approvingly quoted Emerson on "the 
moral peculiarity of the Anglo-Saxon race", and had described 
Anglo-American "harmony" as "the first hope of the world".-’
As late as 1940, T. R. B. in the Hew Republic wa3 to write:
"The Traditional Republican -administration' foreign attitude 
has favored the fullest collaboration with England and the 
building up of a powerful navy to safeguard American ’interests’. 
On this front therefore the President has a policy which 
commands the heartiest approval of all those who have had 
this traditional Republican attitude, first crystallized 
into a policy by John Hay and carried on right up to the 
time of Henry L. Stimson left the State Department".^ World 
War I perhaps weakened this feeling; despite the apparent 
identity of ideals revealed at Versailles, the immediate 
post-war period had reavealed a number of conflicting interests.
^Osgood, pp. 72-3, 282, 285.
2pp. 185-187.April 8th, 1940, cited in James Martin, II: 1230.
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Although aware of the common legal traditions and the 
political and economic similarities between Britain and the 
United States, Herbert Hoover and John Poster Dulles were 
both in their inter-war writings very much aware of the de­
ficiencies in the British Empire. Hoover certainly had be­
come convinced as a result of his World War I experience 
of the uniqueness of the United States. Versailles to Hoover
had revealed "the collision of civilizations that had grown
7three hundred years apart". The United States by contrast 
had developed a distinctive civilization, where class barriers 
and destructive ideologies were unknown, and which was based
Qon the working concept of equality of opportunity. To Dulles
it was difficult to see the role of the British Empire in
the liberal world he envisaged. Although he was aware of
the self-governing Dominions, and of the importance of the
qcommon law, Britain was still the major Imperial power.
In 1940, therefore, the preservation of the British Empire
was a worthwhile goal, short of war, and "so long as its
leadership remains liberal as over the past century",^
Ultimately, however, its preservation could not, according
to Dulles, be guaranteed, for within the Empire were "inherent
weaknesses".1  ^ It was, therefore,"inevitable that this
Empire will evolve. . .and the form of evolution cannot be 
12predicted". Opposed to colonialism, and favouring the
¿.Hoover, Memoirs 1:479.
“Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (Garden City, N. Y.: 
Doubleday, 1922), pp. 8-11.
yDulles, "Problems of Peace", p. 160; War, Peace and Change. 
,nPP. 156-8.
10J. P. and Allen Dulles, »Statement of AN AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY,"September 6th, 1940, Dulles MSS (Supplement), p. 7. 
Aibid.* P- 8.12Ibld.
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mandate system and the "open door", Dulles was disturbed 
when he visited Britain in 194-2 to find a basic desire to 
maintain the status quo.1  ^ Although stressing the need for 
post-war Anglo-American collaboration, as well as arguing 
the need for a reviaion of colonial policies, Dulles' 
emotional detachment from the British fight for survival 
made him a less than favourite figure amongst British offi­
cials, even in 1942.14- In later years he was to be criticized 
by fellow Americans for having no conception of the "special 
relationship" between Great Britain and the United States.1^
In many ways Willkie made the same, more powerful criticisms 
of Britain in One World.Willkie, however, had never 
lacked the empathy which Dulles failed to exhibit, and his 
visit to Britain in 194-1 had proved tremendously popular.17 
Dulles' ambivalence towards Britain was matched by 
Hoover. In the'Problems of las ting Peace.he and Hugh Gibson 
were not prepared to condemn.outright Imperialism other than 
the conquest of "Civilized" races: Africa}they made clear 
was not ready for self-government; the most that could be
expected was equal access for all nations for immigration,
18trade, resource development I At the same time, however, 
Hoover was deeply concerned that the United States should 
not be put in a position of defending the British Empire.
13Guhin, pp. 4-9-50.
¡¿Ibid.; Hoopes, p. 53.
^Joseph Alsop to Martin Sommers, September 8th, 194-8;
transcript, interview with Harold E. Stassen, p. 11» Dulles 
(Oral).16PP. 14-15, 30-31-86-7, 130-153.I^Barnard, p. 284.18PP. 163, 318-19.
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During the war, he was worried by the publication of Lipp- 
mann's U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (1943), 
because of its premise that the British navy had been America's 
first line of defense for 120 years. To Dulles and to John 
Reuben Clark (author of the Clark Memorandum) he wrote urging 
that Lippmann's "historic distortion" ought to be answered. 
Britain had always been guided by self-interest, he said, 
and he denied completely that "the growth of the United States 
owed one atom to the helpfulness of the British Empire". 
Nevertheless, earlier in the same year he had written to another 
friend, ". . .the British are going to require some defence 
before this is over. The whole tendency of the Left-wing 
today is to destroy the British in the hope of making Russia 
the great post war partner". Similarly, in 1945, Hoover 
informed Secretary of War Stimson of the need for a negotiated 
peace with Japan, on the basis that a continuation of the 
war would weaken the economic position of the United States 
and Britainvand would strengthen the Soviet Union.^ Hoover's 
position was not, however, as contradictory as it may appear. 
Starting off from the standpoint of American self-interest, 
Hoover's aim was an independent foreign policy; but confronted 
with a conflict between British and Russian interests he had 
no doubt which the United States should support. Although 
he would not have accepted the label, Hoover's attitude was 1
1^Hoover to J. Reuben Clark, October 6th, 1943; Hoover to 
John Foster Dulles, September 30th, 194-3, Hoover MSS.
20Hoover to Chauncey McCormick, March 31st, 1943, Hoover MSS. 
^Memorandum, May 15th, 1945, Henry L. Stimson file, Hoover MSS.
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one of classic realpolltlk, in the best traditions of the 
"Farewell Address". Friendship with Britain was not an aim 
of policy, it was viewed within the context of American 
interests and ideals; in short, he was neither pro-British 
nor anti-British, in so far as that ideal state was possible. 
The Chicago Tribune, often accused of anglophobia, a label 
which Col.McCormick would not accept, put the position of 
the Nationalists bluntly: "If it ever was true, as the inter­
nationalists insisted, that our security was dependent 
upon the British fleet, it isn't true today and it need 
never be true again. We can cooperate with the British or 
not, as our interest demands. That goes equally for the 
Russians, the Chinese and every other nation. Their need for
our friendship is far greater than ours for theirs, and we
22should conduct our foreign affairs accordingly".
Within the framework of the tradition then, relations 
with Britain were seen somewhat ambivalently. In the war 
and afterwards, all Republican leaders could agree that the 
survival of the British Isles as an Independent political 
entity was Important to the United States; such an assumption 
was even part of Taft's foreign policy. But there was a 
difference between this and the view, perhaps more common 
in London than in Washington, that British and American 
Interests were identical. Republicans from all sections of 
the Party could agree that Britain was closer to the United 
States culturally and ideologically than any other country; 
but her deficiencies were still apparent. Thus Republican 
leaders, like left-wing Democrats, for the most part rejected
^ Chicago Tribune. June 24th, 1944.
23White, Taft Story, pp. 154-35; address to American Assembly, 
May 22nd, 1951, cited by Kirk and McClellan, p. 32.
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the implications of Anglo-American alliance which began to 
emerge at the end of the war. This was especially true of 
the nationalists. The image of the British as slick inter­
national poker players, soaking gullible and sycophantic 
American foreign service personnel was convincing, and 
Lincoln's adage, that the sun never sat on the British 
Empire, because the good Lord couldn't trust the British in 
the dark, seemed as relevant as ever in the post-war world, 
in which socialist Britain seemed determined to hang on to 
most of her Empire, and to soak the United States into the 
bargain. Characteristically then, Cal O'Laughlin, Hoover's , 
faithful friend, reported in January, 194-5» that the British
were delighted with Vandenberg's speech of January 10th, and
24noted that Vandenberg was friendly with Lord Halifax.
The implication was clear: perhaps Vandenberg had been 
unduly influenced by the ever wily British. A year later, 
O'Laughlin reported, on the basis of his friend's visit to 
Europe and Asia investigating the food situation, "Mr. Hoover 
found the British as usual grabbing everything in sight. They 
have no intention of doing any more for Egypt and for India 
than they must do".2^ a Strong America, therefore, required 
eternal vigilance against the wiles of the British; Anglo- 
American cooperation, like post-war relationships with the 
Soviet Union, must be seen to be deferential to American 
interests.
24-0'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, January 13th, 194-5, O'Laughlin 
1133.
25o'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, May 18th, 
1946, O'laughlin MSS. .
263
The British Loan
The British Loan was negotiated, without consultation 
with Republican leaders, at a time when the congressional 
party were more concerned with returning the United States 
as quickly' as possible to "Normalcy" To many in Congress, 
the Loan offered a great opportunity to lambast the Adminis­
tration, and to point up the basic issue a3 they saw it: 
between a bungling give-away, extravagant Administration, 
and a more hard-headed realistic opposition.. The desire to 
balance the,budget by trimming down both domestic and exter­
nal expenditure found strong sympathy amongst Congressional 
Republicans in the run up to the 194-6 elections. A bipartisan 
call in March, 1946, for the budget to be balanced in 1946— 
1947 received the support of all the ma;jor Republican leaders
in both Houses of Congress: Vandenberg, Taft, Wherry,
96White, Erldges, Halleck, Martin, Taber. Earlier, in mid- 
February, eight Republicans on the Senate Appropriations 
Committee in the Senate presented a resolution to the Presi­
dent calling for a detailed picture of the American inter-
27national economic position. In delivering the resolution, 
their leader, Senator Bridges, made it clear that they saw 
their action as consistent with the demands by Herbert 
Hoover, Vandenberg and Democratic elder statesman, Bernard 
Baruch, that a balance sheet be drawn up. 0 Senator Warren 
Austin, soon to leave the Senate for the United Nations 
Security Council, was critical of what he described as an
2oNew York Times. March 4th, 1946.
2Xlbid.t February 16th, 1944.
28Ibld.
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undercurrent of "Isolationism" in Congress and the nation.
He was especially critical of Congress’ failure to deal 
with the extension of selective service, universal military 
training and unification of the armed forces. ^
In this climate ofopinion, the attitude of the Nationalists 
especially towards the British loan was predictable. Con­
cerned about what they regarded as the restoration of liberty 
in the United States, they were ill-disposed to go on pouring 
American resources into Europe or Asia for matters other 
than relief. In November, 1945, Col. McCormick recommended 
that England receive "a delegation of energetic Americans 
to teach the English workmen how to work. That would be
better than to strain our own workmen to still greater efforts
•*oto keep English workmen in semi-idleness". In Congress 
the British Loan was greeted with hostility. There was a 
widespread feeling that as usual the United States had been 
bested in international negotiations, as well as the fear 
that this would set a precedent for further loans. John 
Vorys, the influential Ohioan on the Foreign Affairs Committee 
in the House, commented that he found Britain's request for 
an interest free loan an insult to his intelligence. "I 
want to see Britain survive,* he wrote, "but we should help 
from now on only on a basis that is mutually profitable."^1
^Article from Christian Science Monitor, reprinted in 
Congressional Record. 92, March 5th, 1946, Appendix 1178. 
3°Address to Foreign Policy Association, November 17th, 1945,
New York Times, November 18th, 1945.
31 John Vorys to Clark Riker, September 24th, 1945, Vorys MSS., 
Ohio State Historical Society, Columbus.
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Senator Taft reported to Hoover that sentiment against the 
loan was growing, and noted, perhaps with satisfaction, 
that the State Department appeared to he in a state of 
confusion.-^2 The fact that British Conservatives opposed 
the loan, and argued that it would simply advance socialism 
in Britain, was not calculated to increase the Loan’s attrac­
tiveness to the Nationalists.-^
In the Senate the small group of Internationalists 
could he counted on to give support to the Loan. Warren 
Austin was an early supporter, arguing that it would help
Britain to stay away from socialism rather than aid socialism. ^
•35Senator Smith too was an early supporter. In the country 
they could rely on the support of Harold Stassen, who on 
leaving the Navy in November began his campaign to change 
the face of the Republican Party away from Old Guard domin­
ance. Although Stassen was the subject of much press atten­
tion, with resultant good showings in opinion polls, it is 
doubtful that he could at any time wield much influence in 
Congress.-50 The fact is that by 1945-46, only a minority 
of Congressional Republicans shared what the New York Herald 
Tribune described as, a commitment to support "the. . .out­
posts of a functioning free enterprise economy and democratic 
polity." Neither did they share the Herald Tribune * s own
conviction that the "Western democratic ideal" could not
37"be preserved and nurtured in the United States alone".
^Robert A. Taft to Hoover, November 30th, 1945, Hoover MSS. 
33oflaughlln to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, November 3rd, 
-.1945, O’Laughlin MSS.
^Report, September 13th, 1945, McNaughton MSS.
35jj.iexander Smith to Otto T. Mallery, December 12th, 1945,-Smith MSS.
3°By :&ne 1946 Stassen had a narrow lead over Dewey as the 
popular choice for 1948 nominee, Fortune, June, 1946, p. 6.
3'March 1st. 1948.
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Crucial then to the Republican position on the British Loan 
was the centre group, and especially Arthur Vandenberg. John 
Foster Dulles was evidently for the Loan, but he was aware 
of the political difficulties which existed by the end of 
1945. To Vandenberg he suggested that rather than opposing, 
Republicans in Congress should take the more constructive 
path of insisting on a total clarification of the money and 
goods to be taken from the American economy, and for an arti­
culation of the principle on which allocations were to be
7 Q
made between the various nations. In an address to the 
Fiftieth Annual Congress of American Industry, a copy of 
which he sent to Vandenberg prior to delivery, Dulles set 
out his ideas more clearly. The United States, he said, must 
exercise good Judgement in the distribution of foreign loans, 
with priority being given to Britain, France, Holland and 
Belgium; at the same time, however, he was critical of govern­
ment handling of the whole question, and in particular for 
the failure to outline a total programme. "When our govern­
ment talks with foreign governments," he said, "it should 
be primarily to tell them what it is we have decided to do 
in our interest. If some aid to Great Britain is in the 
national interest, and I believe it is, why should it have 
taken over three months of negotiation to define what that 
aid will be. The impression created is that our government 
did not know its own mind, or has been talked or traded into
•^John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, December 17th, 194-5, 
Vandenberg MSS.
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doing what is against its better judgement. The result may­
be serious opposition in the country and in Congress to doing
"59what, if properly explained, the whole nation would support', 
lilce Vandenberg and Hoover and other Republicans, Dulles 
also emphasized that there was a bottom to the barrel:
"There is a severe limit to the material aid which our 
government ought to extend, and it is small in relation to 
the need. There is, however, no limit to the moral leader­
ship which we could give, and that is equally needed. Our
40nation was designed to help others in that way". Dulles'
equivocal endorsement of the British Loan was to be repeated
on March 1st, 1946. He realized, he said on that occasion,
that there were many economic arguments against it, but "it
has become a symbol of whether or not we are prepared to help
Great Britain when she is standing at a critical juncture. . .'^
Vandenberg, however, was sceptical, and in any case was
far more concerned about Byrnes' negotiations in Moscow.
Rot having been consulted, he was not, in December, 1945,
42disposed to fight for the Loan. To Dulles he confided
a "feeling" that they should support it, "for the sake of
some nebulous affinity which the English speaking world must
maintain in mutual self-defense". But he felt the whole thing
had been badly handled - his constituency would be unimpressed 
such 43by/arguments. fori,. "It can easily become a major tragedy." ^
He was particularly concerned that it might make it difficult
39j)ecember 7th, 1945, Dulles MSS.; New York Times. December 8th, 
1945. -Address, December 7th, 1945, Dulles MSS.
41 Address at Philadelphia, March 1st, 1946, New York Times, 
.pMarch 2nd, 1946.
T^Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 230-31.
45Ibid., p.231.
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to turn down other requests, particularly from Russia, which
he knew Republicans would deinitely not support. In view
of these considerations, he wondered whether it might not
be better for the United States not to open up the "pawn- 
44shop" at all. Vandenberg's reasoning revealed a conflict 
between his fear of over-spending, and his desire to oppose 
the Soviet Union externally. He would not wish to see Britain 
weakened in the light of his fears about Russia. On the 
other hand, he remained temperamentally close to Taft when 
it came to expenditure, and his desire to maintain the Ameri­
can way of life. To a friend in Detroit, he wrote at the 
end of December, "I hope it may be a 'new year' in which we
can restore at least a few of the American fundamentals in
45which you and I believe". In London for the opening of 
the United Nations in January, Vandenberg sought to ascer­
tain what the effect on Britain would be if, as he thought
46possible, the Loan were thrown out by Congress. Although
he came round to supporting it, as late as April, 1946, he
was still dubious as to whether the Loan could get through 
47Congress. ‘
The caution and apprehension of Yandenberg needs to 
be seen in the context of domestic politics, as well perhaps
^Vandenberg to John Poster Dulles, December 19th, 1945, 
Vandenberg MSS.; the word "pawnshop" was edited out of the ■ ^ Private Papers. p. 2 3 1.
4--'Vandenberg to B. E. Hutchinson, December 29th, 1945, Vanden- 
,-berg MSS.4oNigel Nicolson, ed., Harold Nlcolson: Diaries and Letters 
1945-62 (London: Collins, 1968), pp. 52-3.
^Report, April 19th, 1946, McNaughton MSS.
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as in the context of his feeling that the Administration 
were consciously ignoring him. The 1946 elections were not 
far from the minds of most Republicans, and the necessity 
of winning, and making certain of victory in'1948 was self- 
evident to all who, with Vandenberg, wished to see a return 
to American fundamentals. Victory could not be regarded as 
inevitable in view of the extraordinary popularity of 
President Truman in his first months in office.^® To make 
matters worse, Republicans found it hard to secure unity, 
as the dissatisfaction at Chicago in December over the Con­
gressional draft of Party principles had revealed.^ A meeting 
of midwestern State Chairmen on February 1st failed to come 
up with anything much more positive; Stassen supporters 
reportedly managed to tone down the section on foreign affairs 
to the innocuous statement that ". . .responsibility for 
world leadership has fallen on American shoulders, but in 
our dealings with other nations we must not make this land
of plenty a land of scarcity. Experienced and capable men
SOmust replace those now handling our foreign affairs”. At 
the State Convention in Nebraska in March, Kenneth Wherry, 
Senate Whip, faced with an attempt by Harold Stassen to get 
Nebraskans to dump Old Guard Senator, Hugh Butler, attacked 
"Republican New Dealers" who he alleged were trying to take 
over the Party. One of the tests for identification of Re­
publican New Dealers,he said, was their use of the slogan,
"We will enforce the peace. . .".^1
^Fortune, January, 1946. r>. 101.49SeeTpSge24l -3 above.
^ Chicago Tribune. February 3rd, 1946.■^ 'New York, Times, March 20th, 1946.
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At the end of March, following the resignation of Na­
tional Chairman and Dewey associate, Herbert Brownell, the 
National Committee elected the .Nationalists' representative,
c2Carroll Reece of Tennessee. Reece's election, said Stassen,
did not constitute a decision on policy or platform: he
still intended to carry on his fight within.the Party on
53issues and principles. The Chicago Tribune clearly thought 
otherwise: "Mr. Stassen will, of course, continue as a 
pseudo-Republican. Currently he is organizing what he calls 
Republican Open Forums, ostensibly an effort to probe the 
opinions of Republican voters. . .If the Republican party 
follows the only course that can assure it victory, namely, 
the selection of a candidate in 1948 who will go to the coun­
try as the sponsor of a pro-American foreign policy, it 
can be expected confidently that Mr. Stassen's Wall Street
sponsors will push him into the camp of the New Deal Inter- 
cAnationalists".-' Given time to reflect, the Tribune was 
even more certain that the election of Reece signified that 
in 1948 the voters "will be offered a clear choice of 
foreign policies, a choice between a pro-American policy put 
forward by a revitalized Republican party and the New Deal 
policy, which now more than ever can be seen as a continuous 
struggle between a pro-Russian group and a pro-British group 
for the influence of the United States.
^ibld., April 2nd, 1946. 
gfebld.-^Chicago Tribune, April 3rd, 1946. ”
55ibld.. April 8th, 1946.
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The reaction of the Chicago Tribune was, not surprisingly, 
echoed by Governor Green of Illinois, who way back in Decem­
ber had been critical of the ’’left wing” stance of the Repub­
lican Thirty. On April 1st, he declared that the issues of 
19^6 would be crucial to the nation: ”In foreign affairs, 
it is not isolationism versus internationalism. It is the 
secret deals of ; the New Dealers versus a frank cooperation 
based on a full recognition of our first responsiblity to
our own people, and in which both the American people and
cs6the world shall know exactly where we stand". Critical 
of the "appeasement" of the Administration at various war­
time conferences, when, he alleged, it had yielded on issues 
vital to American commerce and defense, Green continued:
"The events of the last weeks in Iran and in New York have 
demonstrated both the soundness of those warnings and the 
tragic futility of the New Deal diplomacy. Americans of all 
parties will approve our belated stand against Russian ag­
gression, but I know that the poeple of Illinois would rather 
have seen us act when communist Russia violated the political 
and religious freedom of the Poles, the Lithuanians and the 
other small nations on her borders instead of waiting until 
Stalin's program clashed with the oil interests of the 
British empire".^
j^Ibld.. April and, 1946.
5' ibid.; on March 27th Gromyko, the Russian delegate, walked 
out of the Security Council meeting after the Council had 
voted, against Soviet wishes, to keep the matter of Iran 
on the agenda; Gaddis argues that the decision of Secretary 
Byrnes to push the matter through the Security Council, 
even though the Russians had indicated a willingness to 
withdraw their troops by early May, was largely the result 
of his desire to convince domestic critics that "appease­
ment" was over; op. clt.. pp. 310-1 2 .
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Vandenberg had instinctively realized in 1945 that , 
despite anti-Russian feeling, the British Loan would not be 
very popular in the Middle West. The British Loan and the 
apparently emergent Anglo-American alliance, suggested by 
Churchill's Pulton, Missouri speech in early March, were 
difficult to reconcile with the concept of a "Strong America" 
One Congressman, from Vandenberg's home state, saw the emer­
gent alliance as the result of the influence of Rhodes 
Scholars. "Naturally, these British-educated young men 
return to the United States thrilled with the greatness of 
the British Empire. . .and most of them have devoted their 
time ever since preaching the doctrine that America must 
forever be the guardian of. . .Britain from whom we thought
egwe gained our independence back in 1776". The same Con­
gressman saw Dean Acheson as the prime example, and recalled 
the U.N.R.R.A. conference at Hot Springs, Virginia in 194-3: 
"He ate every meal with the British at that Conference - 
not with the Americans. He played tennis with the British, 
he lived, dressed, and talked like the British, and that 
reminds me of another thing. Personally, I am getting sick 
and tired listening to the "cheerio’s", "right-ho's" eto., 
down here in Washington - and the British accents and manner­
isms which we are constantly met with. It's a new, but 
costly'fad".^
Small wonder then that Republican leaders were hesitant
^Representative Bradley of Michigan, transcript of radio 
address, January 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 1946, reprinted in 
„„Congressional Record. 92. Appendix, p.‘25.
59Ibid.
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about the British Loan. Representative Charles Eaton of New
Jersey was perhaps the most publicly prominent in support both
of the Loan and of standing behind Britain in international
•
affairs. He was a man of limited influence, however, despite 
his seniority on the Foreign Affairs Committee. In New York 
on March 9th, Eaton said that "for our own safety we cannot 
permit Russia to weaken and finally destroy Great Britain as 
a world power. The only assurance of safety for our two coun­
tries and for all other free self-governing capitalistic coun­
tries is our continuing unity in peace as in war". Harold 
Stassen, however, though arguing that defeat of the Loan 
would harm the American economy, urged that all foreign 
loans must have firm conditions attached to them: in 
Britain’s case he wanted a change in sterling bloc and empire 
preference policies.^1 Vandenberg held off from taking any 
public position on the Loan until April 22nd, the day before 
his departure with Byrnes for Paris. In so doing, he des­
cribed it as the most difficult decision he had had to take 
in his whole 18 years in the Senate. Whilst expressing 
regret that Congress had not been consulted in advance, he 
also tried to reassure the Senate that the pound sterling
*was a special case, that the Loan was necessary to the 
functioning of Bretton Woods, and that rather than encourage 
socialism it would contain it. Gradually then, Vandenberg 
convinced himself of the necessity of supporting it.^ He 
did so, knowing full well that although the House was expected
^ Congressional Record, 92, Appendix, p. 1340.
^ New York Times, March 9th, 1946.
" Congressional Record, 92, April 22nd, 1946, p. 4079.°3jbid. t pp. 4080-40cS2.
2.74-
to be most difficult, the Loan had also threatened to be 
difficult in the Senate, with four of the seven Republicans
on the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, including
64Taft, having voted against it in committee.
Taft, in announcing his intention to oppose the Loan, 
reported the decision of the Republican Steering Committee 
that it should not be a Party matter: "a rule which I
think should apply to most matters relating to foreign
65relatlons,,. J Taft then proceeded to take the bill apart,
on the grounds that it violated what he regarded as sound
66principles of foreign lending and fiscal policy. He was, 
he said, prepared to give Britain one and one quarter billion 
dollars to balance Its trade account with the United States, 
but the extra two and one-half billion dollars was "an attempt 
to stabilize the currencies of the world, which is just 
exactly what Bretton Uoods was going to do." Had they not 
passed Bretton Uoods, he said, he would not now be opposing 
the British Loan.^ But as it was he could not see why the 
United States should now be expected to provide the money 
required by Britain to settle her accounts with her own 
Dominions: "It Is difficult indeed for me to see why we 
should underwrite the entire British Empire and the Sterling 
blue".^® Taft's fundamental position remained the same: he 
disputed that the United States should be primarily concerned 
with foreign trade, since its economy was largely self- 
sufficient. The artificial creation of large demands for
§^New York Times, April 11th, 1946.
^ Congressional Record. 92, April 24th, 1946, p. 4106.
Ibid.
°AlbId.. p. 4111.
°°Ibld.. p. 4110.
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exports he saw as Inflationary, and ultimately unwise, since
the United States could not in the long run import enough
69to keep its trade with the rest of the world in balance.
Taft's arguments went largely unanswered from Republi­
can ranks. In succeeding days, Republican support increasingly 
appeared to be lining up behind Taft, with the exception of 
the usual small group of Internationalists. One of the most 
telling points against the loan was, in the words of Senator 
Capper of Kansas, that "Every time we are asked to sacrifice 
our own interests to promote world welfare, we are told that
70this fresh step is necessary to make previous programs work".
So also commented Senator Willis■of Indians: "For month after
month, as the administration has unfolded its program of so-
called international cooperation, many of us have gone along,
thinking that each measure would be the last. . .Yet, apparently,
each proposal is but the genesis of another proposal which,
it is said, is even more important than its predecessor. . .
Perhaps in several more months. . .we shall be told that it
will be less than useless if we do not pass other resolutions
providing for loans to Russia, France, China, or any of a
dozen other nations".^1 With regard to Vandenberg's argument
that the British Loan was necessary to make Bretton Woods
work, he was "constrained to ask why someone did not mention
that when the Bretton Woods legislation was being debated 
72here".
69Ibid.I?Ibid!;
7 2T b ld .
PP. 4107, May 2nd, 
p. 4316.
4113. 1946, p. 4314.
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Senator laFollette, recently welcomed Into Republican 
ranks,cautioned against "extremists who blindly support 
any project that is labeled 'international'"; such propa­
ganda, he said, would provoke a reaction "in the opposite 
direction from sure-footed and sane international coopera­
tion".^ Concern for domestic matters auch as money for 
veterans, for tax reduction, for budget balancing, were fore­
most in the minds of Republican Senators, who were anxious 
to "liquidate" the New Deal. The debate on the loan suggested 
that the "international" climate of 194-5 had been superseded; 
but supporters of the loan had one trump card, which was 
played more in private than in public, which was that the 
loan was necessary because of the dispute that was shaping 
up with Russia. The loan had been doomed, charged Senator 
Burton T-fheeler (Dem., Montanaluntil the propaganda had begun 
that it was necessary to save Britain from Russian hands.^ 
Despite the intrusion of the anti-communist issue, the loan 
was passed by the relatively narrow margin of 46-34. Re­
publicans supplied 19 of the nays, with two more announced 
against the measure.75 The development of the anti-communist 
consensus was even more important in the House of Represen­
tatives than it had been in the Senate. In May, one Repre­
sentative wrote to Under-Secretary Clayton after a dinner 
he had held with Republican Congressmen to muster support 
for the loan: "I find that the economic arguments in favour 
of the loan are on the whole much less convincing to this 
group than the feeling may serve us in good stead in holding
ffilbld.. April 30th, 1946, p. 4239.
7rj k ld., May 3rd, 1946, p. 4373.
rpi b ~ . May .10th,. 1946, p.4806.
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up a hand of a nation whom we may need badly as a friend 
because of impending Russian troubles".'0 In early July,
74 Republicans and the lone Progressive signed a statement 
attacking the British Loan and dedicating the day it was due 
to be debated as Veterans and Old Age Pensions Day.^ By 
July, relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated still 
further. Republicans, who had for the most part been hos­
tile to the Soviet Union, or at least sceptical, throughout 
the war, were by 1946 publicly identifiable as anti-Soviet; 
anti-communism in fact for the Midwestern wing of the Party 
was to be a major issue of the campaign. Given this fact, 
it difficult for Republicans to oppose the British Loan 
when it was put into anti-communist terms. "Out in the 
cloakroom," complained one Representative from Illinois, 
"practically the only argument for the British Loan is the
hush, hush stuff that, ‘Row you can say you voted for some-
78thing to stop Russia’". ,
Against the portrayal of the British Loan in anti-Russian 
terms, opponents suggested that Russia was not the threat 
which she was being built up as, and that the real threat 
to the United States came through bureaucratization and regi­
mentation.^ To these arguments were added the usual anglo- 
phobia, and the conviction that once more the United States 
was being taken for a ride by Britain, whilst at home it was 
sliding into insolvency and bankruptcy. Republican Con­
gressmen complained that the Administration track record did
^Quoted by R. N. Gardner, p. 250.
ZlRew York Times. July 4th, 1946.
¿^Congressional Record. 92, June 28th, 1946, p. 7913.
X^Ibld.. July 8th. 1946. p. 8426.
ibid-, P- S428; ibid.. July 12th. 1946, p. 8867.
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not inspire confidence in the success of the Loan. One 
Congressman complained that the press were labelling opponents 
of the Loan as "isolationists": "The inference is that in 
order to demonstrate to the world that we are not isolation­
ists or nationalistic we must continue lend-lease until the 
end of time".^ Another, who as he reminded the Piouse had 
supported the U. IP., Bretton Hoods and other "international" 
measures, felt that the Loan would serve simply to divide 
the world, and he commented, ". . .it appears that financing 
foreign governtments like atomic energy is a process of 
chain reactions. In my opinion, we better call a halt to
the process while there is still a chance to save the sol-
82vency of the United States".
One of the most influential opponents of the Loan was 
representative John Vorys of Ohio, whose opposition appeared 
to derive from his feeling that the Loan was a bad agreement 
for the United States. At the same time, Vorys attacked 
the technique of representing international agreements as 
"sacred governmental obligations" which Congress was bound 
to ratify to avoid a world tragedy.®-^ He commented also 
that Vinson and Clayton, Secretary of the Treasury and Under­
secretary of State, were inexperienced in diplomacy, and 
had neglected to consult with Congress as in previous "inter- 
national" measures. ^ He believed, he said, in the need for 
cooperation with Britain against communism, and he also be­
lieved that the United States had a duty to help in world­
wide reconstruction, but the British Loan he held was sound
^ Ibid.. p. 8872. 
g2Ibld.. p. 8849.
Sglbld.. p. 8726, July 11th, 1946.
04Ibid.
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in neither an economic nor a political sense. He was es­
pecially dubious as to whether Britain, having promised al­
ready under lend-lease and Bretton Hoods to reform its trad­
ing and exchange practices, would be any more inclined to
85do so under the loan agreement.
On July 13th, the Loan was passed by 219 votes to 155.
One hundred and twenty-two of the negative votes were Re­
publican. Most of the votes, and the voices in favour of 
the loan, came from Eastern Republicans; a bill which seemed
to be nationally unpopular was likely to be a very risky
86proposition in an election year in the Midwest. Among 
the supporters of the bill were conservative Eastern Re­
publicans, Joseph Martin and John Taber; among the opponents 
of the bill were Republicans such as Everett Dirksen of 
Illinois, Mundt of South Dakota and Vorys of Ohio, all of
whom were usually more inclined J to support
87"international” measures than were .Martin and Taber.
The strength of Republican opposition suggested then 
that the Congressional Party were more concerned about domes­
tic problems in the summer of 1946. Inflation and labour 
troubles seemed more important than Britain’s economic 
difficulties; communism and radicalism seemed more of an 
immediate threat in the United States than overseas. On 
the question of opposition to communism the Republican Party 
could unite; thus some supporters of the British Loan were 
careful to point out that if the Loan were defeated, the
r.r.Ibld'» p * 8?25.°°The public seemed to be pre-occupled with domestic matters 
in 1946; polls revealed that 40$ were opposed to the Loan in 
June, and 42$ in August, after Congress had passed it, R. N. 
„Gardner, p. 236. .
°‘Congressional Record. 92, July 13th, 1946, p. 8955-7.
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Communists, the Soviet leaders and the left wing of the
88British Labour Party would celebrate. The problem, however,
was one of priorities and allocation of resources. Senator
Bridges of Hew Hampshire, long known for his anti-soviet
views, gave an insight into the dimensions of the problem.
Bridges believed that the United States could not afford a
period of social and economic dislocation in Euro.pe, but
he regretted that "a large part of our population is still
far from the realization that the epoch of natural Isolation
is ended, that whether we like it or not we must shoulder
the responsibilities and the risks of leadership in a
shrunken w o r l d " . Senator Bridges himself, however, apparently
saw no contradition between his foreign policy convictions
and the statement ofRepublican contributions to the 79th
Congress which he put in the Congressional Record in August,
which outlined the Republican intention to reduce taxes,
economise and balance the budget.-7 Herbert Hoover likewisehe
was belligerently anti-communist;/privately encouraged 
President Truman in his anti-communist stand, and publicly 
attacked the communist press for slandering him whenever he 
went overseas.91 in his usual birthday statement in August, 
he coupled attacks on the Soviet Union with a three point 
plan for the United States: 1) the United States must con­
serve resources and reduce spending and end its "role of 
Santa Claus".; 2) economic relations should be a "two-way 
street", and ^balanced traffic at that"; 3) pending general
q®Ibid., July 12th, 1946, pp. 8856, 8865. 
fffrbid.. June 26th, 1946, p. 7577. 
gyibid.. August 2nd, 1946, p. 10735.
yiO'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, May 18th, 1946, 
Q'laughlln MSS.; note of meeting with President Truman,
May 16th, 1946, Hoover MSS.; New York Times, June 6th, 1946.
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disarmament, the United States must hang on to the atomic 
bomb.
For Herbert Hoover, and the bulk of the congressional 
party, relations with both the Soviet Union and Britain were 
viewed within the framework of a ^Strong America*. The 
apparent decline of Britain, a major change in world power 
which had been foreseen by A. T. Mahan among others in the 
late nineteenth century, coupled with the rising military 
and ideological strength of the Soviet Union, had created 
a situation in which the apparent demands of world leader­
ship could not easily be reconciled with the desire to re­
turn to domestic normalcy. By 1946, the fundamental ques­
tion was how much the United States was prepared to pay, not 
only in terms of money, but also in terms of its way of 
life, to defend and extend the liberal political economy 
overseas. For those who shared the Viillkieite assumption 
about the indivisibility of freedom, the dilemma did not 
exist. For the nationalists, for whom the liberal political 
economy was not a vital interest, the demands of the restora­
tion of '’freedom" at home remained first priority.
By 1946, Vandenberg and Dulles, though still concerned 
about and sensitive to the domestic Implications of United 
States policy, were finding themselves increasingly isolated 
from the Nationalists. To Charles Eaton, Dulles wrote, "I 
was delighted that you raised your voice so effectively in 
support of the British Loan. I am sorry that more of our 
Republican brethren did not follow you, but you were a good
92lbld.. August 13th, 1946.
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symbol of what the Republican Party should stand for".^
Moral leadership against the Soviet Union, which cost nothing, 
had never been controversial, and Dulles in particular had 
been adept at using moral leadership to good political ef­
fect. The implications posed by the failure to secure agree­
ment with the Soviet Union in central Europe went far beyond 
this. Reconstruction of Europe on liberal capitalist lines 
was ultimately to require aid and military commitment, and 
to threaten inflation, bureaucratization and regimentation
at home.94
The British Loan had almost certainly been saved by 
the raising of the communist mena.ce; but even Vandenberg 
had gone along without conviction. The British Loan demonstrated 
two things which Republican.vietory in 1946 was to under­
line;.. „ ; • firstly, that any further talk of a loan to the
QCU.S.S.R. was totally impracticable;-^ secondly, that future 
policies requiring foreign expenditure would require greater 
consultation with Republican leaders. Before the election, 
Byrnes and Vandenberg had begun to develop an exceptionally 
close understanding at the Paris foreign ministers meeting.
This cooperation was going to be even more necessary in the 
80th Congress; but cooperation with Vandenberg had its price; 
and in particular it precluded any hint of a return to the 
conciliatory, "horse-trading" diplomacy which Bymes had 
sought to follow at Moscow in December, 1945.
93Duiies to Charles A. Eaton, July 15th, 1946, Dulles M3S.
94jn 1946 the extension of the Selective Service Act ran into 
considerable difficulty in Congress; Republican ¥hip, Kenneth 
Uherry charged that the Administration was trying to trans­
form the United States into a totalitarian society; Con­
gressional Record, 92, June 5th, 1946, p. 6332.
95nerring, Aid to Russia, pp. 253-65.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The 1946 Election and the Development of Containment
As in 194-4-, the main focus of the Republican campaign 
in 1946 was not on matters of foreign policy. The main issues 
of the campaign were domestic, including labour relations, 
price controls, commodity shortages, especially of meat, and 
a general Republican charge of bureaucratic bungling and in­
competence. Thomas Dewey, up for re-election as Governor 
of New York, struck the theme of domestic disillusion in 
his first campaign broadcast:
’’During the war all of us held firmly to a precious 
vision of what we called the 'post-war world'. We 
saw America once again the land of freedom and 
opportunity. We saw a reaffirmation of the ideal 
of government by the people and an end to wartime 
regimentation.
Well, we are in the 'post-war world'. We have been 
in it for more than a year. But our vision remains 
just a vision.
Our people stand in lines for meat - and there is 
no meat. We still need new cars. Our national hous­
ing shortage is critical. Our hopes for a better 
world are being blotted out by clouds of Washington 
confusion."1
Whilst, however, concentrating on disillusion following 
the failure of the better world to emerge, there was also 
a significant ideological element to the Republican cam­
paign which was of relevance to matters of foreign policy.
For Dewey, for example, the great responsibility of the Re­
publican Party was to uphold the tradition that Americans 
"are the trustees of the cause of equal opportunity for 
all our people, of social freedom,' of economic freedom. We
1 Radio Address, October 7th, 1946, Dewey, Public Papers, 
p. 783.
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are trustees of the greatest cause of all - of human 
2freedom". Y/hilst preaching national unity, Dewey saw this
trusteeship as too Important to be entrusted to Democrats:
"having no basic philosophy the present Democratic Party
is committed to a series of expedients which would take us
step by step into a controlled and regimented society. . .
We believe that free men and only free men can continue
leading the world upward in the paths of peace and righteous-
3ness and in liberty and justice for all".
The ideological framework of the Republican campaign, 
as revealed by Dewey, made it possible for the less subtle 
to subsume all the issues of the 1945 campaign under the 
broad is.sue of "Democracy versus Communism". The Midwestern 
wing of the Party, which had,with Carroll Reece’s election 
as Rational Chairman, got control of the national organiza­
tion, especially tended to see things in this way. In May, 
Reece had labelled Democratic policies as bearing "a 
definite made-in-Moscow label". Therefore, he had concluded, 
"from a long-range viewpoint the choice which confronts
4Americans this year is between communism and republicanism".
I
Accordingly, the Rational Committee concentrated its prepara­
tion of campaign material under the headings of Red Menace, 
Bureaucracy, High Taxes, Preservation of the American Way 
of Life.'* "The issue is clear for 1946," wrote one Representa 
tive: "To loan or not to loan. Rew Deal or Republican, the 
Kremlin or the Constitution. Leninism or liberty".^
The highly ideological perspective on the 1946 election
^Radio address, Rovember 6th, 1946, ibid., p. 835.
¿Speech accepting Renomination, September 4th, 1946, ibid.. p. 
^Speech at Springfield, Missouri, May 28th, 1946, reprinted in 
Congressional Record. 92, Appendix, p. 3441.
¿Rew York Times. August 18th, 1946.
°Congressional Record. 92, Appendix, p. 913.
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was shared by Vandenberg, who at times appeared paranoic about
left-wing Democrats whom he described as "pro-Russky" or
7fellow travellers. In June he wrote to a Michigan con­
stituent, "Unless I am greatly mistaken, it will be a highly 
critical showdown between the "American way of life’ on the 
one hand and highly financed, highly organized radicalism
Oon the other hand". To a political associate he wrote in 
August about his own campaign, which he was being forced to 
neglect, ". . .if the people understand that they are 
'dropping a letter to Stalin in the mailbox' when they drop 
their votes in the ballot box, I have no doubt of the out-
Qcome". Whether justifiably or not, as a result of the at­
tacks to which he had been subject in left wing newspapers, 
Vandenberg had been convinced that he was the prime target 
of the Communists, that they would stop at nothing to defeat 
him, and that his defeat in Michigan would therefore be a 
severe setback for the global struggle against world com­
munism. To his friend, the editor of the Polish News, in 
Detroit, who had allowed an editorial attacking Vandenberg's 
desertion of Poland to be published, he wrote a long and some­
what irritable rebuke: "I now see what I confront this 
fall".10
Vandenberg's view of the world was consistent. He saw 
himself, in terms of the development of American policy, as 
having been the prime instrument of the policy of toughness
¿Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 266, 271.
®Vandenberg to C. L. Brody, June 1st, 1946, Vandenberg MSS. 
“Vandenberg to J. U. Blodgett, August 23rd, 1946, Vandenberg 
.MSS.
luVandenberg to Prank Januszewski, July 27th, 1946, Vanden­
berg MSS.
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towards the Soviet Union. By preaching nonpartisanship at 
the time of a highly ideological election, Vandenberg was 
in a curious position, hut he was adept at playing the game.
To the Senate, after the foreign ministers meetings, 
he reported that events had vindicated his position: he 
had always been an opponent of Big Power domination, and 
saw arrangements for the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference 
as being in line with his views; an advocate of the review 
of all treaties if they endangered peace, he reminded the 
Senate of Article XtV of the United Nations Charter which 
he said he had initiated; an opponent of Yalta style "power 
politics", he reminded the Senate of his long opposition 
to the Polish settlement, and of his proposal for a treaty 
to disarm Germany which, had it been followed at Yalta, would, 
he said, have eliminated "many of our subsequent, tragic 
errors and anxieties".^ Privately, to a political associate 
in Michigan, Vandenberg confided his feeling that "the de­
velopments in the Tito case (as reported this morning) de­
monstrate that I have been right in demanding an American 
foreign policy which 'stands up to Russia.' When-Byrnes 
phoned me his 303 from Paris last week, he said that inas­
much as he has now adopted a 'republican foreign policy' 
he is entitled to have the chief Republican conspirator 
sharing the grief with him. I am quite willing to 'carry 
on' as long as he does. I really think he is doing a thor­
oughly sturdy job" . 1 2 Vandenberg then, was prepared to 
champion the cause of Secretary Byrnes and the bipartisan
11 Congressional Record. 92, July 16th, 1946, pp. 9061-65.
12Vandenberg to J. <i. Blodgett, August 23rd, 1946, Vandenberg 
MSS. The reference to Tito is connected with the .incident 
of August 19th, in which an American plane was shot down 
by the Yugoslavs.
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policy. At the same time, however, he was inclined to
take credit himself for having put Byrnes and American policy
14on the right tracks.
The Republican self-image of complete opposition to 
totalitarianism, at home and overseas, was shared by other 
leading Republicans. At the Ohio State Convention in Sep­
tember, Taft confidently asserted that Republican criticism 
had terminated appeasement of Russia. J Taft also alleged 
that whilst playing into Stalin’s hands abroad, the Hew
Deal at home had tried to teach that '’communism” is a kind
16of liberal Democracy. Former vice-presidential nominee, 
now Senatorial candidate, John Bricker, challenged Presi­
dent Truman to intervene in the Ohio campaign: ". . .bring
on your New Deal, Communistic and subversive groups. If
17we can’t lick them in Ohio, America is lost anyway”.
Similar Implications, as already suggested, were made by 
Thomas Dewey who spoke at the New York State Convention of 
the conflict between ’’those who believe in dictatorship, 
either the dictatorship of communism or fascism and those 
on the other hand who believe that human freedom is the ul­
timate expression of the highest aspiration of man. We are 
enlisted here - all of us - under the single banner of 
human feeedom. No Republican candidate in this State elec­
tion has been dominated by the dictation of a splinter group
1 ^3ee Vandenberg's vigorous defense of Byrnes against Senator 
.¿Wherry, Congressional Record. 92, July 31st, 1946, p. 10534. '^See page'j247above.
^ New York Herald Tribune. September 12th, 1946.
1^Chicago Tribune. September 12th, 1946.
^7¡few York Herald Tribune. September 12th, 1946.
1 ■’)
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or of any group of men who owe their allegiance to any
18foreign ideology".
On the question of supporting the bipartisan foreign
policy, Republicans appeared to be united in 1946. Senator
Taft was to claim in a radio address in November that there
were no basic conflicts within the Republican Party over
foreign policy.19 jn a gesture of unity, he had written
in conciliatory tones to Vandenberg in late October: "I
noticed in Joseph Alsop's column some effort to show that
I differed with you on foreign policy. I suppose there
may be some differences as there always are, but I approve
without qualification your whole position as far as I know 
20it". There were differences in the Party, however: Col. 
McCormick of the Chicago Trlbune had no illusions about New 
York Republicanism, which he saw as being dedicated to the 
preservation of British Imperialism. The only hope he saw 
was for the Midwest to nominate either Taft or Bricker in 
1948. Although anti-communism could serve as the basis for 
broad agreement, what was really at stake was the degree 
of commitment to anti-communist foreign policies. Taft 
found encouragement in the hardening of policy towards the 
Soviet Union and the less harsh policy towards Germany; but 
where he differed from Vandenberg by 1946 was in his estima­
tion of the importance of developments outside the western 
hemisphere for the United States. The widening gulf was 
obscured by Vandenberg’s cautious approach; he did not go 
out of his way to alienate the Nationalists, as Internation-
1pNew York Times, September 5th, 1946.
1 York' Herald Tribune. November 4th, 1946.
2URoFert A. Taft to Vandenberg, October 20th, 1946, Yanden­berg MSS.
21 New York Times, September 22nd, 1946.
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alists such as Harold Stassen and Senator Morse did, by 
talking of "economic isolationists" who refused to see the 
connection between "America's standard of living" and the 
"world economy"; neither did he proclaim America's respon­
sibilities "as the great creditor nation of the world" to
pursue policies that would lead to "increased trade between
22the nations of the world". He was more careful to talk
about American interests rather than responsibilities, and
about the bottom to the barrel rather than about the needs
of world trade and reconstruction.
Perhaps the key to apparent Republican unity in the
1946 elections was the apparent reaction of the left wing
of the Democratic Party to the development .of the anti-
Russian consensus. Pre-disposed to see the Democrats as
pro-communist, especially because of left wing political
and pro-labour ties in Hew York State, Republican leaders
could not have been unduly surprised by the controversial
speech of Henry Wallace in September. The day that Wallace
was to make his speech, Bob Andrews writing in the Hew York
Herald Tribune said that September 12th might go down in
history as the day Truman decided his only chance of re-
election lay with the left: he Instanced four actions by
the President, one of which was the advance endorsement of
23Wallace's speech. Coming at a time when Byrnes and
^Address by Wayne Morse, Oregon, June 9th, 1946, reprinted 
in Congressional Record, 92, Appendix, p. 3862; address 
by Harold Stassen, ¡mine, April 12th; 1946, ibid.., Appendix, 
v .  2 5 0 2 .
23september 12th, 1946.
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Vandenberg (and southern conservative Democrat, Tom 
Connally) were in Paris, the Wallace speech, calling for a 
sphere of influence approach to world politics, and critical 
of the. "Get tough with Russia" policy, suggested a challenge 
to the bipartisan foreign policy from within the Adminis­
tration.2^ In Paris. Yandenberg Issued a statement, de­
claring his conviction that most Republicans would continue 
to follow a "bipartisan" foreign policy, and concluding in
words destined for immortality: "We can only cooperate
25with one Secretary of State at a time".
The Wallace affair then was ideal electoral material 
for Republicans. It enabled them to pose as patriotic de­
fenders of American foreign policy. Thus the New York 
Herald Tribune castigated the Administration for its incom­
petence, and charged that Republicans in their worst moments 
had never done anything so damaging to world peace. Accord­
ing to Dulles, Dewey felt it best "not to make any major 
attack" in case it seemed that he was trying to derive par­
tisan advantage.2? Dewey was, however, reported as having 
been greatly disturbed by the Wallace speech, and as ex­
pressing the opinion that it was a bid for the communist
pQvote. Par more outspoken was Taft, who with the backing 
of officials of the Republican Rational Committee, charged 
the President with having made a bid for the votes of the
C.I.O.-P.A.C. which he alleged favoured the Russians abroad 
and communism at home. Taft was in no doubt that the Presi­
dent had repudiated Byrnes' policy of standing up for freedom
2^Por a full account of the affair, see Markowitz, pp. 181—91. 
25yandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 300-01.
^September 13th, 1945.
2<Dulles to A. H. Yandenberg, September 16th, 194-6, Dulles „MSS (Supplement).
2°New York Herald Tribune, September 15th, 194-5; Dewey, ruTjircH&pers. p. 000. Q
and equality of all peoples. The Democratic Party was, he 
said, "so divided between Communism and Americanism, that 
its foreign policy can only be futile and contradictory and 
make the United States the laughing stock of the world".^9 
Commented National Chairman, Carroll Reece, "If Mr. Stalin 
were to come to this country and address the P. A. C. in 
Madison Square Garden, what could he have said that Mr. 
Wallace did not say?"^0 Wallace's speech then* fitted in 
with the pre-existing thesis of Democratic culpability for 
"appeasement" of Stalin. On September 11th, at Columbus, 
Taft had warned that a "New Deal" Congress, especially one 
owing its election to the C.I.O-P.A.C., "would return again 
to the appeasement of Russia, to a policy in Germany dic­
tated by PM and the rest of the communist press' in New 
York, and an imperialist policy whenever it did not run 
against Russian interests".^1
President Truman's initial attempt to compromise by
getting Wallace to make no more speeches for the duration
■ 32of the Paris conference disturbed Dulles. To Vandenberg 
he expressed his dismay, interpreting it, probably correctly, 
as a manoeuvre to "hold the left wingers in line" and allow­
ing them "to feel that they have a chance of controlling 
our foreign policy or at least nullifying any foreign policy 
of which they do not approve".^ like Dewey, Vandenberg
2^New York Times. September 14th, 1946; New York Herald 
nTribune. September 14th, 1946.
^ Chicago* Tribune. September 17th, 1946.
^ New York Herald Tribune, September 15th, 1946.
32por Wallace *s account of this, suggesting that Truman was 
prepared to take a far more flexible line toward the Soviet 
Union, see Markowitz, pp. 188-90.
33i)ulles to A. H. Yandenberg, September 19th, 1946, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
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cautioned against a full-scale attack on the Administration,
preferring to let people Judge for themselves. To Dulles
he expressed his regret that the Wallace affair had gone
against "my own entire theory about the necessity of making
Russia understand that our new bi-partisan American foreign
policy says what it means and means what it says”. But he
said he had kept silent because "I thought perhaps the
country would like to feel that there is one Party left that
can ^e trusted in emergencies. There'll be plenty of time
to tell the story when there isn't quite so much at stake.
Meanwhile, I cannot but believe that this episode ha3 been
34a -body blow to the President and his Party”. The resigna­
tion of Wallace did not even get the President off the hook. 
At best it substantiated earlier Judgements of his incom­
petence.-^ At worst it helped to substantiate the thesis 
that at least a section of the Democrats were advocates of 
"appeasement"; Carroll-RedCaricdiunented, "the President has 
seen fit to gamble for the radical vote in Hew York and
3^A. H. Vandenberg to Dulles, September 19th, 1946, Dulles 
MSS (Supplement;.
^commented Lippmann, "Mr. Truman has exposed himself to 
the world as a bit slow to catch on"., New York Herald 
Tribune, September 17th, 1946; the Chicago Tribune commented 
that ,Tit has disclosed more clearly than ever Mr. Truman's 
fabulous incompetence. .. .Even the most simple minded of 
citizens must now have the measure of Mr. Truman's fitness 
for the office he holds"., September 17th, 1946. Senator 
Morse expressed the hope that the country could struggle 
through until 1948 "when I'm convinced the chief bungler 
of America will be removed from the White House"., Hew York Times, September 21st, 1946.
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elsewhere with the nation's security". In New York State 
Itself, both Dewey and Senatorial nominee, Irving Ives, 
made continuous references to bipartisan foreign policy. 
Speaking to a foreign language voter group at the end of 
October, Dewey prided himself on the fact that Republicans 
alone had made "no compromise whatever with totalitarianism
in any form".37
In October, Yandenberg made his sole "nonpartisan" 
contribution to the campaign with a radio report from Paris.3® 
His response to the allegations made by Wallace and others 
was masterly. American policy was not one of "getting tough 
with Russia" but simply one of "friendly firmness", he de­
clared; asked whether it departed from Roosevelt's policy, 
he hedged cleverly: "Well - that depends upon what you mean 
by the 'Roosevelt pattern'. If you mean the 'Roosevelt 
pattern' as originally laid down in the Atlantic Charter,
I should say that we are earnestly seeking to return to it 
after it was partially scrapped by the late President him­
self at Yalta. . ." Roosevelt had, continued Vandenberg, 
been forced to give way on some issues because of war, but 
he reminded his audience that in 1935 Roosevelt had himself 
addressed a strong note to the Soviet Union, Vandenberg 
also denied that he was trying to divide the world into two 
spheres: ". . .there is little left to give - unless we 
give our birthright. . .It is impossible to keep on signing
jj?Chlcago Tribune. September 20th, 1946.
3 »New York Herald Tribune. November 1st, 1946; see also 
speeches" by Irving Ives on September 21st and October 1st, 
1946, New York Times, September 22nd, 1946, October 2nd, 1946. 
3°New York Times. October 20th, 1946,
36
294
‘dotted lines'* as we often - perhaps too often - did in 
war". His general theme was insistent if repetitive: "I 
sometimes wonder Just what our ‘appeasers1' here at home 
would have us do". ". . .Perhaps we fail to understand 
Moscow. Certainly Moscow misunderstands us." "But we need 
to know that they are not pushing toward a communist world.
If there is any way to achieve this mutual understanding and 
good-will, I will thankfully and prayerfully embrace it. 
lie must all keep on trying. But we will not Vs ell America 
Short' in the process." Yandenberg's statement was in keep­
ing with the traditions of "Strong America"; he was not giv­
ing up hope of cooperation with the Soviet Union even, but,
". . .1 say again and again that this is not possible on a 
one-way street. I would have America do everything, consis­
tent with her honor, her security and her ideals, to deserve 
this cooperation and to allay any reasonable Russian grounds 
for fear, suspicion and distrust. I think we are doing this 
today - despite the astonishing and often subversive conten­
tions of some of our own American critics to the contrary".^ 
Vandenberg's report from Paris, and the attack made 
upon him by Henry Wallace harmonized with the general Re­
publican campaign. Attacks on Vandenberg merely substantiated 
the thesis that the Republican Party was the main obstacle, 
at home and overseas, to communism. If foreign policy as 
such was not a major issue of the ¿Lection, anti-communism, 
and its foreign policy implications were. Unless a Republican 
Congress were elected, charged Taft, "we will not have an
39lbld.
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American foreign policy but a foreign foreign policy". A 
Democratic victory would, he said, mean the substitution of 
Wallace for Byrnes as Secretary of State. This was probably 
why Moscow wanted the Democrats to win, he said.^
In November, 1946, the Republican Party duly swept to 
victory, gaining control of Congress for the first time 
since the Hoover landslide of 1928. The verdict of the 
pollsters was that foreign policy had played no part in the 
victory.^ Nevertheless, the Republican Party had success­
fully done whata it had demonstrably failed to do in 1944: 
it had neutralized its "isolationist" image and had in 
fact taken the political initiative as the apparent defen­
der of the bipartisan anti-communist consensus against 
attacks from the Democratic left wing. Vandenberg heralded 
1946 as a victory for the bipartisan foreign policy. Taft 
argued that the turn to the right did not mean a change in
foreign policy; he even argued that it did not prevent coopera-
4'3tion with Communist and Socialist countries. If the elec­
tion meant anything at all, however, it certainly ruled out 
the kind of alternative offered in 1946 by Henry Wallace.
3ack in the Senate with a huge majority, Arthur Vandenberg 
was. now to be chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. 
Despite his absence for much of the campaign, he had found his
identification with the Administration foreign policy a
44source of tremendous popularity. In the future, Vandenberg's
^ New York Times, October 30th, 1946. A Moscow newscaster had 
apparently made a statement earlier in October that a Repub­
lican Congress would be a disaster. Ibid., October 22nd, 1946. 41 Fortune. March, 1947, p. 10.
42New York Times. November 7th, 1946.
72New York Herald Tribune, November 8th, 1946.
44Wallace, speaking in Detroit, had been prevailed upon by local Democrats, to take all references to Vandenberg and Russian 
policy out of his speech, Chicago Tribune. November 3rd, 1946.
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role as a broker with the Republican Nationalists, whose 
numbers had been strengthened considerably by the 1946 vic­
tory, was to become even more important than it had already.
What gave Vandenberg added importance was the question of 
foreign economic policy. The Administration had had diffi­
culty enough with the British Loan in a Democratic Congress, 
but with a Republican Congress under the dominant influence 
of Taft Vandenberg's cooperation became all the more necessary.
For the Nationalists, the 1946 victory was the first 
step on the road to Normalcy; freedom was to be restored 
through fiscal conservatism, by cutting taxes and reducing 
the federal government budget to something approaching pre- 
New Deal size. Herbert Hoover, for example, saw it as 
"much more than just another congressional election". "The 
whole world has been for years driving to the left on the 
totalitarian road of ’planned economy'. America is by this 
election the first country to repudiate this r o a d . H e  
took some delight in the fact that the Republicans seemed 
to be committed to changing the country's direction, rather 
than allowing those who flirted with the New Deal to deflect 
them. He also noticed a change in attitude towards himself.
"The climate has changed," he wrote, "Republicans that I 
haven’t seen in years are coming in." Cal O'laughlin 
concluded on the basis of the results that the Chicago 
Tribune would be very influential at the 1948 Convention.^
^ Chicago Tribune. November 7th, 1946.
¿^Hoover to Raymond L. Wilbur, November 10th, 1946, Hoover M3S.
O'laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, November 9th,
1946, O' Laughlin M3S.
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This judgement certainly reflected the Chicago Tribune's 
own hopes. Whilst exultant about the Republican victory, 
the "greatest victory for the Republic since Appomatox", the 
Tribune saw a few clouds on the horizon, not the least of 
which was the senior Senator from Michigan. In particular, 
it described Vandenberg's claim that his re-election was a 
vote of confidence in bipartisanship as "poppycock". Whilst 
it had been "campaigning through the Mdddle west for American­
ism and the end of New Deal controls, confusion, corruption, 
and communism," Vandenberg was,in its view, "amusing himself 
in Paris with his aristocratic friends". The voters of 
Michigan, it said, had had no choice over foreign policy,
"THE TRI3UN2 with its expounding of the issues. . .and its 
exhortations to vote the Republican ticket straight. . . 
did more to carry the State for Vandenberg than did Vanden- 
berg himself".
The 19^6 elections then, by returning the Republicans 
to power, confirmed the shift to the right in American poli­
tics, and appeared to presage a Republican victory in 1948. 
Sensing their time had come, Congressional Republicans were 
anxious to restore American government to pre-New Deal 
dimensions, and to expose what they regarded as the bungling 
and near-treason of the Democratic Administration. The 
election, like the debate over the British Loan, was some­
thing of a setback for the foreign policies of the Administra-
" /
^ Chicago Tribune. November 7th, 1946; November 10th, 1946.
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tion, although it did free President Truman from the inhibi­
tions of the left wing of the Democratic Party. ^  Vague 
appeals on behalf of "international cooperation" would no
longer suffice to get the money out of Congress that the
50Administration needed for its foreign policy. The Repub­
lican leadership,it is true, was broadly committed to the 
foreign policy goals of the Administration; to the endorse­
ments of Taft and Vandenberg were to be added those of 
solid Republicans such as new Speaker of the House, Joseph 
Martin, and the influential Midwesterner, Everett Dirksen 
of Illinois. Dirksen expressed confidence that there "should 
be no difficulty over foreign policy where the GOP is con­
cerned. The present broad foreign policy is the same as 
that laid down by the Republican Conference at Mackinac 
Island in 1 9 4 - 3 . John Vorys of Ohio likewise reassured 
a friend and southern Democratic Congressman, "I believe we 
can go ahead with the of trying to work out some details
of an American foreign policy as we have been doing. That
152is, most of us". Alfred Landon added his voice to those 
who affirmed that Republicans would cooperate with the Presi­
dent in developing foreign policy along the lines already 
laid down by Secretary Byrnes.53 in all cases, however, 
the pledge of cooperation carried with it the assumption *51
49Memo written by Clark Clifford on American-Soviet relations 
arguing a similar case to George Kennan, had apparently 
been locked away in a safe by the President, who had de­
scribed it as too hot to handle, Richard M. Preeland, The 
Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthylsm (New York:
_ Knopf, 1972), pp. 56-7, ¿7.
5°lbld., pp. -61-9.51 New York Times. November 12th, 194-6.
¿?2Vorys to Peter Jarman, November 7th, 194-6, Vorys MSS.
55New York Times, December 17th, 194-6.
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that it -would he on a more equal basis than before. John 
Foster Dulles, commenting on the President's offer of coopera­
tion, said, "The President is right in predicting that Re­
publicans who have worked cooperatively with him in the 
past will do so in the future. Presumably their views will
carry more weight now that the Republican party is the
54majority party in the nation and in Congress."
The demand for Republicans to be brought into decision 
making was, apart from Dulles' vested interest, a prerequisite 
for political support in Congress. As he prepared for the 
80th Congress, Vandenberg was very much aware of the poli­
tical difficulties that lay ahead. The bulk of Congressional 
Republicans were more likely to line up behind Taft than 
Vandenberg over matters of foreign economic policy. Already 
Taft and John Taber, champion of the vital House Appropria­
tions Committee, were talking of a 10-12 billion dollar cut 
in the budget.^ The tariff, central to post-war foreign 
policy, could be expected to be a particular headache.^ 
Vandenberg was convinced that his colleagues would be far 
less "docile" than in the past, whilst he expected less co-
c7operation from the Democrats than he had given in opposition.
In December he announced his withdrawal from active partici­
pation in future United Nations and Foreign Ministers' meet­
ings, as well as making it plain that he was not a candidate 
for the 1948 nomination.-^ His desire to concentrate on
^ Ibld.. November 12th, 1946.
I^New York Times. December 8th, 1946.
Diary, January 18th, 1947, Smith MSS.
Vandenberg to Esther Van Wagoner Tufty, November 11th, 1946,
QVandenberg MSS. ‘5°New York Times. December 18th, 1945.
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his work in the Senate was a measure of the difficulties
he expected; privately he indicated that he expected the
■first great challenge" of the New Congress to be an attempt
"to prematurely reduce our national defense beyond the limits
59currently advisable or justified". Vandenberg was not
alone in his fears, for there was a general apprehension
reflected in the Press that now the Republicans were back
in power they would initiate investigations into various
areas of alleged Democratic laxity; amongst the rumoured
targets was the failure of the Administration to press hard
60enough for outlying bases for the United States. Senator 
Smith of New Jersey, was in De«.ember greatly disturbed lest 
the Republicans tried to make political capital out of in­
vestigations into military matters, not least because he
61
felt it would rebound against them. In his diary he con­
fided: "I am very fond of Bob Taft but we must watch his 
battle for leadership of the p a r t y " . T a f t ,  who had secured 
the ascendency in National Committee circles through the 
election of Carroll Reece, and who could claim to have 
largely engineered the successful 1946 election strategy, 
was very much a shadow over bipartisan policy by the end 
of the year. Despite his apparent endorsement of policy 
after the election, over the previous year he had shown 
himself an able and articulate opponent of the basic *61
59-yandenberg to Colonel Alton T. Roberts, December 20th, 
1946, Vandenberg MSS.
P^New York Times. November 24th, 1946; Rep. James Wadsworth 
sought to.reassure his military contactsthat Republicans 
would not make partisan issues of unification and military 
training, James Wadsworth to W. G. Andrews, December 23rd, 
1946, James W. Wadsworth, Jr. MSS., library of Congress.
61 Alexander Smith to Homer Ferguson,December 23rd, 1946,
. Smith MSS.
°2Dlary, December 30th, 1946, Smith MSS.
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abruptions on which post-war planning had been based.
Despite his gratification at a stiffer policy toward the 
Soviet Union, and the hopes of a reversal of German policy 
promised by Secretary Byrnes' speech at Stuttgart, he had 
still not been won over to the multilateral world. J
For Arthur Vandenberg, the lingering fear of "isola­
tionism" had its compensations: it could not help but 
strengthen his own bargaining position. Yandenberg himself, 
despite apprehension about some of his colleagues, was 
still also distrustful of the Administration, especially 
after the Wallace affair. Wallace's post-election charges 
that Vandenberg was"violently anti-Russian" and that the 
President had allowed foreign policy to fall too much under 
his control could not be ignored, for the President had a 
very different political constituency to satisfy from that 
of Vandenberg.^4 Vandenberg's suspicions of the Administra­
tion had in 1946 been partially eroded by the development 
of his relationship with James Byrnes, In December, in 
announcing his decision not to attend any more conferences,
65he said, "I am for him 1,000 per cent in what he is doing".
He was, therefore, to be considerably "jolted" in the New 
Year by the announcement of the resignation of Byrnes, and 
the appointment of General Marshall, whose personal prestige 
and aloofness were to change the gro.und rules of bipartisan- 
ship.65
°?Freeland, pp. 61-6.
64New York Times. November 13th, 1946; see also comments by 
-Cabell Phillips, ibid.. November 24th, 1946.
°?Ibld.. December l8th, 1945.
°°Report,. January 10th, 1946, Me Naught on MSS. Frank Mcllaughton 
thought that Vandenberg had to a large extent dominated Byrnes, ibid.
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The 80th Congress and the Origins of Containment
"It looks like a good many of you have moved over to 
the left since I was last here," quipped President Truman 
to the new Congress in January, 1947.^ He could not, 
however, have derived much cheer from Congress' opening 
speech hy Speaker Joseph Martin, whose commitment to a 
"Strong America" had not diminished in the post-war period. 
Speaking of the danger that "the warstricken nations may 
be led to rely too much on the United States, and try too 
little to help themselves," Martin warned that the United 
States "must avoid the danger of so depleting and weakening 
ourselves as to be dragged down with them. . .Only a strong,
s-Q
sound, solvent, free America can help to rescue the world".
Martin's conviction that the best way the United States
could help the world was by putting its own house in order,
by dismantling the Hew Deal and re-establishing "freedom",
was a fair reflection of Congressional Republican sentiment,
especially in the House of Representatives.
The political situation in 194-7 was extremely complex'. ,.
The initial struggle between supporters of Dewey and supporters
of Taft to control the organization of the House, which
Dewey's supporters won, could not obscure the fact that the
69House leadership remained firmly Rationalist. The House 
Foreign Affairs Committee was weak, chaired by the ageing 
and totally uninfluential 'Doc' Eaton, who was followed in
^Xllew York Times, January 7th, 1947.
^ Ibid., January 4th, 1947.
k^Ibld.. January 5th, 1947; Taft's supporters wanted Clarence 
Brown of Ohio as majority leader, Dewey's supporters secured 
the election, after the latter's withdrawal, of Charles 
Halleck of Indiana; Alsop to Martin Sommers, February 3rd, 
1947, Alsop MSS.
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seniority by four midwesterners whose past record on foreign
policy suggested little support for Administration proposals.
In the Senate, the dominant figure was expected to be Taft, 
who from his official position as Chairman of the Republican 
Steering Committee exercised far more influence than the 
nominal majority leader, “Internationalist” Wallace White 
of Maine. Majority Whip was the unsubtle Nebraskan conserva­
tive, Kenneth Wherry, whilst the presiding officer of the 
Republican Conference was Eugene Millikin. Completing the 
"hydra-headed" leadership was Vandenberg, President pro- 
temnore and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
The key to the situation was the relationship between Taft
and Vandenberg, which had never been close, but which was
71based on a polite if distant accomodation. Overlaying
the situation in Congress was the manoeuvring for the 194-8
nomination. Harold Stassen was the first in the field,
having announced his candidacy in December, 194$, as well
as his continuing determination "to move our Republican
72party along the path of true liberalism". The main conten­
ders, however, were already expected to be Dewey and Taft.
The former was reported by early 1947 to have made consider­
able progress already in garnering delegates.^ The latter's 
candidacy was somewhat delayed by the prevarication of John 
Bricker, whose appearance on the Washington scene, including 
a disastrous Gridiron dinner speech, had not had the effect
7°New York Times. January 14th, 194-7; among the four was 
John Vorys, who was to emerge as a supporter of the bi­
partisan policy in 1947.
''Report, "Taft III - His Mind and His Methods", January 9th, 
-1947, McNaughton.MSS.
»2Kew York Times. December 18th, 1946.
73Alsop to Martin Sommers, January 3rd, 1947, Alsop MSS.
70
304
his supporters hoped, but who was nevertheless reluctant to 
give Taft the go ahead.^ Vandenberg's independence amidst 
all the Presidential politicking was undoubtedly an advan­
tage. It was as important to him as his independence from 
the Administration. He even sought to persuade Dulles to 
become less dependent on Dewey.75 In the position of broker 
in which he found himself, it was Important to him to keep 
his lines open to all groups: his position precluded his 
being a partisan, a me-too or a member of a party faction.
His role was a difficult one, but it was one in which 
he excelled.
The most serious problem posed by the 80th Congress to 
the Administration's foreign policy derived from the cam­
paign commitment to reduce federal expenditure and cut taxes. 
Support for 11 economy" was particularly strong in the House 
of Representatives, where the very thought of Appropriations 
Committee Chairman, John Taber, was enough to produce apoplexy 
in Administration circles. In November, Speaker elect 
Martin was talking in terms of a 10^ tax cut, which he 
hoped would be in operation by February.^ In December,
Taber and Taft had been talking of a budget cut of 10-12
77billion dollars. Sven Harold Stassen ¡Joined in the demand
7^0' Laughlin to General MacArthur, December 20th, 194-6, 
O'Laughlln I-IS3.; Ray Brecht report, "Taft and Bricker", 
December 27th, 1946, McMaughton 1-133.; . Hew York. Times, . 
December 22nd, 194-6; Alsop to Martin Sommers, March 9th, 
1947, Alsop MSS.; Clarence Brown to Halter I. Tooze,
January 14-th, 194-7, Brown MSS.; Patterson, Mr.. Republican, 
pp. 375-5.‘-’Unsigned pencilled note from Hardman Park Hotel, Dulles 
to Herbert Brownell, March 4-th, 194-7, Dulles MSS.
*'0Chicago Tribune, November 13th, 1946.
77Ifew York Times. December 8th, 1946.
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for substantial cuts in taxes and expenditure, although he
rv Q
avoided the extreme demands of the Nationalists. The 
Legislative Budget then, which Congress was, under the 
1946 Reorganization Act, required to consider, proved an 
early test of Republican attitudes towards the central 
economic questions. In the Senate the proposal to cut six 
billion dollars off the budget was fiercely resisted by 
Vandenberg: "I shall have to say it bluntly, Mr. President;
I cannot escapt the conviction that this may prove to be 
sheer folly. At this critical juncture in world affairs, 
when there are great powers which think only in terms of 
force, I do not believe we have any right to speculate, to 
indulge in guess-work - ani that is all we are doing here 
today - at the expense of our national security in this rest­
less and unpredictable world. In my view, this is the year
79of all years when we must hold the line'*. A compromise, 
backed by all Republican.leaders except Wherry, to cut the 
amount by only four and one-half billion instead of the 
six billion recommended by the Republican group on the 
Legislative budget, was duly passed, with Democratic sup-
Oqport. In the House the leadership was determined to hold 
out. Majority Leader Halleck assured the House that Republi­
cans were concerned about American defense, but "no military 
disaster within the range of posslblity today could equal. . . 
the destruction of American power and authority which would 
be accomplished by the all-consuming conflagration of inflation 
American defense, he said, should not be construed so narrowly. 
Halleck was supported
X^Ibld., January 12th, 1947.
/^Congressional Record, 93, February 21st, 1947, p. 1265. 80Ibla.t p. 1438; 21 Republicans voted for the reduced cut,
24 opposed; adding the non-voters who had a declared posi- 
tion, the split was 25 for, 26 against.
_ Ibid.. February 20th, 1947, P. 1209.82r b ld .
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by Everett Dirksen of Illinois, who deprecated "futile
efforts to halt communism with hand-outs of American cash"
and argued that the first essential was to be strong at
home.®^ The tenets of a "Strong America" were as powerful
as ever among House members, who proceeded to vote the full
six billion dollar cut, with only Margaret Chase Smith of
84Maine opposing. The vote was a remarkable testimony to 
the effectiveness of the control which Joseph Martin and 
Charles Ealleck exercised over Republican rank and file.^-*
At least one influential Republican member had doubts about
o ¿rthe wisdom of the House's action. On the Legislative 
Budget the House, not for the first time, was to defer to 
the caution of the Senate; but the debate in the House was 
indicative of an organized commitment to "$conomy"which could 
not be ignored. This commitment was not to die with the 
compromise over the Legislative Budget, nor was it confined 
to those who were opposed to the bipartisan foreign policy.
In March, after the announcement of the proposal to aid 
Greece and Turkey, John Vorys, despite his disenchantment 
with the reactionary House leadership, was to write that if, 
as he aimed, they could eventually "get our budget around 
to where we are spending about half a billion on the State 
Department and two or three billion on foreign loans»grants, 
bribes, etc., and thus be able to cut our appropriations for 
the armed forces from §11,000,000,000 to, say, $3*000,000,000, 
we may make the grade".^ Even Vandenberg, in opposing the
Q|lbld.. p. 1250.°^Kew York Times, February 21st, 1947.
p^Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 15th, 1947, Alsop MSS.
o^Dlary, February 17th, 1947, Wadsworth MSS.
°'Vorys to Evert G. Addison, March 22nd, 1947, Yorys MSS.
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full cuts sought by Republicans in the Legislative Budget, 
had not closed the door to cuts beyond the four and one-
OQ
half billion dollars finally agreed.
Whilst the Republican commitment to "economy'*was a 
major problem for the development of American policy, so 
also the continued Republican scepticism about the recip­
rocal trade agreements programme was a source of much appre­
hension. Multilateral tariff reduction remained a central 
aim of American foreign policy, and an eighteen nation con­
ference on tariffs was scheduled to open at Geneva in April. 
The Republican victory had, however, thrown a shadow over 
this, for protectionist sentiment remained strong amongst 
Congressional Republicans, who saw the tariff reduction 
programme as part of a general process of weakening the 
United States through "give-away" diplomacy. It was rumoured 
that concerns about the tariff were the real reason for 
Vandenberg's decision not to go on any more international 
conferences.^ certainly, Taft remained very sceptical of 
this aspect of the bipartisan policy. To Hoover, later 
in the year, he was to confide his distrust of Under 
Secretary of State, William Clayton. Clayton, he said, 
was an "inveterate free-trader* who had used American "loaning
power to secure concessions which. . .foreign nations really
90cannot afford to make".
Although Taft was undoubtedly the more authentic spokes­
man for the Republicans, Vandenberg managed to secure a com­
promise over the tariff in early 1947, with the aid of his
88r Congressional Record, 93» February 21st, 1945, p. 1265.°°St. Louis lost-despatch, February 7th, 1947, reprinted in 
Congressional Record, $3, Appendix, p. 496.
9°Robert A. Taft to Hoover, August 13th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
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friend , Eugene Millikin, chairman of the Finance Committee. 
The suggestions of Vandenberg and Millikin, worked out with 
¥illiam Clayton and Dean Acheson for the Administration, were 
that in all the agreements signed a provision would be in­
serted allowing either party to modify or withdraw any
91tariff that caused undue hardship. Domestically, provision 
was made for industries who wished to protest tariff cuts 
to be permitted to state their case before the Tariff Com­
mission.^ Taft was reported as cool towards the Vandenberg- 
Mllllkin compromise.^ 3 His own proposals differed markedly; 
he wanted the tariff to be delegated to the Tariff Commission, 
with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements in a supplementary
role In those cases which the Commission found did not
qAimpair the protection of American industry. His-change 
of emphasis revealed a significant division; basically he 
was opposed to the whole R. T. A. programme on the grounds 
that it delegated complete power to the President; he wanted 
the Tariff Commission to define standards of protection, 
rather than simply to serve as an appeal body.
The disagreement between Taft and Vandenberg over the 
tariff was perhaps the first serious one. Vandenberg's 
friendly Journalist, James Reston, commented that it was 
regarded "as a warning to both that a sound domestic policy 
and a sound foreign policy are inseparably connected. It
^llTew York Times. February 5th, 1947.
92Ibld.. February 9th, 1947; Congressional Record, 93»
February 10th, 1947, p. 912-3.•y?Iev York Times, February 9th, 1947.
%4Ibid., February 13th, 1947.
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is being pointed out in the Capital. . .that since each has 
sufficient strength on Capitol Hill to defeat the program
of the other, there is no future for anybody in trying to
95divide the indivisible." Reston's view of the deteriorating
relations between Taft and Vandenberg was confirmed by
QSDulles in early March. Vandenberg, however, tried to dis­
miss the rumours as a New Deal attempt to give the impression 
of Republican disunity. ^  The situation, however, was un­
doubtedly more serious than Vandenberg would admit. With 
the house leadership, Taft stood for the programme on which 
most Congressional Republicans felt they had been elected 
in 194-6. By March, with the Democrats ahead in the Gallup 
poll, and with their failure to secure the six billion budget 
cut and other measures designed to return the United States
to Normalcy, frustration and recriminations were bound to 
98appear.
The mood of the Republican 80th Congress was a vital 
factor which the Administration cuuld not ignore as it 
sought to develop its foreign policy in early 194-7. As 
part of its strategy, it enlisted the aid of Herbert Hoover, 
who was asked to undertake a mission to Germany and Austria, 
on the assumption that he would persuade Congress to support
95ibld_., February 12th, 194-7.
9°Unsigned pencilled note from Wardman Park Hotel, Dulles 
Q7to Herbert Srownell, March 4th, 1947, Dulles MSS.
9'Washington Star. March 11th, 1947, reprinted in Congressional 
„Record, 93, Appendix, p. 977.^“Comments of Senator Bushfield on latest Gallup Poll, ibid., 
March 7th, 1947, p. 1781.
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the appropriations necessary to sustain the American occupa- 
99 .tion.  ^ Influential in matters of relief, especially on 
the House of Representatives, Hoover still belonged firmly 
to the Rationalist wing of the party. In January, 1947, 
he wrote to the newly elected Malone of Nevada, one of the 
most conservative of the famous class of 1946, that his elec­
tion was "one of God's unique gifts to the Republican Party. . 
It is a monument not only to your own capacity but to the
fact that the American people are turning to the right,
100trying to get from under this unendurable regime". His 
selection by the Administration is evidence of its awareness 
of the increased power of economy-minded Republicans after 
the 1946 elections; throughout the 80th Congress he was to 
remain a figure to be wooed. For the most part, however, 
development of foreign policy was dependent on the coopera­
tion of Arthur Vandenberg. In early 1947, Vardenberg was 
in one of his periods of disenchantment with the Administra­
tion. Caught in a difficult political situation, between a 
Congressional party bent on economy and retrenchment, and 
an external situation which to the Administration and to him 
seemed to require bold and costly innovation, he had been 
somewhat shaken by the resignation of James Ryrnes.
In the context of the domestic political situation, as 
well as the development of American foreign policy, the speech 
delivered by Vandenberg at the Cleveland Foreign Affairs Forum 
on January 11th, 1947, is worth careful analysis.101 In the
99pew York Times. January 23rd, 1947.
100doover to George.Malone, January 24th, 1947, Hoover M33.
101 Hew York Times, January 12th, 1947. On the same platform 
was James.Byrnes, who had Just resigned as Secretary of 
State.
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speech there was material for the benefit of fellow Repub­
licans, for the outside world (which he was aware was con­
cerned about the implications of the Republican victory in 
194-6) and material also for General Marshall and the Admin­
istration. Committing himself firmly to an American foreign 
policy, and to the stopping of partisan politics at the 
"water's edge”, he cited his work with Byrnes, "which I hope 
has permanently established the American doctrine that there 
are deadlines in our ideals from which we shall never again 
retreat". The United Nations he held up as "the heart and 
core of united, unpartlsan American foreign policy. We shall 
be faithful to the latter and the spirit of these obligations. 
In my view, this will be true no matter what administration 
sits in Washington." Having affirmed,however, that Re­
publicans would not reverse American foreign policy as it 
had been established by the end of 194-6, he also in his 
criticism of what had not been done outlined his hopes for 
the future. In essence, he wanted a global policy, one 
which would seize the initiative against communism all over 
the world. He was particularly critical of the failure to 
secure a bipartisan policy on Xatin America: ", . .it is 
past time to hold the Ran American Conference which we pro­
mised in 1945, and there to formally renew the joint new 
world authority which is the genius of our new world unity. 
There is too much evidence that we are drifting apart - and 
that a communistic upsurge is moving in. We face no greater 
need than to restore the warmth of new world unity which 
reached an all-time high at San Francisco." On China, too, 
he suggested that the United States Implement a policy to
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unite the opponents of the Communists. In Europe he called 
for the United States to come to terms with Austria and 
Germany, "the heart of the European problem", which required 
economic unification and eventual decentralized political 
control. His desire to sort out central Europe did not 
prevent him from giving an undertaking that American troops 
would remain in occupation until the Job was done.102
Yandenberg’s careful balancing of his external and 
domestic constituencies was mirrored in his handling of the 
sensitive areas of tariffs and rehabilitation and reconstruc­
tion. He believed, he said, that the United States would 
continue the Reciprocal Trade Programme, though whether 
on a bilateral or multilateral basis was dependent on other 
countries, some of which he noted were beginning to make 
bilateral arrangements; but to Republicans he offered the 
assurance that "we intend to keep our American industry and 
agriculture in sound, domestic health, and to protect our 
system of free enterprise. Anything less would be a calamity 
not only for us but for the Western world. But sane, healthy, 
mutual trade expansion is best for all concerned." He also 
thought that the United States would make credit available 
for reconstruction, and would appropriate for relief in 
consultation with the United Nations,"even though", again 
for the benefit of fellow Republicans, "we never again 
contribute 72 per cant of an international fund, as in 
U.II.R.R. A.., which can be controlled and even exploited by
others".10^
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As always, Vandenberg’s speech was masterly. As the 
leading Republican spokesman he was at one and the same 
time seeking to reassure and give a warning to foreign coun­
tries, whilst domestically he was seeking to give warning 
to the Administration and reassurance to his own Party. Al­
though he had gone some way in accepting the "One World" or 
"Internationalist" position, his speech revealed a continu­
ing sympathy with the tenets of a "Strong America." At the 
same time, his veiled criticism of the Administration for 
past failings < could not but strengthen his standing with 
fellow Republicans; and the stronger his position with his 
own Party, the more useful he was to the Administration, and 
still stronger was his bargaining position.
Throughout January, and February, Vandenberg’s relations 
with General Marshall were to remain distant. It was temper­
amentally impossible for General Marshall to offer Vanden- 
berg the same relationship as the latter had developed 
with Byrnes.1®2*' It is probable also that the President was 
not sorry that he had jbund a Secretary of State who had 
enough prestige to stand independent of Vandenberg and Dulles. 
Truman’s respect for presidential prerogatives, his desire 
to restore the domestic initiative to the Administration,
and his awakening desire to be re-elected, as well as his
«
desire to have a prestigious Secretary of State to help 
out with a Republican Congress, all suggest that the appoint­
ment of Marshall may well have been designed to break the 
influence which Vandenberg was widely reputed to have had.
1^Reports, February 25th, February 27th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
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On January 27th, 194-7, Truman wrote to his former Secretary 
of State of "the tendency on the part of Vandenberg and our 
partisan friend, Dulles, to implement a Republican foreign 
policy. Dulles has made two speeches in which he has made 
a sincere attempt, with the help of the Republican press, 
to take charge in foreign relations, expecially as it affects 
the German settlement and Central Europe. It seems to me 
if you are Inclined to do it, that you are in a much better 
position now than at any time in the recent past to flatten 
out that sort of approach."1^  Possibly the President had 
been nettled by Dulles' speech to the Women's Rational Re­
publican Club on January 25th, in which he had underlined 
what he believed to be domestic political realities: "A 
Democratic President and his Secretary of State can propose, 
but a Republican Congress can dispose. Foreign diplomats 
know that, and they suspect what we know - that 2 years from 
now, a Republican will be in the White House. So these
foreign governments will not take very seriously proposals
105which are backed only by the Democratic Party". Representa 
ticr> ' at the Moscow Conference was. Involved in the interplay 
between Administration and Republican leaders. The idea that 
Dulles should go had been floated by James Reston in De­
cember. when the invitation failed to materialize, Dulles
1°5QUOted by Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror; The Onset 
of the Co Id War 1 94-5-50 (Na w York: Horton, 1970), p^  fo2, 
n. 227 !Like the President, Senator Pepper, the left wing 
Democrat from Florida, saw a pattern in the Dulles and 
Vandenberg speeches; in his case he saw it as repudiation 
of the bipartisan policy, repudiation of Potsdam, and 
support of reactionary forces in China and the Argentine, 
^Congressional Record, 93 February 5th, 194-7, PP. 789-90.
10oRev7'Yor:< Times -He raTd, -January 25th, 194-7, reprinted in 
Con?resslonar~PecoriTT* p. 789. < ' ■
107l.'ew~~York Timas, December 18th, 194-7.
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himself broke the Ice by writing to Marshall offering to 
discuss his views on the German situation. At a meeting 
in Washington on February 24th, Dulles was invited to go to 
Moscow, but before acceptance checked with Vandenberg, who 
was less than pleased. Unlike Dewey, who felt that Dulles' 
cooperation with Marshall would be good for the Party, Van­
denberg evidently felt by February that Republicans would 
have been better to have been free to criticize what would 
almost certainly be a failure.10® Vendenberg's reaction to 
the raEprochement between Dulles and the Administration is 
evidence of his dissatisfaction and his desire to maintain 
his own independence. Attacked, along with Dulles, by 
Pravda ( and Senator Pepper) for allegedly trying to build 
up Germany, and to change United States policy towards the 
Argentine and China, (and in Pepper’s view, to force policy 
away from that established by Roosevelt), Vandenberg was 
undoubtedly very wary in early 1947. The exact reasons 
for his wariness are impossible to locate. Possibly it was 
a hangover from the Wallace affair; certainly he was dis­
appointed at Byrnes' dismissal, and upset at not being 
given due deference by the new Secretary of State. Perhaps, 
too, as a man of vanity, he was not too happy at the invita­
tion to Herbert Hoover. He must also have been sensitive 
to the mood of Congress, and to his problems with Taft.
Whilst relations with the Administration remained poor,
Vandenberg and Dulles both continued to outline what they
109saw as the Republican viewpoint on foreign affairs. Both *1
10®Memorandum, "Re: Council of foreign Ministers Meeting in 
loqMoscow", February 26th, 1947, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
1 ^Fuller analysis of Dulles’ speeches is in the following 
chapter.
316
men still revealed their ability to develop policy within 
the framework of restraints imposed by a "Strong America". 
Vandenberg, especially sensitive to the strength of the 
President in Congress, asked Dulles to insert in his address 
to the Inland Daily Press Association in February a plea to 
keep midwestemers informed of foreign affairs.110 In the 
address Dulles put forward a programme which, in the changed 
conditions of 1947, could still be reconciled with a "Strong 
America". First, emphasis was put on saving the world by 
example: they must demonstrate at home that a free society 
and a free economy worked. Additionally, they must keep a 
strong military establishment, promote hemispheric solidarity 
and European unity, support the Chinese Nationalists, and 
use the United Nations to mobilize world opinion against 
injustices such as Poland.111 Dulles’ programme was both 
global and yet "economic", the primary emphasis was still . 
on moral leadership.1^2 At a time when Congress was deter­
mined to prune government spending, Dulles' speech was 
politically astute.
Vandenberg also, in his home town in February, in 
more ornate prose than Dulles, set out his ideas in a Lin­
coln Day Dinner address. He would, he said, continue to
110John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, January 31st, 1947,
...Vandenberg M3S.
. .^ New York Times, February 11th, 1947.
''2j?o the National Publishers Association in January he had 
stressed the need for more creative leadership; in his 
text the passage was emphasized with lines in the margin, 
January 17th, 1947, Dulles MS3.
11 -^New York Times. February 9th, 1947.
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oppose appeasement, and to insist on maximum national de­
fense, including monopoly of the atom bomb, pending agree­
ment, by Russia in particular, to international provision 
that "swift and conclusive punishment. . .shall stop treachery 
at its source". Putting his faith in international coopera­
tion by peace loving nations, who must stand together, he 
transported his audience to Gettysburg, to plead with Lincoln 
that democratic government should not perish from the earth: 
"Republicanism - now as then - is not an end in itself. It 
is the means to an end. The end is the healthy preservation 
here in the United States of free institutions, free enter­
prise and free men, amid a disorganized and distraught world 
not yet recovered from the shock and wreckage of total war.
The end is the restoration of those stabilities which shall 
rekindle the hopes of all Western democracy everywhere that 
here is the true way of life, liberty, happiness and peace." 
Vandenberg then, was reminding Republicans both of their 
traditions and their basic aims, at a time when some were 
disposed to indulge in pure partisanship. He felt sure, 
he said, "that Republicanism will justify their (sic) new 
responsibilities and thus, by deserving works, will assure 
America's final and complete achievement of sane, sound, 
solvent Republican administration in 1 9 4 - 8 . However 
much he had cooperated with the Administration, Vandenberg 
was seeking to reassure his friends that he had not become 
a"liew Dealer", that he did not believe that dollars could
1l4Ibld.
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ultimately solve all problems, In short, that he was keeping 
faith with the Republican tradition.
Both Dulles and Vandenberg had an instinct which enabled 
them to collaborate with the Administration whilst still 
keeping alive their claims as authentic exponents of Re­
publicanism. To Vandenberg's vanity was added Dulles' con­
siderable ambition to guide American foreign policy. On 
February 6th, Dulles wrote of the considerable interest that 
had been shown at home and overseas in his speech to the
National Publishers Association: "It is absolutely certain
116that we started something significant". Three days later 
he wrote, "The favourable extent of that reaction has been 
beyond my expectation. I think it makes clear that we need 
not have any lack of confidence in carrying on along that 
line and scoring another strengthening of U.S. policy and, 
incidentally, of the competence of the G.O.P. in foreign 
affairs.
This then was the domestic context in which a new direc­
tion in American foreign policy was being planned. The 
Truman Doctrine, although the result of an external con­
dition, the British economic crisis and withdrawal from 
Greece, was planned in a domestic political context. Against 
the background of a widespread desire by Republicans to re­
duce all governmental expenditures and to get the United 
States once more on the road to solvency, the Administration 
determined to reverse what it saw as a return to "isolationism".
11^John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, February 6th, 194-7, 
..Vandenberg MSS.
''&John Foster Dulles to Vandenberg, February 9th, 194-7, 
Vandenberg MSS.
319
The R e p u b l i c a n  c o n f i d e n c e  o f  . e l e c t o r a l  v i c t o r y . i n  1948 w a s  
also' b o u n d  u p  w i t h  this. The Administration could not 
afford to allow the Republicans to keep the political ini­
tiative which they had gained in 194-6, and which Vandenberg 
and Dulles had sought to keep in their well publicized speeches 
in 1947.
Aid to Greece and Turkey
"The primarynission of the Truman Doctrine speech was 
not to provide a correct statement of American foreign policy 
but. . .to assure Congressional approval of the Greco- 
Turkish Aid Program." -Richard M. Freeland.
The key to an understanding of the Truman Doctrine was 
the political situation in the United States. The revival 
of "isolationism", an obsession since the days of Franklin 
Roosevelt, had apparently been confirmed by the 1946reaction 
to the British Loan and the 1946 elections. Difficulties 
in 1947 over the tariff and the budget, not to mention re­
sistance to further large-scale aid for reconstruction, 
appeared to State Department and White House planners to
113pose a serious threat to the objectives of post-war policy.
The key to the Administration's strategy for dealing with 
domestic restraints was Arthur Vandenberg, who was later 
described by one of the participants in the planning, as 
never having faced up "fully to the economic realities of 
American responsibilities in the post-war world, in terms
119of tariffs, commercial policies, foreign aid, and taxation".
On February 27th, 1947, the President invited Congres­
sional leaders to the White House to put to them the proposal
]]iFreeland, p. 102.
]°Gaddis,pp. 317-8; Joseph M. Jones, pp. 89-91* 96-98.
''^ J o n e s , p. 124.
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to aid. Greece and Turkey, made urgent by Britain’s economic 
situation and its decision to withdraw from Greece. At the 
meeting, the most effective exponent of the Administration 
case was Dean Acheson, who portrayed the proposal not in 
terms of either humanitarian aid or of strengthening Britain's 
position in the Middle East, but in terms of the prevention 
of Soviet domination of Europe, the Middle East and North 
Africa. Acheson’s presentation apparently salvaged the 
situation after what seemed to the Congressmen a less con­
vincing and less ideological case put forward by Secretary 
of State Marshall. Vandenberg in particular was impressed 
by Acheson's presentation, and urged that any request for 
funds to Congress should be made in similar terms, accom­
panied by a radio address. It was Vandenberg's condition 
then which required that aid to Greece and Turkey be en­
veloped in a global statement of American policy,or, as 
some reports would have it: he demanded that the Presi­
dent should "scare the hell" out of the American people and 
Congress. Joseph Jones ambiguously commented: "It was 
Vandenberg's 'condition' that made it possible, even necessary,
to launch the global policy that broke through the re-
121mainlng barriers of American isolationism".
As the Administration was doubtless aware, the Greek 
Turkish aid proposals had come at a difficult time for 120
120Ibld.. pp. 138-144; Preeland, pp. 88-89.
121Joseph M. Jones, p. 143.
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Vandenberg: ‘ already the congressional party had revealed
itself divided, with relations between Taft and Vandenberg
somewaht uneasy. In the week following the "White House
briefing, which could not have been helped by the omission
122of Taft, the signs of disunity became even more evident.
To add to the problem was the fact that the President had
also put in a request for 350 million dollars post-U.N.R.R.A.
relief, whilst Herbert Hoover, returned from his mission
overseas, had urged Congress at the end of February to
123exercise care in the dispensation of such relief.
"Charitable relief," he said, "is today a double tax upon
most of our people. It isnot only a direct burden upon the
taxpayer, but these unremunerative and unbalanced exports
keep up prices and the cost of living." ’With taxes taking
35$ of the national income, there was a limit, said Hoover,
despite the belief of people abroad that "ourpossibilities
124of giving are unlimited". Efficiency, economy, safeguards 
for the taxpayer, repayment, these were the key elements in
1 PRHoover's approach. ° In his view the United States could 
not afford, neither would the receiver benefit from what 
for years he and other Republicans had labelled a permanent 
international W.P.A. Hoover's views could be expected to 
carry considerable weight in Congress in view both of his 
experience and his recent trip overseas, and could not help 
but reinforce the disquiet which rumours of the White House 
briefing aroused. As many, including perhaps Vandenberg
l22New York Times. March 9th, 1947.
123Acheson, p. 221; O'Laughlln to Brigadier General David 
Sarnoff, March 8th,-1947, O'Laughlln MSS.
'^Testimony to House Foreign Affairs Committee, New York 
Times. March 1st, 1947.125ibid.
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himself realized, a crucial time for decision had come: the 
emerging Administration initiative, which some saw as a 
familiar pattern in the long duping of the United States 
by slick British diplomats, was a challenge to the desire 
of the Congressional Republican Party to return to normalcy.12o 
In the House of Representatives in particular some of the 
comment was bitter: "It is not Russian communism we have 
to fear but New Deal communism", commented one Representa­
tive. Another war, he argued, would make it Impossible to
1 27restore America to normal health. ‘
Such was the reaction, that the Chicago Tribune reported 
that Vandenberg felt that he did not know enough about the
1 oAsituation to support it.before his colleagues. The Ad­
ministration meanwhile was preparing if necessary to go
1 pQover Congress' head and to appeal to the people. * The 
White Eouse Staff were busy on a speech which Clark Clifford 
labelled "the opening gun in a campaign to bring people up 
to realization that the war isn't over by any means''.1^0 
Privately, however, Vandenberg had seemingly been impressed 
by Acheson's rhetoric. To the editor of the Jewish News in 
Detroit he wrote, in answer to a query about Palestine: "Of 
course the problem throughout the entire Middle East has
1 ^ Walter Trohan reported that Dean Acheson had told a Re­
publican Congressman at a party that Turkey had served 
notice that it would reduce its army unless the United 
States shared the cost; Trohan reported that Republicans 
were disposed to see this as a part of a mounting cam­
paign to get the U.S. to take over British commitments. 
r7Chlcago Tribune. March 9th, 1947.
:^ ¿Congressional Record. 93, March 4th, 1947, p. 1671.
' ^ Chicago Tribune. March 8th, 1947.
129¡fin,Booth Report, "Prex Week - The Great Decision", March 7th,
.,..1947, Me Naught on MSS.
1 -^Handwritten note, March 9th, 1947, George M. Elsey MSS.,
Truman Library.
323
been stupendously complicated during the last few days by 
the frank disclosure that the British Empire is further 
crumbling and that the United States must quickly make some 
major decisions respecting its relationship throughout this 
vast area. . .1 have something of a feeling that the future 
of the entire world may easily turn upon American attitudes 
in respect to the situations which we now confront in connec­
tion with a global problem".^1 At a further White House 
meeting on March 10th at which Taft was included at Vanden- 
berg's request, Vandenberg again reminded the President of 
his previous insistence on a full explanation by the Presi­
dent to both Congress and people.1 *52 it was also reported 
that Vandenberg took the President to task for American 
policy towards the Argentine and China; a report which if 
correct reveals the way in which Vandenberg had come to see 
the Greek and Turkey situation in global, ideological terms. 
Prom the meeting also emanated reports of vague references 
to the possibility of the United States armed forces organ­
izing and training troops in Greece, Turkey, Italy, China
1 "54and Korea, to build a "fence around Russia". After the 
80 minute session at the White House, Vandenberg urged 
Senate Republicans to keep an open mind on the forthcoming 
proposal: "I simply indicated to my colleagues my opinion
that it is not an isolated phase but nay prove to be symbolic 
of general policy which may have to be pursued all around
1 51Vandenberg to Philip Somovitz, March 5th, 1947; see also 
Vandenberg to John B. Bennett, March 5th, 1947, Vandenberg K3S.
152Joseph M. Jones, pp. 168-9; Truman, Memoirs. 11:111.
I ^ Y°rk Times, March 12th, 1947.
154Chicago Tribune. March 11th, 1947.
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the world inasmuch as the same fundamentals are involved in 
so many situations".155 cautious as ever, he withheld en­
dorsement until the President had delivered his side of the 
bargain, but his attitude was hardly in doubt, it was, he 
told his fellow senators,"a matter which transcends politics".
Despite the build-up and the gravity of the President's 
tone, his speech of March 12th, calling for the United States 
"to support free peoples", was received unenthusiastically 
by Congress. The only exception was a passage in the speech, 
added by Clark Clifford, which spoke of the need for the 
United States to supervise the spending of its own funds, 
which was a popular statement in the "economy" climate of 
1947.1^  Warned by the Chicago Tribune not to be taken in 
by eastern press propaganda, designed,it said,to prevent 
Republicans cutting the budget, and to get them to support 
Britain and "half the other governments of the world", Re­
publicans were in a quandary.158 After the President's 
speech there was a tense clash between Senator Brooks of 
Illinois and left wing Democrat Pepper of Florida, in which 
Brooks argued that it was a repetition of 1940-1941, and 
that they wouldn't have to fight Russia now if the Repub­
licans had had their way in 1941 and let the Germans "eat 
up Russia".1 Vandenberg, although supporting the Presi­
dent, and Implying that Congress had no choice but to support
! IflWd.]^Joseph M. Jones, p. 169.
l^luew York Times. March 13th, 1947; Joseph M. Jones, pp, 155-6. 
^ ^ chlcago Tribune, March 11th, 1947.
15*ibld.. March 13th, 1947.
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him, let it be known that he was upset by the Administration's
failure to keep Congress fully in the picture, and for its
failure to present the implications of British decline for
discussion earlier. He also felt that the Administration
had not given enough attention to the possibility of having
a direct showdown with Stalin.12*^
Vandenberg's interpretation of the crisis was, therefore,
consistent with his pre-existing belief as to the need for
a "total policy" to deal with communism on a global basis.
His statement of March 13th asserted that the "plain truth
is that Soviet-American relationships are at the core of
this whole problem".12*'1 He had, therefore, swallowed the
Acheson interpretation whole, seeing the Greek crisis solely
in terms of American-Soviet relations; thus on March 5th he
had written disparagingly of a suggestion that it ought
to be dealt with by the United Nations, largely on the grounds
that such a proposal had been advanced by Senator Pepper,
142whose views he commented, usually parallelled Moscow's.
"My private opinion," he wrote," is that we are rapidly 
approaching a point where we must honestly pose this ques­
tion to ourselves; can the United States survive in a 
Communist-dominated world?"1^  James Reston, who was the 
source of reports of Vandenberg's desire to take the matter 
up with Stalin, had earlier reported that Vandenberg had 
told the President that he should instruct the Secretary
I ^ New York 'limes, March 14th, 1947; Vandenberg, Private
Papers, pp.' 342-4. The timing of the Truman Doctrine made 
some Republicans suspicious, for the question of British 
withdrawal from Greece had been discussed in 1945; Free- 
. land, pp. 39-92.171 Vctndenberg, Private Papers, p, 343-4.
1^Vandenberg to John B. Bennett, March*5th, 1947, Vandenberg
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of State to explain tha policy to Stalin and to say that
it was dual: i) collaboration for peace; ii) economic
intervention in key areas to block Soviet expansion. At
his meeting with Stalin, in April, Marshall did not put it
so bluntly, simply saying that the United States would assist
countries suffering from economic deterioration, in order
144to prevent collapse and threats to democracy. The essen­
tial problem, as the White House and State Department well 
knew, was that the Soviet Union was not directly involved 
in Greece, but the portrayal of the Greek crisis in terms
of a cataclysmic ideological confrontation had been the
145price of Vandenberg's support. George Kerman of the State 
Department Planning Staff, and widely heralded the author 
of the policy of containment was unhappy with the ideological 
and universalist nature of the Truman Doctrine, so also was 
Journalist Walter Lippman who regarded it as vague and un­
controllable. 1 ^  Within a few months of the message, both 
Kennan and Under-secretary Robert Lovett were to be caution­
ing Clark Clifford and the White House staff against any 
more simplified statements of American policy: a lot of 
things,they said, had been said which ought to be forgotten,
including the global commitment to "aid free peoples. . .",
147which they indicated was beyond American capabilities. 14
144 i1 Joseph M. Jones, pp. 154-5.14->Commander Elsey opposed preparing the "All-out" speech 
Clark Clifford had wanted to back up the Greek crisis 
partly because there was no overt action by the Soviet 
Union to serve as an adequate pretext for such a speech; 
.Elsey to Clark Clifford,' Elsey MSS, March 8th, 1947. ' 
'4oj0seph M. Jones, pp. 154-5; New York Herald Tribune. 
.March 15th, 1947.147penciled note, Sfjptember 2nd, 1947, Elsey MSS.
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The Secretary of State also was less than pleased when he 
read the draft in Paris en route for Moscow, but was in-
1 Aftformed that it was necessary to get Congressional support.
In view of this, it is perhaps not surprising that Vandenberg 
again reportedly became disillusioned with the Administration; 
by the end of April, he was to become convinced that there 
was "no Truman Doctrine", purely expediency, nothing more.l2f9 
In April, Henry Wallace was to charge during his Euro­
pean tour that the Truman Doctrine was a political manoeuvre
1 ‘SOdesigned to steal the anti-communist issue from Republicans. 
Vandenberg demanded that the President make his position
1 51clear, and described Wallace as an "itinerant saboteur". 
Wallace's comments were accurate so far as the effect of 
the Truman Doctrine was concerned, but there is no evidence 
that that was the primary Intention, which was to win support 
for the general direction of American foreign policy. Never­
theless, the Truman Doctrine was an Intensely political 
speech, aside from its other implications. By taking the 
anti-communist initiative the President created some diffi­
culties for the Democratic Party, hence the claim by Senator 
Connally, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, that the proposal to aid Greece and Turkey was 
not anti-Russian but anti-agression.1 The principal effect, 
however, was to put Republicans on the spot. The Democratic 
National Committee's executive director, Gael Sullivan, 
immediately exploited this by a challenge to Carroll Reece,
1 ^ Charles j*. Bohlen, The Transformation of American Foreign 
.Policy (London: McDonald, 1970), p. 87.
1 ^ “Report,."Vandenberg III - Cover", April 30th, 194-7, P. 9, 
McNaughton MSS.
150ffew York Times. April 12th, 19-47.
151 ibid.. April 13th, 194-7; Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 351. 
152congresslonal Record. 93» April 22nd, 194-7, P. 5791 .
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to sign a bipartisan declaration in favour of aid to Greece 
and Turkey, a move which Vandenberg and ConnaHy both denounced. 
Reece's reply was as Intensely political as Sullivan's challenge, 
and lends substance to Wallace's perception: assuring Sullivan 
that there was no division in the Republican Party on the 
question of resisting "communist aggression", he berated the 
Administration for its"appeasement" at Yalta, Potsdam, etc., 
which he held was partially responsible for the situation 
in Poland and the Baltic; at the same time, he charged, 
opposition to communist aggression was also involved "in 
the insidious infiltration of Communists and fellow-travelers 
into our own governmental structure at home. Actually, from 
the stand-point of American security, the presence of armed 
bands of outlaws on the frontiers of Greece or Turkey may 
be less dangerous than subversive termites disguised in 
striped trousers and spats in governmental positions in 
Washington". ^ 4
Clearly then, the Truman Doctrine had, with Vandenberg's 
connivance, put the midwestern wing of the party on the spot.
By the end of March, the Gallup Poll was reporting 56% sup­
port for aid to Greece and Turkey, although considerably 
less support for the proposal to send military advisers.
Arthur Krock commented that if Republicans opposed the Ad­
ministration , there would be a danger of reopening the 
"isolation" issue, which in his view had lost them the 1
153ibid.. March 18th, 1947, p. 2167.154carron  Reece to Gael Sullivan, March 18th, 1947, copy 
in O.F. 426, Truman MSS.
155gonprresslonal Record, 93, March 28th, 1947, p. 2827.
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19^0 and 1944 elections.1 ^  By framing its foreign policy- 
in explicit anti-communist terms, the Administration had 
delivered a master stroke; it had challenged Republicans on 
the anti-communist issue which previously they had regarded 
as their own property. TiJhether in the long run the move 
was beneficial to the conduct of foreign policy is, however, 
doubtful. As one recent writer has argued: "By presenting 
aid to Greece and Turkey in termsof an ideological conflict 
between two ways of life, Washington officials encouraged a 
simplistic view of the Cold War which was, in time, to im­
prison American diplomacy in an ideological straight 
jacket. . ."157
Early debate in Congress reflected the unease of the
rank and file. A few Republicans, including Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge (Mass.) and his brother Representative John
Davis Lodge (Conn.), were inclined to see the Doctrine as
the logical conclusion to the pressure which Republicans
had been putting on the Administration, and therefore, to
welcome the about face and even to express a willingness to 
1 ^ 8go further. There was, however, a great deal of unease.
In the House in particular, the economy advocates were in 
disarray. One Representative, after surveying all the 
Ame'rican foreign policy failures, oancluded that the Ad­
ministration had been controlled either by Communists or more 
likely by stupid people duped by communists. He couldn't 
believe that the Hew Dealers had changed theirspots overnight:
l^New York Times, March 18th, 1947.
^¿Gaddis, p. 352.
'5ocon&ressional Record, 93» March 13th, 1947, p, 
March 17th, 1947, P. 2109.
2048; ibid.,
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"A management which has committed 14 years of blunders for 
communism is hardly qualified, because of an almost over­
night reformation, to be given a blank check for a crusade 
against communism”.159 The policy, he argued, would aid 
Russia, it would tie the United States down all over the 
globe and bring about economic collapse; those who advocated 
economy would, he predicted, be branded as friends of Russia 
and as reactionaries putting dollars at the expense of 
lives. Having completed the analysis of the Truman Doctrine 
as the culmination of a long policy of playing into Russian 
hands, he proceeded to agree with an interruption by the 
indefatigable Hoffman of Michigan, who claimed that "our
foreign policy has been coming from abroad through the
1 oBritish Empire for something like 10 years”.
Perhaps the most impressive early opposition came from 
Representative Bender of Ohio, who questioned how support 
for democracy could be reconciled with the regimes in Greece 
and Turkey, and wondered why there had not been similar 
concern for Poland, Finland, or China; from this he concluded 
that the United States was simply taking over British commit­
ments.^ He was not, he said, prepared to commit the United 
States to another world-wide war "to protect the British 
Empire, to maintain monarchy, to bribe any scoundrel 
throughout the world to keep screaming against communism. ”^ 2  
Did this mean, he wondered, that the United States was going 
to turn the whole world into another central America, with
159ibid.. March 18th, 1947, p. £215. 
jP?IbId.. pp. 2216-7.1611 W . , p. 2214; ibid.. March 25th, 1947, p. 2538; ibid..
March 28th, 1948, p. 2833.
162Ibld.. March 25th, 1947, p. 2588.
331
continuous intervention, as in that area in the 1920’s. D 
Perhaps the man in the most difficult position of all 
was Robert Taft. Initially he had reserved his position on 
the question of aid to Greece and Turkey, and in particular 
had expressed his fear that it might lead to war with Russia.
He had also wondered, how the United States could reconcile 
its assertion of a special role in Greece and Turkey with
its objection to Soviet domination of eastern Europe. He
164was particularly opposed to military aid. Taft’s reser­
vations were consistent with his long-standing belief that 
the United States must avoid imperial commitments, and with 
his belief that the United States should not engage in 
costly policies in areas which were not, in his view, vital 
to the security of the United States. By 1947 his view of 
what was vital to the United States had come to diverge 
markedly from Vandenberg's. Vandenberg,it seems, had at 
least since 1946 come to regard the threat of a world dom­
inated by the Soviet Union as something which it was the 
vital interest of the United States to prevent. Not starting 
off from the internationalist assumption of the indivisibility 
of liberty, he had in fact come close to that position; as 
always,however, he retained his fear that the United States 
might over-strain its resources.1^5 Taft, however, still 
had a far more limited view of the vital interests of the
l ^ Ibld.. p. 2587.1 p^New York Times, March 13th, 1947; Chicago Tribune. March 14th,
T9K7 ,1^^In March he wrote of his belief that they could avoid both 
war and "Communist encirclement and infiltration. . .if 
we make it immutably plain that we are the lineal des­
cendants of those rugged old pioneers whose flag bore 
the motto ’Don't Tread on me'. But you may be very sure 
that I share all of your anxieties and that I have no 
illusions." Vandenberg to Bruce Barton, March 24th, 1947, 
Vandenberg MSS.
1
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iUnited States. The fact that the 
majority of Republicans in Congress probably supported him 
was no comfort: trailing in the opinion polls, criticized 
by the eastern press, not loved even by the Chicago Tribune 
his chances of getting the 1948 nomination evidently on the 
wane, Taft decided with reluctance, to go along with the 
proposal to aid Greece and Turkey.
Taft's decision undoubtedly reflected the dilemma in 
which the President's address had put Republicans. In the 
middle of March Herbert Hoover, in an address to some 90 
Senators and Representatives, said that the Republican Party 
had no alternative but to make the money available; failure 
to do so would, he said, simply lay them open to the charge 
that they had undercut Secretary Marshall at the Moscow 
Conference. He did feel, however, that Congress could write 
into the programme a clear definition of the circumstances 
in which Congress would sanction intervention elsewhere,
1 f*7as well as putting restrictions and conditions on the aid.
To Hoover's acquiescence, Alf Landon added enthusiastic sup­
port, seeing it as a reversion to "big stick" diplomacy, 
as befitted "the most awe-inspiring military power the world 
has ever seen". ° No Republican leader in fact was prepared 
to come out in opposition to the aid to Greece and Turkey; 
in the House of Representatives even, vocal opponents came
1^^Report, April 12th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.; Alsop to Martin
Sommers, April 15th, 1947; Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 26th, 
1947, Alsop MSS.; Fortune .([March. 1947)i p. 5; Chicago 
- Tribune. March 11 th^ 1947.'"
1°'0TLaughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, March 23rd,
947, 0'Laughlin MSS. 
lb0New York Times. March 20th, 1947.
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from the ranks of the relatively uuinfluentlal. Amongst 
the early supporters in the House was Everett Dirksen, Illinois, 
hitherto an opponent of Administration foreign policy. Dirk- 
sen announced his support of "spirited resistance to com­
munism” provided the Administration’s about-face was real,
and provided the many wasteful errors of international
169spending, which he catalogued, were remedied. Top of his
list of failures was U.N.R.R.A., the administration of which
he described as having been run by "mental misfits, indolent
170adventurers, and hypersensitive pinks. .
The Greek-Turkish aid bill was introduced into the Senate
on the 19th March, amended in Committee by Vandenberg and
Connally (especially in order to offset criticism about
by-passing the United Nations) and reported out unanimously
171by the Foreign Relations Committee on April 3rd, On 
April 8th, Vandenberg initiated the formal Senate debate.
He began his speech by declaring that the bill could have 
been called "a bill to support the purposes of the United 
Nations to maintain international peace and security", 
a response to criticisms of by-passing of the United Nations; 
or alternatively, it could also have been called "a bill to 
serve America’s self-interest in the maintenance of indepen­
dent governments".1^ 2 In his view, the bill did not Initiate 
a new Doctrine: there was nothing new, he said, in aiding 
free peoples or resisting communism; but what was new was
1^ Congressional Record, 93, March 25th, 1947, pp. 2544-6. 
Z?Ibld.. p. 2545.
1' 'Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 344-6; Alexander Smith 
to A. H. Vandenberg, March 17th, 1947, Smith MSS.
1'2Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 347.
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the decision to send peace time military missions to the
Mediterranean, a policy which had previously been confined
17-5to latln America. Yandenberg denied, therefore, that 
the United States Intended to "underwrite the earth". There 
would;-he said, be further situations requiring interven­
tion,-Me Instanced Koreabut United States reaction would 
always be according to the requirements of the particular 
situation. He also expressed the hope that in future they 
would have enough foresight not to react on a crisis basis. ^ 4  
As regards the criticisms made about ignoring the United 
nations, he asked the critics whether they wanted a repetition 
of U.N.R.R.A. in which the United States paid the bulk of 
the costs, but did not have over-all control.1^  In essence, 
Yandenberg seemed to be emphasizing two points: the policy 
was based on self-interest,- the Foreign Relations Committee 
had supported the bill "for the sake of the Stars and Stripes" 
secondly, he emphasized Congress' responsibilities so far as 
backing up the President was concerned; failure to do so 
would "give the green light to aggression everywhere; 'Our
* rj£T
moral authority and leadership would die on the spot".1'
As always, Yandenberg's efforts on behalf of the bill 
were impressive; his continual emphasis on the Importance 
of not surrendering to communist aggression and his care to 
relate the bill to American interest were calculated to se­
cure maximum Republican support. If Turkey fell, he argued.
In his concluding speech, so would Greece, with a probable
!I?Con^ressional Record,
£?Ibld.t p. 3197.1'0TbTcT.. p. 3198.
93, April 8th, 1947, p. 347.
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"chain reaction" from the Dardanelles to China, and westward
to the Atlanticï "If we fail to act, aggression gets the
green light; and the rest of the world, including America,
177gets the red". From the Moscow Conference he was encour­
aged in his stand by John Foster Dulles, who said that his 
efforts had strengthened the American position in western 
Europe: many "who believe our way are now daring to stand 
up for their beliefs". ' At the end of a two week debate, 
the Greek-Turklsh aid bill was duly passed 67-23, with 16
Republicans joining a mixture of left wing Democrats and
179Southern Democrats in opposition. The debate revealed, 
however, a significant degree of unease amongst Republicans. 
Taft in particular Indicated the conditional nature of his 
support: he did not regard it as a commitment' to a similar 
policy elsewhere, nor eventually to Greece and Turkey when 
peace negotiations had been completed; in his view, it was
purely a measure for reconstruction and rehabilitation,
1 ftorather than a new departure. It was indeed the global 
implications of the policy which worried Republican Senators 
most of all. It was, said Senator Wherry, a consistent 
opponent of Administration foreign policy, "a global leap
1 0  4in the dark". Several predicted national bankruptcy at
worst, a return to war time controls at best. Wherry's
colleague from Nebraska, Senator Butler commented that
the bill was"a return to the basic philosophy of the New
Deal - that the way to meet any problem is to spend Govern- 
1 82ment money". He couldn't understand why the United
IZXlbld.. April 22nd, 1947, P. 3773.{IgDulles to A. H. Vandenberg, April 10th, 1947,
;/.^Congressional Record. 93. April 22nd. 1947. pp®°ibiS.rp.'37ff6:—g/Tbld., April 21 st, 1947, p. 3741.
APril 9th, 1947, p. 3238.
Dulles MSS. 
. 3792-3.
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States, unlike Germany and Russia, "manage to discover that
every country they enter is a liability and must be sub- 
183sidized". To Senator Martin from Pennsylvania, who was 
reluctantly supporting the bill, it was important to remember 
that "there is a bottom even to the .American pocket. I hope 
we shall not have to learn it the hard way, as the British 
did."^^ Another unenthusiastic supporter, Cain, Ciaahington), 
felt that the bill had been presented in such a way that it 
could not be rejected, but ". . .some of us resent the
administration's urging us to move so fast into an unknown
185and uncharted and uncertain field". Even those who could 
always be relied upon were critical, possibly for tactical 
reasons. Lodge and Saltonstall of Massachusetts expressed 
the hope that Congress should not be put into another crisis 
situation; whilst Lodge hoped that the United States would
encourage European integration, to reduce the ultimate costs
186to the United States of its European policy. Flanders, 
Cvermont} regarded aid to Turkey as .being "dangerously near 
the border line of provocative military action". ' Senator
Smith of Mew Jersey was still troubled by the apparent by-
188passing of the United Nations. In his diary he recorded 
his reasons for supporting the bill: despite his concerns 
about the United Nations and his worries about military aid 
to Turkey, he felt he had to support the President; in his 
view, it was not a precedent for making further aid, it was
183
184
185186
187
188
Ibid., p. 3239.
Ibid., p. 3225.
Ibid., April 16th, 1947, p. 3484-5.
Ibid.. April 11th, 1947, P. 3336.
Ibid., p. 3340; Ralph E. Flanders to Alexander Smith. 
April 14th, 1947, Smith MSS.
Congressional Record, 93, April 17th, 1947, p. 3590.
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not a policy of imperialism or Pax Americana, but was a 
move within the spirit of the United Rations.189 Tlie iess 
idealistic and more partisan S-tyles Bridges berated the Ad­
ministration for its inconsistency: it was, he said, still
1 QOshipping U.R.R.R.A. supplies behind the Iron Curtain.
Even Vandenberg took care, in response to an enquiry from
Y/herry, to dissociate himself from the development of Ameri-
191can policy in China. Rot for the first time, the debate
revealed that the policy which would maximize Republican
support was one which was both rigidly anti-communist and
limited in financial or other commitments.
Despite Vandenberg's tactical success in getting the
Greek-Turkish aid bill through the Senate, the Republican *
Ihrty was clearly divided over the question. Vandenberg
was less than universally praised for his closeness to the
192Administration. One Ohio Republican went so far as to 
describe him as "the most dangerous force which has ever 
imperiled the existence of the United States".19  ^ same
man felt that if the party followed.Vandenberg and "other 
pro-European Senators" there would be "no Republican party 
by November of 1948".19^ Whilst Vandenberg was incurring 
the hostility of the Rationalists, Dewey kept silent. Joseph 
Alsop described him as having "broken all records for
l89Diary, March 3rd, 14th, 25th, 27th, April 18th, 1947, 
lQnSmlth MSS.Congressional Record. 93, April 16th, 1947, PP. 3470-1; 
Vandenberg and Bridges combined to prevent Congress ap­
propriating funds to complete the pipe-line lend-lease 
shipments, the last of which left the U.S. in early summer; 
Herring, Aid to Russia, p. 273^
InT^on^ress^onal Record« 93, April 16th, 1947, p. 3474.1920'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Saraoff, March 22nd, 
1947, O'laughlin MSS.19^George %. Gugle to John Bricker, March 18th, 1947, copy 
in.in Vorys MSS.
194George L. Gugle to Vorys, March 19th, 1947, Vorys MSS.
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1 95political mumness". ^  The divisions amongst Republicans 
might have been expected to manifest themselves most em­
barrassingly in the House of Representatives, where there 
was nobody of Vandenberg's calibre identified with Adminis­
tration foreign policy. In the event, however, House Re­
publicans gave the bill an easier passage.than had been the 
case with the British Loan in 194-6. Backed by the House 
leadership,which helped to overcome the obstruction of the 
Chairman of the Rules Committee, Leo Allen of Illinois, the 
bill was also supported by John Vorys of Ohio, who emerged 
as the most influential member of the Foreign Affairs Com­
mittee.1^  ^ consistent pre-war anti-interventionist, and 
an opponent of the British Loan the previous year, Vorys' 
changed position was Indicative of the willingness of a 
group of midwestern Republicans (Including Everett Dirksen) 
to support tough anti-communist foreign policies. As he 
explained, to a political associate in Ohio: "There is a 
split in the Ohio delegation in both the House and the 
Senate on this. It is a tough question politically because
it is a tough question from the standpoint of national policy,
197but I find that I cannot line up beside Wallace and Stalin".
To fears as to whether the United States could afford 
the policy being embarked on, and to fears that it might 
lead to war, Vorys argued in debate that if they didn't act 
now, they might as well withdraw to their own border, double 
their military budget, adopt universal military training and
1 ^ Washington Sunday Post. May 11th, 194-7, reprinted in 
Congressional Record. 93, Appendix, p. 2220.
] pj w  York Times. May 3rd, 1947; Westerfield, pp. 104, 224. •97yoryS to William Schneider, May 9th, 1947, Vorys MSS.
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prepare for "the bitter end of World War II, ) in a few
198years". Eventually, he argued, the United States would 
save on defense spending by "a judicious and well-ordered 
plan of assisting in the rebuilding of the economy and the 
defense of the world. I believe this will bring peace 
nearer; at worst, it will make our defense¿heaper."1^
As to whether it would bring war, he preferred, he said, to 
rely in this matter "on the judgement of General Marshall 
rather than that of General Bender".20^ The implications 
of the bill were clear to Vorys: it meant, he said, that 
the United States was not going to withdraw from Europe, 
they were going to stay and rebuild it. Vorys' support 
of the bill appeared to go further than fellow Ohioan Taft's 
support in the Senate. Rather than a continuation of former 
policy, he saw it as the beginning of something new. He 
was also unimpressed with those who argued that past mistakes 
by the Administration were hardly a basis for present confi­
dence:
"It will not do much good to debate now the Hew 
Deal policy of appeasement that is partly responsible 
for this. It was not a bipartisan policy. Re­
publicans generally opposed it. We were for a 
policy of firmness with Russia. How that our 
policy of firmness is at last being followed, we 
Republicans should back it up.
1^ Congressional Record. 93, May 6th, 1947, P. 4623.
199ibld., P. 4624; like most House Republicans, Vorys was 
opposed to universal military training; the only con­
ceivable war he saw as an "A bomb war" with Russia, in 
which the U.S. would have no need of a costly mass 
.army; Vorys to E. W. Dillon, March 29th, 1947, Vorys MSS.
2U0Bender was a fellow Ohio Congressman opposed to the bill. 
Congressional Record, 93. May 6th, p. 4623.201 Ib id .
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"The Administration made a lot of mistakes in 
launching this program. Republicans should 
have been consulted earlier. Paul Porter, the 
most thoroughly repudiated public official in 
America, should not have headed the mission to 
Greece. The United Nations should have been 
informed earlier. ¥e should never have been told 
that March 31 was the deadline.
"So what? All of this is spilled milk - very 
sour spilled milk. If this bill is voted down 
it will be taken the world over, not as a vote 
of protest against the administration's past 
mistakes, but as a vote against the new policy 202 
of firmness backed with action instead of words."
On the 9th May the bill passed the House by 287 to 
107, with Republicans divided 127 to 9b.^ 3  The vote con­
firmed the importance of the group of former anti-interven­
tionists, whose foreign policy ideas were rooted in tradi­
tionalism, but who were prepared to support a hard-headed, 
anti-communist, interventionist foreign policy. Among the 
group lias Dirksen of Illinois who, contrary to Taft's posi­
tion in the Senate,gave as one of the prime reasons for
204support, the Soviet interest in Middle Eastern oil. Por 
the most part, however, Republican members of the House 
were very hesitant about committing the United States on a 
road which might lead to war; few were prepared to accept 
that the securing of Middle Eastern oil was a vital interest 
of the United States. An incisive analysis of the situation 
was made in an open letter to President Truman by Rep. Case 
of South Dakota, who had presided over the debate as chair­
man of the Committee of the Whole House. In his letter he
g^Ibld.. p. 4624.
gP^ibid.. May 9th, 1947, p. 4975.
204Tbid.. May 6th, 1947, p. 4633.
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emphasized that the bill should not be seen as a commitment 
to war. Support, he said, had been very reluctant: the 
House had been dealing with a fait accompli. He estimated 
that at least 75 members, himself included, had refrained 
from opposing simply because they had not wished to pull 
the rug from under the President and Secretary Marshall in 
positions they had taken at the Moscow Conference. At the 
same time, he warned that Congress was weary of "government 
by crisis", the aid to Greece and Turkey was merely a "stop­
gap", some way had to be found to let the nations of the 
world, live and let live.2^5
Case’s analysis was an accurate reflection of a strong 
Republican ground swell against the way in which aid to 
Greece and Turkey had been presented by the Administration.
It seems clear that rather than strengthening bipartisanship, 
the Truman Doctrine had in fact given the Administration 
the domestic political initiative. By the end of April,
Arthur Vandenberg had apparently come to see it as pure 
expediency rather than marking a real change in Administration
2Qgattitudes towards the Soviet Union on a global basis.
By the summer, John Poster Dulles, despite his early support 
to Vandenberg, had come to re-evaluate the whole episode:
"I realize that once it was formulated," he wrote to Vanden­
berg, "it would have been a disaster had Congress repudiated
it, but I have never been very keen about it, and I think it
207needs considerable over-hauling to be workable". Harold
2°5prancls Case to Harry S. Truman, May 10th, 194-7, O.F. 426, 
Truman MSS. . _, '
206See page%28above.
20?Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, July 21st, 1947, Dulles MSS.
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Stassen, regarded as the Internationalist contender for the 
1948 nomination, also had his doubts, publicly condemning 
it as "negative" and warning against wasteand military in­
volvement.20® Certainly the way in which Vandenberg had 
manoeuvred, or been manoeuvred into getting, Congress to 
accept the Greek-Turklsh aid had done nothing for his pop­
ularity amongst his colleagues in Congress. In both Senate 
and House, resentment was expressed at the implication that 
Congress had the duty to go along with the President. Even 
regular supporters of bipartisan foreign policy were dis­
turbed at the way in which the Truman Doctrine had been put 
to the Republicans; Vandenberg himself often invoked in 
his defense the fact that by the time Congress was consulted 
it had, as in the case of the Greek-Turkish bill, no real 
choice.2°9 The comment of one Representative from Michigan, 
although always to be found in the opposition ranks on foreign 
policy, was cutting: "If this Congress has reached the con­
clusion that it must follow and uphold every thought of the 
Chief Executive, of the Secretary of State, or, if you please, 
of a bipartisan group of internationalists in the other 
body, then the House might Just as well adjourn, or perhaps 
resign, go home, and save the taxpayers' money". In July, 
Senator Malone of Nevada charged that the U. S. did not have 
a bipartisan foreign policy: "what we do have is a few Re­
publicans who vote with the Democrats for the disconnected
York Times, May 6th, 1947.
20°Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 339, 342, 351. For report 
of criticisms of Vandenberg, O'laughlin to Herbert Hoover, 
May 29th, 1947, O'Laighlin MSS. .
21 Congressional Record. 93, May 9th, 1947, p. 4920.
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and dangerous emergency decisions of the administrations. . ,nc 
He also charged that the Administration was deliberately 
fostering fear of communism to build "an international WPA" 
whilst still allowing oil refining equipment to be shipped 
to the Soviet Union. 212
Rumours of the proposed long term programme to bring 
about European reconstruction did not help matters. At the 
end of March, the left wing Democrat, Taylor of Idaho, taunted 
Republicans about the reports of a new long term aid pro­
gramme, forecast . by an American magazine article: ". . . 
they have got it down to the point where the poor Republi­
cans cannot vote their convictions for fear of being called 
Communists. We are in the same boat together: the Red 
hunt has got us all".21^ Not surprisingly, Vandenberg 
whilst struggling over a foreign relief bill in May, was 
honifled to read an article by James Reston on a proposed 
five year aid programme for European reconstruction:
. .either you are wrong or this government is out of its 
mind. Any plan of that size is out of the question."21^
By May, then, Yandenberg was once more disillusioned 
with the Administration. To many Republicans he seemed little 
more than an Administration stooge, whilst as a result of 
the Administration’s actions in March and April- he felt, 
not unreasonably, that he was being asked to get costly mea­
sures through Congress whilst not being put fully in the
2 1llbid., Appendix, p. 4138.
2* 2 Ibid.
213ibid., March 31st, 1947, p. 2867.21^Report of telephone conversation, quoted in Preeland, p.181.
21 Spicture. J At the same time, however, the debates in 
Congress at the inauguration of containment revealed his 
indispensability to the Administration. The plans being 
formulated could not ultimately be passed without 11s coop­
eration. If the State Department convinced themselves that 
he would easily be persuaded, the fact is that his own con­
victions, and the political situation which made him indis­
pensable, would dictate the need ibr concessions to his view- 
21 5point. Vandenberg and the Congressional Republicans were 
in 19^7 no more prepared than in 1944- to give assent to what 
they regarded as an "international if. P. A.", "lie 
have got to stay strong at home, not only for our own sake 
but for the sake of world peace and security," wrote John- 
Vorys, one of the newer Republican converts to the bipartisan 
foreign policy, "but I believe that reconstruction can be 
good business for the United States if we go at it the 
right way." ' In 194-7 no Republican leader could afford 
to ignore the tenets of a "Strong America"; the emerging 
American policy towards Europe would have to be seen to be 
related to American self-interest as well as to be. explicitly 
anti-communist in order to gain Republican support.
^  Washington Sunday Post, May 11th, 194-7, reprinted in 
Congressional Record, 93, Appendix, p. 2220; Alsop to 
,Martin Sommers, May 31st, 1947, Alsop-MSS,21hpor the State Department view of Vandenberg as lacking in 
creativity, but open to reasoned persuasion, see Joseph 
M. Jones, p. 124.
21?Vorys to John V. Miller, June 4th, 1947, Vorys- MSS.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Towards a "Long Range" European Policy
In their dealings with American foreign policy initiatives 
up to 1946, Republican leaders were largely responding to 
developments formulated outside the Republican Earty. The 
main content of Republican policy until that time consisted 
of the domestic restraints hitherto referred to as a "Strong 
America", and a firm anti-communism. In the previous chap­
ter, it was shown how Republicans were manoeuvred into accep­
tance of the Greek-Turkish aid programme by invocation of 
the anti-communist crusade to counter their strong "economy" 
sentiment. Nevertheless, although the aid to Greece and 
Turkey was put in the context of an anti-communist crusade, 
Republican leaders were still not confident about the Admin­
istration's handling of foreign policy; in particular, they 
disliked the expediency and crisis tactics. Thus although 
the Truman Doctrine has frequently been portrayed as the be­
ginning of a new, constructive era in American foreign re­
lations, to Republicans it also seemed to be one of a long 
line of ad_ hoc expediencies produced by an administration 
lacking both in philosophy and faith in the American system.
From 1947 Republican leaders were increasingly to press 
for policy to be put on a non-crisis basis, and for a coherent, 
consistent global policy to be formulated. Republican leaders 
saw the establishment of such a policy as essential for the 
preservation of "liberty" in the United States; liberalism 
could not flourish in a continual state of emergency, and 
neither American institutions nor the economy could long
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survive such a situation. The assumption that the objectives 
and capabilities of the United States would be carefully eval­
uated and balanced was implicit in the demand for a settled po 
licy. Hot only was this beneficial at home, but as Vandenberg 
often argued, it let the rest of the world know where the 
United States stood; as he saw it, the alternative was 
continuous misunderstandings and bitterness among allies, 
and possible miscalculation by potential enemies. The de­
mand for a settled foreign policy, anticipating rather than 
reacting to crises, pre-dated the Greek-Turkish aid programme, 
and it particularly began to come to the fore in the after- 
math of the 194-6 elections. After their victory, Republican 
leaders were determined to try to influence Administration 
policy rather than to be passive collaborators; the likeli­
hood of a Republican victory in 1948, and the failure of 
Hew Real diplomacy to bring about a peace over a year after 
the war, seemed ample justification for their efforts.
The German Question
By the end of 1946 the most crucial question in American 
foreign policy was the nature of the European settlement to 
be arrived at following the inability of the Big Powers to 
produce agreement at the Foreign Ministers’ Meetings and 
Peace Conference in 1946. The German settlement, which was 
due to be discussed at the meeting in Moscow in March, 1947» 
was central to the structure of peace. The most intractable 
of the problems left over by World War II, the question of 
the post-war status of Germany had been complicated by the 
war-time decision to press for unconditional surrender, and 
by the attempt at joint occupation. The major occupying
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powers each approached the German settlement in terms of 
their own perceived national interests. For France and the 
Soviet Union, in particular, the German settlement was seen: 
as vital to their security, whilst the Soviet Union had an 
additional interest in securing reparations to help pay for 
its own post-war reconstruction. For the United States, a , 
series of constraints hedged German policy: a) Germany must 
not in the long run be an economic burden on the United 
States; b) long term military occupation, on a major scale 
was ideologically and economically unthinkable; c) Germany 
must not be allowed to come within the Soviet sphere of 
economic and political influence. The still considerable 
fear of and revulsion for Nazi Germany, and the consequent 
determination not to allow Germany to benefit from another 
quarrel among the victors of war,was an additional constraint, 
which is likely to be overlooked as the period recedes from 
memory. There was, in short, still a disposition to try and 
solve the problem of Germany in cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, however hopeless such a task might seem in retrospect. 
The not unexpected resurgence of political conservatism in 
the United States, of which the 194-6 elections seemed a sure 
portent,• made this task more complicated.
For .-Republican leaders, who had never had a commitment 
to. the alliance with the Soviet Union, the re-evaluation of 
German policy proved less difficult than for many of their
1This analysis of the German question is based to a large 
extent on the following: Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (New 
York: Oxford,University Press, 1970); Joyce and Gabriel 
Kolko, The limits of Powter: The World and United States 
Foreign Policy. 1 9^-1 94-4 ' filew York: 'Harper^ 1$72); Herbert 
Peis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Co Id War 19-45-50 
(liew York: Norton, 1 970J.
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political opponents. At the same time, it is not irrelevant 
to note a basic sympathy with Germany on the part of certain 
Republican leaders in the pre-war years. John Poster Dulles’ 
lack of outright opposition to Hitler, which in 1944 in par­
ticular was to lead to allegations that he was pro-Nazi, is 
well established. In 1935, apparently confronted with a re­
volt by his law partners, who refused to go on doing business 
with German firms on account of persecution of the Jews, 
Dulles relented in tears, protesting that the firm’s German 
business was profitable.^ In his intellectual formulations, 
Dulles sought in the late 1930's to find ways of reconciling 
the demands of dynamic nations such as Germany with the need 
to maintain peace. In 1940, with his brother, he wrote 
that the aggressive policies of the Axis powers "can doubt­
less be explained. . .in terms of errors and injustices of 
the past and the inherent vices of excessive nationalism.
But their present objectives seem to go far beyond anything 
necessary to redress those errors and to be calculated to 
Impose upon others, in even greater degree, the same injus-
-ztices of which they themselves complained."^ Even, however, 
in the dark days of 1940, whilst advocating moral and eco­
nomic influence to be exerted "with a view to checking the 
super-dynamic tendencies which are now the characteristics 
of certain countries" the Dulles brothers were not prepared 
to commit themselves to the restoration of the European 
status quo; some way had to be found, perhaps through federal
2Hoopes, p. 47.^John Foster Dulles and Allen ¥. Dulles, "Statement of an
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY," September 6th, 1940, p. 9, Dulles
MSS (Supplement). -
principles, to absorb the energies of dynamic nations.
Thomas Dewey in later years provided a down to earth summary 
of Dulles' views at that time: "He felt that the Germans 
were the strong, aggressive force in Europe. He thought,
I think, that Hitler was a passing phenomenon who would 
disappear and was reflecting a basic economic problem - - 
which is certainly going on now and will go on through his­
tory. There will be fat and happy people, and there will 
be lean and hungry people. His thesis was that the fat and 
happy should gracefully yield to avoid war and let the lean 
and hungry have a little better place in the sun. In due 
course the lean and hungry people would become fat and happy, 
so that this process of peaceful change would be the solu­
tion. The full horror of Hitler had not yet dawned on the 
world, but it was becoming pretty clear. "•* Dulles' views
on Germany at this stage were not far different from Herbert 
Hoover's. In the war-time book he wrote with Hugh Gibson, 
Hoover had discounted any notion of the division of Germany, 
and appeared to blame the situation resulting in World War
II largely on what he regarded as selfish and unreasonable 
French demands. For Hoover more than for Dulles perhaps, 
a wreak Germany was never, even at the height of war-time 
anti-German sentiment, seen as a desirable path to peace.^
During the war, detached and unemotional attitudes 
towards Germany were, like criticism of the Soviet Union,
¿Ibid.
-’Transcript, interview with Thomas E. Dewey, p. 6, Dulles 
(Oral).
°Eoover and Gibson, p. 316; note also J. Reuben Clark to 
Hoover, January 15th, 1943; "I am not nearly so much con­
cerned about Germany, for I think that if she had not, over 
the years since the Versailles Treaty, been so grossly mis­
handled,' we need not have had this war." Hoover MSS.
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regarded as the trade mark of the "Isolationist”. In 1944, 
for example, Sumner Welles outlined a German plan to prepare 
for a third war by a process of "indirect complicity", 
enabling it to gain control of Europe and much of the rest 
of the world politically and economically through using na­
tionals of other countries: "The principal danger is that 
after the present war the people of the democracies, and 
particularly of the United States, will wish once more, as 
in 1920, to plunge themselves into the oblivion of ’normalcy*. 
We will be Inclined to accept at its face value the propaganda 
which will once more emanate from German sources and, un­
fortunately, from many wholly sincere and patriotic sources 
susceptible to the Influence of German propaganda. The 
very nature of the German plan will, in peace times, seem 
fantastic.'" Republican leaders could not afford, in the 
v^r-time climate to be seen as pro-German, or worse, as 
Dulles >ras accused during the 1944 campaign, of being pro- 
Eazi. So, in August, 1944, New York Republican James Wads- 
Yrorth Yearned Dewey of an intelligence report he had read 
indicating that the Germans hoped to inflence the Republi­
can? so as to embarrass relations with Britain and the 
Soviet Union. "It might be deduced from that," replied 
Dewey, "that the Ih-zis are expecting to go under ground 
when they lose the Yrar and come out again ten and fifteen
Qyears from now."
The question of post-war occupation also made Germany 
a very sensitive political issue for Republicans by 1944.
^Sumner Vie lies, The Time for Decision . (London: Hamish 
„Hamilton, 1944), p. 266.
“Thomas E. Dewey to Wadsworth, August 23rd, 1944, Wadsworth 
MSS.
351
The 194-4- Platform,whilst committing the Republican Party 
to total victory and to keeping the Axis lmpo.tent, also 
expressed the determination to being all the armed forces, 
other than those who volunteered for further overseas duty, 
home at the 'earliest possible time after the "cessation 
of hostilities".9 The pressures for a return to "■normalcy" 
■were, in addition to scepticism about working with the Soviet 
Union, an obstacle to the complete embrace of Administration 
policy towards Germany as it developed. During the 194-4 
campaign, Dewey appeared reluctant to spell out Republican 
policy on the German question. On one occasion, he said, 
it would depend on when Germany surrendered.10 On another, 
under Dulles' guidance, he had talked of a policing of 
Germany by European countries such as France, the Low Coun­
tries and Poland.11 Finally, influenced by the ideas of 
Jean Monnet, Dewey and Dulles suggested that the Ruhr should 
be internationalized.12 Clarifying his views still further 
during the campaign, Dewey suggested that German raw materials
would form part of a programme of rehabilitation and eco-
1 3nomlc integration of the European continent. Privately, 
however, Dulles seemed to be prepared to contemplate consider­
able dismemberment of Germany as a prelude to European federa-
when
tion. In an unpublished memorandum he noted that/the GermanA
is assimilated into other societies,he makes a good citizen." 
On this premise he constructed a tentative plan: "Let us
^Porter and Johnson, p. 407.
1 °Uew York Times t June 30th, 1944.
111bid.. August 20th, 1944.
12Ibid.. August 21st, 1944; Chicago Tribune. June 7th, 1944; 
Koopes, pp. 67-8.
1 ^ Eew York Times, September 9th, 1944.
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then draw life of the Germans into surrounding countries, 
leaving only a nucleus of Prussia. Let the Rhineland be 
drawn into Prance, South Germany into Austria, Eastern 
Germany into Poland. Then let us encourage a European fed­
eration of States that will ally itself against the rise
14of the war spirit in the Prussians to police them".
In so far as there was anything resembling a coherent 
Republican attitude to post-war Germany by 1944, it was one 
which was constrained by the need to convince the rank; and 
file that it would not lead to permanent policing by the United 
States. Part of Dewey's campaign strategy was to claim that 
the New Deal wished to keep people in the army because it 
was either unable or unwilling to provide jobs for them in 
private enterprise. This strategy led the New York Times 
to comment that he appeared to under-estimate the length of 
job that would be involved in occupation of both Germany 
and J a p a n . T h e  vague ideas developed by Dulles were 
compatible with the domestic constraint, as well as logical 
developments of his own; position on international affairs: 
not having been prepared to fight before Pearl Harbor because 
he felt the United States would go in for the wrong reasons, 
Dulles had at the same time urged the need for a reform of 
the European state system, for the extension of the Federal 
principle to areas outside the Americas, and to the integration 
of "hungry" peoples such as the Germans into the liberal 
western world. Dulles' war-time activities with the Commission 
on a Just and Durable Peace had not taken him substantially 
beyond this position, certainly in so far as United States
^Memorandum dictated in Atlantic City, November 1944, Dulles 
_M3S,
'^September 8th, 1944.
353
military commitments on the European continent were concerned.
Apart from Vandenberg's speech of January, 1945, copies 
of which Roosevelt had taken to Yalta, there was no major 
initiative on German policy by Republican leaders and no 
real cooperation with the Administration. The question of 
Germany was a matter for Head of State meetings at Yalta and 
Potsdam, and a question for the military. Requiring no 
legislation, German policy, although of fundamental impor­
tance, was largely an Executive matter. The Rationalists 
in particular were frequently critical of what they per­
ceived as German policy in 1945-6, and especially of the
16Morgenthau Plan, which Dewey had publicly attacked in 1944. 
Publicly, however, criticism of the Morgenthau Plan and 
German policy did not really emerge until after the war, and 
especially when relations with the Soviet Union began to 
cool. After Yalta, for example, far more attention was 
given to Poland than to the implications of the German policy 
tentatively agreed on. Herbert Hoover, however, was dis­
turbed bywhat he saw as the disastrous consequences of the 
policy: "The folks here who want more punishment of the 
civil population of Germany seem to overlook that they have 
already received a punishment that will last for 40 years.
And one of the sardonic things is that with their present 
set up we will probably be feeding them for the next two
1^During the 1944 campaign Dewey blamed the Morgenthau Plan 
for prolonging the war, Hew York Times. November 5th, 1944; 
in the campaign he lambasted Roosevelt for taking to Quebec 
not the Secs of State or ¥ar, but the Secretary of the 
Treasury, "whose qualifications as an expert on military 
and international affairs are still a closely guarded 
military secret." Ibid.. October 18th, 1944.
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In October he spokeor three years out of charity."1^
out against the Mcrgenthau Plan: "Measures which reduce the
economic life of coming generations to the low levels of an
agricultural state are neither justice nor good policy. . .
There is no such thing as a 'hard peace' or a 'soft peace'.
It must be a just peace if we are to restore justice in
18the world. And without justice there is no peace."
Reports of conditions in Germany in late 194-5 and early 
1946 angered some, largely Republican Senators, especially 
Langer (N. Dak.),.Wherry (Neb.), Eawkes (N.J.), and Ship- 
stead (Minn.), all of whom were consistent opponents of Ad- 
ministration foreign policy.  ^ Some Senators were particularly 
upset by a statement by the President that he could feel 
no real sympathy for those who had caused so much death, 
destruction and starvation themselves. Commented Senator 
Hawkes: ". . .there are millions of people in Germany who
had no more to do with what Hitler did than I have had to 
do with what the New Deal has done in the United States of 
America". In February, Governor Green of Illinois, a 
barometer of Midwestern Republicanism, indicted the policy 
of "starvation" in Germany as being likely to "breed in the 
hearts of its victims a smoldering hate against us. . . 
which may force us to maintain permanent armies of occupa­
tion". 21 In May, Alf Landon spoke of the need to let Germany
22operate as an economically self-supporting nation. In
]lHoover to William F. Knowland, June 12th, 194-5,
1 ^ New York Times, October 14-th, 194-5. 
^ Congressional Record, 92, January 29th, 194-6, pp 
-ibid., Appendix, p. 509.
2?Ibid.. p. 512.Ibid.. Appendix, p. 927.
Hoover MSS. 
. 512, 516;
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August Herbert Hoover warned that "dismemberment of the
German state and the attempt to reduce the German people to
a level of perpetual poverty will some day break into another
23world explosion. . ."
Whilst criticism of policy towards Germany was rife, 
the Administration was in fact moving towards a change. In 
July, at Paris, Secretary Byrnes offered to merge the Ameri­
can zone of occupation with any other power's zone, which 
was a move to lead to merger with the British zone in De­
cember. In a speech at Suttgart in September, where he 
was accompanied by Vandenberg and Connally, he made a number 
of commitments to a revitalized Germany: German control of 
the Ruhr and the Rhineland, opposition to reparations from 
current production, and a belief that Germany must be allowed 
to export goods to attain self-sufficiency. Designed to 
counter Soviet efforts to woo the Germans, the Byrnes speech 
' also encouraged Robert Taft who wrote-to•Vandenberg:
"It looks as if he was turning definitely against the pre-
24existing policies which I have criticized". For his part, 
Vandenberg, after what was his only post-war trip to Germany, 
concluded that the effect of the war on Germany was "past 
comprehension. There certainly won't be any 'German menace' 
again in my life time."2  ^ For Republicans, the re-evaluation 
of German policy came naturally: as naturally as the changed 
state of relations with the Soviet Union. Both the antl-
22Uew York Times, May 5th, 1946.
2?Ibid., August,13th, 1946.
24Robert A. Taft to Vandenberg, October 20th, 1946, Vandenberg 
o_M3S.
25vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 299.
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communist crusade, which Republicans tended to regard as their 
own mission, as well as the desire to restore the United 
States to domestic "normalcy" required such a re-evaluation. 
The election of the Republican Congress in 1946, with its 
commitment to economy, and its interest in exposing what 
it regarded as past errors, inevitably raised questions about 
the German occupation, and therefore, about United States 
European policy. Republican leaders, as it became clear, 
were not content simply to endorse Administration policies 
without consultation and participation, especially in view 
of the costs of continued European occupation and relief.
Dulles and Hoover: European Unity and a "Separate Peace"
Apart from Vandenberg, the most Important Republicans 
in terms of the development of foreign policy in 1947 were 
John Poster Dulles and Herbert Hoover. Dulles still had 
no official position, other than his advisory role with 
Dewey; but since 1944, his position had been greatly streng­
thened by the development of a close friendship with Van­
denberg. Herbert Hoover owed his importance to his repu­
tation as an expert on matters of foreign relief, a view of 
his capacities which was especially strong amongst Republican 
members of the House of Representatives.
In the past, Dulles and Hoover had, as previously argued, 
shared many common views on American foreign policy. Both
had always been, and remained, concerned about the dangers
2oof over-expenditure and military over-commitment. But in 2
2^Por confirmation of this interpretation of Dulles' position beyond the immediate post-war period, see Guhin, pp. 107-8, 
140-2.
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so far as a difference existed between them in their in­
tellectual formulations of policy, it stemmed from Dulles' 
sense of mission, which became a central characteristic of 
his foreign policy rhetoric in the 1940's. Hoover had been 
convinced since his World War I experience that the countries 
of Europe were virtually past praying for.2^ Dulles tended 
by contrast to emphasize the beneficial aspects of world 
leadership, and to give less emphasis than Hoover to the 
difficulties overseas which stood in the way of the attain­
ment of American alms. Dulles in fact claimed even to wel­
come the Soviet challenge, based on his reading of Toynbee's 
theory of "challenge and response". Through its response 
to the Soviet challenge, he felt the United States could 
rediscover its own purpose, and could invigorate western 
civilisation. ° In the 1950's he was to come to fear the 
domestic consequences of a relaxation of tension with the 
Soviet Union, fearing that in such circumstances the United 
States would lose its newly rediscovered creative belief in 
Itself.2^
The difference between Hoover and Dulles was reflected 
in their approaches to the German question. For whereas 
Hoover appeared to approach the problem from the standpoint 
of reduction of American expenditure, Dulles, although not 
Insensitive to "economy" arguments, was more concerned to
2^Hoover, Memoirs I: 473-9; still later, he was to write 
that "enumeration of the 'points' which the President 
lost at Ihris Is of little importance to history except 
as a demonstration of the hostility of Old World concepts 
to Hew World Ideals." Herbert Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow 
^ Wilson (Hew York: McGraw Hill, 1958), p. 263”
^°Dulles to Edward C. Carter, January 22nd, 1947; Dulles to __Joseph Barnes, January 31st, 1947, Dulles MSS.
29GUhin, pp.124-8, 151-3.
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see the German question as part of a constructive, long­
term European settlement. Unlike Hoover and the midwes- 
tern Republicans, who had always regarded the Soviet Union 
as a potentially worse enemy than Germany, and who had less 
faith in America's ability to bring about a liberal demo­
cratic Europe, Dulles seemed unwilling to accept the simple 
solution of the restoration of a strong Germany. By early 
1947, Dulles had begun to clarify his views on American 
policy in Europe; and increasingly, he was coming to talk 
of the German problem in terms of Europe as a whole. In 
part he and Dewey had used this approach in 1944, partly 
under the influence of Jean Monnet. With the development 
of the post-war rift with the Soviet Union, Dulles had 
become concerned that the talk of a restoration of a strong 
Germary might push France into the Soviet Union bloc. The 
solution, the integration of Germany into a united Europe, 
was a logical development from Dulles' assumptions: a 
united Europe, based on the principle of Federalism, which 
he regarded with almost reverence, would not be the restora­
tion of the old Europe which he had always opposed; it 
would safeguard "freedom" in western Europe, providing 
Americans with the rights to trade, travel and so on, which 
he saw as fundamental alms of United States policy; it 
would finally in the long run produce a Europe which could 
support itself, and which therefore would not be a burden 
on the United States. In short, through its sense of mission, 
the United States would also be able to serve the paramount 
needs of a "Strong America".
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Apart from the problem of how to put the grand plan into 
operation, which required access to the Administration,
Dulles still was unclear on matters of detail. To a friend 
he wrote in September, 1946, of his difficulties which needed 
sorting out. These included such questions as whether Eas­
tern Europe be excluded, should England be included, what 
sort of political unity, and questions of free trade,
immigration and common currency. Also in his list was the
■30question of whether Germany would have to be split up.
On January 17th, 1947, Dulles’ celebrated address to the 
National Publishers Association, delivered after consulta­
tion with Dewey and Vandenberg, was clearly aa effort both 
to develop a distinctive Republican solution to the problem 
of Europe, and to exert direct influence on the Administra­
tion before the forthcoming Moscow Conference. In the care­
fully planned press build up before the speech, Dulles 
briefed Alsop and other journalists in the letter sending
them advance copies, that the speech "sets forth what I
31think I can fairly call the Republican position". The 
actual speech called for the development of creative leader­
ship by the United States, following the success achieved 
in 1946 through developing policies of relief for the needy 
and opposition to Soviet expansion. German policy must now 
be guided by considerations of the economic unity of Europe 
rather than "the Potsdam dictum" of single German economic
^Dulles to Ferdinand Mayer, September 24th, 1946, Dulles MSS. 
^'Dulles to Joseph W. A.].sop, January 15th, 1947, Dulles MSS.
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unit y. Alth ough accepting the importance of German eco­
nomic union, disrupted by the Joint occupation, which had 
separated industrial areas from agricultural areas, Dulles 
argued that European unity was more important. His solution 
was simple but calculating. Aware of European fears of 
Germany less than two years after the war, he took care to 
say that the new Europe must not lead to German dominance.
At the same time, he described "pastoralizatlon", i.e., the 
de-industrialization of Germany, as impracticable; apart 
from other considerations, it would put an increased burden 
on the United States if the German economy was held down.
A long-term occupation of Germany he also ruled out.
What Dulles had done in effect was to guard in advance 
against critics who accused him of simply wanting to restore 
Germany to its pre-war dominance in order to build a bloc 
against the Soviet Union. In the United States Senator Pepper 
made this charge, seeing it as part of a conscious Republican 
attempt to reverse war-time "international cooperation’* and 
to return to a post-World War I policy of rebuilding Ger­
many. 33 izvestla printed an. analysis by a Soviet historian 
suggesting that the speech indicated a determination by the 
United States and Britain to use their zones as the basis 
of an anti-Russian coalition.^ Dulles himself hastened to
32Address to National Publishers Association, January 17th, 
1947, Dulles MSS. On January 11th, Vandenberg had called 
for economic unification of Germany and the offer of even­
tual decentralized political autonomy to give the Germans 
hope for the future: this revealed a different emphasis 
from Dulles' speech, of which the latter must have been 
aware and which probably accounts for the mention of the 
importance, albeit secondary, of German economic unity.
For Vandenberg speech, see New York Times, January 12th,1947. 
55congresslonal Record, 9 3, February 5th, 19^7, p. 789.
34New York Times. February 17th, 194-7; Pravda also attacked 
Vandenberg and Dulles for their speeches of January 11th 
and 17th, respectively; New York Times, January 27th, 194-7.
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correct the notion that he saw European unity as a bloc 
against Russia: " . . .  the goal should be increased unity 
in all of Europe and only if the Soviet Union is unwilling 
to play ball with its zone in Eastern Europe should we seek 
a unification limited to Western Europe", he wrote.^5 if 
Dulles' proposal was not anti-Soviet in the narrow sense, 
its implications certainly cut across apparent Soviet per­
ceptions of their interests in Europe: the integration of 
the German industrial machine into western Europe could not 
help but weaken Soviet influence on the continent; by im­
plication it meant no reparations for the Soviet Union,as 
well as a powerful economic pull to counter Russian force 
in eastern Europe. Walter Lippmann, who warmly supported 
the proposal, Interpreted it as likely to create a dilemma 
for indigenous communists. Opposition to European integra­
tion would be against national interests, and if in response 
to Moscow they took this line, they would be weakened. At 
the same time, it was not a narrowly anti-Soviet policy: 
it would only become a western bloc if the Soviet Union 
compelled Poland and Czechoslovakia to remain outside the 
United Europe. ^
The policy then which Dulles outlined in January, 1947, 
was a masterly political statement, in the larger sense of 
the word. Internationally it contrived to hold out hope to 
all Europe, including even Germany, without alienating Prance. 
It could be defended against the charge of being anti-Soviet.
^Dulles to Maynard Stitt, February 4th, 1947; Dulles to 
-Geoffrey Ihrsons, February 6th, 1947, Dulles MSS.
^Washington Post, January 21st, 1947» reprinted in Congres- slOflal6RgTOi,U7’ $3. Appehdix, f>. 3142. ---°---
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Yet, as Dulles claimed to Secretary Marshall, it could only 
strengthen the American hand In Its negotiations with the 
Soviet Union, since it showed that the latter could no longer 
count on being able to veto the development of policy in 
Europe. In short, the virtue of the programme was that 
it "could be carried out without the participation of the 
Soviet Union" if theneed arose.^ Domestically, the speech 
capitalized on the Republican victory of 1946, and streng­
thened Dulles’ claims as a Republican spokesman whom the
38Administration could hardly ignore. The statement was 
also, along with his Chicago speech of February 10th, re­
concilable with Republican concerns about over extension: 
Dulles still saw America*s role largely in terms of moral 
credit and economic power, plus the immediate presence of 
its occupied forces; in the not too distant future it held 
out the hope of creating a liberal Europe, strong enough for 
American withdrawal. Yet, whilst playing down the Ameri­
can role in European unity, partly perhaps out of sensitivity 
to external attacks of "imperialism", to Secretary of State
^Memorandum, "Re: Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in 
• Moscow", February 26th, 194-7, P. 3, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
3°The Soviet attacks made it difficult for the Administration 
to ignore him; to have left him behind in the circumstances 
would have indicated division in the United States. Drew 
Middleton wrote in the New York Times that Dulles’ invita­
tion symbolized the division between the U.S.and U.S.S.R. 
over Germany, ibid., February 27th, 1947; Senator Smith 
wrote, "I have felt right along that. . .it was vitally 
essential that you should go, especially because of the 
courageous position you have taken with regard to the 
Russian situation." Alexander Smith to John Foster Dulles, 
February 27th, 194-7, Smith MSS.} To his wife, on arrival, 
Dulles wrote that he was the second to emerge from the 
plane: "apparently my coming second was noted -in view of 
the attacks here - which was what I hoped." John Foster 
Dulles to Janet Avery Dulles, March 10th, 1947, Janet 
Avery Dulles MSS.
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Marshall, Dulles apparently expressed the view that Europe 
was "of vital importance to us; that we had fought two wars 
to keep political freedom alive in that area, and that in 
essence we would have lost those wars if it fell tinder a 
Soviet type of dictatorship which suppressed human liberty.-^ 
Assuming that Dulles’ choice of words was considered, Dulles' 
description of Europe as of vital importance to the United 
States marked a definite development of his foreign policy.
In Chicago earlier in February he had put it rather differ­
ently, saying that whilst European unity "depends primarily 
on the peoples of the Continent themselves,. . .the United 
States has there both moral rights, bought with the blood 
of two wars, and political power".
While Dulles was putting forward his dynamic view of 
American policy toward Europe, Herbert Hoover was also being 
brought into the picture. The idea of inviting Hoover to 
visit Germany originated with General Lucius D. Clay, the 
Deputy U. S. Military Governor in Germany.^1 The invitation 
was designed to persuade Congressional Republicans of the 
necessity of appropriating funds for the continued occupa- 
tion. Hoover, however, was not prepared to be used so 
obviously, and demanded that the invitation should come 
from the President himself, and also that his enquiry should 
not be merely into the nature of the food shortages, but 
into the political causes. Hoover's conditions therefore
^Memorandum, "Re; Council of Foreign Ministers' Meeting in 
¿,0Moscow", February 26th, 194-7, p. 2, Dulles MSS (Supplement). 
. New York Times, February 11th, 194-7.
4^  Ibid., January 23rd, 194-7.
^2Ibid.. January 24-th, 194-7.
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would open up his enquiry into matters such as the level 
of industry, the problem of whether Germany should be allowed 
to export, and the question of economic unification. All 
of these were, as the Secretary of War noted, matters for 
the State Department, which were soon to form the agenda 
for the Moscow Conference.^ Against the domestic political 
background, the Administration had no real option but to 
accede to Hoover's conditions. To the President, Hoover 
made it clear that his proposed mission would not be a sim­
ple reporting job, he would view its function as determining 
ways in which the economic burdens on the United States 
could be reduced: "It will come as a great shock to our 
people that the American taxpayer for a second year must 
expend huge sums to provide food for the enemy peoples. 
Therefore it seems to me that the mission to accomplish its 
purpose must also Include inquiry into what further immediate 
steps are possible to increase their exports and thus their 
ability to become self-supporting; what possibilities there 
are of payment otherwise; and then charity can be expected
to end. Without some such inclusive report, the Congress
44and the taxpayers are left without hope." At a meeting 
with the President on January 22nd, Hoover secured agreement
^Robert P. Patterson to Forrest Davis, December 27th, 1946, 
Robert P. Patterson MSS., Library of Congress. In January 
Hoover appeared to be trying to strike up a relationship 
with the new Secretary of State through Cal O'Laughlin; 
Memorandum, January 22nd, 1947, Hoover file, O'Laughlin
44MSS.Hoover to  Harry S Truman, January 19th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
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that his mission -would look into food and "its collateral 
45problems". In his public statement Hoover once more 
emphasized the prime purpose of his mission, the need to 
find ways of reducing the burden which the occupation of 
Germany was imposing on the American taxpayer. In his view, 
therefore, rather than being a mere fact finding mission,
to determine Germany’s food needs for the next few months,
h.f\his mission was a "long-range study".
The findings of the Hoover mission were predictable.
His report, coming at the end of February, at a time when 
the Greek crisis and preparations for the Moscow Conference 
were dominating the Washington scene, at least guaranteed 
that Congress would appropriate the necessary funds, which 
from the Administration point of view had been the object 
of the exercise. But his suggestions as to ways of reducing 
long-term costs were likewise bound to be taken upjby Con­
gressional Republicans. The report argued that in future4 
all relief expenditures should be repaid: in fact, they 
should be the first charge on the German economy, ahead of 
reparations. It also suggested that among ways of reducing 
costs to the United States was a removal of restrictions 
on the export of German manufactured goods. The over-all 
implication of the report was, therefore, of an economic re­
vival of Germany, designed primarily to reduce the burden 
on the United States. The report concluded: "If western
‘ Truman file
7|Note, dated January 22nd, 1947,/Hoover MSS.
^6New York Times, January 23rd, 1947.
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civilization is to survive in Europe it must also survive
in  Germany. And i t  must be b u ilt  in to  a cooperative member
of that civilization. That, indeed, is the hope of any
47lasting peace." Not surprisingly, Hoover privately urged
the President not to compromise at Moscow over Germany. He
f e l t  th a t the United S ta tes could l e t  the Russians know that
it was prepared to wait for a peace treaty, and that in the
48meantime it would build up the blzone economically. The 
implications of Hoover’s report, like Dulles’ more subtle 
proposals, wss therefore the use of German economic power 
to strengthen Europe, economically and politically, both 
against the Soviet Union and Indigenous communists in wes­
tern Europe. Aside from any other considerations, the domes­
tic political situation in the United States ruled out any 
chance of compromise with the Soviet Union over Germany.
In March Hoover followed up his report with a more 
detailed one, which, he confided to Henry Stimson, "will 
probably stir up the ’Morgenthau planners’.”  ^ By intent 
then, Hoover's report was designed to further the case for 
the rebuilding of German Industry after what he regarded as 
the disastrous attempt to hold it back in the preceding 18 
months.^® In his second report, he listed what he described 
as five "illusions": i) the idea that Germany could be re­
duced to a pastoral state, which he said would require the
^ Ibld., February 28th, 1947.
^Memorandum, attached to letter from Julius Klein to Bernice 
Miller, March 6th, 1947, Hoover MSS. .
^Hoover to Henry Stimson., March 21st, 1947, Hoover MSS.
Stimson, although a member of Roosevelt's cabinet, had been 
opposed to the Morgenthau Plan at the beginning, Stimson, 
cnPP. 568-74.5uNew York Times, March 24th, 1947.
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removal of 25 million people; 11) the idea that one could 
eliminate industries with "war potential", for he claimed 
that all industries could be so described; the way to deal 
with this was through enforced disarmament, not the imposi­
tion of levels of industry; iii) the idea that Germany could 
support itself simply through light industrial activity; 
iv) the idea that Germany could ever support itself under 
any "levels of industry" plan; v) the idea that Europe could 
recover without Germany. His conclusion was simple: free 
German industry, subject to the over-all supervision of a 
control commission; stop the removal of industrial plants; 
insist on the unification of German industry under inter­
national control (including the Russian zone) and prevent 
the detachment of the Rhineland and Ruhr. These proposals, 
he said, would safeguard the interests of British and 
American taxpayers, and would bring about the economic re­
covery of the whole of Europe. If it proved impossible 
to secure four-power agreement on these lines for the whole 
of Germany, at least, they shouR put the principles into 
operation in the bizone, which would "do infinitely more 
for Europe than American loans and charity". The report 
also argued that the failure of Russia and France to .carry 
out "the agreement for economic unification of the four zones 
of military occupation and the additional burdens this im­
posed upon us in consequence certainly warrant our ignoring
all agreements for ‘level of industry* transfer and destruc-
51tion of non-arms plants". 51
51 ibid.
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For his work, Hoover received the customary congratula­
tions from the Administration. Secretary of War Patterson 
thanked him for having assisted in getting the funds for 
administration and relief in occupied a r e a s . T h e  Presi­
dent had earlier thanked him for having "made a very decided 
contribution to the situation in Germany and Austria", which 
he said "will have a bearing on the conference in Moscow".53 
Apart from his services in getting Congress to look more 
favourably on War Department appropriations, however, Hoover's 
main contribution bad been to the cause of the pro-German 
elements in the Administration. General Clay, whose sugges­
tion it had been for Hoover to be invited^was particularly 
pleased. To Hoover, he wrote, "If it were not for your 
report, I know that we would face disaster in the months 
ahead. As it is, I believe we shall pull through with an 
appreciable economic revival and without substantial loss 
to communist penetration and influence." More Important, 
however, he added, "we can sense even now the improvement 
in American thinking and feeling toward the German problems 
which has come about from your report. In the long run, 
that may be even more valuable to us than the appropriation; 
although this latter need was so urgent from our viewpoint 
as to overshadow the former".-^
52Patterson to Herbert Hoover, March 28th, 1947, Patterson 
„MSS.
-^Harry S. Truman to Hoover, March 11th, 1947, Hoover MSS. 
54luc1us D..Clay to Hoover, April 7th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
Hoover also argued the case for the removal of restrictions 
on heavy industry in Germany at a luncheon with James 
Forestal, Millis, p. 251.
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Whilst Hoover, as the champion for the nationalists
was helping to strengthen the pro-German elements in the
Administration, John Poster Dulles was at least hoping to
do the reverse. Suspicious especially of Clay and Robert
D. Murphy, one of Dulles’ main concerns before accepting the
invitation to attend the Moscow Conference had been that
the delegation should not be heavily pro-German.Dulles
was reportedly the leader of the pro-French section of
the delegation at Moscow. His concern was that the pro-
German elements might drive Prance into Soviet hands, and
might in any case lead to a strong Germany under Soviet 
egcontrol.-' Whereas Hoover then saw the revival of Germany 
as the key to European recovery, and incidentally to the 
restoration of Normalcy in the United States, Dulles pre­
ferred to approach the German problem from a European per­
spective, in line with the ideas he had developed in January.
His hope was that he could persuade Secretary of State Mar­
shall of the superiority of his approach to the problem.
As the Conference proceeded, Dulles became convinced that 
he was having some effect. Dulles' evaluation of his own 
importance was lent substance by a Howard K. Smith report 
from Moscow that "Secretary Marshall does not give the im­
pression of holding the initiative in American foreign 
policy, but father to be following stronger forces inside 
his delegation,the chief Influence of which is the Repub­
lican delegate Mr. John Poster Dulles. . . The report
-^Memorandum, "Re: Council of Foreign Ministers' Meeting in 
Moscow", February 26th, 1947, p. 6, Dulles MSS (Supplement). 
^Murphy.was Clay's political adviser in Germany.. 
ggNew York Times. March 19th, 1947; ibid.. April 2nd, 1947.
Transcript, broadcast from Moscow by Howard K. Smith, March 16th, 
1947, Dulles MSS.
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also noted that "General Marshall’s predominantly conserva­
tive advisers and delegates led by Mr. John Poster Dulles" 
reacted to the Truman Doctrine "with undisguised enthusiasm, 
and they consider it not a local Isolated action, a temporary 
crisis largely staged for domestic consumption. They be­
lieve it is a redical, definitive change in all American
foreign policy, and their strength appears to be such that
58what they believe to be the case will be the case. . ."
Irritated by the complacency of "our Berlin people", 
he
who/felt, "overestimate their ability to prevent Soviet 
control a unified Germany" (sic), Dulles reported to his 
wife that he was trying to get the delegation to see things 
in a "European context", and he also reported, "I really 
think that Marshall is getting the idea".-^ Publicly also, 
he described the proposal by the United States for inter­
national control of the Ruhr and other major industrial 
areas as the most important development of the Conference, 
and reiterated that what was required was "a European solu- 
tion in a Europe that includes Germany".
Dulles' hostility to the pro-German approach was inten­
sified by the fact that the Soviet Union was now pressing 
the case for a unified and re-industrialized Germany. To 
Vandenberg he reported his conviction that the Russians
^Ibld.
-^John Poster Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, March 22nd, 1947, 
copy in Janet Dulles MSS., John Poster Dulles to Janet 
Dulles, Thursday (probably April .11th, 1947)» Janet Dulles 
. l-ISS. . . . .
P°ITew York Times. April 23rd, 1947.
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were "anxious for unity if it is on terms which they believe 
will give them a good chance to get contol of Germany, which 
would for all practical purposes mean control of the con­
tinent. They want a highly centralized government located 
in Berlin which being within their zone they feel they can 
get to control by penetration. Also they replace (sic) 
reliance on nation-wide trade unions with headquarters at 
Berlin." ^ 1 The Russian insistence on reparations fromcurrent 
production, including consumer goods, clinched the argument. 
Dulles' proposal would mean that German industry worked for 
th®. benefit of liberal capitalism and democracy in western 
Europe; he was not prepared to see a settlement which 
operated economically to the benefit of the Soviet Union 
and against the interests both of western Europe and the 
United States. He noted to Yandenberg, in terms which were 
bound to appeal to him, that this new reparations proposal 
"would mean an indefinite postponement of the ability of the 
United States zone to pay for its food imports. In effect 
we would be paying reparations to Russia." ^ 2
Both publicly and privately Dulles described the Moscow 
Conference as an important stage in the development of a 
constructive European policy by the United States. The 
statement which he issued at the conclusion of the conference 
referred to American desires for Germanyin terms of a poli­
tical system in which men could organize "without surrender­
ing their individuality or falling under the mastery of those
^1John Poster Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, March 22nd, 194-7, 
^«copy in Janet Dulles MSS.
62Ibld.
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who masquerade as the state." At the same time, he com­
mented on the need for increased European economic unity, 
and referred to the conference as a demonstration of the 
"increased unity between the British, French and ourselves". 
The United States, he said, would not compromise its prin­
ciples, it was still looking for four-power unity, but at 
the same time he reassured that "whether or not there is a 
four-power treaty the United States will continue to con­
cern itself with European conditions which have twice in-
64volved us in war". Privately, too, he celebrated the fact 
that American statements at Moscow, for the first time to 
his knowledge, reflected a desire for increased economic
unification in Europe, even if they did not go as far as
65he would have liked.
Back in the United Sfetes after the Conference, Dulles 
delivered a radio report in which he outlined the key nature 
of the bizone which, by virtue of the inclusion of the Ruhr, 
"is the economic heart of Europe".66 jn ttie biZOne, the 
United States could"pump vitality into Western Europe" and 
demonstrate "the value of our free institutions". The 
United States would then not merely be putting in money, 
but "ideas and efficiency and technical ability" and would 
be able to show "that we still have the capacity to produce 
what the world wants". ' As always, Dulles emphasized the 
creative leadership he felt the United States could and 
should exert. The challenge he saw not as a military one,
f^New York Times, April 25th, 1947.
^ Ibld.
9?Dulles to Charles Edmundson, May 20th, 1947, Dulles MSS.92New York Times. April 30th, 1947.
Ibid" :
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for in his view the Soviet Union did not want war, because 
they were too weak, but counted more on subversion and trade 
union activity. They wanted control of Germany to help 
rebuild their own economy, he argued. But as against his 
perception of the emerging strategy of the Soviet Union, 
he reported, as in his Moscow statement, on the good rela­
tions with Prance and Britain, ’’because we have a similar 
spiritual and political background”. In his view then, the 
European orientation of United States policy as revealed at 
Moscow was a big gain: ’’The positions we took will show 
the world that we have ideas and ideals and not merely 
dollars’’.^® In effect Moscow had, to Dulles, confirmed 
the insidious nature of Soviet purposes in Germany and 
begun to make the western bloc a reality; it was time to put 
into execution the policy he had proposed. On the same day 
that Dulles delivered his report, Senator Vandenberg, com­
menting on the report by Secretary of State Marshall, was 
more explicit: "We must still strive for a united program.
But if it is beyond reasonable reach, we cnnnot wait for too 
long for a peace program which at least unites those who 
can agree.
The failure of the Moscow Conference had made a divided 
Europe almost inevitable. It would be an exaggeration to 
attribute this to the influence of Republican leaders and 
the conservative 80th Congress, but they were important parts 
of the domestic half of the equation. Certainly, what amounted 
to the change of alliances by 194-7 was from all respects wel-
?glbid.
°°Ibid. Henry Wallace said on May 2nd, 194-7, that Dulles' and 
Vandenberg's comments would be interpreted in Europe as steps 
toward the creation of an anti-Soviet bloc; Ibid., May 3rcl»
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corned by Republican leaders and Congressional rank and file: 
it satisfied requirements both of ideology and economy to 
restore Germany as a major bulwark of liberal capitalism 
in Europe. It is doubtful whether any major figures in 
the Administration had ever disagreed with the revival of 
German economic strength as a broad aim, but it had always 
been assumed that such a satisfactory settlement could arrive 
by a process of four power agreement. By 194-7 this was com­
ing to seem unlikely, although the sensitivities of European
70allies required that the possibility should not be excluded. 
Dulles had been aware of this in his formulations throughout 
the early months of 19^7, but Herbert Hoover, whose con­
cerns stemmed from fears about the burden on the United States 
rather than from a desire to reconstruct Europe, had less 
time for such niceties. On May 26th, in a public letter to 
John Taber, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, 
ostensibly designed to get Taber's support for foreign 
appropriations, Hoover raised the question of a separate 
peace with Germany: "The time has come when we should issue 
a last call to Russia and Prance to comply with the Potsdam 
agreement. If they do not at once respond, we and the Bri­
tish should immediately take the sets to set up the economy 
of the bizonal areas so as to restore their individual pro­
duction and exports." If the next Foreign Ministers' Meeting 
proved unsatisfactory, Hoover suggested they should consider 
a separate peace with a new German government. Russian ob-
"^Thls was particularly so with Prance, with its strong Comunist 
Party and its lingering hostility to German revival; much to 
the horror of some Republicans, this factor required the 
Marshall Plan not to exclude the Soviet Union.
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struction he attributed to a belief that the United States 
"can be bled white by relief measures. We should wait no 
longer. Russia will not make war about it". Prance, said 
Hoover, should be asked to integrate its zone into the bi­
zonal area; in view of the sacrifices the United States was
making for Prance, the American people had "a right to ex-
71pect French cooperation". Clearly, however, Hoover was 
not particularly worried about upsetting Prance, for the 
most vital of "the frontiers of Western civilization" were 
Germany and Japan.
Hoover's letter was said to have struck a responsive 
chord in Congress and the Administration, and also in the 
press.72 Prank McWaughton commented: "Hoover is not re­
garded by anyone as a political hack or a has-been. When 
he gets in this field of operation, he is taken by Congress 
as solid. Joe Martin, Taber, A1 Engel of the Appropriations 
Committee, and dozens of others have said that Hoover is 
right." He also commented that Vandenberg was "sick of 
trying to get the Russians to agree to a reasonable and 
just program for Germany".73 The logic of Hoover's demand 
could not be faulted, and it was naturally especially ap­
pealing to the large number of Congressional Republicans 
who shared his assumptions about the effects of foreign 
expenditure on the American economy and ultimately the
7*New York Times. May 27th, 1947.
72ibid., May 25th, 1947; Herbert Hoover to O'laughlin, June 5th, 
„JT5W, 0' Laughlin MSS.
'^McNaughton to David Hulbard, May 30th, 1947, Mclaughton 
MSS.
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American way of life. At a time when plans were being for­
mulated by the Administration for a large scale programme 
of aid to bring about European reconstruction, Hoover's in­
fluence in Congress could not be ignored. In any new long 
range programme, Hoover and his supporters could be ex­
pected to argue not only for strict economy, but also to 
look for positive proposals to revive Germany.
John Poster Dulles on the other hand, who like Hoover 
felt that he had had some influence in the development of 
policy in 1947, could be expected to look not only for eco­
nomic use of American resources, but in particular for that 
vision and creative leadership which he had consistently 
maintained to be America's role in the world. Although tak­
ing comfort from the fact that the perceived shift in Ameri­
can policy "to the program of economic aid based on increas­
ing economic unity in Europe, which I discussed at great 
length with Secretary Marshall at Moscow" was at least par­
tially the result of his efforts, his over-all confidence
74in the Administration was low. By July he had come to 
have doubts as to whether American policy was properly coor­
dinated, and felt that changes would be necessary "so that 
they will have enough chance of success and be sufficiently 
within our means so that the American people will support 
them."^ He was also concerned, as he confided to Vanden- 
berg, about the inattention to Prench fears about the revival
^Dulles to Paul Hutchinson, June 24th, 1947, Dulles MSS. 
'^Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, July 21st, 1947, Dulles MSS.
377
of Germany, which he felt would prevent European unity and
rj
throw Prance into the hands of Russia. Dulles’ position 
on Europe then was clear by the middle of 1947. Firstly, 
he had come to see Europe as of vital importance to the 
United States, a position which certainly he had not made 
explicit before. Secondly, he had come to place the whole 
emphasis of American policy on the creation of a united 
Western Europe, bothas a means of re-integrating Germany 
without causing disunity, but also as a logical development 
of his fairly long standing desire to expand the political 
economy of the United States, i.e., liberal capitalism and 
federalism, outside the western hemisphere. Thirdly, he 
was still concerned about over-commitment by the United 
States, both militarily and economically. This concern 
was almost certainly intensified by his acute realization 
that a foreign policy which lost political support in the 
United States would fail, a lesson which he had drawn from 
Woodrow Wilson’s experience a generation before, and one 
which can only have been reinforced by his closeness to 
Dewey’s long campaign for the Presidency. The strength of 
Dulles’ position was the way in which, perhaps more success­
fully than Vandenberg even, he managed to combine vision - 
and idealism with realism, and national unity with partisan 
advantage.77 It was this perhaps which made him an unpopular 
figure with the Administration, State Department officials,
z & s n .•'This was the verdict of conservative Joe Pew, bitter op-
ponent first of Willkie, then of Vandenberg, who was a major 
financial supporter of the Republican Party in the 1940's 
and vías to support Dewey in 1948. Diary, September 24th, 1948, Smith MSS. Por evidence of Dulles' continuing caution about military intervention see his letter on a State Dept, proposal in August, 1947, to get a U.U. mandate in Greece, which he 
helped to squash,John Poster Dulles to Vandenberg, August 28th1.947, Vandenberg MSS. 9
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foreign, especially British diplomats, and certain elements 
of the American press.
European Relief and Reconstruction
What made both Hoover and Dulles important figures in 
the development of American foreign policy in 194-7 was the 
Juxtaposition of a perceived external crisis and an economy- 
minded Republican Congress. By 194-7, the foreign policy of 
the United States had demonstrably failed, in terms both 
of the desire to preserve Big Power unity, and of the desire 
to bring about a multilateral peace. The bad winter in 
Europe, the British economic crisis and the failure of the 
Moscow Conference made re-evaluation a necessity, whilst the 
domestic political situation inevitably impinged on such a 
re-evaluation. The manner in which the Greek-Turklsh aid 
had been presented to Congress had not improved Executive - 
Legislative relations. To some Republicans it suggested 
that the dangers had been exaggerated in order to manipulate 
Congress, whilst the rumours of a large scale programme of 
aid for European reconstruction were also apt to be seen as 
another device to frustrate the Republican Congress’ desire 
to get the domestic economy on a peacetime footing.^
The difficulties which a programme of European recon­
struction might meet in Congres were illustrated by the bill 
for $350,000,000 relief in war-torn areas,(Poland, Austria, 
Hungary, Greece, China and Italy) which was designed to take
^Retrospective account by James Reston, Hew York Times. 
November 6th, 194-7.
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over from the much criticized U.N.N.R.A. in 1947. Writing 
in the Republican in April, Karl Mundt of South Dakota- des­
cribed the proposed programme as "a new formula for foreign 
relief - largely the program of Herbert Hoover, former Re­
publican President. Our foreign relief will henceforth te 
supervised by American citizens rather than foreign Communist 
leaders. It will be used to extend relief to human suffer­
ing”. Any further assistance above the needs of prevention
of starvation, would, avowed Mundt, go only "to areas where
79the precepts of freedom are permitted to function”. Mundt’s 
description of Hoover’s influence was perhaps exaggerated.
In February Hoover had testified before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, in which he had outlined a stringent set 
of conditions and a formidable programme of economy. Among 
his proposals had been the confinement of relief to food, 
medicine, seeds, fertilizers and perhaps some clothing; 
that relief to be purely In the form of credits for Ameri­
can goods, not cash; that relief levels be not above the 
level in Germany; that the relief be put on a monthly basis, 
terminable at any time, and certainly in 1947; that no re­
lief be given to any country paying reparations; that the 
cost be repaid to the United States or alternatively repaid 
to a United Nations fund for future relief. "Charitable 
relief,” said Hoover, "is today a double tax upon most of 
our people. It is not only a direct burden upon the tax­
payer, but these unremunerative and unbalanced exports keep
^ Republican (April, 1947), reprinted in Congressional 
Record, 93, Appendix, p. 2191.
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up prices and the cost of living”. There was, he had said, 
with taxes taking 35,^ of the national Income a limit on 
what the United States could do, despite ‘the belief of 
people abroad that "our possibilities of giving are un­
limited".^ The bill, as reported out of the Foreign Af­
fairs Committee, failed to satisfy Hoover's friends in the 
House, including two influential members of the Committee,
Vorys and Christian Herter. Many of Hoover’s recommenda­
tions were there, but on April 22nd, Christian Herter put 
down a list of amendments to the bill, Including a proposal 
to name the countries epeciflcally Involved,to avoid giving 
the President a blank cheque; a requirement for 90% of 
purchases to be made in the United States, and under United 
States purchasing agencies; a review of the authorization 
after the harvests; provision for money from goods to be 
used for further relief or at the discretion of the United 
States; the establishment of a Relief Administration separate 
from the State Department; the postponement of all repara-
O 1tions, to avoid subsidizing the U.S.3.R.
The intention of Herter and others to amend the bill 
revealed the powerlessness of Charles Eaton and the small 
group of H0use Internationalists. Eaton in particular at­
tempted to make the debate into a vote of confidence both 
of the bipartisan foreign policy and of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee. The bill was duly amended in ways to make it
fffolew York Times, March 1st, 1947.
_ Congressional Record, 93. April 22nd. 1947. pp. 3822. 3824-5. 
82ibid.. Ipfil~23rd. 1947. pp. 3861-2 .
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more acceptable to Hoover’s suggestions, including provisions 
for no relief to countries paying reparations,which effec­
tively excluded Hungary from relief, as well as for no more 
than 10^ of the relief to be purchased outside the United 
States, and for the establishment of a separate administra­
tion under the President.®-^ The most important amendment, 
however, concerned the amount, which the House finally voted, 
225-165, to cut to 200,000,000 dollars, with only 36 Repub­
licans opposing the cut. This vote, which was supported 
by majority leader Halleck, and other influential Repub­
licans such as Vorys, Dirksen, Mundt, Knutson and Taber marked
a repudiation for the leadership of the Foreign Affairs 
04Committee. The amended bill passed 373-66, with 45 Re-
85publicans opposed, the majority from the Midwest.
In the Senate Hoover's efforts to get the bill amended 
fell on stonier ground. To Senator Vandenberg he sent a 
detailed memorandum which argued that the United States must
"serve notice that large scale charity is at an end and that
86repayment in some form must be undertaken". In the memo­
randum he called for a prohibition of relief on any country 
whose army was above "police needs", prohibition to coun­
tries paying reparations, and a specific designation of 
the countries to be helped: "As the bill stands it is a 
blank check to employ anyone anywhere and to relieve any 
country anywhere - - among 50 nations which would include
g?Ibld.. April 29th, 1947, pp. 4243-44, 4239.
°4Ibid., April 30th, 1947, P. 4292; New York Times, May 1st,
#ti W ,plliid.
ODMemorandum, "Status of the Proposed Amendments to the 
Authorization Bill for 0380,000,000 Relief", April 21st, 
1947, copy in Smith MSS.
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even Rumania, Yugoslavia and any other Communist dominated
Qi-t
nation". In the event, however, Vandenberg piloted the 
bill through the Senate in two days, Only 12 Republicans 
and seven Democrats could be mustered to vote for the cut,
approved by the House, to $200,000,000 dollars, and the
88bill passed the Senate without a roll call.
Most of the House amendments were lost in Conference,
including the over-all figure, and John Vorys refused to
89sign the Conference report. Debate on the Conference re­
port once more revealed the strength of economy sentiment 
in the House, and the hostility to the bipartisan majority 
on the Foreign Affairs Committee. One hundred and forty six 
Republicans, including majority leader Halleck and appropria­
tions chairman, Taber, voted, unsuccessfully, to recommit
90the bill to Conference.
The 1947 relief bill then, revealed the extent of dis­
satisfaction with continued foreign expenditure; a compara­
tively minor measure, Justified largely on humanitarian 
grounds, it had, despite the ease with which it went through 
the Senate, proved surprisingly controversial. Even Vandenberg, 
in defending the bill, out of the necessity.to "present a 
united front", revealed some dissatisfaction with the way 
in which he was continually being expected to defend Adminis-
pllbld.
°°Con,g;resslonal Record, 93» May 14th, 1947, p. 5245; Senator 
Wherry did not even vote for a cut, though he pointed out 
that the Appropriations Committees still had to ascertain 
Qr.that the amount was Justified; ibid., p. 5243.
°;ibld., May 21st, 1947, P. 5620-517“9°Ibld., pp. 5625-6; New York Times, May 22nd, 1947.
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tration policies without being put in the full picture.
Out of the debates over foreign expenditure one clear argu­
ment was emerging: there must be an end to crisis measures 
and the development of a coherent programme, based on an 
evaluation both of external needs and domestic capabilities.
Those Republicans faced with the job of having to argue the 
Administration's case before unenthuslastlc colleagues 
were convinced that this was necessary; repeatedly since 
the last year of the war, measures had been presented to
Congress piecemeal, often argued as necessary to make pre-
92vlous measures work.
The most clear call for an over-all study of American 
policy came from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, close to Vandenberg, who was 
concerned both about the direction of Republican leadership 
as well as about the lack of coherent Administration leader­
ship. The United States, he said, had not, two years after 
the war, achieved any of the aims outlined in the peace.
Its failure he attributed to: i) lack of assurances received
on U. S, equipment and supplies from its allies during the war whilst they were dependent'
ii) an over-estimation of Japanese strength, leading to un­
necessary concessions at Yalta; iii) lack of preparation
for the end of war, leading to lv) a dwindling of military 
93strength. What was now needed, he argued, was "a consis­
tent, decisive, and thoroughgoing over-all plan for foreign
91
Congressional Record, 93, May 14th, 1947, p. 5243; Hew 
York Times, May öth, 1947; Alsop to Martin Sommers, May 31st,
MSS.
y£iBoth Charles Eaton and Vandenberg agreed on the need for 
an over-all study of American resources. Congressional 
Record, 93, April 23rd, 1947, p. 3862; ibid.. May 14th,
-1947, P. 5243.93rbid., p. 5 2 3 4 .
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p o licy  which w i l l  secure m ilita ry , p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
conditions in  the world which w i l l  make peace and prosperity  
p o ssib le ; and which, by making foreign  peoples se lf -su p p o r t­
in g , w i l l  obtain  for us the markets and raw m aterials we 
need. In other words, Mr. P resident, what i s  wanted i s  a
94foreign  aid  program which w i l l  a lso  aid  the American people."  
Such a p o licy  required, he sa id , l )  a more e f fe c t iv e  American 
fa e ig n  serv ice ; though he did not share the view that i t  was 
" largely  composed o f m illio n a ire  graduates o f  Ivy League 
C olleges who lo a f  in  g l i t t e r in g  world c a p ita ls  where, having 
e n t ir e ly  forgotten  America, they adopt reactionary and 
su p erc ilio u s  views in  order to toady to the European n o b i l i ­
ty"; i i )  American p o licy  must be co n s is ten t: "We must not 
blow hot and co ld . We must not be caught by surprise"; 
i l l )  the United S tates must export democracy, i t  must not 
become im p e r ia lis t ; i l l ) i t  must remain strong, econom ically, 
m il i t a r i ly  and m orally . ^  Lodge’s speech was important in  
p a rticu la r  because he was probably as c lo se  to Vandenberg 
as any other Senator, and because he represented a group 
o f  Republicans whose support was e s s e n t ia l  to the Adminis­
tr a t io n . Concerned about the d irec tio n  in  which both the 
A dm inistration and h is own party were headed, Lodge’s speech, 
w ith i t s  emphasis on s e l f - in t e r e s t  and a "Strong America", 
represented an updating o f  the Republican tra d itio n  by the 
grandson o f one o f  i t s  best known defenders. Lodge had no 
time fo r  the pennypinchlng, and what he regarded as sh ort-
y^Ibid p. 5235.PP. 5234-5.
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sighted parsimony of many Congressional leaders: "Whether 
. . .from the standpoint of integrating a new Europe, or 
from the standpoint of restoring peace and prosperity, we 
may as well realize that it will in all probability be 
cheaper to appropriate substantial sums to be spent in 
accordance with a sound plan than to appropriate a smaller 
sum on a shotgun basis. In one case you have a good chance
of getting your bacon back; in the other you face the sure
Q&prospect of total loss".
By May, 194-7, the concept of an over-all programme,
based on an evaluation of American capabilities, with clearly
defined objectives, promising an end to American handouts,
was becoming a political necessity for Republican support.
Such a programme offered Republican leaders who wished to
cooperate with the Administration the chance of a distinctive
Republican contribution to policy. In place of the commonly
accepted image of Rew Beal Waste, inefficiency, and failure
to stand up for American interests (hence Lodge's reference
to State Department reform), Republicans could cater to their
own self-image of dynamism, efficiency, and above all con-
97cern for and belief in the American system. Arthur Krock
□-Ibid., p. 5235.y‘The concept of European unity, which Dulles sought to ad­
vance as a Republican idea, was a perfect fusion of "economy", 
"mission" and "vision". In so far as it sought to extend 
political-economic principles that were deemed to have been 
successful on the American continent, it was in line with 
tradition; the extension of the political-economy of "free­
dom" had been an aim, albeit not a vital one, of American 
diplomacy since the Revolution. John Vorys was convinced 
that "while. . .it is important for Americans to study the 
details of European history, it is far more important for 
Europeans to be studying American history at this time, 
in order to find out how a continent of people of all kinds of races functions as the United States of America.", Vorys 
to Joseph C. Canady, March 22nd, 1947, YoffS MSS.
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reported in May that Republican leaders were lmpr^ed by an
a n a ly s is  o f  a well-known former R epresentative, proposing
a supervisory council, headed by acabinet level appointee,
to supervise all foreign relief and aid, "in order that
taxpayers o f the United S tates may be re liev ed  as soon as
possible and that the grant-in-aid countries can in due
course seek future assistance through International Bank 
98Loahs." Such a scheme, which began with an explicit recog­
nition that there was a limit to American capabilities, rather 
than emphasis on American responsibilities, was a.political 
necessity. It would not necessarily guarantee Republican 
unity in support of Administration policy, for Republicans 
would still disagree as to howjnuch the United States could 
and should afford for international reconstruction, but such 
an approach would be the best way to get support in Congress.
On June 5th, Secretary Marshall delivered his speech at 
Harvard, calling on European nations to get together and 
ascertain their total needs from the United States. Mar­
shall's proposal, which was by June not unexpected, except 
perhaps in its new approach, came at a time when relations 
between the Executive and Congress were poor. The situation 
was not improved by a wrangle between Taft and the President 
over a remark by Taft attributing high prices to the 
Administration's foreign aid programme. The dispute, which 
was regarded as a preliminary "bout" to 19^8, put Vandenberg 
in a difficult position, and boded ill for Republican
^New York Times, May 20th, 194-7.
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cooperation over European reconstruction. The President's 
veto of the Republican bill to cut taxes, and his attempt, 
which Congress over-ruled, to veto the Taft-Hartley Act, 
also contributed to a political climate that was not con­
ducive to cooperation. Herbert Hoover, close to the House 
leadership, resentful of Vandenberg, and convinced that but 
for his own efforts Congress would not have passed the relief 
bill, predicted that many Republicans would now cease to 
cooperate and that it would be revealed that "the publicity 
crumb-eaters cannot deliver the Republicans".^^
In the House of Representatives, one of the most con­
sistent opponents of all foreign policy legislation,Hoffman 
of Michigan, took some delight in the situation. There were 
now signs, he said, that people were beginning to realize 
thet Mr. Tinman's foreign policy was politically motivated, 
and that he was aiming at the 1948 election. Perhaps, he 
added, the call by many "Internationally minded 'me too' 
Republicans" for an inventory of national resources, was a 
sign of their realization that "there is a bottom to the 
barrel".
Vandenberg's endorsement of the Marshall proposal, which 
was made before the Senate Republican Policy Committee in 
mid-June, undoubtedly proved a great irritation to many 
Republicans. In his endorsement, Vandenberg made two con­
ditions: i) the programme must be based on an inventory of
9^0'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, June 7th, 1947* O'Laughlin MSS.
'¿"Herbert Hoover to O'Laughlin, June 23rd, 194-7, O'laughlin MSS.0^1 Congressional Record, 93* June 17th, 194-7, p. 7146.
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resources; ii) a bipartisan advisory council must be created 
to coordinaee the programme and advise both President and 
Congress. Guided by "intelligent self-interest", as he des­
cribed it, he expressed satisfaction with the realization 
thet the problem must be faced on an over-all instead of a 
crisis basis, and he saw the inventory of resources as being 
necessary in the same "intelligent self-interest". Harking 
back to a "Strong America", his statement concluded,
"This comes first because if America ever sags, the world's
102hopes sag with her". The strongest reaction, as one might 
expect, came from the Chicago Tribune. which lambasted Van- 
denberg as a New Peal stooge: "By his definition, whatever 
he was for in foreign affairs was bipartisan altho he never 
knew what he was for until the New Beal told him what it 
was for".1<^
Scarcely less upset was Herbert Hoover. On June 15th, 
in a public letter addressed to Senator Styles Bridges, 
Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, he outlined his 
proposals for the American contribution to world reconstruc­
tion in far different terms. Characteristically, his whole 
emphasis was on the limitations imposed by the situation in 
the United States: ". . .the greatest danger to all civiliza­
tion is for us to impair our economy by drains which cripple 
our own productivity. Unless this one remaining Gibraltar 
of economic strength is maintained, chaos will be inevitable
12^New York Times, June 14-th, 194-7.
'°^Chicago Tribune, June 16th, 194-7.
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over the whole world".10^ Like Yandenberg he accepted the 
premises of a "Strong America", but his deductive processes 
were different. Calling for the coordination of all govern­
ment agencies involved in foreign economic relations was un­
exceptionable, but his assertion that the United States must 
prevent excessive exports, on the grounds that they were in­
flationary, revealed his continuing opposition to one of the 
basic tenets of economic multilaterlalism. In his other pro­
posals, the possible reduction of consumption at home to 
prevent starvation abroad, aperiodic assessment of the 
safety margin in hand for the export of goods and services, 
the stockpiling of strategic materials from abroad, and a 
blunt insistence that all recipients cooperate with the
United States to reduce the burden on it, Hoover revealed
105that his prime concern was the domestic economy. As firmly 
as ever then, Hoover was looking towards a restoration of 
the free economy of pre-llew Deal days, which he saw as being 
prevented by incessant government expenditure both i home 
and overseas. In his proposal that the United States con­
centrate its resources "in the areas in which Western civil­
ization can be preserved", was a deep seated criticism of 
the whole approach of the Marshall Plan. The Plan left the 
initiative to foreign nations to get together; it also in­
cluded the Soviet Union, which had, said Hoover, cost the 
United States billions in the past two years because of 
its obstruction: ". . .we can apparently expect little 
cooperation from that quarter". Hoover's whole approach
^^New York Times, June 16th, 194-7.
105fbla.----------
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was more narrowly nationalistic: he clearly believed that 
the United States should make up its mind what it could 
and should do on the basis of its own self-interests, and 
then present this to other nations on a take it or leave 
it basis. This was an approach which he continued to re­
veal in his advocacy of restoration of the German economy.
Hoover's objections to the whole proposal apparently 
stemmed from three factors: i) his continuing belief in 
the fundamental importance of economy; li) the fact that 
he had not been consulted by the Administration, whilst 
Vandenberg clearly had; iii) the invitation to the Soviet 
Union and its satellites. On the laSt v point, he wondered 
what had become of the Truman Doctrine. Did the Administra­
tion believe that Russia would cooperate economically but 
not politically and did the Administration really believe 
that "any Republican Congress" would give aid to Russia 
or the satellites? At the same time, he was clearly irri­
tated that he, and his friend Bernard Baruch, had not been 
consulted: ". . .If they want Republican cooperation (and
many Democrats) why don't they consult somebody," he enquired
. 10(5of Cal O'Laughlin. Convinced that he had the most rele­
vant experience of Europeans and problems of relief, Hoover 
was inclined to regard the Administration as amateurs who 
would learn the hard way:
"Marshall will get a demand for three times what the 
American people can, or will, give. Reducing such 
demands will be a painful moment for him. I have gone through such affairs before."
Herbert Hoover to O'Laughlin, June 16th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.106
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"The General has never d ea lt w ith p olitic ian s of Europe who under the present desperate circumstance of th e ir  countries are even more d esp erately  s e l f i s h  than ever before. He apparently b e liev es  that they  move from the same altru ism  which animates th is  more comfortable land o f our own. Already he has a ta s te  o f  what they can do to him in  th e ir  in s is te n c e  on bringing in to  the European set-up  Russia -  -  a l l  o f which i s  the negation o f  the Truman D octrine.I t  can r e su lt  in  good i f  the Russians have repented.I t  can a lso  r e s u lt  in  a new era o f appeasement.”10'
Hoover’s views were important p r ec ise ly  because o f  h is  
reputation  among Republicans in  Congress. Cal O’Laughlln 
in d icated  to him that h is  reservation s were shared by many 
Republicans, who were, claimed O'Laughlin, no longer pre­
pared to fo llow  Vandenberg, who was "well Inside the Mar- 
shall-Truman camp”. The Truman v e to es , and the apparent
back-tracking from the Truman Doctrine would, claimed O'Laugh-
108l ln ,  undoubtedly lead to d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  Congress. Hoover's 
in i t i a t iv e s  in  foreign  p o licy , the le t t e r  to Bridges and the 
c a l l  fo r  a separate peace w ith Germany in  the face o f con­
tinued  Russian ob stru ction , were deemed by Hoover and h is  
fr ie n d s , to have upset both Marshall and Vandenberg. O'Laugh­
l in  predicted  that although by th is  Hoover had excluded him­
s e l f  from the proposed b ip artisan  advisory cou n cil, the
Admiminstration would try  to appoint people c lo se  to Hoover
109to  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  him to oppose. In July, O'Laughlin
reported th at Hoover was in  frequent touch withnBmbers o f  
the Foreign R elations Committee, a r e s u lt ,  he claim ed, o f
10^Herbert Hoover to O'Laughlin, June 23rd, 194-7, O'Laughlin MSS. 
1 oo0'Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, June 21st, 194-7; O'Laughlin to 
Hoover, June 27th, 1947, O’Laughlin MSS.
1u^O’Laughlin to Herbert Hoover, June 21st, 1947; Herbert 
Hoover to O'Laughlin, June 23rd, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
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Vandenberg's loss of influence, stemming from the fact that
110he alone was being kept informed by Marshall.
Some of the evidence for Hoover's rising influence 
comes from sources, such as Cal O'Laughlin, who were not 
always totally objective in their evaluations of the situa­
tion. Nevertheless there is other evidence of Hoover’s 
Importance. John Vorys, whose influence in the House was 
in the ascendant, wrote in June regarding the relief bill,
", . .1 am relying heavily on the advice of former President 
Herbert Hoover, who is in my opinion one of the best in­
formed persons on relief needs in the United States".^^ 
Further evidence is furnished by Hoover's success, with the 
aid of his friend Dr. Julius Klein, in persuading House 
Republicans to concentrate all matters involving foreign 
relief in a special committee.112 The committee duly created, 
the Committee on Foreign Aid, chaired by a friend of Hoover, 
Christian Herter, was given the brief of looking at the 
over-all problem and of co-ordinating the work of various 
committees involved, both domestically and externally. The 
fact that this committee was created at the insistence of 
Joseph Martin; against the wishes of Charles Eaton, chairman 
of Foreign Affairs, led to reports that the Committee would
1 1 -Z.be an obstructionist influence. J To Taft, Hoover expressed
114his delight at the acceptance of his recommendation. The 10*24
1100'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, July 12th, 
...1947, 0'Iaughlin MSS.
Jorys to M. E. Dudley, June 2nd, 1947, Vorys MSS.
112Julius Klein to Hoover, June 2nd, 1947; Julius Klein to 
Hoover,. July 2nd, 1947, Hoover MSS.
114Iew York Times, July 15th, 1947; July 23rd, 1947; Con­gressional' Record, July 22nd, 1947, pp. 97o1-3.
114hoover to Robert A. Taft, July 16th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
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Herter Committee clearly was not solely the work of Hoover; 
but It was created by a coalition of people who had great 
respect for Hoover's views and broadly respected his concerns 
about the continued impact of overseas expenditure on the 
domestic economy.
Hoover also received encouragement from Senator Taft.
Taft wrote in July congratulating him on his analysis of
the Marshall Plan, whilst criticising both the Administration,
and also Vandenberg, for the latter's suggestion of a special
commission to study the relationship between aid and the
domestic economy: "Such a commission has now been appointed,
but Harriman is its chairman, and the staff will presumably
be selected by the Administration. While there are a number
of good men on this Committee, I don't know how far they
will stand up for their convictions, Neither do I like the
implication that if we are capable of exporting more goods
we should, therefore, do so regardless of the wisdom, either
11 5from our standpoint or that of the countries of Europe".
Taft was prepared to support a lending programme to make
available food stuffs, machinery and supplies, "to help
them work harder". He was, however, not happy about the
probable outcome of the Paris Conference: "I am afraid that
European nations will agree on some global plan and global
figure which Marshall may accept, and then we will be in the
116wrong if we try to cut it down to a reasonable plan".
Like Taft, Hoover clearly did not see the revival of trade
^^Robert A. Taft to Hoover, July 11th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
116Ibld.
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with. Europe as being in any way vital to the United States. 
The limited view of American objectives and capabilities 
which both had always held had not fundamentally changed 
by 19^7. Hoover then, expressed his agreement with Taft’s 
fears, "it looks like committing the United States without 
authority of Congress - until afterwards. Of course all 
of us want to do wjkt we can, but we do not want to exhaust 
this country."* 11^
It is clear then, that initial Republican reaction to 
the Marshall Plan was less than enthusiastic. Thomas Dewey’s 
failure to speak out, despite an excellent opportunity to 
do so when Gemeral Marshall addressed the Governor's Con-
1 * O
ference in mid-July9was noted by Arthur Krock. Since
Dewey was the favourite to get the Republican nomination,
and since the pundits still made the Republicans overwhelming
favourites to win in 194-8, Dewey's failure to take a lead
119was bound to excite comment. In the summer of 1947, he
did send his close adviser to Europe to study conditions,
1 20presumably in order to prepare for the campaign. Hoover's 
associate, Hugh Gibson, found Dewey annoyed by the current 
gibei that he was trying to get into the White House "in 
sneakers" without taking a stand on any of the issues. He 
also claimed that Dewey was both "cadging for ideas about 
foreign policy" whilst also claiming that the Administration
|]lHoover to Robert A. Taft, July 16th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
11 °New York Times. July 16th, 194-7.
119Leo Egan article, ibid., July 20th, 1947; Alsop to Martin 
Sommers, June 9th, 1947, Alsop MSS., O'Laughlin to Hoover, 
...July 28th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.
'^uNew York Times, July 13th, 1947.
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had recognized its bankruptcy and called on Dulles for 
guidance. On August, 28th, Dewey did make a national 
speech, in which he made the not infrequent claim of having 
created bipartisanship in 1944, and recommended universal
1 22military training to his audience of American Legionnaires. 
Expressing his commitment to bipartisanship, he was critical 
in a suitably partisan way of its operation, "because in 
many important matters there has been virtually no consul­
tation and bipartisanship has been ignored. On many occasions 
the country has been confronted with fully elaborated pro­
grams which it had no choice but to accept or present to 
the world a picture of a divided nation."12-’ But whilst 
affirming the necessity for Congress to have a full share 
in shaping policy, Dewey still said nothing to indicate his 
position onthe question loomingup of large scale aid for 
European reconstruction. A Fortune poll, however, showed
him clearly ahead of all his Republican contenders by the
1 pAsummer of 194-7. Dewey's caution was a sure barometer of 
feeling among organization Republicans, in and outside Congress, 
whom he could not afford to alienate.
The failure of the U.S.S.R. to accept the French- 
British invitation to participate in the Paris Conference 
probably saved the Marshall Plan in the long run, but in the 
last few weeks of the first session of the 80th Congress, 
there were few signs for optimism. The appointment of
]21 Hugh Gibson to Hoover, August 25th, 194-7, Hoover MSS.
__l!ew York Times, August 29th, 1947.10YoTd"
1 ^ Fortune, September, 1947, pp. 5-6, 10.
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Herbert Hoover, at the instigation of Speaker Martin, to 
the Committee to study the reorganization of the Executive 
Branch was a sign of his continued influence. Hoover was 
continuing, in cooperation with Bernard Baruch, to advance 
the idea that instead of a Marshall Plan, there should be 
an international bank loan to Europe, which would thereby 
reduce the strain on the United States. J The Administra­
tion were claiming to be worried about a new kind of 
"Isolationism" (economic) the latest manifestation of which 
they saw as the way in which John Taber had heId up Greek-
Turkish appropriations for ten weeks without any reproach
126from Republican leaders. Taber had in fact become con­
vinced as a result of his investigations that the Greek- 
Turkish programme was "wholly dominated by a lot of New 
Peal crackpots such as Paul Porter, Pavid Niles, Sam Rosenman, 
and Pelix Frankfurter".1 Reportedly, he felt that Pwight
Griswold, the Nebraskan Republican (identified with Stassen)
128had no idea of what was going on. The Administration 
finally got round this obstacle by getting Secretary Marshall 
and Under-secretaryXlovett together with House leaders, and 
warning the latter that if America pulled out of Europe,
Italy and France would probably fall. 129 Not surprisingly,
as the session drew to its close, Vandenberg felt distressed
l25o’Laughlin to Brigadier General Sarnoff, July 12th, 194-7;
O'laughlin to Herbert Hoover, July 19th, 194-7, O’Laughlin MSS. 
12°New York Times, July 20th, 194-7.
I2£juiius Klein to Hoover, July 2nd, 194-7, Hoover MSS.
1E2Ibid.12°Report, July 18th, 194-7, McNaughton MSS.
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at the way in which the Marshall Plan had been presented 
to the American people; not enough emphasis had been put on 
the fact that it was "businesslike" and"hard-headed", he 
confided.*
Vandenberg,it is clear, had by 1947 virtually come to 
accept the "one world" assumption of the indivisibility of 
liberty; certainly he now regarded what happened in the 
outside world as being considerably more important to the 
United States than did either Hoover or Taft. Aware as al­
ways of the dangers of over-commitment, by July, 1947, he 
was convinced of the importance of making the American 
people understand "that America cannot indefinitely prosper 
in a broken world and that we have a real stake in exter­
nal rehabilitation."1^1 In a lengthy letter to Colonel Alton 
T. Roberts of the American Legion in August, Vandenberg 
sketched out his over-all conception of American policy: 
the key question was whether the "two worlds" co.uld live in 
peace; he hoped so, but at the same time, the U. S. must make 
itself strong, through diplomatic and military means, through
aid, and through coalition building via regional and other
132pacts, in case war came.  ^ On the fundamental question of 
balancing resources against interests, which had been a per­
sistent post-war struggle in his own mind, he argued:
"We have poured 20 billions into the Old World 
since the war ended and there is little or 
nothing, in the way of peace and security or 
recuperation, to show for it. That can not go
I^Alscp to Martin Sommers, July 29th, 1948, Alsop MSS.
'51Vandenberg to Floyd MeGriff, July 1st, 1947, Vandenberg MSS. 
132vandenberg to Colonel Alton T. Roberts, August 12th, 1947, 
Vandenberg MSS.
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on any longer. We are not rich enough to 
W.P.A. the earth. Nor is it our job. We have 
to think about ourselves because a sagging 
economy in America will be the end of hope for 
the whole world. But when we think about our­
selves , if we have any sense, we shall also 
realize that America herself cannot long sur­
vive if all the rest of the world sags. Further­
more, there is only one way in which we could main­
tain our system in a generally Communistically 
controlled world, and that one way would be to live 
under such utterly rigid disciplines ourselves 
that' our freedoms would become a paraphrase.
So we have a stake in helping Britain and 
France and China and Greece and Turkey and 
Italy, etc. Intelligent self-interest is in­
volved in that stake. That's where the 'Marshall 
Plan' comes in, if I understand it correctly.
WE PROPOSE TO HELP THOSE WHO HELP THEMSELVES AND WHO 
ARE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE MAKING 
PRACTICAL PLANS TO THIS END. Help to any others 
would be futile. And even this help must be within 
the limits of our own production available for 
export."133
Vandenberg was certainly not alone in Congress, for example, 
in the House of Representatives, such influential figures 
as Vorys and Dirksen, though friendly to Hoover, were pre­
pared to accept the Vandenberg interpretation, provided 
they were sure that that was what the Marshall Plan was 
all about.1^4 The manner of the Marshall Plan’s presenta­
tion, and especially the invitation to the Soviet Union, made 
it difficult for Republicans to accept the Vandenberg. inter­
pretation. Many Republicans wanted a showdown with Russia; 
if they were to support large scale appropriations in an 
election year,they wanted to be certain that there were no
]5?Ibld.
'34john Vorys,.for example, committed to anti-communist spending, 
would not support the Marshall Plan unless the revival of 
Germany was part of it; Vorys to H. B. Burchinal, July 27th, 
194-7; Vorys to Dr. Eugene Van Cleef, July 19th, 1947;
Vorys to John J. Raskob, July 14th, 1947, Vorys MSS.
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flirtations with Henry Wallace. The walk-out of the Russians
at Paris, and Secretary Marshall's assurance to the Foreign
Relations Committee that if a participant iiation succumbed
to communism it would get no further aid largely helped to
1 35ease the fear of further "appeasement", however.
As Congress recessed for the summer in 1947 then^the 
outlook for the commitment of the United States to long­
term, large-scale reconstruction of Europe was uncertain; 
in view of the 194-6 elections, perhaps it was incredible 
that it should even be the subject of serious consideration 
less than a year later. The first session of the 80th 
Congress had revealed that American foreign policy, if it 
were to be successfully Implemented, would have to make 
continuing concessions to conservative sensibilities both 
as regards outright hostility to the Soviet Union, and ade­
quate safeguards for American domestic economic interests. 
Joseph Alsop commented that "the record of the Congress 
clearly raises. . .a very serious issue as to the nature 
of American conservatism. Is it to be back to Harding, or 
is it to be forward to Stassen - or Dewey, or Lodge, or 
whomever you please?. . .The Congress has on the whole, 
shown strong back to Harding Inclinations. Cabot is exer­
cised about this, as are several of the younger Republi- 
136cans." Taft, launching his candidacy for the Presiden­
tial nomination at Columbus, revealed the difficulties that 1
1 -^Reports, July 4th, 1947, July 11th, 1947, McNaughton MSS.
The House Appropriations Committee refused to vote funds 
for relief for Hungary and Poland, New York Times, July 19th,i947# '
^^Alsop to Martin Sommers, July 29th, 1947, Alsop MSS. See 
also Diary, August 19th, 1947, Smith MSS.
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still lay in the way both of Republican unity and of the 
Marshall Plan in the run up to the election. Blaming con­
ditions in the world on Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, and 
on the Morgenthau Plan, which he said had wrecked the economy
of Europe, Taft was also extremely critical of Truman for
137lack of real cooperation with Congress. Taft accepted 
that Congress should not "give foreign countries a picture 
of a divided America" and should not interfere in foreign 
policy "unless that policy Involves us in the danger of an 
unnecessary war, or proposes to drain.the resources of our 
taxpayers and our productive labor to an unreasonable de­
gree". At the same time, however, he expressed the opinion 
that, in view of domestic inflation especially, American 
loans in future should be confined to providing the actual 
goods necessary to enable recipients to restore their own 
productive ability. "Certainly, we must move very cautiously 
and be sure that additional loans really furnish incentive 
to the foreign peoples Involved to work harder to support
themselves, and are not too burdensome on our own tax-
1 ^ 8payers." J Privately', to Hoover, Taft indicated his doubts 
about the whole approach to aiding Europe. "Like you, I am 
afraid that the manner in which the Marshall Plan was pre­
sented invites the foreign nations to gang up and make un­
reasonable demands. Instead of making them come to us and 
Imposing conditions on our assistance, we always seem to 
be begging them to let us help them as if it were to our 
financial or economic advantage to do so. As a matter of 
fact, the only advantage to us is a long-range desire to
l^ IlTew York Times, August 1st, 1947.
1 ^ Tbid:
401
see peace and prosperity in the world."
The strength of Republican conservatism in Congress 
undoubtedly made Vandenberg, Dulles and Hoover more impor­
tant to the Administration than they would otherwise have 
been. Each, in varying degrees, had reservations and fears 
about the course on which the United States was embarked, 
and each expected the Administration to make concessions to 
their viewpoint. All required a continued tough attitude 
to the Soviet Union. Dulles looked for increased emphasis 
on a united European policy. Hoover was concerned about 
Germany: in August, he publicly stated that if the Soviet 
Union failed to cooperate, the United States should insist 
as a condition of American aid, that Prance and Eritain 
;join in setting up a government in the three western zones
14of Germany, thereby reducing United States occupation costs. 
Most satisfied was Vandenberg, who was beginning to develop 
a much closer relationship with Secretary Marshall, and who 
was gratified that at long last the Administration had 
taken up his call for a western Ksmisphere fact, duly ne­
gotiated at Rio in August. Dulles was less happy, especially 
because of his fear that the Administration lacked the ability 
to co-ordinate policy over-all, and would imperil domestic 
support. Hoover, despite the issuance of JCS 1779, paving 
the way for re-industrialization of Germany, was not sur­
prisingly the least satisfied. Hot accepting the vital 
importance which both Vandenberg and Dulles had apparently
1^Robert A. Taft to Hoover, August 13th, 1947, Hoover MSS. 
140New York Times. August 10th, 1947.
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by 194-7 come to place on affairs in Europe, Hoover's funda­
mental concern remained with what he regarded as the unending 
and ultimately ruinous strain which the proposed European 
policy would impose on the United States. To his loyal 
friend, Cal O'laughlln, he wrote, "General Marshall has 
succeeded for the moment in complete division of the two 
worlds. But whether the present definite boundaries along 
the Iron Curtain and Manchuria will remain is speculative - 
for nations will remain within their-present allotted places
only so long as they can work the two now competitive Santa 
141Clauses." His conviction that Europeans and Asians were
past praying for, and that Americans were Innocents abroad,
remained firm; his unparallelled experience enabled him in
the eyes of many Republicans to speak with final authority
1.42on this subject.
Interim Aid *142
In the summer of 1947, large numbers of Congressmen 
hurried to Europe to Investigate conditions there for 
themselves. Inevitably reactions to what they saw differed. 
Senator Smith of Hew Jersey vías an easy convert to the ar­
guments of the British officials, Ambassador Douglas and 
Halter Lippmann that the Marshall Plan offered the sole 
alternative to chaos. On his journey, however, he met members 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, a conservative
]^Hoover to John O'Laughlin, July 23rd, 1947, Hoover MSS.
142Ironically,if Republican leaders were dissatisfied, left 
wing Democrats attributed them with too much influence; 
Pepper said that a resurgence of anti-liberalism and anti- 
internationalism had made "reaction in domestic policy 
the most potent force in shaping our foreign policy.",Hew York Times, August 17th, 1947. In June, Henry Wallace 
EacT linked Hoover and Vandenberg with proposals to make 
a separate peace with Germany and Austria; Ibid.. June 10th,
1947.
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dominated body, who suggested to him that "Operation Rathole"
143summed up their reaction. John Taber, the economy fiend
of the House of Representatives, who was reportedly "causing
sleepless nights in the White House", proved rather harder 
144to persuade. In Berlin he was quoted as having said that
the people of Europe were not working hard enough: "We 
in the United States got where we are because we worked 
harder". He also said that any country which went com­
munist, and he mentioned France, would get no help from the 
145United States. On his return he was reportedly not wholly 
opposed to foreign aid, but also of the opinion that the
r'
situation was neither as bad as the Administration or some
146of his colleagues had pictured it.
Taber and Smith were representatives of the two ex­
tremes. On balance, however, most Congressmen came back 
from Europe slightly more convinced than they had been be­
fore of the need for American assistance. The establishment 
of the Comintern in October, to fight the Marshall Plan, 
helped to create a sense of urgency in some quarters. Ever­
ett Dlrksen, for example, already committed to general poli­
cies of anti-communist spending, called on October 9th, in
Berlin, for quick American aid to prevent the Soviets
147establishing a "bridgehead on the Atlantic". On his re­
turn he apparently reported that the "betting" was that the
1 AAUnited States and Russia would be at war within four months. ° 
1^Diary, October 16th, 1947, Smith MSS.
^T^Alsop to Martin Sommers, October 25th, 1947, Alsop MSS. 
145^ew York Times, October 4th, 1947.
1^ Ibid., October 24th, 1947; O'Laughlln to Brigadier General Lavid Sarnoff, October 25th, 1947, O'Laughlin MSS.^.luew York Times. October 10th, 1947.
14oo»lh,ughlin to Brigadier General Sarnoff, November 14th,
1947, 0'Laughlin MSS.
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Similarly, John Vorys was talking about the possibility of 
war. In a widely distributed letter,he wrote: "I am more 
deeply concerned, than ever, about Russian aggression and 
infiltration since my return from Europe this fall.. . . 
although our small occupation forces could be over run by 
near-by Russian forces, this has not happened because 
Russia is not yet ready for the type of counter attack we 
would make, not in Germany or in Austria but in Russia;
Russia in not ready for that type of attack against the 
United States. I believe that we must not yield an inch to 
Russia anywhere, must prepare for possible war, that any 
aid we furnish must be used to strengthen anti-communist 
forces in Europe, and that we must have far more effective 
American Information and propaganda. , .n1^9
Clearly, what most Republican Congressmen were concerned 
about was the extent and potential of "communism” and/or 
Russian influence in western Europe. Aid programmes to 
Europe could be expected to be viewed solely in the light 
of that perceived threat. Mr. Bender of Ohio, a staunch op­
ponent of the earlier Truman Doctrine, attempted to counter 
the general impression brought back by quoting a report he 
had received from a Pittsburgh businessman, who had come 
back convinced that in France and England there was not the 
"slightest danger" of communism, and that this was simply 
a "bugaboo put out by our administration" to support their 
aid policies. ^ 0  Over-all, there is little doubt that the 1
1^Vorys, letter to various enquirers regarding broadcast 
by Walter Winchell, October 30th, 194-7, Vorys M33.
1^ Congressional Record, 93» Appendix, p. 4322.
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summer recess of 194-7 had done a significant amount to make 
Congress more receptive to further American aid. Hugh Scott 
of Pennsylvania claimed in a radio broadcast in Hobember that 
"four outspoken isolationists" he knew had completely changed 
their views about the American role in world affairs as a 
result of their visit.1'’1
Over the summer, the Administration decided to try
and establish an emergency programme of European aid, to
1 52meet what it regarded as a crisis situation. J On Septem­
ber 29th, those Congressional leaders who were available 
went to the White House, where Lovett duly warned that un­
less immediate aid was forthcoming, communism would sweep 
over most of western Europe.^ 3  Vandenberg was reportedly 
less than pleased at the President’s suggestion that it was 
now up to Congress, especially in view of the fact that the
Administration had known for five weeks about the economic
154situation in Europe. Despite his reservations, Vandenberg 
(and Senator Bridges and Representative Eaton) agreed to
1 55support interim aid, and to call their respective committees.
At this time,however, John Taber, chairman of the vital 
House Appropriations Committee,was in Europe, and both 
Senator Taft and Speaker Martin were making political tours 
in the west. This apparently left the burden of opposition 
on majority leader Ealleck. Halleck was reported as saying: 
"You must realize there is a growing resistance to these 1
151ibid.. Appendix, p. 4261.
152jn September, Lovett warned Vandenberg of "disturbing news" 
regarding the economic situation of Prance, Italy and even 
Britain; Robert A. Lovett, to Vandenberg, September 21st, 
1947, Vandenberg MSS.
153Report, October 3rd, 1947, McHaughton MSS.
]54£eport, October 4th, 1947, McHaughton MSS.'-^ Report, October 3rd, 1947, McHaughton MSS.
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programs. I have been out in the hustings, and I know.
The people don't like it. I think we should hear from our 
committees who are in Europe now, making studies specifically 
for the Congress. I don't feel that I can commit the House 
to rush into anything until we have had the Herter Committee 
report, and until Mr. Taber and the others return. There 
is a gfowing feeling that these relief programs with all 
the shipments of food and goods to Europe are pushing prices 
higher, creating greater scarcities here, and the people 
don't like it."*^
Although the only real representative of the economy 
wing at the White House meeting, Hallack's reaction was 
indicative of the difficulties which lay ahead in a political 
year. Out on the hustings, Joseph Martin and Robert Taft/ 
were revealing a determination both to blame the Administra­
tion for the state of the world, and to change the scope of 
the envisaged aid to 'Europe. Both men in their oratory 
rejected the New Deal -W.P.A. approach and preached self- 
help; Taft in particular was talking of ending foreign aid 
by 1950 and of getting the budget by that time down to 25- 
30,000,000,000 dollars. Taft was evidently trying to 
ensure that in 1948 the Republicans presented a real challenge 
to the Administration; this did not mean that he opposed 1
15°Report, October 9th, 1947, I-IcITaughton M33.
157Hew York Times, October 9th, 1947.
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"bipartisan foreign policy necessarily, indeed he gave
Senator Vandenberg a lot of credit for what he regarded as
1 88the beneficial aspects of it. At the same time, however,
he was concerned that the Republicans should challenge
both domestically and overseas what he represented as the
New Deal philosophy, which he saw as one of extravagance
and interference in people's lives. In the foreign sphere,
he charged, the New Dealers . .have. . .tried to use our
financial resources to force on the rest of the world the
manner in which they shall conduct their foreign exchange,
their foreign trade, and even their currency and other
1 89domestic affairs".
Not surprisingly, the coolness of hey Republicans, and 
some of the public comments of Taft and others, caused a 
great deal of concern amongst members of the Administration. 
James Reston drew comfort, however, from the fact that the 
revival of the Comintern would allow the Marshall Plan to 
be presented as a palitical rather than an economic 
m e a s u r e . N o t  until October 23rd, did the President 
call a special session, due to meet on November 17th. Poli­
tics was very much in the air when Congress assembled. The 
preceding weeks had seen a spate of Republican oratory and 
public comment on matters of foreign policy. Nobody seemed 
prepared to come out in direct opposition to the Marshall 
Plan: even Taft, who described the 8,000,000,000 figure 
for the first year, which, he said, had been proposed by 1
158ibid., September 26th, 194-7.159TSTcT.
1o0TbTT.. October 1 2th, 1947.
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some officials, as "beyond all reason", seemed inclined to 
go along provided the total cost was cut considerably. 1 ^1 
Vandenberg, however, was pessimistic, both about Taft and 
the general situation: He concluded that the people were 
moving back toward "isolationism", and that Taft had sensed 
this. 1 ^2 Against this, however, was the fact that Dewey 
had publicly endorsed the Marshall Plan in a speech in New 
York. While doing so, he blamed the situation which made 
it necessary on the past mistakes of the Administration, 
attributed all the successes of the bipartisan policy, 
since its creation by himself, to Rgpublicans, and promised 
that Republicans would see that the Marshall Plan was an 
efficient, business-like venture: "By the greatest of good 
fortune, both for our country and for the world, we have a 
Republican Congress. It understands the nature of business, 
and I am confident that these able men will bring forward
a sound program. It may well eventuate that the election
rof a Republican Congress last year not only saved the domes­
tic affairs of the United States, but it may well slso save
4 ~Zthe peace of the world". ^ Republicans, he said, would 
make American policy more effective: "It is time we got
1^1Ibid., November 5th, 1947; O'laughlin to Hoover, November 8th, 
>^1947, O'laughlin MSS.
10ciReport, November 17th, 1947, Me Naught on MSS.; Vandenberg, 
Private Papers, p. 379; on November 11th, Taft had announced 
his "absolute*1 opposition to the figure of 2,657,000,000 
Marshall had said was necessary for European aid, China 
and Army occupation costs for the balance of fiscal, year 
^1948; New York Times, November 12th, 1947.
1°^New York Times, November 6th, 1947; a copy of the speech 
is in the Dulles MSS.
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business men into a business job," instead of using "social
164planners who do not know a loom from a corn husker".
Dewey’s highly partisan endorsement of the Marshall 
Plan,faaS|like the rhetoric of Taft, Martin and others, an 
indication of the difficulties that would beset the passage 
of a major piece of foreign policy legislation in an elec­
tion year. When Congress met, President Truman showed him­
self able to enter into the spirit of things by linking 
his call for emergency aid to a call for domestic controls 
to check Inflation, a move which to Republicans seemed de­
liberately provocative. On the same day, Taft delivered 
a reply on radio, concentrating largely on domestic issues, 
but also arguing that the Administration had no real will 
to return to peace-time conditions: "Evidently under this 
Administration we can never return to a state of peace.
We still have war taxes. Vie have a war budget. Now we
165are to have war controls". His sole reference to foreign 
policy was to suggest that European aid would be useless
without changes of policy towards China and Germany, both
166of which had become common Republican charges. Arthur 
Sears Henning reported that Congressional Republicans in­
tended to fight the 1948 election along the lines laid down 
by Taft: they intended to reduce Marshall Plan expenditure, 
and to deal with rising prices by reducing government ex­
penditure, limiting exports, reducing taxes and controlling
¡ g lbld.
!i$Ibid.t November 18th, 1947.
1°°Ibid. -
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1 67the growth of credit.
Strongest support for the Taft position came, as always, 
from the House of Representatives. Congressman Bender of 
Ohio congratulated Taft for his work in the Senate, ex-
pecially since he "has had a number of ten percent Re-
168publicans included in the majority". Bender saw the 
President's speech as having been designed to pin the blame 
for inflation on the Republicans, for he knew full-well they 
would not enact controls; it was time, said Bender, that 
Republicans told the truth, that it was Democratic bungling 
at home and abroad which had led to inflation at home and
to turning practically the whole of Europe over to the
1 69Communists. A Michigan Representative noted that the 
C.E.E.C. report of September 1st, said nothing about com­
munism, but the Marshall Plan was "being sold to the people
of the United States on the proposition of preventing the
170spread of communism throughout western Europe". "Is it
not possible," asked Mr. Bender, "for a Member of Congress 
to be a defender of the Constitution and not convict him­
self of isolationism? Are we going to permit these labels 
to be pinned on us? " 1 ? 1
More significant, however, was the reaction of Dlrksen 
and Mundt, two influential members of the House whose sup­
port had been crucial over the question of aid to Greece
1¡ ^ Chicago Tribune, November 19th, 1947.
1^Congressional Record, 93, November 18th, 1947, P. 10650.SnHt--:----IZyibld., p. 10662.
171 Ibid., p. 10550.
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and Turkey earlier in the year. Dirksen’s position, it
became clear, was now very close to that of Vandenberg:
the United States, he felt,could not abandon Europe without
eventual danger to the American way of life. Large
amounts of American aid to Europe could be justified, he
argued, if they preserved American freedom, safeguarded
her right to do business with the rest of the world, and
172prevented another war. Mundt of South Dakota, who 
like Dirksen had been to Europe over the recess, was pre­
pared, with safeguards,to go ahead with aid to Europe. He 
was, however, not prepared to commit himself to a five,
four or three year programme in advance: the United States
173must retain freedom of action, he said. The speeches 
by Dirksen and Mundt, both nationalists and midwesterners, 
indicated that,provided interim aid was portrayed as an 
anti-communist measure, there would be enough support in 
the House to carry It.
On November 24th, the Interim Aid bill was reported 
out by the Foreign Relations Committee, designed to pro­
vide 1597,000,000 for food, coal, petroleum, fertilizers, 
cotton and medicine for France, Italy and Austria; It was
not, said Vandenberg, meant to be the first instalment
174on the Marshall Plan. In his masterly presentation, 
Vandenberg dealt with all the issues that had been raised 
by Republicans in preceding weeks. He claimed that more
II!Ibid., pp. 10651-2.
l^rlbTT., November 20th, 1947, pp. 10693-4.
1'4Ibid., November 24th, 1947, pp. 10701-4.
412
careful preparation had gone into this than previous
measures, and he pointed out various safeguards which
partly as a result of Republican criticism of previous
bills had been written in: separate administration by
the relief administrator created by the previous bill;
a revolving fund, requiring all goods to be paid for in
local currencies, the expenditure of which was subject to
American direction. Vandenberg regretted the omission
of China from the bill, but commented that there was no
practical way in which Congress could initiate an aid
programme for China, and promised that China would be
176includedin subsequent plans. Ke also regretted that
the President had tied Interim Aid to his anti-inflation
message; unlike the long-term programme, interim aid was
not large enough to have a significant influence, although
he noted that provision had been made for 2 5% of the total
177to be spent outside the United States,
In his presentation, Vandenberg again revealed the 
extent to which he had come to differ from Taft and the 
Rationalists. Still taking care, as always, to justify 
his position on the basis of self-interest; he now saw 
it as the "self interest which knows that. . .there can 
be no peace for us or anybody else which does not stem
111Ibid., p. 10704.'°lbid. At the insistence of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 60 million dollars was added for China; Vanden 
berg agreed to leave it in because to take it out would 
look like a negation of the desire to give aid., ibid.t 
December 15th, 1947, p.■11346. In Rovember and December 
there was a great deal of Republican support for China, 
including speeches by Dewey in Rew York (Rovember 24th) 
and Rew Hampshire (Rovember 20th); at a dinner In Washing ton in December, attended by over 100 Congressmen, Dewey 
spoke of the strategic importance of China in the event 
of a war with the Soviet Union. Report, December 13th, 
1947, McRaughton MSS.
177congresslonal Record, 93, Rovember 24th, 1947, p. 10704.
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from justice". It was furthermore a self-interest 
which realized that western civilisation could not indefin­
itely be preserved alone, which knew that the United States 
could not "Indefinitely prosper in a broken world" and
which recognized that any revolution would "rate America
178as the top-prize scalp". Vandenberg had seemingly,as 
his enemies had long alleged, joined the Internationalists. 
In December he was to decline a request by National Chair­
man Carroll Reece to make a Republican broadcast: "I am 
acutely conscious of the fact that I cannot speak for the 
Republican Party on this subject because the Party is 
sharply (and often bitterly) divided. . . 1  do not wish to 
embarrass any of my Party associates who certainly have 
a complete right to disagree with me. This is their Party 
just as much as it is mine. There is no need (and cer-' 
tainly there is no advantage) in needlessly aggravating 
this situation".1^
Despite all the fears of October and early November,
Interim Aid went through the Senate without difficulty.
Taft,having joined with 19 Republicans and 11 Democrats in
an abortive attempt to reduce the amount authorized, from
597,000,000 to |400,000,000, signified that despite his
1 ftf)objections he would support the bill. He disliked, he 
said, the whole approach of asking recipients what they 
wanted; he preferred simply to make surplus available, on
¡Zglbld., pp. 1 0 7 0 1-2 .
1 Vandenberg to Carroll Reece, December 17th, 1947, Van­
denberg MSS. In November, Reece had come under fire from Internationalists for having claimed that the Presi 
dent had cooked up a "phony" issue to recall Congress; 
Report, November 28th, 1947, McNaughton MSS. Alexander 
Smith to Carroll Reece, December 10th, 1947, Smith MSS.
1^ Congressional Record. 93, November 26th, 1947, p. 10910; 
ibid., November 28th, 1947, P. 10928
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a credit basis, rather than trying to make good the trade
deficit of every country "which will wreck the United States
if we go through with it". The emergency, he felt, gave
Congress no choice but to go along; but he hoped that in
the long-range programme a board would be created, with full
authority to administer the aid in the light of domestic
181economic needs. In the event, only three Republicans
1 82and three Democrats opposed the Interim Aid bill.
In the House, the survival instincts of the Republican 
majority also enabled them to paper over the divisions.
The chairman of the Rules Committee, Leo Allen of Illinois, 
in introducing the rule, announced his personal opposition, 
on the grounds that passage of Interim Aid would be inter­
preted as "tantamount to the passage of the Marshall Plan
1 83when it comes before the House". His over-all opposi­
tion was, he indicated, largely on the grounds of the eco­
nomic effects; it would, he said, ultimately reduce the 
United States to the level of Europe, for the same reasons: 
"the fundamental causes of today’s economic distress in 
Europe are found in government policies that have stifled
initiative, controlled enterprise, upset currencies, and
184disrupted production". Majority leader Halleck bitterly 
attacked the Administration for the manner in which it had 
called the special session and injected the issue of prices
}ollbld.. pp. 10930-1. 
gXlbld.. December 1st, 1947, p. 10980.
-^Ibld., December 4th, 1947, P. 11035; members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee had made strongly anti- 
Russian statements before the Rules Committee, designed 
to make Interim Aid seem necessary to prevent Russian 
take-over of France, Italy and Austria; New York Times, 
December 4th, 1947.
1^ Congressional Record. 93, December 12th, 1947, p. 11036.
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into the debate. Despite the bitterness and division,
the House, as a result of clever manoeuvring by Joseph
Martin, passed the bill by a voice vote, to avoid bringing
1the divisions out into the open.
In Interim Aid, as in all other pieces of foreign 
policy legislation requiring large appropriations, Repub­
licans in Congress went along reluctantly. Opposition to 
the President, at a time of perceived crisis, would have 
been politically suicidal. The tactic seemed to be to go 
along, criticize past failures, and take credit for what 
were regarded as good features of policy both in the past 
and the present. Throughout 194-7, the dimensions of a 
Republican long-term policy were becoming apparent: this 
policy required a consistent anti-communist posture; it re­
quired aid programmes to be administered separately from 
both State Department and White House if possible, to pro­
vide loyal, competent and efficient administration based 
on an awareness,(which the State Department was judged in­
capable of having) of American domestic economic interests; 
it required also recognition of the importance to the United 
States of China, which at the initiative of the House of 
Representatives was Included ultimately in the Interim Aid 
bill; it required also a change of policy in Germany. On
1 jj5ibia. t December 11th, 1947, p. 11283.
1°°Report, .December 12th, 194-7, McNaughton MSS.
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all these matters, Republican leaders and Congress could 
basically agree, and what Is more could satisfy themselves 
that their record was distinctive and superior to that of 
the Administration. Where the Republicans got into diffi­
culties, however, was in evaluating the importance of Europe 
to the United States, and how much they were prepared to 
devote to achieve their aims there.
By the end of 1947, the majority of the Congressional 
Party still appeared to stand with Taft and Hoover in plac­
ing prime importance on a restoration of Normalcy in the 
United States. It is not that Taft and Hoover regarded 
Europe as unimportant, but that neither regarded it as 
vital. Seeing the Russian challenge as largely an ideologi­
cal rather than a military challenge, they placed first the 
need to make the American system work properly at home; 
and this, by their definition, it could not do if it con­
tinued to pour their wealth overseas and to over-tax the 
American people. They also could not accept that the 
United States had any great need, economically, for the 
multilateral world. In New York, in November, Taft had 
commented that the Administration could not "get away from 
the New Deal principle that government spending is a good 
thing in itself. They so overdraw the picture to convince 
our people that these grants were entirely for our own 
benefit that even the Europeans came to believe they were 
conferring a favour on us by accepting our loans - that we 
had to export to prevent a depression."1®^ For Taft then, 
aid to Europe was primarily humanitarian, and ooncerned with
18?New York Times, November 11th, 194-7.
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America’s interest in bringing about peace in the world; 
given these assumptions, his continual attempts to reduce 
American commitments were logical.
Republican leaders, then, by the end of 194-7 were 
basically agreed on the kind of European peace they wished 
to see, but they were divided as to how to get there (be­
tween, for example, the pro-French views of Dulles and 
the pro-German views of Hoover), and even more divided by 
their evaluation of the importance of Europe to the United 
States. United in their concern to see the restoration 
of a particular kind of political economy in the United 
States, they were divided over the extent to which they 
gave this prime importance, or, at the other extreme, saw 
this as ultimately dependent on the type of foreign policy 
carried out. The task of 1948 was to be that of somehow 
preserving unity'in the face of unprecedented foreign de­
mands on the United States in peace-time, so as to assure 
the election of a Republican President of the United States. 
Even Yandenberg, for all his association with non-partisan- 
ship, was. concerned that this should happen; despite its 
divisions, he saw the Republican Party still as being the 
only Party truly committed to liberty, and therefore. the 
only one to be able to make American foreign policy work.
To a close friend in Michigan in early 1948, Vandenberg 
still described himself as a ’’fundamentalist". He agreed 
that "the disintegration of Constitutional liberty in 
America would end the hope of the world”, although he 
also believed that governments had to evolve, and he cited 
the development of social responsibility in the United States.
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But, ha continued, "the mere statement of this fact un­
avoidably involves the need for greatest prudence and 
caution lest this evolution shall destroy the 'fundamentals' 
from which I think it logically springs. And at this point 
our minds completely meet when you say that the present
Democratic Party cannot be entrusted with any such respon- 
188sibilities". In foreign policy also he revealed a con­
tinuous concern with fundamentals; as in domestic affairs, 
his concern was with re-evaluating traditional policies 
in the light of changed conditions, rather than in radical 
change. Dulles'approach was very similar, and so also 
presumably through the latter's influence was Dewey's. 
Increasingly towards the end of 194-7 Vandenberg and Dewey 
were using such traditional symbols as "efficiency", 
"self-help", "hard-headedness", and even a "business job", 
to justify their support and to assett a Republican contri­
bution to what seemed a radical departure in American foreign' ,tl}eypolicy. Although/accepted, unlike Taft and Hoover, the 
premise that the American system could no longer survive 
in a communist dominated world, which was the essence of 
the earlier "One World" position, through a mixture of 
pragmatism and conviction they continued to be sensitive 
to the traditional concern with over-commitment and over­
stretching of resources.
1 88Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 424-5.
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CHA.PTER NINE
1948: The Politics of Unity 
All Republicans knew that 1948 was to be their year.
With the war, the depression and Franklin Roosevelt behind 
them, nothing appeared to stand in the way of the restora­
tion of the United States to political Normalcy. 1948 was, 
however, to pose a test to the foreign policy leadership 
which Arthur Vandenberg had patiently sought to develop 
since the war. Although the Republicans had avoided the 
serious "splintering" over the Interim Aid programme which 
Vandenberg feared, 1948 was likely to be an even more cri­
tical time for party unity than the previous year.^ The 
first session of the 80th Congress had failed to bring 
about the changes which the majority in the Congressional 
Party were committed to; Instead it had seen the Party's 
commitment to domestic economy frustrated by increased 
foreign commitments. Inevitably, nerves had become frayed; 
frustration and resentment, both at the Administration and 
Vandenberg, had Increased. The midwestern wing of the Party 
was determined that the Administration should be held account­
able for its past mistakes, and that the Republicans would 
not fight another "me-too" campaign in 1948.2
The Chicago Tribune was foremost advocate of a fiery, partisan
1Vandenberg to Leverett Saltonstall, November 17th, 1947,
Vandenberg MSS.
2Hoover to Colonel Orville Bullington, November 11th,
1947, Hoover MSS; Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 48.
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campaign. In Its view "Only a real, vigorous campaign for
economy at home and for a foreign policy founded upon Ameri-
• ■*
can welfare" would enable the Republicans to win in 1948.^
The prospect of the re-nomination of Thomas Dewey would mean
that Mr. Truman's worries were at an end. Dewey, it
commented, was a "me-too" candidate who "actually claims
credit for what is called the bipartisan foreign policy,
which is to say that he is for the Truman-Marsha11 pro-
4gram in all its essentials and most of its details". The 
Chicago-Tribune's real venom, however, was reserved for 
Vandenberg, whom it dismissed as a Democrat: "He was able 
to pose as a Republican after going over to the Hew Deal, 
and it is a sad commentary on the weakness.of other Re-
15publican senators that they accept the impersonation".
Talk of Vandenberg's likely candidacy for the Presidency 
in view of an anticipated Taft-Dewey deadlock was greeted
with horror by the proprietor of the Tribune. and other
6Republicans of somewhat less extreme views. "Hoover hates 
the Michigan Senator," commented Cal O'Laughlin.^ In Feb­
ruary he reported how the Old Guard in seeking an alterna­
tive . to Vandenberg had been considering Joseph Martin: "To 
block Vandenberg Speaker Martin is being boomed, but while 
practically all of the House Republicans are back of him,
^Chicago Tribune, January 16th, 1948.
_Ibid.7 January 20th, 1948.
2Ibid., January 26th, 1948.
“O'iaughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, December 6th, 
1947,.O'Laughlin MSS.
7Ibid. . ... '
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he is a poor speaker, his relatives are all Catholics and 
he is unimpressive in appearance. To look Martin over a 
dinner was given for him in lew York. . .It was attended 
by prominent republican (sic) and financial leaders. He
Odid not make a good impression."0 Still, he added, "Hoover
gwould infinitely prefer Martin to Vandenberg."
Whatever his prestige amongst syndicated columnists,
with the major eastern newspapers, and with the small group
of Republican Internationalists, Vandenberg had by 1948 be-
10come a controversial figure amongst Republicans. James 
Reston, perhaps closer to him than any other journalist, com­
mented in February:
"The Senator from Michigan has been walking the 
knife-edge for months between the broad objectives 
of the Administration's policy, which he approves, 
and the reluctant halfway policies of so.jnany of 
his colleagues, who are neither isolationist nor 
internationalist but somewhere in between, at sea.
"The genius of his leadership in this field is that he 
understands and sympathizes with both sides. Al­
though he has really made the crossing himself, 
heBjected'; the Willkie technique of storming the 
uncertain. He makes concessions from time to 
time to both sides, never really satisfying either 
and often Infuriating both. But on the whole he 
maintains control of the situation and when he 
stands firm, his party hesitates to attack full- 
front. "'1
Reston's appraisal would seem accurate. Those who accused 
him, with the Chicago Tribune, of being a mere "me-too"
QO'laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, February 14th, 
1948, O'laughlin MSS.
°Ibld.
lOThere is no doubt that the press did their best to push 
Vandenberg's candidacy in 1948; neither Taft nor Dewey 
were popular. Vandenberg's continual good publicity did 
not help to win friends amongst fellow Republicans. Re­
portedly the editor of the Saturday Evening Post felt that 
Taft was "as dangerous to the national security of this 
country as Chamberlain ever was to Britain's"., Martin 
Sommers to Stewart Alsop, March 17th, 1948, Alsop MSS.
11 New York Times. February 8th, 1948.
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were being a shade harsh; he still in fact shared the basic 
convictions which formed part of the Republican creed, as 
well as a lingering distrust and distaste for the Demo­
cratic Party. His private writings reveal the continual 
dialogue he conducted within himself, as between the demands 
of national unity at a time which he perceived as being one
of crisis, and the needs both of a strong and coherent
1 2two-party system, and of a sound domestic economy. In 
the fall of 194-7, on the eve of the greatest overseas ex­
penditure on record in times of peace, his misgivings were 
apparent. To Robert Lovett, he wrote in connection with 
the proposed construction of a United Nations building?
"I can make no sort of commitment regarding Congressional
attitudes respecting this difficult and delicate problem,
13I can make no commitment for myself." Would not such a 
proposal, he asked, "tend to arm the critics who will argue 
thatall our aid programs are a futility? Does this not 
encourage the rapidly growing isolationism which argues that 
UN is bound to be a pipeline into the U. S. Treasury?" He 
continued, "The next Congress will be asked for many billions 
in foreign emergency (which it undoubtedly is). Only a 
desperate emergency could possibly Justify these demands 
upon our American resources." Since other nations had for 
the most part insufficient dollars to pay their share of 
the United Nations construction, he wondered whether their
'For an earlier introspective account of his concern about 
the philosophic basis of bipartisanship, see Vandenberg, Private Papers. pp. 54-8-50.
 ^^ Vandenberg to Robert A. Lovett, October 30th, 194-7, 
Vandenberg MSS.
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desire to proceed was not "based solely on the too-preva-
lent concept that Uncle Sam is so rich that he can pay for
anything."1^ To his wife, he wrote from Washington while
plans were being made for Interim Aid: "The confidential
reports from Europe are that the Commies are losing ground
(even their satellites are restless). . .This seems to be
the time for us *to make hay*. But if our friends in
Western Europe are allowed to starve and freeze to death
this winter, the Commies will be completely back in the
saddle. On the other hand, we must keep our own feet on
the ground and avoid commitments that would disrupt our
1 5own economy. Where to draw the line!"
Vandenberg's task in ,1948. was somehow to preserve Re­
publican unity for the election, whilst at the same time
giving support to further developments in European policy.
16The prospects of so doing were not good. Aside from the 
inevitable conflict that seemed to be shaping up for the 
nomination between eastern and midwestern Republicanism, 
there still remained to be resolved the question of the 
Marshall Plan. Despite the ultimate ease with which In­
terim Aid had been negotiated through Congress in December, 
a great deal of Republican disquiet about various aspects 
of policy had been revealed. Apart from the pressure, es­
pecially from the House, to include China in Interim Aid, 
Senator Vandenberg had had to deal with a determined attempt
!1^ Vandenberg, Private Papers, p, 378.
'°Vorys to L. E. Suizer, February 12th, 194-8, Vorys MSS.
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by the Senate Appropriations Committee to prevent all re­
parations being paid from Germany, a policy which to that
Committee appeared inconsistent with the objectives both of
17Interim Aid and the Marshall Plan. It was clear that to 
gain Republican support, the Marshall Plan would have to 
be as explicitly and consistently anti-communist as the 
Interim Aid programme; it was also clear that some arrange­
ment would have to be made, especially in view of the elec­
tion, for the whole administration of the programme to be
18independent of the White House and the State Department.1
To add to the potential difficulties of the Plan was the
fact that Herbert Hoover, like Taft, was full of scepticism
about it. Hoover had already declined an invitation by
Henry Stimson to be a member of the citizen's group he was
19organizing in support of the Marshall Plan. Speaking in 
New Yprk, in November, he had suggested that the only real
Q  f^/flongresslonal Record. 93, December 19th, 1947, pp. 11680-90. 1 °0' Laughlin to Brigadier General Samoff, December 6th,
194-7; O'laughlin MSS.; Preeland comments that the Admin­istration's rhetoric to try to pass the Marshall Plan was 
forcing it into policies that were not intended, op. clt.. 
p. 200; Gael Sullivan of the Democratic National Committee 
regarded the military emphasis being put on the Marshall 
Plan as "dynamite" and wrote that "all of us here have 
been emphasizing th fact that it's.a blueprint for win­ning the peace for generations to come." He wanted the 
Administration to de-emphasize the nationalistic slant 
which appeared to be put on the Plan, and concluded, "I 
believe it is imperative to take this program out of uni­
form," Gael Sullivan to J. Howard McGrath, November 24th, 
q 1947, J. Howard McGrath MSS., Truman Library.
'"Hoover to Henry L. Stimson, November 7th, 1947, Hoover MSS.
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solution to Europe's difficulties was a move away from eco­
nomic utipias, back on to "the only road to freedom from
20hunger and cold". In the Hew Year, Senator Smith of New
21Jersey found him still sceptical.
In the discussion of the Marshall Plan, Vandenberg, for 
the first time since he had assumed the role of G. 0. P. 
foreign policy leader, was to be faced with organized op­
position among Senate Republicans, and the open hostility 
of the House Republican leadership. Initial reactions in 
December to the proposed 17 billion, four-year plan, had
indicated the difficulties. Taft, unsurprisingly, was
22prepared to consider only a smaller, one year trial.
James Reston argued that Vandenberg had advised the Presi­
dent against the four year, 17 billion plan even before
23Taft's announcement. On December 22nd, Vandenberg announ­
ced that he reserved judgement on the programme, although 
he reaffirmed his commitment to "saving Western Europe
on a self-help basis" which he regarded as essential "from
oAthe standpoint of intelligent American self-interest".
In the House meanwhile there were reports that Republican 
leaders were talking of drafting a "Republican Marshall 
Plan", a move which Foreign Affairs committee chairman, 
Charles Eaton, publicly opposed.2^ Despite the signs ofl
POHew'York Times, November 21st, 194-7.
2^Diary, January 1st, 1948, Smith MSS.
2lNew York Times, December 21st, 1947.
2?Ibid., December 22nd, 1947. 
t^Ibld., December 23rd, 1947.
2^Ibid., December 24th, 1947.
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a build-up of Republican opposition, Cabell Phillips had 
earlier reported that supporters of the bill were confident 
that, giving safeguards, it would pass; he reported one 
Senator as saying; "The greatest help we had in getting 
the interim-aid bill through came straight from Moscow.
I see no reason to think we can’t count on more of the 
same with ERP."2^
In January a group of 18-20 Senators, led by Wherry,
tjegan to organize opposition to the Administration proposals.
Both Taft and Vandenberg refused an invitation to attend
their first meeting, which was reportedly a source of relief
to Wherry, who was not on good personal terms with either:
"When they get into a meeting it is just like a Republican
27conference - nobody else gets a chance to talk," Wherry's 
denial that the meeting was a move to organize an opposition 
failed to impress Vandenberg; privately he commented: "I 
see the boys are advertising their meeting as a move to­
wards conciliation; but that's not the way it was planned
28by some of those die-hards." The meeting, which was at­
tended by some 18 Republican Senators, largely from the 
midwest and mountain states, ultimately led to the formu­
lation of a set of alternative proposals for European re­
construction. Continuing to meet through until March, the
2^Ibld., December 14th, 1947.
2'Report, "The Marshall Plan - The 20 Men (NA & INTL)", 
January 17th, 1947, p. 3, McNaughton MSS.
28Ibld.. p. 6.
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committee of 204as It came to be called, was composed of 
diverse elements. Some, such as Malone (Nevada) and Kern 
(Missouri) were in effect outright opponents of large scale 
aid for reconstruction; others, such as Knowland (Calif.) 
and Ball (Minn.) were primarily concerned with modifying the 
proposal of the Administration. As a whole, the group was 
able to agree in calling for significant changes in the con­
ception of the Marshall Plan, and for a reduction in the 
amount authorized.2^ On many points, Vandenberg was able 
to move towards the viewpoint of the committee of 20; in 
some respects he still shared their reservations and con­
cerns. In particular, he was able to meet their views on 
the administrative set-up of E.R.P., on the provision for 
a Congressional watch-dog committee to oversee Its opera­
tions, and on the writing in of provisions for a termination 
of aid should progesss on the part of recipients be unsat­
isfactory.^ Where, however, he failed to make concessions 
was over the demand that aid be given in the form of speci­
fic production prospects in basic industries, to be con­
trolled by the Administrator. In the bill reported out 
by the Foreign Relations Committee provision was made for 
such projects, but they were not to become the core of the 
programme; the basis of the E.R.P. was, in line with war­
time multilateral planning, the desire to revive trade
^Accounts of the group's activities reported in the New 
York Times. January 31st, .1948, February 7th, 1948, Feb­
ruary .8th, 1948, February 15th, 1948, March 1st, 1948. 
3°Report, February 12th, 1948, McNaughton MSS; New York 
Times, February 13th, 1948, March 1st, 1948; Vandenberg, 
Private .Papers, pp. 387-9.
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through subsidizing the dollar deficits of European coun­
tries. 51 This approach was one which the Nationalists from 
Taft and Hoover down could not accept, since they failed 
to accept the basic premise of the importance of an ex­
pansion of trade to the American economy.
By the time that Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
had ended in early February, Vandanberg had by amendment 
taken the steam out of the opponents of the bill. Joseph 
Alsop, although fa*r from an objective observer, commented 
on February 6th, "There will, I think, be an ERP compromise, 
which will pass, in effect, as the Vandenberg bill. He is 
going to emerge from this session as a really big figure, 
while poor Taft, I fear , will look mighty puny."-^ Still 
however, there remained the question of the amount that 
would be authorized. In January, Herbert Hoover had issued 
a statement paring the Administration request for 
$6,800,000,000 for the first fifteen months down to 
$3,000,000,000 plus a further $1,000,000 for loans for 
the first twelve months. v Taft also criticized the Ad­
ministration figure as being too high, as did the committee 
of 20. ^  To their criticism was added that of the chairman 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Bridges, 
who alleged that the Administration had inflated theirxe-
IpNew York Times, February 13th, 1948.
^Alsop to Martin Sommers, February 6th, 1948, Alsop MSS. 
-^Chicago Tribune. January 22nd, 1948; O'laughlin to Briga- 
dier General David Sarnoff, January 23rd, 1948, O'laughlin4m s s.
J New York Times, January 19th, 1948.
-429-
quested amount by 2 billion dollars.^5 Many Republicans 
were inclined to go along with the four billion required 
up to January, 1949, by which time they were convinced 
that a Republican President would be able to sort things 
out. Thomas Dewey, however, the favourite to be next 
President, lent his weight to the demand for the full re- 
quest. As reported out by the Foreign Relations Comm­
ittee, the bill proposed an initial authorization of
§5,3Q0,000,000 for 12 months, which represented a cut in
37the time span of the initial period, not in amount. Both 
Taft and the committee of 20 were dissatisfied with this, 
and Taft predicted that Congress would reduce it.^®
Despite all the fears which had been generated, the 
attempt led by Taft to reduce the initial authorization 
to $4,000,000,000 dollars, was the most serious challenge 
which Vandenberg had to face. During the debate, there was 
some evidence of organized opposition, but it was largely 
confined to the die-hard members of the committee of 20.
On the Taft amendment to reduce initial authorization to 
$4 billion dollars, 24 Republicans voted against the amend­
ment and 23 in favour. ^  On the final vote, only 13 Sena-
40tors.voted against. . Taft's failure to lend his prestige 
to the dissidents was clearly crucial; despite his well- 
known views, he made it clear that he would oppose any
^ Chicago Tribune, January 27th, 1948.
5°New York Times. February 13th, 1948.
3%Ibid., February 14th, 1948.
¿Hlbid.. February 15th, 1948.
^Congressional Record. 94. March 12th. 1948, p. 2708. 
40lbld.. March ~13th, 1948, p. 2793.
-430-
amendment designed to gut the E.R.P.; his support of the 
bill was justified solely in terms of its political import 
as an;.anti-communist measure, it did not mean that he had 
come to accept the economic theories underlying its whole 
approach.^ What perhaps gave the bill an easier passage 
than might have been predicted was the Czechoslovak coup 
at the end of February, and the impending sense of crisis. 
If all else failed, Congressional Republicans could always 
be relied to respond in an atmosphere of crisis. For 
Taft, with his eye on the Presidential nomination, there 
was an added incentive to show himself both statesmanlike 
and willing to compromise.
In the House of Representatives the outcome was less
predictable. The House Foreign Affairs Committee had
initially got itself into a tangle over the proposal of
Christian Herter, chairman of the Select Committee on
Foreign Aid, that an Independent corporation be created to
oversee all foreign spending, a view undoubtedly influenced
by Hoover. In the event it was decided to leave this
question open, especially in view of the fact that the
Senate had under Vandenberg's guidance already plumped for
the alternative Brookings Institution recommendation of an
42independent government agency. Then Speaker Martin and 
Majority Leader Halleck caused consternation by Insisting 
on an "omnibus" foreign aid bill, Including not only the 
proposed E.R.P., but also Greek-Turkish aid and aid to
Ibid., March 12th, 1948, p. 2641, 2650.
42Poole, pp. 238-40, 245.
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China. Informed of this decision "by the House leadership 
whilst on the Senate floor, Vandenberg apparently regarded 
it as direct challenge to him. Against the House leader­
ship, Yandenberg invoked the crisis in Europe. He warned 
Congressional leaders that there was a real danger of 
communist take-over of Italy; if the Republicans delayed
E.R.P., they would get the blame, he said. J Vandenberg's 
warning was effective in speeding up House consideration, 
if not in persuading the leadership to drop the "omnibus" 
approach. James Wadsworth noted in his diary that a 
meeting of the Republican Steering Committee had revealed 
that "a large majority have come to a realization that we 
must help the Western Democracies in Europe in their efforts
to get together and cooperate in their defense against the
44menace of communism". To Herbert Hoover, Christian
Herter wrote of the Increasing pressure on the House to act 
45quickly.
Hoover himself had changed step over the E.R.P... He 
still had his doubts, and in particular he hoped that Latin 
America, whose economy was more complementary to that of 
Europe, would be brought into the plan so that American 
costs could be cut, ultimately, he hoped by 50%. Many
of his original objections he felt had been removed, and 
in the last week of March, he addressed a public letter to
^Report, March 13th, 194?, Mcllaughton MSS; Diary, March 16th, 
a a1948, Wadsworth MSS.
77Diary, March 16th, 1948, Wadsworth MSS.
^Christian Herter to Hoover, March 15th, 1948, Hoover MSS. 
^“Memorandum, March 6th, 1948, pp. 3-4, John Taber file,
Hoover MSS.
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Speaker'Martin, which could not fail to reinforce the al­
ready considerable pressures on the House: "I realize 
that many approach this gigantic experiment with great 
apprehension and a realization of the sacrifices it will 
mean to our people. . . .However, if it should produce 
economic, political and self-defense unity in Western 
Europe, and thus a major dam against Russian aggression,
it would stem the tide now running so strongly against
47civilization and peace."
March, 1948 was a frenetic month. The Czechoslovak 
coup, the forthcoming Italian elections, the report from 
General Clay that war might come, all helped to give the 
impression of ineluctable crisis. In Congress there was
48open talk of military confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
Hot all Republicans were convinced about the crisis, but 
scepticism did not make it easier to deal with Administra­
tion requests. Hoover was inclined to see it as an Adminis­
tration tactic "to try to blitz the House into accepting 
the Senate bill. We saw exactly the same blitz over U:. 
N.R.R.A., Bretton Woods and the British Loan. In every 
case such action has made common sense management and con­
trol of these questions impossible of enactment. I still
hope the House can do something to make the administration
49of this bill more sensible". Yet Hoover's later letter
^Hoover to Joseph Martin, March 24th, 1948, copy attached 
to Hoover to Bernard M. Baruch, March 24th, 1948, Bernard 
._M. Baruch MSS., Princeton University Library. 
y°Report, March 12th, 1948, McUaughton MSS.
49noover to Christian Herter, March 13th, 1948, Hoover MSS.
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to Martin -was In its own way a recognition of the pressures
under which Congress was, whether by design or not, being
forced to work. The death of Masaryk, President Truman's
speech of March 17th calling on Congress for universal
military training, the Brussels Treaty, the Russian exit
from the Allied Control Council in Berlin, and subsequent
restrictions on transport and travel, all, to an historically
minded generationssuggested a strong possibility of war.
"It is accurate to say," wrote Representative Wadsworth
in his diary, "that the opposition to this bill labored
in large measure under the same delusions as were evident
back in 1939, 1940, and 1941."-*® In the event, it was
perhaps surprising that as many as 61 House Republicans
held out in opposition to the omnibus foreign aid bill.-*1
Although, at the insistence of John Vorys, the House got
its way over aid to China, and incorporation of Greek-
Turkish aid, the real victory once more belonged to Van-
denberg.^2 On the same day, as it voted for the 6billion
dollar aid bill, Congress also voted to override the
President's veto of the tax bill. The Chicago Tribune
commented that it was a pity that the men who led the tax
fight did not control foreign affairs. In the Tribune's
view, Vandenberg and Eaton had put the Republican Party
53under a tremendous political handicap.
5®Diary, March 31st, 1948, Wadsworth MSS.
5'Congressional Record. 94, March 31st, 1948, p. 3321; the 
bill passed 329-74, Republican figures were 171-61, ibid. 
->2Westerfleld, p. 26 3; Vorys to Harld S. Stacy, October 9th, 
1948, Vorys MSS.53ghlcago Tribune, April 6th, 1948.
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Congressional authorization of the Marshall Plan was, 
as Joseph Alsop had predicted earlier in the Mew Year, a 
tremendous victory for Vandenberg. Whipib it inevitably 
increased talk about his possible nomination, it had not
cAincreased his popularity in Congress. Neither, despite
the months of patient compromise, had the E.R.P. greatly
contributed to unity over foreign affairs. It was true
that the impending integration of Germany into a western
bloc, and the emphasis on European unity and self-help
were music to Republican ears, but domestic Normalcy still
seemed as far off as possible. In the wake of aid for
European reconstruction, followed talk of military guarantees
and peace-time arms aid. In March,'Cal O’laughlin wrote,
". . .we are doing in the west precisely what Stalin has
done and is doing on eastern ¿„Europe. In other words, we
are supporting the formation of a bloc which will depend
on us to lend lease equipment just as in the world war,
and it follows that as in that holocaust, our manpower
55will be available for another struggle in Europe.' The
formation of a military bloc! . was not explicitly put in
was it the
the original Marshall Plan idea, nor,/fcart of /policy formu­
lations of Dulles or, still less, Hoover. Dulles had, in 
particular, always been consistent in his opposition to 
reliance primarily on a military response to the Soviet
5*ln later years, John Yorys said that although he frequently 
conferred with Vandenberg, he did not do so openly, because 
ofsome members of the House and Senate who would not have approved, Poole, pp. 412-3.
-^o'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, March 6th, 1948, 0'Laugh1in MSS.
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challenge; as late as January, 1948, he had warned about 
the dangers of letting the military make United States policy, 
and of striking a military posture. The United States, he 
had told the Foreign Policy Association, In characteristic 
Dullesian language, must combat Soviet expansion "with
56food and fuel and with creative ideas and lofty ideals".
Not surprisingly, Dulles was to have serious reservations
about the proposed regional alliance which was being seriously
57considered from the spring of 1948 in Washington.
The paradox was, however, that Congressional Republicans 
could not be roused to make large scale appropriations to 
meet a purely economic and ideological challenge; especially 
in view of the fact that the majority did not share the 
"One World" view of the indivisibility of liberty. To Re­
publican Congressmen, a military threat made far more sense 
and was far better justification for large scale expendi­
ture. The Administration, by design or through genuine 
confusion, did not always speak with one voice as to exactly 
what kind of threat it was trying to combat, but increasingly 
resorted to crisis tactics to force Congress to act. Such 
tactics caused disquiet and scepticism. Taft, for example, 
refused to get hysterical about the Czechoslovakian coup:
-^ITew York Times. January 18th, 1948; in December, on his 
return from the London Foreign Ministers' Meeting, which had included for him a visit to Paris in a state of poli­
tical crisis, he described the danger as "not military 
but economic"., ibid., December 25th, 1947. .
-’•Hoopes, p. 76; Guilin, pp. 85-6. Dulles, had never liked 
the idea of semi-permanent treaties, and was also worried 
in case American military support discouraged Europe from 
saving itself through unification. Possibly Dulles' atti­
tude to the military reflected the residual Church in­fluences on him.
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there was, he said, nothing the United States could have done; 
he didn't see how economic aid could help in that kind of 
situation; he didn't believe Russia planned any military 
aggression "beyond the line fixed at Yalta". In his view, 
therefore, the Czechoslovakian coup was solely a consolida­
tion of the gains made at Yalta. If there was any crisis, 
he demanded the Administration to give full information,
but in any case, like Speaker Martin, he favoured concentra-
58tion on the development of American air power. Yet for
all the scepticism and clarity of his analysis, and despite 
his known convictions, Taft voted for the Marshall Plan; 
perhaps he was aware of the political risks in an election 
year of taking what might appear to be such partisan and 
unpatriotic action.
Taft's cautious scepticism was parallelled by National 
Chairman Reece. In response to the President's speech to 
Congress in mid-March, calling for a draft, universal 
military training, and support of the Brussels Pact, Reece 
commented, "If we are really on the verge of war it is, of 
course, the duty of all loyal Americans to cooperate with­
out regard for political considerations to insure the nation's 
security. But that should not preclude inquiry as to how 
vie got into our present situation and who led us there.
The fact that the scare came at a time when the President's
5^ iiew York Times, March 15th, 1948. March 18th. 1948. March-qSTst7TOS:--5*Ibld.. March 18th, 1948.
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political stock was low made some Republicans suspicious. 
Harold Knutson said that President Truman had created far
60
more crises even than Roosevelt: he said he had given up
61counting, but claimed the total had reached 78 in 194-7.
To the Chicago Tribune, the war scare was suspiciously
like an attempt by the military to justify grandiose
plans for expansion: it reported, for example, testimony
by the Navy Secretary before the Senate Armed Services
Committee of the sighting of a submarine, presumably Russian,
62over 200 miles off San Francisco. The Tribune viewed with 
some alarm the prospect of defence costs rising to 20 -25  
billion for fiscal year 1950, which would mean a total bud­
get in the region of 50 billion dollars and, in the Tribune1s
63view, national collapse.
The Tribune * s analysis revealed the extent to which
Republican dreams of 1944-6 were now in disarray. Herbert
Hoover was relying on John Taber to enquire carefully into
E.R.P. appropriations to make up for the size of the authori- 
64zation.- Not even the Italian elections cheered him up, 
for he feared that in the future the United States might
^°0n March 13th, Cabell Phillips wrote that the President's 
stock was very low and that Republicans were convinced of 
victory in 1948; New York Times. March 14th, 1948; in 
April the National' Committee were to issue a document 
attributing the March 17th speech to his desire to dis­
tract attention from his troubles with the Southern revolt 
in the Democratic Party, and the Wallace candicacy; ibid.. 
April 11th, 1948. See also, comments by Representative 
Hoffman, Chicago Tribune. March 26th. 1948.
°J,Ibid., March ¿7th, 1948.
52THd., March 26th, 1948; March 27th, 1948.
°4xi'obver to John Taber, March 22nd, 1948, Hoover MSS.
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Finally,find Itself continually forced to Interfere, 
despite the assumption of electoral success he was worried 
about the future of the Party of Lincoln; reported ;ja 1 
O'Laughlln, ". . .he is worrying what the people will do 
with this party which has reduced taxes and will have to 
raise them after the election".^0 Against this, Thomas 
Dewey, speaking in Milwaukee in April, offered a more op­
timistic assessment: whilst warning against military domin­
ation of American policy, a timely warning in the midwest, 
he called for the United States to take a new approach: it 
must take the moral offensive, by the use of propaganda, 
a federation of western Europe, universal military train­
ing and limited selective service, a new far eastern policy
67and complete world-wide Intelligence. The influence of 
Dulles’ ideas was apparent in his formulation. What was 
new about the approach was less certain,but, perhaps de­
tecting Republican unease and wariness, especially in the 
midwest, Dewey was promising light at the end of the tunnel. 
Increasingly, despite the war scare, thoughts were turning 
to the election, to Philadelphia, and to the final reward 
after the barren sixteen years in the wilderness. What­
ever the difficulties confronting Republicans, all could 
take comfort from the seemingly greater difficulties of the 
President, beset with rumours that he would step down in 
favour of Eisenhower, as well as with troubles from Dlxie- 
crats and supporters of Henry Wallace. In 1948, at long 
last, Republicans would win their reward for the statesman-
^O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, April 21st, 
..1948, O'Laughlln MSS.
.„Ibid.
6‘Chicago Trlbune, April 2nd, 1948.
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ship they had exhibited since 1944.
While Vandenberg was labouring in Congress on behalf of 
the .European Recovery Program, and becoming involved in pre­
liminary discussions on a European security treaty, other 
party leaders were increasingly Involved in the struggle 
for the presidential nomination. 194-8 had begun with Taft 
and Dewey billed as the most likely contenders. Taft, with 
his great centre of power in the Midwest, and strong support 
in the South, was the favourite of the party Old Guard. His 
biggest disadvantage, however, was the fear, which the polls 
confirmed, that he might prove difficult to elect. Henry 
Wallace's announcement of his third party candidacy in 
December appeared to make that less of a worry, with Re­
publican Rational Chairman Reece prepared to write the 
obituary for the Democratic Party: it "merely makes offi­
cial the tragic disintegration of the once great party of 
Jefferson", commented Reece. "The Moscow wing of the Demo­
cratic Party has now parted company from the Pendergast 
68wing". At the meeting of the National Committee in Jan­
uary, the question of whether Taft could get elected was 
a major topic of discussion. "They all want to nominate 
Taft," wrote Joseph Alsop, "but the polls are frightening 
them off."6? Taft himself, was well aware of the need, if4
he was to get the nomination, of removing the fear that he
6^New York Times, December 31st, 194-7; Wallace, in reply to 
criticisms that his candidacy made the nomination of Taft 
more likely, replied that Taft's election would give more 
hope for a change of foreign policy than that of any other 
possible Republican nominee exceptperhaps Eisenhower, ibid., 
December 11th, 194-7.
°9a.isop to Martin Sommers, January 22nd, 194-8, Alsop M3S; 
see also O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, 
January 23rd, 1948, O'Laughlin MSS.
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could not get elected. Although his identification with 
the Taft-Hartley Act was considered as much a liability as 
his foreign policy views, the latter could not be ignored.
In January, Taft had been disturbed by reports that Stassen, 
who had been critical of him recently on the question of 
foreign aid, was going to challenge him in his home state. 
Stassen's refusal to heed Taft's private request not to 
intervene in the Ohio Primary, seemed certain to guarantee 
a divisive time for Republicans in the run up to the 1948 
Convention.^1
Stassen's determination to fight Taft on his home 
ground was reminiscent of the tactics of Willkie. But in 
early 1948. nobody took Stassen's campaign for the nomina­
tion very seriously. There was some speculation that his
real aim was to become vice-presidential candidate on a
72ticket headed by Vandenberg. More serious consideration
was given to the question of whether Elsenhower would try
to secure the nomination. Like Taft's deficiencies, the
question of whether Eisenhower would run was a burning
topic of conversation at the January National Committee 
73meeting. Eisenhower could convince nobody that he didn't 
want the nomination, "Everyone knowg," wrote Cal O'laughlin,
70
70‘ Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 379-82.
'‘Alsop to Martin Sommers,"“January 30th, 1948, Alsop MSS;
Chicago Tribune, January 26th, 1948, January 27th, 1948. 
'dAlsop to Martin Sommers, February 14th, 1948, February 27th, 1948, March 15th, 1948, Alsop MSS.
‘^ Report, January 22nd, 1948, McNaughton MSS; Alsop to Martin 
Sommers, January 22nd, 1948, Alsop MSS; Chicago Tribune. January 26th, 1948.
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"he would accept the nomination if he could get it." 
O'Laughlln's view was shared by Joseph Alsop, whilst Eisen­
hower's old war-time comrade, Commander H. C. Butcher3wrote 
to Eisenhower, explaining the rumours: "Some professional 
Republican politicians are of the opinion that General Ike
is thin skinned and can not stand criticism. Therefore,
75they plan to needle him out of the campaign." Certainly
Dewey took Eisenhower's possible candidacy seriously; apart
from MacArthur, he was the only candidate that Dewey was
reported to fear. Eisenhower's public announcement that
he was not a candidate temporarily put an end to the specu-
77lation, as well as disappointing.many supporters.'1 Eisen-
74
74‘ O'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, October 22nd, 
1947, O'laughlin MSS. Reports of his address at a dinner 
in honour of Governor Duff of Pennsylvania in December, 
at which Taft and Vandenberg were present, helped to in­
crease rumours of his candidacy; the meeting was meant to 
be off the record, but to Vandenberg's annoyance, somebody 
lgaked distorted reports. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Rolman 
Morin, December 12th, 1947, copy in General Eloyd L. Parks 
MSS., Eisenhower Library; Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 
423-4. In December, Vandenberg had written thanking 
Eisenhower for the gift of a box of cigars with the comment, 
". . .I am smoking to your good health and your Presidential 
success at Columbia or anywhere else". A. H. Vandenberg 
to Dwight D. Eisenhower, December 15th, 1947, Dwight D.
(-Eisenhower MSS. Elsenhower Library.
'-’Harry C. Butcher to Elsenhower, January 17th, 1948, Eisen-
„,-hower MSS.
'°0'Laughlin to Brigadier General David Sarnoff, October 11th, 
1947, O'laughlin'MSS.''Report, January 30th, 1948, MeNaughton MSS; ". . .his pre­
sent stand is at variance with what he intimated privately 
trhen he visited Manchester in October," grumbled one of his 
supporters, Leonard V. Finder to "Mother and dad", January 
30th, 1948, Leonard V. Finder MSS., Elsenhower Library.
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Lower himself was to give the impression that he favoured 
Vandenberg for the nomination; he also apparently left the 
door open for himself to take the Democratic nomination if
*70.Taft or MacArthur got the Republican nomination.' Elsen­
hower's elimination of limself from the race, convinced the 
pundits that a compromise choice, either Joseph Martin or 
Vandenberg would be nominated, Vandenberg still protested 
that he was not a candidate; to Eisenhower booster. Finder, 
he cabled in March in response to a request for an inter­
view,’'. . .1 am quite willing to chat with you about Eisen-
79hower or about why I should not - repeat not - be nominated". 
The Soviets apparently shared the Judgement of the eastern 
press, for in January the Soviet Ambassador requested a
gomeeting with Vandenberg.
For all the press speculation, however, the fact is that 
the principal contenders for the nomination were Dewey and 
Taft. Both were conducting vigorous campaigns for the 
nomination in what looked likely to be a vintage year. In­
evitably, in view of the emergence of the United States as 
the dominant world power, both candidates were forced to 
deal with the question of foreign policy in their pre­
convention campaigns; the question could not as easily be 
avoided as in 1944. Dewey, sensitive to past taunts as to 
his avoidance of discussion, made a forthright explication 
of his views. In Massachusetts in February, he committed 
himself to European federation, and to make Marshall Plan
^jstewart Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 2nd, 1948, Alsop MSS. 
'^Telegram, A. H. Vandenberg to Finder, March 6th, 1948, „Finder MSS.
°°Report, January 30th, 1948, McNaughton MSS.
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aid conditional on progress towards unity and on self-help
81towards economic recovery. At the same time, he had no 
hesitation in putting blame on the Administration for the 
state of the world, especially for its failure to tackle the 
question of the Ruhr, whose internationalization he recalled, 
he had advocated four years earlier: "The policies which 
created this paralysis can and must be reversed. Our. 
Government can still do a job, unless the Rational Admin­
istration actually wants, for political purposes, to keep 
this country in a continuing state of crisis and of high 
prices caused by shortages of goods". He also blamed
the Administration for helping "to build up the strength of
82another expanding despotism". In March, a Chicago Tribune 
reporter commented that in recent off the record speeches. 
Dewey had become increasingly belligerent in matters of 
foreign policy, having even advocated, the creation of a 
United States military establishment in Outer Mongolia. His 
commitment to the Marshall Plan was also unequivocal, des­
pite the rhetorical conditions imposed in the February 
speech.®-'5 Accepting the validity of the President's crisis 
speech3n mid-March ('às far as it went"), he was unsparing 
in his criticism of the Administration for having let things 
get to the present pass, and for vacillation. The United 
States, he said, must have a "hard boiled" programme of
Pi
01 Taft's organization got reports that this speech made a 
good impression; John Gordon Bennett, "Supplementary 
Massachusetts Report", Taft, Philadelphia Convention File, 
Clarence Brown MSS.
g2New York Times, February 13th, 194-8.^ Chicago Tribune, March 21st, 194-8.
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aid, and an "accelerated” diplomatic and propaganda offen­
sive, and must revive its world wide intelligence services.
In addition, he promised that over the next two months, he
would continue to make a number of speeches on foreign
84affairs. Dewey's early rhetoric then, indicated the like­
lihood of a vigorous and hard-hitting campaign on matters 
of foreign policy. Indications were that Dewey would ex­
pect to attack the Administration for having made previous 
mistakes, as well as urging more vigorous, yet on the whole 
not over costly, American leadership. The emphasis on 
dynamic leadership, on ideas and toughness, which Dewey 
and Dulles had developed since 1944 formed, therefore, the 
basis of the foreign policy "alternative", which they were 
proposing to offer in the 1948 campaign.
For his part, Taft, although he made concessions to the 
prevailing trends, could not but strike a dissenting note.
Even more explicitly than Dewey, he blamed the Administra­
tion for the world situation. Democratic policy towards the 
Soviet Union, he argued, was not "merely a mistake" but the 
result of "softness" towards communism in "the basic New
AcDeal philosophy". J As well as excluding Republicans from 
the mistakes which had been made, and calling for a change 
of policy In Asia, Taft also berated the Administration for 
having failed to give a moral lead. At the same time, how­
ever, he criticized the Administration for having over-estimated 
the influence which American economic power could have on
®^New York Times. March 24th, 1948; Chicago Tribune. March 
p 25th, 1948.
0!:,New York Times. February 13th, 1948.
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the world.®^ Fundamentally then, Taft was still at odds
with the direction of post-war policy; not because it was
anti-Russian, for he deferred to nobody in his anti-communism
and berated the Administration for having "an inferiority
complex to Russia", but because in his view it was based
87on a mis-perception of American interests. At Chicago 
in February, he revealed the extent to whichhLs ideas re­
mained unchanged: "We may well remember that the ultimate 
purpose of any foreign policy is to assure that freedom under 
which progress can be resumed. We should not be actuated 
by purely altruistic desire to Improve the condition of
other people who have failed for centuries to do the job for
88themselves". Taft, then, could not share Dewey's vision
of a dynamic capitalism} too much aid would be damaging,
he said, it would do more harm than good in Europe, they
89must be made to "depend on their own efforts". Though 
Taft’s political ambitions had perhaps forced him to modi­
fy his views, he was by 194-8 further from the position of 
Vandenberg and Dewey than he had been in 1944. Opposed to 
the idea of a draft, he pinned his hopes on a strong air 
force, on reserach and Intelligence, and on a system of re­
serve provision. Assuming, apparently correctly, that the 
United States did not face a military challenge behond the
jj6Ibld.
°Zlbid., February 24th, 1948. 
xrlbid.February 11th, 1948.
89TbIT.. February 24th, 1948.
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line "fixed at Yalta", he still believed in the military
90impregnability of the United States. Prepared to support 
economic and military aid, within reason, he never lost 
sight of the prime objective of foreign policy as it had 
been traditionally defined, to maintain freedom in the 
United States; characteristically, then, he was concerned 
as a first priority to fight communism in the United States, 
rather than concentrating exclusively or primarily on 
Europe or even Asia. In the final analysis, the European 
situation was not, in Taft's view, of vital concern to the 
United States; given this assumption, it followed that from 
a self-interest standpoint, the provision of large scale 
assistance to sustain liberal capitalism in Europe was 
not required, and, as he had consistently argued throughout 
the post-ivar years, might end freedom in the United States 
■whilst doing no good to the recipients.
The challenge of Harold Stassen, whose star was in the 
ascendant following primary victories in Wisconsin and 
Nebraska, provided a crucial test for Taft in his home state. 
Inevitably, Stassen, who as ever sought to be in the van­
guard of foreign policy leadership, was bound to force an
91examination of Taft's foreign policy position. In the 
early part of 1948, he outdid everyone in his call for the 
United States to go on the offensive against the Soviet 
Union with economic and propaganda methods. Such methods,
Chicago Tribune, March 21st , 1948.; Hew York Times,. .:- .
March1 1  948. ■; _
Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 18th, 1948; Alsop to Martin
Sommers, May 3rd, 1948, Alsop MSS.
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he had argued, would facilitate a new convention in 1950
92to strengthen the United Nations. In April, in Wisconsin, 
Stassen announced his support for a move to outlaw the 
Communist Party,which was likely to be popular in some sec­
tors of the Republican Party. ^  In Ohio, he continued with 
same theme. There was, he said, a "world menaae to liberal­
ism" which should be met neither by appeasement nor by talk 
of inevitable war, but by outlawry of the Communist Party, 
both in the United States and all peace-loving countries,
as well as by a strengthening of the United Nations and the
94establishment of an international peace force. Calling 
for assurance that Marshall aid would be continued into 
the second year, and endorsing the idea of a regional se­
curity grouping with the Brussels pact powers, he also 
challenged Taft's right to be considered a Republican 
leader; on matters such as the Marshall Plan, he claimed 
that he himself was far nearer to the Republican position. ^  
Stassen's campaign forced Taft to defend his own position, 
labelling Stassen a dreamy Idealist and a virtual New Dealer,
he also charged him with being a late-comer in his opposition 
9 6to communism. Taft also opposed the idea of outlawing 
the Communist Party: "Under our Constitution a man can be
-pNew York Times. January 6th, 1948.
°^He~attacked Truman and Dewey for opposing this; referring 
to a Dewey statement opposing outlawry, he commented 
darkly: "Jan Masaryk made a statement very much like
.that to me in Prague a year ago,", Ibid.. April 3rd, 1948. 
ZZIbid.. April 24th. 1948. Chicago Tribune, April 16th, 1948.
York Times. April 24th, 194#; April 25th, 1948.
96lbid., April 28th, 1948.
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a Communist if he desires". At the same time, Taft re­
solutely defended his own pre-Pearl Harbor position, claim­
ing that like Ifillkie and Roosevelt he had favoured aid to 
Britain short of war, but that he had opposed Roosevelt's 
later measures as likely to lead to war. "I predicted the 
futility of war," he commented, "the fact that a nation which 
wins a war, loses the war. I foresaw the advent of Govern­
ment regulation and control, and huge Government deficits.
I urged peace until it should become clear that our national
98freedom was involved".
Stassen's Intervention in Ohio, as Taft had feared,
weakened Taft’s own candidacy without significantly streng-
99thening that of Stassen himself. By May, with MacArthur's 
candidacy already played out, the Old Guard were looking 
to Martin or Bricker in the event of Taft's failure. Their 
hopes depended, however, on Stassen eliminating Dewey in the 
Oregon primary.100 In the event, Stassen's ineffective 
challenge to Dewey to a radio debate on the issue of out­
lawry of the Communist Party was generally held to have 
effectively put an end to his candidacy, and incidentally 
to the Old Guard's hopes that he might "stop" Dewey. Stassen's 
attempt to bracket Truman-Tiallace-Dewey as all favouring the 
continued legalization of the Communist Party might have
^Ibid. , April 25th, 1948.
98TbTT., May 2nd, 1948.995Iary, May 6th, 1948, Smith MSS; O'laughlln to Brigadier 
..General David Sarnoff, May 14th, 1948, O'laughlin MSS.
100Ibid.
97
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seemed good tactics in the climate of 194-8, but it misfired. 101
By the end of the campaign, his credibility gone, Stassen
102was alleging a Taft-Dewey deal to defeat him.
By contrast, Dewey’s campaign in Oregon reflected the
self-confidence, and the arrogance, of a front-runner.
Stressing that he was "the founder and head of the nation's
bipartisan foreign policy" and that he had, as Governor of
New York, conferred with "the heads of freedom-loving nations
all over the world", he portrayed the Democratic Admlnistra-
103tion as vacillating and fumbling. Taking a consistently
hard line against the Soviet Union, he said that he had two
men in mind for Secretary of State, both of whom were capa-
104ble of saying "No" to Stalin: Dulles and Vandenberg. 
Commenting on radio reports that the Soviet Union was pre­
pared to negotiate it's difficulties with the United States, 
"the best news since V-J Day if they mean it", he added that 
for the first time the Administration was dealing from
strength, which he attributed to "prodding by the Republi- 
105can Congress". . If Dewey was offering any alternative
policy to that already being pursued, it was hard to de- 
106tect. The bipartisan policy, which he claimed as his 
own, was the foundation of his policy; the Administration
101 New York Times. May 13th, 1948.
1°2TbTd., May 20th, 1948.
1°3TbicT., May 16th, 1948.
]9-Ibid.. May 7th, 1948.
] jgTbTd.. May 12th, 1948.
10bIn October, 1947, James Forrestal had got the Impression 
from Dewey that he was in general agreement with the Ad­
ministration's foreign policy, Millis, p. 314.
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he appeared to regard aa inefficient and maybe half­
hearted protagonists of the same. Dewey, then, offered 
the Old Guard no real hope of making foreign policy the 
issue in the 1948 campaign which they so dearly wished.
The Old Guard, however, was whistling in the dark, with talk of
107nominating Bricker if Taft couldn't get it. The press 
could talk about nobody as a serious alternative but 
Vandenberg.
Vandenberg's success in Congress with the Marshall 
Plan, and later the Vandenberg Resolution, kept him con­
tinually in the forefront in 1948. He remained, however, 
despite pressure, opposed to his own candidacy: concerned 
about his health, afraid of dying in office, aware of his 
wife's opposition, the reasons why he felt he should not 
be a candidate were many. Hot least was the fact that he
felt his candidacy would impair foreign policy leadership 
108in the Senate. Senator Smith, on the basis of a long 
talk Tilth him in June, concluded, "The Vandenberg situation 
is serious. There is something behind that the does not 
want in the light. . .", and "The Chicago Tribune is out 
to get him".10  ^ Vandenberg's hesitancy could not however 
stop the speculation, nor the activities of friends such 
as Senator Smith and Henry Cabot lodge, nor of his son,
1°^0'Iaughlin to General MacArthur, June 11th, 1948;
O'laughlin to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, June 11th, 1948, 
O’laughlin MSS.
‘.Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 424-7, 431-9; Alsop to 
Martin Sommers, ‘June 1st;., 1948, Alsop MSS". ,
1°9piary, June 16th, 1948, Smith MSS.
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Arthur Vandenberg, Jr.. Friends and foes alike seemed con­
vinced that he would ultimately be a candidate, reports even 
got down to details of who would be his Vice-President
(Dewey was mentioned in April) and who would be his Secre-
11 0tary of the Treasury.
On June 2nd, 1948, it was revealed that a poll of 50 
Washington correspondents, whilst unanimously forecasting 
a Republican victory, also predicted by a large majority 
that Vandenberg would be the next President of the United 
States.^ A day later, in what was regarded as an overt 
attack on Vandenberg, the House Appropriations Committee, 
led by John Taber of New York, slashed 25$ off the first 
year of the Marshall Plan. Majority leader Charles Halleck 
reportedly told "a friend of young Van's that the House 
was a ’Martin House first, a Dewey House second, a Taft 
House third, and not a Vandenberg House at all”'. The same 
source also claimed that the cuts had been planned by Halleck, 
Taber and Martin to trip up Vandenberg before the Republi­
can Convention. There were even insinuations that Dewey
112might have known something about the move in advance.
Whatever the truth of the rumours, Vandenberg was predictably 
furious, and immediately asked to be allowed to testify 
before the Senate Appropriations Committee; he also attacked
^^Alsop to Martin Sommers, April 2nd, 1948; Alsop to Martin 
Sommers, April 10th, 1948; Alsop to Martin Sommers. April 
18th, 1948; Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 12th, 19^8,
Alsop MSS.111 New York Times, June 3rd, 1948.
112Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 12th, 1948; Alsop MSS;
Report, June 11th, 1948, McNaughton MSS.
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the cuts on the floor of the Senate. To John Foster 
Dulles he wrote of the need to do something quickly about 
drafting the Republican foreign policy platform: " . . .  Be­
cause I think it is quite obvious now that a serious effort 
will be made in the Resolutions Committee of the Convention 
to upset any sort of enlightened foreign policy and return 
to the ’good old days' when it took two weeks to cross the 
o c e a n " . " I  think," he continued, "the action of the 
House Appropriations Committee yesterday is one of the warn­
ing signals. I do not know how anything could be more shock­
ing or more subversive of every Republican pretense toward 
international cooperation. Mr. Molotov told Western Europe 
last summer not to make the mistake of 'trusting' us. Some 
of our distinguished colleagues seem bent on proving how 
right he was. I am frankly disgusted this morning. I do 
not know whether I can survive the day without making a
11C'Sherman statement’ or not." J Vandenberg's inclination 
then, although resisted by his son and Senator Lodge, was 
to take himself unequivocally out of contention for the 
Presidentialnomination. ^ ^ ^
The action of the House Appropriations Committee, which 
was a reflection of the under-currents against Vandenberg, 
and the "bipartisan" foreign policy, presaged a lively Con­
vention. The Old Guard were determined to cut Vandenberg 
down to size, and to ensure that he didn't complete what 
many regarded as his betrayal of the Party by winning the
113
114
113
116
Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 396-7.
Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, June 4th, 1948, Vanden 
berg MSS.
Ibid.
Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 12th, 1948, Alsop MSS.
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nomination. ' For their part, Vandenberg's supporters 
were simply spurred on to greater action, with Governor 
Duff of Pennsylvania coming into the spotlight as a key
1 1 O
advocate of Vandenberg's nomination. Cal O'laughlin, a
faithful reflector of anti-Vandenberg opinion, reported to 
General MacArthur that "Vandenberg is doing all in his 
power, under cover of course, to get the nomination. He 
seized upon the cut of the ERP appropriations to make a 
dramatic appeal to all those who believe in huge spending 
for foreign aid. However, there will be many delegates 
at the Convention opposed to the Truman policies and they 
will insist that with Vandenberg it would be impossible for 
the Party to criticize them in the bitter campaign we have 
entered upon."
Vandenberg was not alone in fighting the appropriation
cuts. Publicly he was backed by Dewey, Stassen and Earl
Warren; Dewey in particular could not afford to let Van-
120denberg take all the credit for fighting the cuts. In
Congress, however, Vandenberg also received support from 
fellow Republicans, including even from Senate Y/hip, Kenneth 
Wherry, who had led the opposition to the Marshall Plan 
earlier in the year. Senator Bridges, chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, also supported Vandenberg, whilst 
in the House Vandenberg was supported by Christian Herter 
and Everett Dirksen. 1 The signs of the closing of the
117
117
118 Chicago Tribune. June 9th, 1948. Alsop MSS.5Alsop to Martin Sommers, June 8th, 1 948/J Chicago Tribune. 
June 10th, 1948.
119o'Laughlin to General MacArthur, June 11th, 1948, O'laughlin 
1pnM3S.
1 ^ uIbld.; clipping from Yfashington Post. June 8th, 1948 in 
piDewey file, Democratic Rational Committee Library MSS.
1 'Rew York Times. June 10th, 1948; Report, June 5th, 1948,Me Naught on MSS.
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ranks did not impress John Taber, who reaffirmed that he
would not yield an inch, and that he expected the House to
support him. The bill had, he said, become "a test as to
whether people will support legislation based on facts and
constitutional government or whether they want billions of
tax money appropriated by hearsay and emotion. The house
unlike two-thirds of the senate, was elected less than
two years ago. We came here to put a stop to legislation
122rammed thru by emergency and tear-jerker tactics."
With the Republican Convention due to open in Phila­
delphia on June 20th, the pressures on securing unity were 
tremendous. They were increased by President Truman's ac­
tion in setting off for a "non-political" trip to the West, 
during which he appeared to be capitalizing on Republican 
difficulties by describing the 80th Congress as the worst 
ever. The President's charge brought instant reaction: 
from Charles Halleck the comment that many thought Mr. Truman 
was the poorest President the United States had ever had;
.from Taft the comment that among other things the Congress
1 o-xhad reversed the Administration policy towards communism. J 
Vandenberg also, In a television broadcast from the Foreign 
Relations Committee room, took issue with the President's 
attacks on Congress: "It is a little early to subordinate 
the national welfare to partisan sniping. At least let 
it be said.that Congress has remained faithfully at work
122Chlcago Tribune, June 10th, 1948.
12^Uew York Times, June 1Qth, 1948; June 12th, 1948.
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during this critical fortnight. It has not shared the 
Presidential luxury of a self-serving political vacation 
at a moment when the whole Government should be on the Job 
in Washington’.’. At the same time, Vandenberg declared his 
pride in the Congress' record in foreign affairs; in fact,
he said, he doubted whether a better record had ever been
. 124made.
Vandenberg's broadcast, enabling him to appear in his
most convincing role, as a non-partisan partisan, was timely
Although three days earlier he had given the impression that
he would be happy with Dewey as President and Dulles as
125Secretary of State, his candidacy was very much alive.
On the day of his television address there were reports that 
he would allow his position on the nomination to be deter­
mined by the question of whether or not Congress restored 
the E.R.P. funds. Taft meanwhile, was clearly seeking 
to conciliate Vandenberg. A few days before the Convention, 
he told him that in the event of his nomination, he would 
want him to be his Secretary of State. 1 On June 18th, 
he announced that the passage of draft legislation and agree 
ment on E.R.P. appropriations were essential before Congress 
adjourned, which was no idle threat with the Convention only 
two days away. As Republican leader in domestic affairs, 
he said that he would be "quite prepared to stand by the 124
12 4Ibid., June 19th, 1948.
125ibld., June 1 6th, 1948.
]^ M d ., June 19th, 1948.
1d 'Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 438; Taft was also respon­
sible for the nomination of Senator Lodge as chairmen of 
the Resolutions Committee at the Convention, New York Times, June 23rd, 1948.
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view of Senator Vandenberg as to what is essential to carry
123out our moral commitments to .Europe". John Taber, how­
ever, held out until the end. On June 18th,he was reported
as saying: "There is no agreement. There is no agreement
129on anything. There is nothing; it's all over". But 
under pressure, he gave way at the eleventh hour, most of 
the funds were restored, and Congress adjourned in time 
for the Republicans to hurry off to Philadelphia.1-^
In the event, the first two weeks of June were a tri­
umph for Vendenberg, although he had been aided by the pres­
sures toward Party unity. Personally he had no illusions 
as to his own popularity amongst the Old Guard, even though 
many had given him belated support in his struggle with the 
House Appropriations Committee. On June 20th, the Hew York 
Times carried a statement by the Governor of Michigan, that 
Vandenberg would take the nomination if the Convention 
demanded it, a statement which was factually correct but 
likely to give a false impression. The fight with the House 
leadership had wakened Vandenberg to the possiblity of an 
attempt to revert to "isolationism", especially with Gover­
nor Green of Illinois scheduled to deliver the' keynote ad­
dress. In that event alone was he prepared to become an 
active candidate. 1 -^ 1 The reported attempt of Col. McCormick,
1 2^Ibld., June 19th, 1948; he had earlier threatened to bring 
Congress back after the Convention, a threat which led to 
uproar in the House Steering Committee, Diary, June 8th 
and 9th, 1948, Wadsworth MSS.
^2°gew York Times, June 19th, 1948.
130Ibid., June 1Oth, 1948; Dewey is usually credited with 
having put pressure on Taber, who as an up-state New York 
.Republican was loyal to Dewey.
1 Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 428.
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proprietor of the Chicago Tribune, to arrange a Taft-Stassen
ticket to stop Dewey and Vandenberg was, however, a sign, 
not only of the durability of the nationalists'hatred of 
Vandenberg, but also of their desperation. As the Conven­
tion was once more to reveal, the Dewey organization had n 
left nothing to chance, and Vandenberg's fears were un­
founded.
Philadelphia 194-8: The Triumph of 'Unity*
The first, most important Job of the 1948 Convention was 
to secure agreement on a foreign policy plank, a Job which 
had caused difficulties in the two previous Conventions, and 
which, in view of the development of bipartisanship and the 
unforeseen changes in American policy since 1944, might be 
expected to cause even more difficulty than previously. The 
ground work for the 1948 platform had been laid since May 
by John Poster Dulles and Vandenberg, although they each 
ultimately submitted separate drafts to the Resolutions 
C o m m i t t e e . F o r  the most part Vandenberg and Dulles had 
been in agreement, although Dulles, by 1948 more sensitive 
to the needs of electoral politics, favoured a more detailed 
bill of goods, especially mentioning policies towards coun- 
tries such as Italy and China. J At Philadelphia, despite 
the opposition of Senator Brooks of Illinois, Senator Lodge 
was able to pilot the platform through with remarkable 
ease.1^  A few controversial items were taken out, apparently
1 32vandenberg to John Poster Dulles, May 14th, 1948; 1948 
Scrapbook, June 20th-25th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
'33see Dulles' draft of June 8th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS; in 
the early Dulles draft was the following: "The iron curtain 
must not be advanced and we shall keep hope alive in those 
behind it - in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries - 
.who trusted in our word".
'34charles S. Reed to Vandenberg, July 14th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
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as anticipated, including a United Nations control of atomic
energy, a commitment to "implement with appropriations any
commitment made by legislative enactment", and a specific
135commitment to the Reciprocal Trade programme.
The resultant platform was far less equivocal over 
foreign affairs than had been the case in 194-4-. Although 
all the fundamentals of a "Strong America" remained, the 
emphasis was different. For the traditionalists, there was 
the familiar commitment "to uphold as a beacon light for
mankind everywhere, the inspiring American tradition of
1 36liberty, opportunity and justice for all. . ." There 
were also a string of statements giving the familiar reitera­
tion of prime concern for American welfare: "Prudently con­
serving our own resources, we shall cooperate on a self-
137help basis with other peace-loving nations". "At all
times safeguarding our own industry and agriculture, and 
under efficient administrative procedures for the legitimate
consideration of domestic needs, we shall support the system
1 *38of reciprocal trade and encourage International commerce." D 
. .all foreign commitments should be made public and sub­
ject to constitutional ratification. In all of these things 
we shall primarily consult the national security and welfare 
of our own United States. In all of these things we shall 
welcome the world's cooperation. But in none of these things
 ^55ghicap-Q Tribune, June 23rd, 1948; Vandenberg, 
.^P a p e r s p. 429.
'3oporter and Johnson, p. 4-50.
¡Sima.
15ürbid., p. 454.
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1 79shall we surrender our ideals or our free institutions.”
But whilst the familiar signposts remained, there was also 
a lack of any concern for sovereignty, which had been a great 
issue in 19^4; in its place was a strong commitment to the 
United Nations. More remarkably, there was a statement 
calling for "primary recognition of America’s self-interest 
in the liberty of other peoples” and praise of the Republi­
can Congress for having passed "the most far-reaching 
measures in history adopted to aid the recovery of the free 
world on a basis of self-help and with prudent regard for 
our own resources".* 1^0 No wonder Vandenberg derived some 
satisfaction that the unanimous passage of the platform 
"means that the Chicago Colonel and many of my bitter Con­
gressional foes who were Delegates must have voted for it.
141Life does have its amusing consolations".
In short, the platform did not promise the changes in 
foreign policy which the Nationalists desired. Neither 
was it other than mildly partisan: it expressed pride in 
the part Republicans had played "in those limited areas of 
foreign policy in which they have been permitted to parti­
cipate" and offered the minority party a chance in the next 
administration to Join "in stopping partisan politics at the
1 JfOwater’s edge". The Platform then was a victory for Van­
denberg and the group of Republicans who had supported the
13?ibia.
]gOlbid., pp. 450, 451.'2,1 Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 428-9.
14"Porter and Johnson, p. 454.
-460-
bulk of Administration foreign policy initiatives since 
World War II. Passage of the platform did not, however, 
produce unity out of a hat; controversial Issues such as 
arms aid and the European security pact lay in the future. 
Vandenberg, however, defending the platform to a friend 
against the charges of over-generalization allowed himself 
to be carried away, describing it as "the most Important 
advance in American foreign policy since the Monroe Doc­
trine". "I think it definitely and conclusively commits the 
Republican Party to the intelligent self-interest which we 
have in the preservation other independent governments as 
a bulwark to our own national security," he w r o t e . N a t u r ­
ally, the Chicago Tribune could not share Vandenberg’s en­
thusiasm over the direction which the Republicans seemed 
headed as a result of developments prior to and at the 
Convention.1^  These developments, which it attributed to 
Wall Street dominance and internationalist propaganda, it 
felt could only be redeemed by the nomination of Taft, "a 
candidate distinguished for common sense and for his belief 
that the welfare of the United States must not be sacrificed 
either to the desire of European nations to live off us or 
to the ambitions of our own military for dominance over the 
nation",
1 ^ 3Vandenberg to Prank Januszewski, July 17th., 1948, Vandenberg
1 A A ^ S .Chicago Tribune, June 21st, 1948.
145ibid., June 23rd, 1948. Joseph Alsop predicted that the 
"reactionaries" would be too divided between the candida­
cies of Taft, Bricker, Martin, Dewey, etc., to be able to 
unite at the Convention; Alsop to Martin Sommers> June 12th, 
1948, Alsop MSS.
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If the "Internationalists" were able to make the 
running in drafting the platform, they kept a low pro­
file in the public sessions of the Convention. Apart 
from Clare Luce, whose fiery partisanship and out-spoken- 
ness always compensated for earlier "One World" affiliations, 
the principal speakers were all Identified with the Old 
Guard: Governor Green of Illinois, Senator Wherry and Herbert 
Hoover. In the area of foreign policy, all the main 
speakers at the Convention took a partisan line, for the 
most part emphasizing the mistakes of the Administration 
in appeasing the Soviet Union at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. 
Clare Luce said she dreaded to think how much more would 
have been given to Stalin had not "Senator Vandenberg and 
Poster Dulles and other Republican Statesmen. . . .  put 
some backbone into the New Deal State Department.
Senator Wherry, similarly, although coming from the opposite 
wing of the Party to Clare Luce, said "there has been and 
will continue to be cooperation by the Republican majority 
in Congress with all Americans of good will in a fair and 
reasonable American foreign policy. But the Republican 
Party and its Congressional leadership have never been
the appeasers of Soviet Russia. You can't charge the
147Republican Party with that." He also credited the Repub­
lican Party with having helped bring about the abandonment 
of the Morgenthau Plan, which he saw as the root cause of 
American foreign policy flounderings: "Our party and its 
representatives in Congress know that German recovery
14gOfficial Report of the. Proceedings of the Twenty Fourth 
National Convention, held in Philadelphia. Pennsylvania. 
June 217 2^, 24 aiiFgS, 1 $48'. p. 59.
147Ibid., p. 70.
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is the key to recovery for all of Europe. It is essential 
to our belated American policy to neutralize the threat of 
world communism."
The somewhat apocalyptic terms with which both Inter­
nationalists and Nationalists had viewed the 1948 Convention 
proved unjustified. Not surprisingly, the Convention was 
more concerned to smooth over differences, rather than to 
exacerbate them. Thus Dewey, on arrival, praised the 80th 
Congress, which had recently come under attack from the 
President, and like many of the key speakers, praised it 
for having made the Administration take a more realistic 
foreign policy line, and for having forced the Truman team 
to "quit w o b b l i n g " . * 1 ^  Clare Luce’s praise of Stassen, 
Ydhdenberg and Dewey, and her omission of Taft, were noted, 
but drowned by the applause which greeted her anti-adminis­
tration rhetoric.150 in her syndicated report of the 
Convention, she commented that Governor Green's address had 
been far from the "isolationist” argument that rumours had 
suggested it would be, and instead ". . .it showed that 
the Republican party has returned to the progressive, forward 
marching, world-minded foreign policy of Theodore Roosevelt, 
John Hay and Ellhu Root."1^1
The actual process of nomination likewise went smoothly. 
Despite the unfaltering enthusiasm of his supporters, who
148Ibid.
1^^Irwln Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, The Truman Victory of 
1948 (New York: New American Library, 1968} p.
Chicago Tribune. June 21, 1948.
15^Ibld.t June 23, 1948; New York Times. June 22, 1948.
1 51J United Feature Syndicate Release, June 2 3, 1948, copy in 
Baruch MSS.
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even hired an elephant to boost his drive for the nomina­
tion, Taft's candidacy never transcended his sectional 
appeal to the South, Midwest, mountain and border states.
His reputed poor electoral record frightened the cautious, 
whilst his relatively progressive record on domestic affairs 
had, in his view at least, led to disenchantment amongst 
some conservatives, who were courted by the slick Dewey 
organizers.1^ 2 The main hope of stopping Dewey probably 
lay with Vandenberg, who declined to "connive", but who in 
any case was more unpopular with the Old Guard than Dewey. 
Such was its despair, that the Midwest put its faith in 
Stassen. Having described Stassen in January as "merely a 
1948 edition of Willkie, put up by ’.fall Street to fool 
middle westerners into thinking he is one of them. . ." 
the Chicago Tribune, at the instigation of the indefatigable 
Colonel, came out in favour of a Taft-Stassen ticket, arguing 
that Vandenberg could not even carry Michigan and that Dewey 
would do no better than in 1944.1-^ The chances of a Taft- 
Stassen ticket seemed less great than that of a Vandenberg- 
Stassen ticket, but Vandenberg refused to take any active 
part in such a move.1^  jn any case, the chances were slim, 
but the Dewey machine was leaving nothing to chance; 
rumours abbut Vandenberg's mistress, which had been used 
by the right wing in the past, were circulated by the Dewey 
organization at Philadelphia.
1 -*2Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp.416-417.
^-^Chlcago Tribune. January 3^* 1948, June 22, 1948; New York 
Times, June 22, 1948.
^^Patterson, Mr. Republican, p. 412; New York Times, June 
24, 1948; cKTeago Tribune*, June 23, 1 ^48"!
1^Report, June 19, 1948, McNaughton MSS,; New York Times, 
June 24, 1948.
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The key to the nomination was held by the Pennsyl­
vania delegation, the largest of the "favourite son" 
delegations, which was committed to supporting Senator 
Martin. This situation, the result of divisions between 
the Grundy organization and Governor Duff, who hated Dewey 
and supported Vandenberg, was resolved on June 22nd when 
Senator Martin announced that he was withdrawing, there­
fore leaving his Dewey-dominated delegation free to support
1 R6Dewey on the first ballot. J Following the Pennsylvania 
success, the Dewey organization succeeded in wooing Indiana, 
reportedly by offering Charles Halleck the vice-presidency.157 
At the end of the first ballot, a meeting of Taft, Stassen, 
Governor Duff, Governor Sigler (Mich.) and J. D. Hamilton 
unsuccessfully sought agreement on how to stop the inexor­
able Dewey b l i t z . " i t  might have bôen worse. It might 
have been Vandenberg"j commented Colonel McCormlch as he 
left the Convention floor.^59 por the third time, commented 
the Colonel's paper, the international bankers had taken 
the Republican Party; the Tribune only hoped that Dewey 
would not drag other Republican candidates down to defeat.1^0 
There was no doubt that Dewey was less than utBEersally 
popular even among the party faithful gathered at Phila­
delphia. Senator Martin's description of him in his nom­
inating speech as " a giant towering over all" brought 
laughter from the floor and galleries, and his name was 
reportedly b o o e d . T h e r e  was also some scepticism about *15960
15oChicago Tribune. June 23, 1948; Ross, p. 17.
1^^New York Times, June 24, 1948.
1 ^ Chicago Tribune. June 24, 1948.
159Ibid., June 25, 1948.160Ibid.
1^Ibid.. June 24, 1948.
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Buthis claim that he had made no promises of Jobs.1^2
even the Tribune's chief political correspondent^ Arthur
Sears Henning, reported the unity and the optimism of the
Convention, as well as explaining Dewey's nomination partly
out of a desire to do "political Justice to a candidate
who but for the war unquestionably would have been elected
in 1944."163 Some of the Internationalists however, were
still uneasy, especially about the way in which Dewey's
supporters were conciliating conservatives. Senator Smith
of New Jersey for example was concerned about rumours that
Halleck would get the vice-presidential nomination, and
sought to throw what influence, he had behind Stassen's
candidacy for the Job. In his diary he confided, "there
is an undercurrent of isolationism and the pressure of the
diehards."164 Had Halleck been nominated, the supporters
of Stassen and Vandenberg, determined to make the defeat
of the Old Guard total, were preparing to nominate Stassen
from the floor. In the event, Warren's selection avoided'.,the
1 65split between Dewey and the Internationalists.
The Convention then, was a complete triumph for the kind 
of Republicanism for which Vandenberg had become the spokes-
fman -since 1945. Vandenberg confessed himself well pleased.
To a friend in Michigan he wrote, "I agree»with you about
162
163
164
165
Joseph Alsop commented that "some of Dewey's larger 
contributors, . . behave as though they had already 
taken out a mortagage on the feovernmnt." Alsop to 
Martin Sommers, June 29, 1948, Alsop MSS.; Congressman 
Walter Judd was quoted as saying that "he's promised so 
many men cabinet Jobs that they'll have to operate in 
three shifts." Chicago Tribune. June 26, 1948.
Chicago Tribune. June 25, 1948.
Diary, June 25, 1948, Smith MSS.
Ibid_., June 26, 1948; Vandenberg, Private Parers. pp. 439-41.
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the Republican ticket. The Warren touch did something to 
it which has added immeasurably to its potentiality. . . . 
the Philadelphia platform and the Philadelphia ticket are 
such a complete vindication of my own Republican attitudes
that I am totally content."166
Vandenberg's contentment was shared by others who were 
agreeably surprised that after the potential disasters of 
early June, the Party had emerged in good shape for the 
election and for v i c t o r y . J o h n  Vorys of Ohio wrote, 
presumably assuming with everyone else that victory was 
inevitable, "Por the first time since I have been a Member 
of Congress, I feel freed from the obligations and embarrass­
ments imposed by the presidential ambitions of Bricker and 
faft. An era in Ohio politics has ended, and you would 
be surprised to know how little regret there is among a
lot of people greatly interested in politics out here."168 
The complete rout of the Midwest at Philadelphia was 
based on the assumption that electoral victory required a 
candidate who could carry the large industrial states where 
Taft, especially because of his alienation of organized 
labour, was likely to be a liability. The politics of 
unity required however, a convincing victory in November.
Taft,despite his characteristic cheerful reaction, was 
very much aware of the way in which his wing of the Party 
had been repudiated at the Convention. To Governor Green 
of Illinois, he wrote, "I urged your name on Tom Dewey 
but I got little response except that you were too closely 
connected with the Chicago Tribune. Tom's whole concern
^^Vandenberg to John W. Blodgett, July 6, 1948, Vandenbergi -MSS.
1^James W. Wadsworth to Thomas E. Dewey, June 30, 1948, 
Wadsworth MSS.
1^Vorys to Leonard W. Hall, June 29, 1948, Vorys MSS.
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seemed to be about carrying the Atlantic seaboard and he 
seemed to be afraid of all midwestern candidates because 
they were too ’isolationist.'"1^  ^ dedicated partisan,
Taft was not likely to rock the boat in public. Despite 
his personal disappointment, he could with all Republicans 
share the Joy that an unhappy period in American and Republican 
Party history was coming to an end.
The Campaign
The Convention at Philadelphia appeared to have got 
the Republicans off to an excellent start to what seemed 
their inexorable victory. Their opponenets by contrast, 
already divided by the'Wallace candidacy, also suffered 
the defection of the Dixiecrats, and a widespread lack of 
enthusiasm for the Truman candidacy, which found expression 
in heterogeneous support for Eisenhower.1^  The theme of 
the Dewey campaign was to be "Unity", a phrase considered 
suitable at what was regarded as a time of severe national 
crisis, and which was also by implication meant to illus­
trate both the statesmanship and the internal "unity" of 
the Republican Party by comparison with its opponents.
Dewey, as much of a machine politican as Truman, although 
he had never been linked in any way with corrupt politics, 
sought to put over the claim that he was far more of a 
statesman; his opponent by contrast was pictured as a none 
too intelligent man whose meddling in foreign affairs had
1 ^ Patterson, Mr. Republican p. 421 ; according to Vandenberg, 
Taft sent word to the party meeting to discuss the vice- 
presidential nominee that he favoured Bricker, Vandenberg, Private Papers p. 439.
1^Indications of the extent of this support, including 
Stettinius, Joseph Grew, Adlai Stevenson, and at one 
stage the Disiecrats, may be gleaned from the Leonard 
V. Finder Papers, Eisenhower Pile, in the Eisenhower Library.
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been injurious to the country. Dewey's tactics then, were 
to claim all the essential features of American policy as 
it had developed by 1948 as being Republican inspired; all 
the failures, and the alleged Initial bungling which had made 
expensive aid programmes necessary were of course the re­
sponsibility of the Administration. The Republican campaign 
was not therefoure "non-partisan" in an absolute sense, 
but it was designed to maintain a high tone, to reveal 
Dewey as a man who would not respond to Truman's lower 
level of political sniping. Such a campaign it was judged, 
would make it easier for the Republicans to unite the 
country when Dewey took over from Truman in 1949; it also 
had the added political advantage of not opening up old sores 
which had previously divided the Party. "Unity" was a 
theme which nobody could oppose, provided of course it 
brought results, and in the summer of 1948 few doubted 
that it would. Ag Herbert Hoover commented: "Prom the signs 
about, I do not think it will be a very different campaign 
from 1944 but even so, I don't see how it is possible to 
lose the election."1^1
The major internal influence on the nature of the Repub­
lican campaign was Senator Vandenberg. Assuming the inevit­
ability of the coming Republican victory, Vandenberg's main 
concern in 1948 was to protect the bipartisan foreign policy 
which had been associated with him in the post-war years 
from the damage which might be inflicted on it by partisan 
politicians. At times therefore, his relations with some 
of Dewey's advisers, including even his good friend Dulles,
T7T Hoover to Hugh Gibson, August 12, 1948, Hoover MSS.
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became somewhat strained. On July 1st at a press con­
ference following discussions with Dulles, Dewey announced 
his intention of attacking foreign policy decisions made 
without consultation with Republicans, including China
and Palestine policy, the Potsdam decisions and the Greek-
172Turkish aid programme. Vandenberg, disturbed by Dewey's 
remarks, addressed a long letter to Dulles outlining his 
concern that they handle foreign affairs carefully in the 
campaign, and suggesting that Dewey's statements on foreign 
affairs be made, if Dewey agreed, only after consultion 
with Dulles, to avoid "some of the groups working at cross 
purposes". Convinced of victory, Vandenberg was already 
looking forward to January: "the next Republican Secretary 
of State is going to need Democratic votes in the Senate 
just as badly as the present Administration has needed 
Republican votes. I have no illusions that the Republican
isolationists have surrendered, They will be 'back at the 
old stand' next January."172 3*75 Although not wishing, to give 
the impression that the Republicans could not attack over 
foreign affairs, Vandenberg argued that there was a danger, 
which he felt Dewey had approached, of circumscribing "our 
bipartisan liaison too narrowly" and thereby robbing them­
selves of Important credits, of which he felt the E. C. A. 
was a spectacular example.17^ At the same time, Vandenberg 
outlined his intention of urging Secretary Marshall to 
establish a liaison with Eulles: "I know the Secretary has
172New York Times, July 2, 194-8.
173Vandenberg, Private Papers. pp. 446-7.
17^'Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, July 2, 1948, 
Vandenberg MSS.
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a great respect for you" he wrote, "and I am sure it 
will be possible to find some sort of a working agree­
ment regarding contemporary crises ..: which may develop 
in our foreign relations. Governor Dewey’s highly pat­
riotic attitudes in this connection during the campaign 
of 1944 cannot be forgotten.
Dulles sprang to Dewey's defence, arguing that Truman 
did not divorce himself from politics, and iewey could not 
be expected to either; nevertheless, the Vandenberg thesis 
won the day.1?6 Apart from a statement on the Italian 
colonies, to which Vandenberg took exception, Dewey did 
not significantly deviate from the path laid down by Van­
denberg. ^ 77 q # Douglas Dillon, one of the group who 
helped to compile largely un-used material on foreign 
relations for the campaign,explained in retrospect that 
Dewey did not use the material, because he was "convinced 
he was going to win, and he followed the advice of Senator 
Artlhur Vandenberg and of Cabot Lodge. . .that he should not say 
anything that would too much upset the Democrats because 
it would be hard for them when they were in the majority
1^ Vandenberg to John Poster Dulles, July 2, 1948, Vandenberg MSS,
^^Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 447-8.
177Dewey had spoken in favour of returning the colonies 
to Italy, Vandenberg disagreed that he should commit 
himself on a complex international matter during the 
campaign. Vandenberg to John Poster Dulles, August; 21 ,
1948, Vandenberg MSS.
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A similarafter 1948 to deal with the Democrats."1?® 
analysis was made by Dulles in a letter to a friend in 
September 1948: "The policy to follow in foreign affairs 
is difficult because Vandenberg is particularly anxious 
to avoid anything in the nature of attack. He is taking 
for granted Dewey’s election and is looking to the situation 
after January when cooperation from Democrats will be re­
quired to effectuate the Republican foreign policy." He 
also added, "I think that not being a candidate for office 
himself he is a little too dispassionate, but his p&int of 
view cannot be ignnred as there must not be any 'break' 
between him and Dewey."1?9
Over-shadowing the campaign however, was the crisis 
1 ftnin Berlin. Even what to Republicans seemed the unnecess­
arily provocative tone of the Democratic platform was in­
sufficient to bring about a re-appraisal of the campaign.1®1 
In the crisis of 1948, all the actions of the Administration 
seemed somehow beneath contempt; thus the decision of the 
President to call the extra session of Congress evoked from 
Vandenberg the comment that he doubted that "any good to the 
country" would come from it: "This sounds like a vast hys­
terical gasp of an expiring administration."1®2 *4Yet even 
an Old Guard sympathizer, Cal O'laughlin, warned Dewey
1 ?®Transcript, interview 'with C. Douglas Dillon pp. 2-4, 
Dulles (Oral).
179Dulles to Ferdinand Meyer, September 7, 1948, Dulles 
MSS (Supplement).
130The Soviet blockade of Berlin began on June 24.4 Q 4lo Memorandum by John Foster Dulles on meeting with Robert 
A. Lovett, August 20, 1948, copy in Vandenberg MSS; 
statement by Dewey, Chicago Tribune. July 15, 1948.
1®^Hew York Times. July 16, 1948.
-472-
against making too much of an issue of the special session, 
which he said was not solely dictated by domestic politics, 
but by the dangerous situation in Berlin.1®^ Yandenberg 
also was extremely concerned about the situation, and 
what he regarded as the attendant risk of war. To Robert 
Lovett, who had written expressing less than pleasure with 
the decision to call a special session of Congress, he 
urged that the State Department keep in touch with Dulles: 
"Unity is dreadfully important at home (to whatever extent 
this asset remains within our reach after Philadelphia). 
Publicly, Charles Eaton of New Jersey, Chairman of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, called on the President 
to tell Congress Just how close the country was to war. 
Describing Berlin as the supreme issue facing the United 
States, he commented, "It is a world conflict between Christ 
and the devil, between freedom and slavery.”1®-* Congressman 
Walter Judd publicly warned that the country might be at 
war before the end of the year.1®®
In the face of all the war talk, Dewey’s statesmanlike 
pose tías faultless. On July 21st he described Berlin as 
the "major concern" of the Rebuplicans; he was, he said, in 
daily contact with John Foster Dulles over the situation.1®^ 
Harold Stassen, who the same day had had a meeting with 
Dewey, took a more partisan line: whilst attacking the 
Russians, he blamed "the unusual administrative set-up that 
grew out of the Potddam Conference" which made it "almost
4^ 7* ,ra ' Tl
^O’laughlin to Thomas E. Dewey, July 16, 1948, O’Laughlin MSS1 PAVandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 453-4; Robert A. Lovett 
to Vandenberg, July 15, 1948; Vandenberg to Robert A. Lovett 
July 19, 1948, Yandenberg MSS.
1®^Chlcago Tribune. July 21, 1948.
1®6Ibid.
187ibid. July 22, 1948 -473-
impossible to have a satisfactory administration of the 
whole of Berlin or Germany.”1®® On July 23rd, Dewey con­
ferred with Eisenhower, and even extended to hflim the rare 
privilege of a joint press conference: both men expressed 
agreement on the Berlin question and the whole problem 
of European military and economic union, whilst Dewey 
expressed the hope that he would have the opportunity of 
calling on Eisenhower in the future.1®^ Finally, on July 
24th, after consultation with Vandenberg and Dulles, Dewey 
issued a statement on Berlin in which, whilst criticizing 
past mistakes, he expressed the conviction that the United 
States must not surrender its rights in Berlin.1 90 Explana­
tion of Dewey's conduct was given by two journalists with 
good Rgpublican contacts, James Reston and Arthur Krock. 
Both agreed that in view of the external situation, Dewey 
would not attack the Administration over foreign affairs: 
'There may" commented Reston, "even be no attack made on 
President Truman for undue interference during the campaign 
period with the conduct of foreign affairs by the State 
Department."  ^ Arthur Krock commented that whilst Dewey 
and Dulles were privately very critical of Administration 
policies leading up to the Berlin crisis, they would not 
rock the boat. Dewey would, he predicted, "limit his dis­
cussions of foreign policy to very broad and cautious 
statements, as in 1944, in acknowledgement of practical
TBS
Ibid., On July 22, the President expressed confidence 
about a peaceful outcome, and said he would not be dis­
cussing foreign affairs in his message to the special 
session of Congress. Chicago Tribune. July 23, 1948.
1 ®% e w  York Times. July 24, 1948.
19°Ibld., July 31, 1948.
191 Ibid., July 31, 1948.
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necessities and patriotic requirements."
Clearly then, the Berlin crisis, added to the solid 
influence of Vandenberg, had an inhibiting effect on the 
Republican campaign; it was even reported that the Repub­
lican Rational Committee Campaign Committee had decided 
not to approve the use of its major research pamphlet:
"Democratic Duplicity and Appeasement in Foreign Policy
1 93Administration, 1935-47." At times Dewey showed signs of 
wishing to break free from the constraints imposed on 
him, as over his comments on the Italian colonies and his 
clear identification with China. Even Vandenberg was 
prepared to agree that he could attack areas of policy not 
Involved in major negotiation which had not been the subject 
of bipartisan development. But, in spelling out his objec­
tions to Dewey’s statement on the Italian colonies, Vanden­
berg indicated how narrowly in practice he wished criticism 
to be circumscribed. They must not, he said, commit 
themselves publicly in advance of consultation with 
friendly nations, they should deal with generalities 
which invited "unity rather than debate". "From the stand­
point of sheer politics I respectfully submit that we can 
prove from the record that Republicans can be wholly trusted 
with these foreign policy responsibilities. I respectfully 
submit that our only political danger is to UNPROVE it."
And further ". . .1 think we (as a Party) have Infinitely 
much to lose if we invite the slightest suspicion of our
^^Ibid., August 5th, 1948.
 ^9j?Ibld. t August 15th, 1948.
1 92
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richly earned prestige (from the Governor down) as the
1 94authors and advocates of foreign policy cooperation." 
Insisting in public that he did not Intend bipartisan 
foreign policy to muzzle his relations with other countries, 
Dewey, through his secretary, stated that, "is a founder 
of this bi-partisan foreign policy. . .Governor Dewey has 
consistently sought a united front in foreign affairs". 
Perhaps significantly, the same day, after a meeting with 
Dewey, Charles Halleck reminded the press that on many 
matters Republicans had not been consulted, and that "mis­
takes" at war-time conferences had increased the difficul­
ties of the situation in which the United States was now 
1 96operating.  ^ The tactics seemed clear: to take all the 
credit for the successful aspects of .American policy, and 
to dwell critically on the seemingly unsuccessful aspects, 
such as the war-time conferences, with which Republicans 
had not been consulted. At the end of August, Dewey said 
that he was not going to be lulled into over-confidence, 
and that he was going to conduct a rugged campaign.1^
But as far as foreign affairs were concerned his hands were, 
seemingly tied by his commitment to unity, both in the 
national and party sense. In particular, with Dulles' 
relationship with Vandenberg apparently cooling, it was 
clearly unthinkable that there be a repetition of 1944,
1^Yandenberg to John Foster Dulles, August 21st, 1948, 
Vandenberg MSS.
'95uew York Times, August 20th. 1948.
196ibTd; : "
197ibld.. August 31st, 1948.
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when a few liberal Republicans and influential newspapers
1Q8had deserted him.
If the theme of ’’unity” was based on the assumption 
that a Republican victory was inevitable, the small group 
of Democrats who, led by Clark Clifford, were managing the 
President’s re-election campaign clearly thought other- 
wise. Rone of the President's political advisers held 
high political or administrative office; they were in many 
ways excluded from the foreign policy decision-making pro­
cess to almost the same degree as the political advisers 
surrounding Dewey. This meant, therefore, that the Presi­
dent Tías, like Dewey, ppulled by two sets of advisers; the
political, and those whose interests were in maintaining
200a united foreign policy. In the same way as Republicans 
sought to maximise their contributions td bipartisanship, 
so the President's political advisers sought in 194-8 to 
play down bipartisan foreign policy, and to play up execu­
tive leadership, especially as Vandenberg's prestige began
l^qAlsop to Martin Somers, August 16th, 1948, Alsop MSS. 
iyyUseful background on this can be found in, Harold Emery 
Barto, "Clark Clifford and the Presidential Election of 
1948" (Ph.D. thesis, Rutgers University, 1970), pp. 25-31,
35-38.200In July Dulles gave the following account of a talk with 
Robert Lovett which reveals the strains between the two 
sets of advisers; ’’. . .He. . .privately expressed his 
chagrin at the Democratic platform on foreign policy, 
saying that he and M. were bitterly disappointed; that 
they had worked with the President to get a decent.plat­
form which would not claim all credit for the results of 
bi-partisan cooperation; that they had thought they had 
Truman's support, but that in the end the political ad­
visers had written it their way. Also, the State Depart­
ment knew nothing about the call of Congress until they 
read it in the papers." Memorandum of meeting with Lovett 
and Marshall, July 19th, 1948, dated July 20th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
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began to rise as a result of the Marshall Plan fight.
In December 1947, Clark Clifford prepared a memorandum 
outlining re-election strategy for 1948 in which he dis­
counted the possibility of a continuation of bipartisanship,
and referred to the "considerable political advantage to
202the Administration in its battle with the Kremlin". 
Predicting a continued deterioration of relations with the 
Soviet Union, the memorandum noted that "In times of 
crisis the American citizen tends to back up his Presi­
dent".20  ^ Republican strategy it saw as distinguishing 
between the good (Marshall) and the bad (Truman), whilst 
playing up their own part, and especially the role of Van- 
denberg.20^ The Administration must, therefore, ensure 
greater exposure for the President as regards foreign policy 
leadership; they must correct the situation in which
"several of the incumbent Cabinet officers tend to regard
205themselves as the rulers of independent baronies".
The essence of the Clifford strategy was, therefore, 
clear; in 1948, Mr. Truman must be seen to be President, 
and in particular he must regain the initiative in matters 
of defence and foreign policy. Such then was the broad
?01
201 Clifford crossed out a reference to bipartisanship in 
the 1948 State of the Union speech, Draft 6, January 7th, 
1948, State of the Union, Elsey MSS; he also opposed 
reference to bipartisanship in the draft of the message 
on the Marshall Plan in December, 1947, Pencilled note, 
undated, Marshall Plan Message Polder 3, #lsey MSS. 
202Clark Clifford, Confidential Memorandum to the President, 
November 19th, 1947, pp. 14-15, Political Pile, Clark M. Clifford M3S., Truman Library,
SSIlMi., P. 15.f g f o i a •. p. is.2°5ToicT.. pp. JO-1.
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strategy of 1948; it was a strategy which was "bound to 
bring some degree of conflict with the State Department 
and the Department of Defence. In the first half of 1948, 
Truman’s political advisers worked hard, albeit with limited 
success, to establish the President as the man who made 
policy. Perhaps the key example of this ..was the President’s 
decision to address Congress in mid-March, on the same day 
that he addressed a St. Patrick’s Day meeting in Dew York.
The St. Patrick's Day speech in Dew York hae been planned 
first; it was designed to give a simple explanation of the 
European situation in anti-Russian and anti-Wallace terms, 
for obvious political reasons. Commander Elsey, one of 
Clifford’s top aides, commented, that unless the President 
did something to offset the Marshall Plan and engative pub­
licity about Palestine and China, he was lost; he needed, 
therefore, to deliver a speech outlining American leader­
ship in the search for peace, European recovery and unity, 
and opposition to Russian expansion.20  ^ The State Depart­
ment viewed the projected speech with considerable misgivings,
feeling that the world was far too dangerous a place for
207the President to take a belligerent stand. Only two days
2®^Pencilled note, "Problems - as BIG sees them 8 March 
’48", Speech Pile, March 17th, 1948, Elsey MSS. 
pencil note, "For. Pol. Message to Congress" bears the 
cryptic comments: "HST talked to Marshall who is ner­
vous - world keg of dynamite - HST shouldn't start it." 
Speech File, March 17th, 1948, Elsey MSS. The same 
file contains other similar warnings from the State De­
partment in opposition to the more belligerent stance 
of the political staff.
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before the scheduled speech, it was decided that the Presi­
dent should first address Congress, a view taken against 
the wishes apparently of the political staff, and ask it to 
enact Universal Military Training. On March 17th, then, only 
one and one-half hours before the scheduled speech to Con­
gress, Congressional leaders were invited to attend the 
White House, but apparently refused to do so. Both Re­
publicans and Democrats were reportedly hostile to the 
President's action, and there was speculation that Vanden- 
berg had not been consulted in advance for political rea-
OAOsons. The speech was perhaps a success in terms of 
publicity: the Democratic National Committee Staff noted 
that more people had listened to it on the radio than to 
any speech by Truman since VE day; one of the political 
staff, congratulating Clark Clifford, said it was a pity 
that policy decisions had not yet been made which would 
have enabled it to contain an effective plan for paace to 
help with the Italian elections and to steal the issue from 
Wallace.  ^ The speech failed, however,to impress Taft, 
who remained as opposed to universal military training as 
ever. Prank MeNaughton of Time scorned various House leaders 
who "sat at the Republican committee table in the densely- 
crowded House Chamber1;. They grinned as if they were seeing 
the death of an opposition political party and as if they
2^Report, "Truman Reaction Etc. (NA)", March 1948,
_ Me Naught on MSS. . ...
20%emorandugi,Ken Pry to Jack Redding, March 19th, 1948, 
Publicity Piles, Democratic National Committee Records, 
Truman library; William Batt to Clifford, March 18th,
1948, Political Pile, Clifford MSS.
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had no realization of any U.S. peril."
Truman's address to Congress in March revealed, therefore, 
the political ramifications of the crisis of 1948. At the 
time of his speech, his stock was very low, and in the suc­
ceeding months there appeared to be no improvement. Opposed 
by large sections of his party, he appeared to have lost 
whatever control he had ever had of his Administration. 
Foreign policy in particular seemed increasingly the pre­
serve of Secretary Marshall, under-Secretary Lovett and
Senator Vandenberg. April, in fact, found the President's
211prestige and morale at a low ebb. Arthur Krock commented
that "the President's influence at this writing is weaker
than any President’s has been in modern American history,
and in an hour when national security requires all the
212strength implicit in his office". Walter Lippmann
also claimed that the President had lost control of his
administration: ", . .Mr. Truman does not have the quail-
213fications that are essential in a Commander in Chief".
It seems clear, therefore, that the President's role in
the development of policy was, apart from politically
sensitive matters such as Israel, minimal by the summer of
1948. Sven matters of appointment to the European Recovery
Program were partially taken out of Administration hands
by the need to secure the assent of Vandenberg and Con- 
214gress.
^Report, March 17th, 1948, MeNaughton MSS.
211rjris Coffin to Finder, April 13th, 1948, Finder MSS.
212New York Times, April 4th, 1948.
213Clipping, dated April 1st, 1948, Harry S. Truman Admin- 
c .istration, Subject File, Elsey MSS.
^Lllienthal, II: 337.
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Rather than redound to his political advantage, the
war scare in fact seemed to have the reverse effect. In
May, Senator George told reporters that the country should
elect a strong, one-term President; he did not think Truman
215was "the answer to the country's prayer for leadership".
In early June, fifty Washington correspondents, asked who 
was the "most qualified" to he the next President, divided 
their votes equally between Yandenberg, Taft and Dewey, 
with only one vote for the incumbent. ° Despite the prog­
nostications, the President refused to accept defeat. Al­
though he had not managed to establish himself as outstand­
ing executive leader, the basic Clifford strategy remained 
valid. Political considerations required him to undercut 
Wallace, which in return required Wallace to be impugned 
as a communist, and the President to be closely associated 
with possible moves toward world peace. In May the head 
of research at the Democratic Rational Committee wrote to 
Clifford of the need, as evidenced by the polls, for the 
President to express confidence in peace and spell out 
how it was to be achieved. He also noted the disillusion­
ment and ignorance of the electorate with regard to foreign 
policy.217 Another element of the strategy was avoidance 
of too slavish an identification with the bipartisan 
foreign policy. An indication of this was the Democratic
21^Hew York Times. May 25th, 1948.
216Ibid.. June 3rd, 1948.
217William Batt, memorandum to Clifford, May 8th, 1948, 
Political Pile, Clifford,MSS.
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platform, with its long section on Israel, and a paragraph 
on Poland, outlipr Woodrow Wilson's fight for Polish free­
dom on the aftermath of World War I. What grieved Repub­
licans especially was the way in which it took sole creditfrom
in developing United States policy./before Pearl Harbor 
right up to the Liar shall Plan, with only negative mentions 
of Republicans for their opposition in Congress to the R.T.A. 
programme, and to the Marshall Plan appropriations. The 
ppllcy of excluding any olive branches to Republicans was 
the work of the political staff.^ 3  clearly they were not 
going to allow their campaign to be muzzled by bipartisan 
policy, any more than Dewey had intended to.
In the event, the President's re-election campaign did 
not concentrate on foreign affairs, but his advisers were 
quite prepared to let it '. enter the debate. Aware of Re­
publican internal divisions, convinced that the Administra-
218The original State Department draft was hard hitting, 
with mention of the "short-sighted policies of the Smoot- 
Kawley tariff, and of the philosophy of Grundyism" in con­
nection with the tariff, and with attacks on Republicans 
for imposing discriminatory conditions on the admission 
of displaced persons, and with references to "isolation­
ism" within the G.O.P.; at the same time, however, it 
had paid tribute to "those distinguished Republicans" 
who had worked for E.R.P. in 1948; State Department 
Draft, Political Pile, Clifford MSS., The section on 
S.R.P. was initially approved by the President, "This 
is OS I think," he wrote beside it; he also approved 
references to bipartisanship which like the section on 
S.R.P. did not survive the final'drafting; Proposals 
attached to G.M.E. Memo, August 26th, 1948, Speech 
Pile, Slsey MSS.
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tion had a good track record, they were confident that
foreign affairs would not harm them. y If the Republicans
were the jarty of the rich and the special interests, while
the Democrats were the party of the people, so, in the view
they encouraged in their rhetoric, the Republicans were
the party of high tariffs and "isolationism", whilst the
220
Democrats were the party of international cooperation.
So far as the "communist issue" was concerned, they were pre­
pared to counter-attack boldly, by elaborating the Clifford 
thesis that the Communists wanted a Republican victory to 
bring about political reaction, in which conditions commun­
ism would thrive.Co n c e r n e d about Dewey's "unity" theme, 
they counter-attacked, by bringing in Cordell Hull to answer 
Dewey's claim that he had founded the bipartisan foreign 
policy, and by getting the State Department to supply mater­
ial refuting Dewey's claim that the Republicans had changed 
E.R.P. from Just another relief handout into a practical 
measure. One of Clifford's helpers argued for greater 
attack on "unity"; it was, he said, platitudinous and de-
21 Memorandum on Foreign Policy in the Campaign", Presiden- dial Speech File, Western Tour - September 12th, 1948 - 
-n0ctober 2nd, 1948, Charles S. Murphy MSS, Truman Library.
22U"Suggestions for Preparing Outlines for Brief Platform 
Speeches", Presidential Speech File, Murphy MSS.
221sarto, p. 198; William Batt pointed out that Dewey had 
done nothing about Communists in Hew York State, where 
70$ of American Communists resided and that he had worked 
closely with Communist Party "elements". Batt's refer­
ence was apparently to the fact that three New York Re­
publicans had been elected with American labor Party 
endorsement! William L. Batt, Memorandum to J. Howard 
McGrath, September 2nd, 1948, Dewey File, Democratic Na­
tional Committee Library MSS.
222Memorandum, Jonathan Daniels to Matthew Connelly (aboard 
Pres, train), copy in Political File, Clifford MSS; 
memorandum, F. H. Russell to Robert A. Lovett, October 
13th, 1948, Presidential Speech File, Murphy MSS,
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signed to hide the issues. The President, he argued, could
not throw away the<asset "contained in the fact that when
all is said and done the Initiative in formulating a foreign
policy which has the overwhelming approval of the American
people came from a Democratic Administration".22-^ In
Minnesota in October, Truman apparently responded to the
suggestion by a snipe at Dewey. The unity they had, he
said, was achieved by Republicans as well as Democrats
who were prepared to fight for principles: "It was not
achieved by the people who copied the answers down neatly
224after the teacher had written them on the blackboard".
The biggest threat to the somewhat uneasy bipartisanship 
during the 1948 campaign^ came from the political advisers' 
desire that any successful settlement of the Berlin crisis 
should be seen to be the work of the President. In August 
William Batt, the Director of the Research Division of the 
Democratic Rational Committee, had written to Clifford of 
the need to let the President be seen to be handling the 
Berlin crisis: "If an arrangement is obtained with Russia 
to resume four-power talks, the President should be first 
to announce this result. He should go on the radio and 
tell the people how he has directed our foreign policy to 
establish not merely peace in our time but peace for all 
time. He should remind the people of his Truman Doctrine 
and the European Recovery Plan, and point to the fact that 
both the policy of economic aid to Europe and military aid
223*L' to ClifDrd, October 5th, 1948, Political File, 
Clifford MSS.224~New York Times, October 14th, 1948.
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to Greece and Turkey have proved to he successful. He should 
discuss these policies as steps to enhance the prospects of 
permanent peace."22  ^ Suggestions such as these emanating 
from the President’s political staff were hound to make the 
delicate bipartisan approach to the Berlin crisis even more 
difficult. The bipartisan policy, which was symbolized by 
the cooperation between Secretary of State Marshall and 
John Poster Dulles at the Paris United Nations Assembly, was 
one of securing three power unity against the Russians; such 
a policy, especially in view of French uncertainty about the 
agreed re-establishment of a German government, required 
assurance of continuity. Whilst, therefore, Republicans 
were in their own view being statesmanlike over Berlin at 
a time of acute crisis, and so as not to arouse fears in 
Britain and Prance or to bring about Russian miscalculation, 
Truman's political advisers hit on the idea of sending
226Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin.
The proposal, which was clearly designed to associate the 
President with a major peace initiative and to cut the 
ground from under Henry Wallace, was, to the irritation of 
the political staff, vetoed by Secretary Marshall. That 
would have been the end of the affair, but for the fact 
that news of the scheme leaked to the press because of the
225william L. Batt, to Clifford, August 11th, 1948, Political 
Pile, Clifford MSS. On 30th August, Clifford apparently 
talked with the President about the publicity angle to 
the negotiations with the Soviet Union over Berlin, hand­
written note, August 30th, 1948, Speech Pile, Elsey MSS. 
226Barto, pp. 191-3.
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Administration's action in booking and then cancelling radio 
227time.
Republicans were outraged by the revelations. To them 
it seemed that as during the Wallace affair in 1946, the 
President was playing politics with foreign policy at a 
time of major crisis. To Dewey, Dulles cabled from Paris;
"My estimate of Yinson affair is that it greatly increases 
difficulty pursuing joint British French U.S. policy toward 
Soviet. French and British who feel they are most exposed 
to consequences of firm policy are wondering whether they 
can rely on our stability or whether after they are committed 
we may not deal separately with Soviet Union behind their 
backs. Situation somewhat like that created during 1946 
Paris Conference.by President's approval of Wallace
aaOspeech." The strategy Dulles recommended was in keeping
with the whole "unity" theme: "From standpoint of bipartisan
cooperation you may want to suggest necessity of unity
behind Marshall. You are seeking through me to present
united face of foreign perils but you cannot at the same
time cooperate with irreconcilable policies one developed
by Secretary of State at Paris the other developed under
229political Influences at Washington". Republican high 
command seemed disposed to follow Dulles' line. So sure 
were they of victory, that on balance they decided not to
^^Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 456-7: New York Times.
October 10th,"T5*57 --- --------------22yTelegram, Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, October 10th, 1948, 
Dulles MSS.
229lbld.
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make overt attacks on the Vinson proposal. On October 
10th, Dewey issued a "non-political" statement in line with 
Dulles' recommendations: "The people of America whole­
heartedly and vigorously support the labours of our bi­
partisan delegation at Paris and specifically its insisten­
ce on a prompt lifting of the blockade of Berlin. The 
nations of the world can rest assured that the American 
people are in fact united in their foreign policy and will 
firmly and unshakably uphold the United Nations and our
friends of the free world in every step to build and pre-
230serve the peace." On the same day, Vandenberg allowed 
himself a reference to the affair at a dinner at which he 
was presented with the Freedom Award: ", . .now that we 
have gone to the United Nations we must intelligently avoid 
any unilateral independent action on our own account, lest 
we confuse our friendly associates, cramp the Security 
Council, and encourage our opponents to think our appeal to 
the United Nations is either timid or insincere. Since I 
think I have earned the right to deal in the truth, I am 
bound to assert that we have just had a narrow escape upon 
this score at Washington",2^1
At the time, the Vinson affair seemed to illustrate the 
high mindedr ‘, statesmanlike pose of Dewey as compared 
with the cheap precinct politics of Truman. Both govern­
ment officials and Republicans were watchful for a repeat
230New York Times, October 11th, 194-8.
231Ibid.
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attempt.2-52 Amongst ostensible neutrals, Truman also ap­
peared to have few friends. Amongst his critics wea Walter 
Lippman, who bemoaned the fact that American policy had 
become separate from the Democratic process: only Vanden- 
berg, he said, of those who made important decisions, had 
been elected to his office. Truman, he commented, had no 
control, he simply meddled: ", . .in plain words Mr.
Truman does not know how to be President. He does not 
know how to conduct foreign relations or how to be Commander 
in Chief. His absences from Washington during the campaign 
have merely disclosed what has since the beginning been 
the fact - that Mr. Truman does not govern and has no con­
trol over, the diplomatic and military policy of the United 
States."233 go also, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr added his 
condemnation: "Mr. Truman’s final meddling venture in
foreign policy, probably prompted by a desire to gain a few 
votes, actually cost him many a supporter among the more 
sophisticated portion of the electorate. The idea that 
he might be able to pull a rabbit out of a hat by sending 
Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow after our dispute with Russia 
had been submitted to the United Nations, proved beyond 
doubt that Mr. Truman does not understand foreign policy.
We may be grateful that the team, to which he has intrusted 
our foreign affairs, was, on the whole, a good one; and 
that he interfered only occasionally with their conduct
2^2New York Times, October 10th, 194-8; Vandenberg, Private 
Papers. pp. 457-60; telegram, Allen W. Dulles to John 
Poster Dulles, October 23rd, 1948, Dulles MSS.
233Mew York Herald Tribune, October 12th, 1948.
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of foreign affairs." The New York Herald Tribune, feel­
ing charitable as victory neared, said that the country 
would not "wish to berate their Vice-President become Presi­
dent by the chance of death. There was plainly a grlsvous 
blunder in his selection; but that was not his fault." Its 
one remaining fear was that "he may spend his remaining months 
in office improvising fresh experiments in foreign affairs 
to avenge his defeat. The hope must be that the strong men 
about him will be able to save the country from such blun­
dering. "^35 There was a certain inevitability about the 
Chicago Tribune1s endorsement of Dewey, despite all it 
had said about him; its judgement on Truman reflected the 
current trend: "Mr. Truman is not the worst President this 
country has had; but he has the least capacity for the of­
fice. "While he is incapable of great betrayals, he is 
possessed by an invincible stupidity and a political moral­
ity that has never risen above the ghost voting and the
236graft of the Pendergast machine."
Doubtless his confidence increased still further by the
apparent unanimity amongst the Influential, Dewey continued
to parade the theme of unity as he toured the country on his
237immaculately organized "Dewey Victory Special". His whole 
Campaign was as mechanical as it appeared to be effective.
At his brief whistle stops he appealed for national unity,
?^Ibid., November 1st, 1948.235TMT.
23^0ctober 6th, 1948.
237Sven the baggage was so marked! Report, September 19th, 
1948, McNaughton MSS.
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condemned the Administration for letting the Communists 
get into Government and then asking for 25 million dollars 
to get them out, and promised the "biggest, fanciest house­
cleaning in Washington next January that this country has 
ever seen". Then, having introduced his wife, he departed 
for the next performance.2-^ His major speeches were even 
more mechanical. One reporter, who like most failed to 
warm to him, described his appearence: ", . .there he is,
smiling, waving, tidy and efficient, the very symbol of a
239generation that has glorified techniques". Despite 
reports that a number of Republican senatorial candidates 
were in difficulty, the confidence of victory was virtually 
unchallenged.22*'0 In Earls, Dulles and Marshall were giving 
thought to the transition period after Dewey's election, 
a matter of which Truman, as the supposed defeated candi-
P41date, was left totally ignorant. Back in New York, Allen
Dulles was thinking of the same thing, and in particular of
the difficult position his brother would be in, in Paris
242in the transition period. Por the moment, however, Dulles 
was enjoying the attentions of the Ambassadors of the world,
all of whom were as confident of the result as the opinion
24^pollsters. J
238uew York Times, October 14th. 1948.
2?9lbid.
240Diary, October 10th, 1948, Smith MSS; New York Times, 
October 14th, 1948.
241 Memorandum of conversation with Secretary of State Mar- 
shall, October 25th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
242Allen Dulles to John Poster Dulles, October 22nd, 1948, Dulles MSS.
245DuIles to A. H. Vandenberg, October 24th, 1948, Dulles 
MSS (Supplement); telegram, Dalles to Thomas E. Dewey, 
October 11th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
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In the last weeks of the campaign,, foreign policy, 
albeit subtly, became an issue of some importance. Not 
that Republican spokesmen offered any serious alternatives, 
but they continued to press home their past contributions, 
and their present commitment. Dewey, in his major foreign 
policy address at Louisville, Kentucky in October, echoed 
Vandenberg in making greater and greater claims for past 
Republican wisdom; claiming that Republicans in 1945 had 
been responsible for ensuring that Regional Security Agree­
ments under the United Nations need not be subject to the 
veto; claiming to have made E.R.P. a practical aid programme; 
claiming to have initiated bipartisan foreign policy whilst
attacking the Democrats for themselves claiming sole credit
pAAfor it. He also attacked the Administration for its 
bungling and its failure to understand communism: "The 
leaders of the world Communist movement are ruthless, hard- 
headed, ambitious men. The tragedy of our time has been 
that we have had an administration that did not understand 
those leaders and did not understand the great need for 
firmness and consistency in our foreign affairs. Time and 
again, America has been made to appear before the world as 
a fumbling giant, serving up diplomatic victories which only 
whetted the appetities of men whose appetites are world 
wide."^^ James Reston, on the "Dewey Victory Special",
^ ^ New York Times. October lAth, 1948; on October 4th, in 
a radio address, Vandenberg had outlined his view of bi­
partisanship, outlining the long list of Republican con­
tributions, and excluding China, Palestine, Japan, Germany, 
and "until recently" Latin America from the bipartisan ._policy; ibid., October 5th. 1944.
245rbid., October 14th, 1948.
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commented that,despite his high-minded claims, Dewey had
made the Berlin crisis and the Vinson affair an issue,
since at almost every stop, he criticized the Administration's
handling of foreign affairs. Whilst he did not mention the
Vinson affair, his aides made it clear to reporters that
it was to that he was referring when he repeatedly said
that the Administration's left hand did not know what its
245right hand was doing.
Coming into the home straight, Dewey was reportedly 
determined not to sink to what was generally regarded as 
the low level of his opponent.2^  In his diary, Senator 
Smith commented, "We are all stunned at the extravagance 
of invective that Truman is hurling around in his desperate 
effort to win. His charges against his opponents are diffi­
cult to understand. Both he and the Wallace forces are
248trying to divide America when we need unity so badly".
At Pittsburgh on October 11th, Dewey had announced, "We are 
now entering the final three weeks of the campaign to unite 
America. With the ominous overtones of division and strife 
in the world, there is increasing evidence of the great good 
this election is going to do. It will revive the spiritual 
unity of our people. It will restore our unity and our 
strength in the cause of peace abroad. And most of all it 
will show the world that we are selecting a competent Ad­
ministration which will unfailingly back up the work of its
2^_Ibld.. October 17th, 1948.
27llbid., October 23rd, 1948.
24°5Iary, October 30th, 1948, Smith MSS.
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own representatives in the United Nations for peace."
At Cleveland on October 27th, he stuck to the same theme, 
with more emphasis on Administration incompetence both to 
diagnose and deal with the Communist threat. The Admin­
istration, he said, were, "whether they know it or not" 
voicing Communist propaganda in their talk of an economic 
boom and bust. Peace depended on unity,he said, but his
opponents were ridiculing the "old-fashioned AmeClean idea
250of teamwork and unity". At the end of his campaign, 
Dewey was convinced that his campaign was "worthy of the 
greatness of our country". "As a people," he told his 
Madison Square Garden audience at the end of October,
"you and I have made great progress during this campaign.
We have rediscovered our belief in the old-fashioned Ameri­
can idea of teamwork. We have rediscovered the great fun­
damental that when Americans are united on a team it is un­
beatable." Now, with this election, the World would "know 
at last where America stands and it will be the same place 
every day. We shall at last be all out on the side of 
human freedom". ^ The day before, campaigning in New 
England, he had expressed his conviction that a united 
America, pressurizing Europe to unite also, could roll back
249yew York Times. October 12th, 1948.
250ibid.. October 28th, 1948; Vandenberg described this as 
"one of the greatest speeches of all time" in a radio 
address the following day, ibid., October 29th, 1948.
251 ibid.. October 31st, 1948.
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252the iron curtain, and push bach the "area of slavery".
To what extent Dewey was offering an alternative to the 
policy already being pursued is doubtful. His whole cam­
paign had been one of high minded gpaeralties: he favoured 
American aid to bring about European federation, more help 
to China, and bipartisanship? he opposed Communism, appease­
ment and "isolation". But this hardly added up to a new 
programme. In late October, Dulles wrote to Dewey of the 
need for "a fresh approach on foreign affairs", he offered 
little guide as to what he thought this' should be; his major 
drift appeared to be that the Incoming Administration needed 
time to re-order priorities before assuming control:
". . .foreign policies are today largely dependent on stra­
tegic considerations; on what we are prepared to do about 
armaments at home and abroad and on what we will contribute 
to the economic recovery of our friends abroad. To assume 
responsibility for new foreign policies apart from the possi­
bility of their integration into a total national policy, 
would be to risk failure. Equally, it would be unfortunate
to drift into such identification with existing policies as
253would make it embarrassing to change them." These con­
siderations reflected a proper concern for a Republican Sec­
retary of State, who would still have to come to terms with
252Ibid., October 30th, 1948.
253Memorandurn to Dewey, October 26th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
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Congress. To Vandenberg he wrote, "I am getting an amazing
picture of the world situation and the flood of demands to
254which we are going to be dubjected. . ." Press reports
meanwhile, indicated that the new Administration intended
to build, unite, arm, and finance the non-Communist world
on a larger scale than the Truman Administration had ever
dared s u g g e s t . S u c h  an outcome was, however, unlikely;
the Republican emphasis as always was not on more, but on
more efficient use of the same, or if possible, of less.
In his letter of October 30th, Dulles wrote to Dewey, "it
is apparent your election will bring to all our foreign
friends new hope that the United States power will be more
256effectively used for world peace". - That in essence was 
what the Republicans offered, not a real alternative, but 
the efficiency which they held came from a wholehearted be­
lief iif freedom and the American system, as opposed to the 
half-hearted belief of Dew Dealers.
More precise formulations, apart from being diplomati­
cally unwise, would have created fifflculties within the 
Republican Party. "Unity" and "teamwork" required demon­
strations of party unity. Despite earlier strains, by the 
end of the campaign, Dewey, Dulles and Vandenberg were said 
to be in perfect harmony, as too was Harold Stassen.2^
254Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, October 24th, 1948, Dulles MSS (Supplement).
255ciipping from New York Post. October 21st, 1948, Dewey 
Pile, Democratic NationaTTCommittee Library MSS. 
25&Telegram, Dulles to Dewey. October 30th, 1948, Dulles MSS. New York Times, October 18th, 1948.
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Although, relations with Taft were poor, Taft refused to be
drawn publicly, even on the question of arms aid to Europe
which was likely to be the first major subject to confront
the new Administration. "Even if I have ideas, I'll wait
until Governor Dewey and Mr. Dulles express an opinion,"
said Taft. On the general question of relations between
Dewey and the Congressional Party, Taft merely grinned, and
wagging a finger at reporters, said, "There's unity in the
air."2^® Efforts were made to conciliate Martin and Halleck
and a programme of broadcasts laid on for Congressional
leaders. Even John Taber was reported as expecting no
difficulties in his relations with Dewey: "You can talk
to Dewey. You can talk to Dewey and he'll listen. Van-
denberg doesn't know what the spending picture is-vall about.
So, with the Republican Party ostensibly united, more so
than at any time in its history, claimed Earl Warren, and the
pollsters having given up taking soundings because the
campaign was so one-sided, Republicans not surprisingly
were coming to see polling day as a mere formality.
In the last week of the campaign, even Dewey's press
agent, James Hagerty, conceded that the President gained
261some support, but he was sure it was not from Dewey.
Truman, however, exuded confidence. Big crowds, he said,
25^Ibld.t October 6th, 1948; Patterson, Mr. Republican. 
PRqPP. 421-4.^-^New York Times, October 17th, 1948, ibid., October 30th.
-,-T948.
g°?Ibld.. October 14th, 1948.
Ibid., October 31st, 1948.
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greeted him everywhere; he predicted that there would be some
262red-faced pollsters on November 3rd. Speaking in Boston
and New York, Truman rounded off his campaign vigorously, 
arguing that the best way to defeat Communism was to re­
elect him: the only real danger, he said stemmed from the 
possibility of another Depression and the policies of the 
80th Congress. In Brooklyn on October 29th, he sprang to 
the defense of the abortive Vinson proposal: "So long as 
I am President of the United States," he said, "the door 
will not be closed to peace. I will always explore every
possible means, no matter how difficult or how unconventional,
263for reaching agreement". Regrettably, he said, his op­
ponent had brought foreign policy into the campaign, and 
he proceeded to attack the Republican Party as the party of
"isolationism" and reaction. "I have good news for you.
264We have the Republicans on the run," he said. The same 
day, he raised Bronx cheers by allegedly quoting Dewey as 
saying, "’You know your future is still ahead of you’. I 
was greatly impressed by this bold stand of the Republican 
candidate," he quipped.2 -^*
Despite Truman's final flourish, and the huge crowds 
which turned out to see him on the East Coast, his chances 
were not taken seriously. On October 31st, Taft predicted
2^2Ibid
263t h £* ’ 264THT! ’ 
265ibid.
October 17th, 
October 30th,
1948.
1948.
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that the Republicans would have four to five million votes 
to s p a r e . F r o m  Paris John Foster Dulles cabled his dis­
appointment to Dewey that he was ’’not to be with you on the 
day when what I have so ardently hoped for will, it seems, 
finally be realized".Herbert Hoover, who was earlier 
optimistic because he had detected "another mass movement 
. . .such as the phenomena which swept ¥oodrow ¥ilson and 
’a Mr. Hoover' aside", was invited to a dinner party in 
Hew York to hear Arthur Krock expound on the incoming Ad-
p/TQministration. In Paris, meanwhile, Dulles was invited
to be guest of honour at a dinner given by the rhillipines 
Ambassador, in anticipation of Republican victory; the shock 
election result forced him to cover his disappointment by 
apologizing good humo.uredly for the guests having been in­
vited under false pretenses. For all his good humour, 
Dulles was disappointed with the result. Dewey's campaign 
he felt, "had dignity" and "was in the best American tra­
dition". Dulles was, therefore, "rather frightened by the
270influences which prevented it from succeeding". Not only 
was the result a crushing blow to Dulles' own ambitions, 
as well as to those of Dewey, it was also a defeat for the
| ^ New York Herald Tribune, November 1st, 1948.
2 0iTelegram, Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, October 30th, 1948, Dulles MSS.
2°8C. D. Hilles to Ezra R. Whitla, October 19th, 1948, copy 
in Hilles file; ¥illiam Chadbourne to Hoover, October 1st, 1948, Hoover MSS.
2°9Diary of Janet Avery Dulles: U.N. Assembly 1948, p. 3 5, Janet Dulles MSS.
2 ‘°T3.egram, Dulles to Thomas E. Dewey, November 3rd, 1948, Dulles MSS.
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“politics of unity" and for the architects of Republican 
consensus since Mackinac and Chicago.
The expectation of Republican victory in 194-8 had been 
implicit in the Party's actions at least since the 1946 
elections, and to a lesser extent since-Roosevelt's death 
in 1945. This expectation had been reinforced by the ap­
parent deficiencies of President Truman, and,on the part of 
eastern Republicans at least, by what they regarded as 
their own statesmanlike response to the strife-ridden post­
war world. The splits in the Democratic Party in 1948, 
leading to the Wallace and Thurmond candidacies, ha d contrasted 
with the unity which the Republicans seemed to have con­
structed at Philadelphia. Because expectations of victory 
were so high, disappointment was to be even more acute, and 
the unity, which had been the theme of Dewey's campaign was 
to disappear more quickly than it came. The fact that the 
election had been lost to Truman, a man whom all agreed was 
of poor presidential calibre, made the defeat much harder 
to take than those inflicted by Roosevelt. One of Hoover's 
friends reflected the general disbelief and despair:
"Think of it. The democrats with a candidate so abysmally 
Ignorant (I use the word advisedly) that he is frightening 
to a thinking person; the Dixiecrats with a candidate; and 
Wallace as a candidate! And yet the republicans couldn't 
manage to win!"271 Herbert Hoover commented bitterly: "We
2?1Herbert V. Clark to William P. Knowland, November 22nd,
1948, copy in Herbert Y. Clark file, Hoover MSS.
-500-
lost that campaign; Truman did not win it".
Inevitably, the election defeat led to re eliminations.
Although disturbed by "the state of mind that seems to have
influenced the votes of the majority in the election", the
Chicago Tribune saw the result as an inevitable consequence
273of Via 11 Street domination of Republican Conventions.
Publicly Taft attributed the defeat to the general prosperity,
but privately he was extremely bitter, and felt that Dewey
had thrown it away.2^4 Taft’s disillusion with Dewey was
widespread amongst the Old Guard. George H. E. Smith, Staff
Director of -the Majority Policy Committee, prepared an elec-
273tion report for Taft which gave full rein to these views. 1
Dewey’s "Brahmanistic conduct and suffocating over-confidence
blighted the enthusiasm of party workers," it alleged; his
campaign was "self-centered on his personal interest in the
presidency", whilst he and Warren showed that they "both
276regarded the 80th Congress as a liability". It also 
criticized Dewey for having taken no action, despite reports 
that the Congressional campaign was in difficulty, for "in 
the Dewey strategy the congressional battle was a minor in­
cident in the more Important campaign for the presidency".2^  
Criticizing Dewey for over-reliance on the opinion polls,
272
??2Hoover to Arthur S. Crites, December 18th, 194-8, Hoover 
MSS.
273ghlcago Tribune, November 5th, 194-8, November 6th, 1948.
274-Patterson, Mr. Republican, pp. 424-5; White. Taft. pp.
27R83’4'‘^ Report by George H. E. Smith, Staff Director, Majority 
Policy Committee to Robert A. Taft, Chairman, and Members 
of the Majority Policy Committee, December 17th, 1948, 
copy in Wallace H. White MSS, Library of Congress.276Ibid pp. 20-2.
277T5TT., p. 12.
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the report also by Implication took issue with the whole 
strategy of "unity”: . .the Dewey-¥arren speeches were
efforts to keep political waters calm and unruffled. They 
were floated gently upon an air of inevitable success, 
studiously created. The more outlandish Truman's provoca­
tions became, the calmer and more dignified Dewey and Warren 
conducted themselves. No gage of battle was accepted; no 
Truman bungle (like the Vinson affair) was exploited. As 
if to accent the aloofness, Dewey occasionally noticed 
Truman much as a lady prohibitionist recognized the drink 
evil by picking up her skirts and looking the other way 
as she passed a corner saloon."2^  Although critical in part 
of Congress for its lack of unity, the main emphasis of the 
report was its criticism of the Dewey-Warren campaign. It 
also commented that Senator Vandenberg ought to have been 
used more often to speak on foreign policy. The report was 
reflective of a determination on the part of the majority 
of the Congressional party at least, that there should be 
no more "me-too" campaigns: the lesson drawn was for the 
need to be partisan and controversial, especially over 
foreign affairs.2^  Joseph Martin, Republican leader in 
the House, was quoted, in the aftermath of defeat, as urging 
a more partisan approach to all national problems: "The 
trouble with us is that we tried to be statesmen for the
278Ibld.. p. 1 1 .
279Howard Buffet to Hoover, November 22nd, 1948; memorandum, 
November 17th, 1948, in Harrison E. Spangler file, Hoover 
MSS; Samuel lube11, Revolt of the Moderates (New York: 
Harper, 1956), pp. 99-102; Ross, p. 262.
-502-
last two years, and forgot about politics. How then, in 
the next two years, as far as I am concerned, we’re going 
to think more about the ballot bo*.” Like many others, 
Martin had come to see the 1950 elections as crucial:
"One thing is certain, after the lickings we’ve taken in 
the past 16 years, and this one when we all thought we had 
the election won, we've got to win Congress back in 1950 or 
we are through. And I mean through. We’d Just as well 
move into the Democratic Party and work from the inside of 
It. "280 Tlie ex-treme bitterness which infected American 
political life in the succeeding decade was at least partly
op-
a result of Dewey's defeat in 194-8. The 194-8 election, 
then, marked a transition in Republican politics; Repub­
licans could no longer blame their defeats on the war or 
the depression, or on Roosevelt’s magnetic personality; 
they could no longer assume that they were the majority 
party in the nation. In 194-8, History had failed to repeat 
Itself; 194-6 had been a false portent of a Normalcy that 
was never to be restored. 2
2^®Report, December 29th, 194-8, McNaughton MSS.281 Earl Latham, The Communist Controversy in Washington: 
from the New Deal to McCarthy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard, 1966), p. 394”
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CHAPTER TEH
The End of Consensus
The result of the 1948 election was a major blow to the 
three Republican leaders who had, in varying degrees, guided 
and articulated Republican foreign policy since Mackinac. 
Under their leadership the Republican Party had adapted 
itself to the changed role of the United States in world 
affairs in the post-war years. Unhappy with Roosevelt’s 
"Pour Policemen" as well as with much of the wartime Inter­
nationalism, Republican leaders had in their own view been 
influential in shaping a vigorous anti-communist foreign 
policy which seemed more in accord with American interests. 
Within the Republican Party, however, the anti-communist 
consensus, which governed American foreign policy from 1945, 
had caused a number of strains. Most Republicans, it is 
true, could readily welcome what amounted to a reversal of 
alliances by the late 1940’s, for they had never embraced 
the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union with enthusiasm. 
Nevertheless, for the majority of Republicans, certainly 
in Congress, who still put prime emphasis on the restora­
tion of liberty at home, the bipartisan policy was a dan­
gerous double-edged sword, which might damage both the 
Republican Party and their hopes of domestic Normalcy.
Up to 1948, however, the Nationalists were politically 
and intellectually on the defensive. Their ultimate
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humiliation had come at Philadelphia in 1948, when they 
had had to swallow Vandenberg’s foreign policy plant, and 
Earl Warren as vice-presidential nominee in preference to 
a plethora of Nationalists. With Dewey’s election a vir­
tual certainty, and with Dulles probable Secretary of State 
and Vandenberg Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
the final rout of the Nationalists had in the summer of 
1948 seemed complete. In August moves were afoot to under­
cut Taft’s power in the Senate.1 Vandenberg, as ever re­
luctant to take on Taft, was clearly hoping that Mr. Re­
publican would recognize that the time had come to step
Oaside. For his part, however, Taft was apparently oblivious
of the moves against him, and confident that after Dewey's
3election power would be returned to Congress. In the event, 
Dewey's defeat made the attempt to unseat Taft from his 
position as Chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Com­
mittee hopeless. The attempt to pin the blame for the 
1948 defeat on the leadership in Cnngress found relatively 
few supporters in Congress itself. At the meeting of the 
Senate Republican Conference in January, Taft and Wherry 
withstood the liberal Republican challenge by 28 votes to 
14.^ Taft, sensing his political star in the ascendant, 
taunted that liberal Republicans "have offered nothing of 
their own in the way of a program. Apparently what they
1Alsop to Martin Sommers, August 24th, 1948, Alsop MSS;
Henry Cabot lodge to Irving M. Ives, August 12th, 1948, copy 
in Vandenberg MSS.
^Alsop to Martin Sommers, August 24th, 1948, Alsop MSS; 
Vandenberg, Private Papers. p. 449; Vandenberg to Henry 
Cabot Lodge, August 17th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
^Alsop to Martin Sommers, August 16th, 1948, Alsop MSS. 
4yandenberg.Private Papers, pp. 464-7. See also Diary, 
November 17th, 1948, Smith MSS.
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wish for the Senate is a Republican party committed to
nothing except a policy of non-resistance to the Truman
%administration." Victorious in the Senate, Taft and his 
supporters moved on to the National Committee, where even 
a move by the hapless Chairman Hugh Scott to dissociate 
himself from Dewey and the 1948 campaign could not ultimately 
save him. The Nationalists were bent on removing all traces 
of Dewey from the party, and of ending the era of "me- 
too" in national politics.
Amidst all the turmoil, Vandenberg sought as ever to 
preserve unity. Disappointed in his hope that Taft would 
step down voluntarily, he made it clear thathe would not
vote against him but would vote against the more extreme
6Wherry. Meanwhile, so far as the National Committee was
concerned, he advanced the claims of Everett Dirksen of
Illinois. Dirksen, as an evangelistic Midwesterner, a
"liberal thinking conservative" who was Independent of "the
Tribune tower," as well as a supporter of the bipartisan
foreign policy, seemed a man in Vandenberg’s own mould. To
Stassen. he wrote, "He represents the type of Republicanism
7which I like to emphasize".
While Vandenberg was evidently hoping for compromise, 
Dewey, infuriated by attacks on him at the Omaha National 
Committee meeting in January, 1949, was preparing to address
^New York Times, January 5th, 1949.
°Vandenberg, Private Papers. pp. 464-7.
'Vandenberg to Harold Stassen, January 24th, 1949; Vandenberg 
to Thomas E. Dewey, December 6th, 1948, Vandenberg MSS.
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the Congressional Party at a Lincoln Day Dinner. Imrltably,
his speech caused advance speculation as to whether he would
Qhit back at the Old Guard. The Chicago Tribune derived 
some amusement from the rumours that he intended "to tell 
Republicans what they must do to win elections. As Mr.
Dewey is the only living Republican who has lost in two 
Presidential campaigns, he may be qualified to tell how to 
lose but he is hardlyin a position to advise anybody on how 
to win".^ Amidst all the rumours of a boycott of the 
dinner, Vandenberg wrote to Dulles of his Interest and 
curiosity as to what Dewey would have to say: "Thus far 
it seems to me that the Republican Party has been chiefly 
engaged in a post-election job of 'falling apart' instead 
of 'getting together'."^ At the meeting on February 8th, 
Dewey chose to bring out into the open the fact that the 
Party had for years been trying to gloss over a hopeless 
split. His major emphasis was on domestic issues, such as 
unemployment insurance and old age benefits, which in his 
view the Party could not oppose, certainly not if they wished 
to win elections. Seeking to illustrate the difference 
between Republicans and Democrats in foreign affairs, in 
answer to those who argued that the leadership tamely 
accepted Administration policy, he dealt with the question 
of China: "we Republicans have Insisted on a world-wide
&Stewart Alsop to MartinSommers, February 3rd, 1949, Alsop
_MSS.
^Chicago Tribune. January 21st, 1949.
1^Vandenberg to John Foster Dulles, February 7th, 1949, 
Vandenberg MSS.
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foreign policy and not merely a European foreign policy,”
he said.11 12 Two days after Dewey's address, Vandenberg
publicly announced his retirement in 1952. Speaking in
Detroit on the same day, he urged Republicans to unite for
the 1950 campaign, to stop wrangling over 1948, and to stick
to the middle of the road policies of "sound conservatism
and liberalism" in domestic affairs. He also urged them
to continue the bipartisan foreign policy; in opposition,
he said, they would ensure that Administration policies
were "sound and firm" but also that the United States did
12not over-extend itself.
The rhetoric of Dewey and Vandenberg revealed the diffi­
culties inherent in the politics of unity; although both men 
sought to differentiate Republicanism from the New Deal, 
in both domestic and foreign affairs, to many it sounded 
suspiciously like "me-too". The politics of unity had 
assumed that moderation and statesmanship would bring its 
own reward in electoral terms; the argument for that now 
seemed weak. To make matters worse, in the aftermath of 
the 1948 election it had been generally assumed that resi­
dent Truman would now insist on taking a more active role
1 7than hitherto in the formulation of policy. John Roster
11 New York Times, February 9th, 1949.
12New York Times, February 11th, 1949.
13s'ee articles by Thomas J. Hamilton, New York Times.
November 4th, 1948, and Fitzhugh Turner, New York Herald 
Tribune, November 4th, 1948.
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Dulles felt, on the basis of his and Marshall's experiences
during the 194-8 campaign, "that the politicians may want
14to take over the State Department. . . " Speculation
was also rife about the departure of Secretary of Defense
Forrestal, who was strongly indentified with the bipartisan
anti-communist c o n s e n s u s . a  comment by President Truman
in Kansas City in Deeember that the Russian leaders were
anxious to come to terms with the United States, made
without reference to the State Department, also lent weight
to the suggestions that the President now Intended to make
16his own policy. Similarly, the resignation of Secretary
of State Marshall and Under-secretary lovett, and the ap-
1 7pointment of Dean Acheson seemed to confirm the trend. '
By the beginning of January, 194-9, In fact, bipartisanship
was well on the way to being discredited. The Chicago
Tribune shed no tears for Vandenberg as it pronounced the
18end of the bipartisan policy. Acheson's appointment it
1 9greeted with the headline, "It Might as well be Hiss."
Vandenberg remained as convinced as ever of the importance 
of bipartisans foreign policy as constructed since 1944, but
1 Dulles to A. H. Vandenberg, November 4th, 1948, Dulles 
MSS (Supplement).
I York Times. November 14th, 1948.
'6Ibi'd.. December 28th, 1948; Steward Alsop column, New York 
Herald Tribune, January 2nd, 1949.
^ Ibld.January 8th, 1949; Vandenberg, Private Papers. pp. 
469-72; to Vandenberg's disgust, the ratio on the Foreign 
Relations Committee was changed to 8-5, whereas he had 
„been led to expect a 7-6 division, ibid.. p. 468.
^ Chicago Tribune. January 7th, 1949.
1"ibid..January 8th, 1949.
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his influence, both with the Administration and Republicans 
was undeniably past its peak. Largely isolated amongst 
Congressional leaders, he had counted on a Republican execu­
tive to aid his own efforts at foreign policy leadership.
The surprise defeat of Dewey, added to the impending de­
feat of Chiang Kai-shek in China, and the increased focus 
on domestic loyalty trials in the wake of the Hiss case, 
created a totally new political situation. With the help 
of Dulles, temporarily appointed to fill a Senate vacancy, 
Vandenberg gave his usual crucial support in 194-9 to Senate 
passage of the U0rth Atlantic Treaty and the Military Assis­
tance Program. Twenty-four hours after the Senate passed 
the arms aid bill, the Administration announced that the 
Soviet Union had brought about an atomic explosion. Van­
denberg wrote to his wife bitterly about the partisanship 
of some of his colleagues: ", . .Some of the boys who voted 
to gut the arms program are pretty sick of what they did 
in the light of atomic developments twenty-four hours later. 
But they'll just 'play politics' and blame Truman for not 
telling us sooner although if he had, they would Just as 
readily accuse him of trying to influence the arms vote with 
a scare. On many counts I don't like him any better than 
they do. But he is the only President and the only Commander- 
in-Chief we have got or are going to have for three more 
critical years. I want to help lick him when the time comes - 
but not at the expense of the national security, meanwhile."^®
20Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 5 18.
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In declining health., and impotent in the face of changes
in the political situation loth at home and overseas, Van- 
denberg was increasingly gloomy from the summerof 1949. In 
October he wrote to Robert Lovett of his regret that he was 
unable to help Dulles in his special Senate election;
Dulles' election, he argued, would be a God-send for the 
country, and "also for a G.O.P. which shows signs of dan­
gerously splintering in its fidelities to effective free- 
21dom". In another letter, he wrote similarly that the 
Republican Ihrty "shows sings of 'splintering' into various
degrees of isolationism which could be ominous for a free
22America in a free world". To Charles Taft he expressed 
his regret that he and Bob Taft were drawing apart on 
foreign affairs, whilst to Senator Lodge amongst others he 
expressed his disquiet at the distortions about foreign 
policy that were being circulated: "This could develop 
into a very serious business for the country - and it could 
needlessly wreck our Party's future. This is a time for 
sober honesty and straight thinking. We must hold Western 
Europe to far stricter accountability for its specific 'self- 
help and mutual aid'. But at the same time, we must hold 
ourselves to strict accountability for winning the cold 
war and preventing the calamity of a hot one, and for sav­
ing national security and peace from unenlightened politics."2'*
21Vandenberg to Robert A. Lovett, October 26th, 1949, Vanden- berg MSS.
22Vandenberg to Albert L. Miller, October 28th, 1949, Vanden-
to Charles Taft, November 10th, 1949; Vandenberg 
to Henry Cabot Lodge, November 19th, 1949, Vandenberg MSS.
berg MSS. 
^Vandenberg
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• For the moment, however, the tide seemed to be running 
strongly against Vandenberg. Taft, who had never believed 
in the bipartisan policy, was beginning his drive for re- 
election in 1950 with what Joseph Alsop described as a
pA"straight-out isolationist appeal. . ." To Taft, who had 
opposed the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States was 
not faced with a military challenge from the Soviet Union, 
it was "a struggle of ideas and not of arms".25 Taft's 
priority was still to ensure the survival and success of 
liberty at home; if they compromised with socialism, he 
argued, as Britain had, they would be lost. The implica­
tions of Taft’s deeply held views about the need to restore 
domestic Normalcy spelled danger for American economic and 
military commitments to the European continent: it was not 
that the views had changed, but they were now being presented 
in the most receptive climate since the war. Vandenberg 
himself noted in September, 1949; "The whole country is in 
a state of nerves. Everybody is under tension. Nothing is 
right. The whole tenor of Senatorial correspondence has 
changed. Everybody is mad. about something - and they
seem to love to 'take it out' on their members of Con- 
27gress. . ." John Vorys perceived a similar change: "1 
find that most people around here feel as follows about 
our foreign policy problems: 1 - They would rather not
24pjlAlsop to Martin Sommers, September 31st, 1949, Alsop MSS. 
„-¿New York Times, September 5th. 1949.26rETd"p7——^'Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 515-16.
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think about them. 2 - They would rather not spend any 
money on them."2® Vorys himself had become extremely dis­
illusioned with England, for its failure to cooperate 
fully in the implementation of a multilateral trading and 
exchange system and for the extension of socialism. In 
his view the British were "attempting to build Just the
kind of self-sufficient state that got us all into trouble
29in the Thirties". Britain's failure to follow American 
policy toward China in 1950 was to complete his disillusion­
ment.^^ Vorys had in the past been a reliable guide to 
G.O.P. trends; his disillusion by 194-9 was indicative of 
the far deeper disillusion of the Old Guard who felt that 
the Republican Ihrty had failed itself and the nation by 
its failure to present alternative foreign policies over the 
previous four years.
Whilst the Rationalists were preparing to capitalize 
on the disillusion and hysteria engendered by Russian ex­
plosion of the atom bomb, the spy trials, and the communist 
victory in China, the Centre group were not prepared to 
relinquish control. Dewey, whilst after 1948 ruling out 
a third attempt at the White House, had announced his in­
tention of taking an active role as titular leader, and 
said that he had definite ideas about the Party's future. *3
p^Vorys to Robert E. Matthews, November 8th, 1949, Vorys MSS. 
^yVorys to William Benton, July 26th, 1948; Vorys to Prank 
qE. Archer, September 16th, 1959, Vorys MSS.
^TTorys to Ralph W. Gwinn, December 16th, 1950, Vorys MSS.
31New York Times. November 7th, 1948.
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True to his word, in 194-9, ke began to speak out on national
matters far more than over the previous four years, and he
also let it be known that he intended to run again for
32Governor of New York in 1950. In May he began a six 
week European vacation, which included an address to British 
Members of Parliament, in which he warned them of the con­
cern of American taxpayers about the size of American aid
33to Europe, and pressed the need for European unity. On
his return he described continued American aid to Europe
34as vital. While Dewey was strongly identifying himself 
with the European policy which was increasingly to be opposed 
by the Nationalists, he also continued to press for a global 
policy to unite the five "free" continents. In July, at 
the time of the Senate debate of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
Dewey sought to strengthen foreign policy leadership in 
the Senate by the appointment of John Foster Dulles to 
fill a temporary vacancy. More important, however, were 
the preparations he was making to secure the defeat of 
Mr. Republican in 1952. In April, Dewey wrote to General 
Eisenhower that there were "one or two things of some im­
portance that I would like to talk with you about at your 
convenlnce." According to Dewey's own account, he met 
Eisenhower in the summer at Columbia and spoke with him of
^Ibid., January 30th, 1949.
¿/TbTT., May 17th, 1949.
^ TbTT.. June 17th, 1949.
35'ihomas s. Dewey to Eisenhower, April 11th, 1949, Elsenhower 
MSS.
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the need for him to be Republican nominee in 1952.-' By 
September the Alsop brothers were convinced that Eisenhower 
was the favourite for the 1952 nomination. Like Dewey, 
Vandenberg was also looking to Eisenhower. Writing to con­
gratulate him on a recent speech, Vandenberg expressed his 
conviction that Eisenhower was the person best qualified 
to lead the "indispensable 'revival* of the philosophy of 
the 'middle road"' to protect "our threatened American 
unity".^ The somewhat cryptic letter included two telling
sentences: "This means more than meets the eye. I am one
39of those who deeply believes in you".
Despite their set-backs, the Centre group proved remark­
ably resilient in the changed atmosphere of 1949 and beyond. 
Whilst a more belligerent leadership, especially identified 
with the anti-communist struggle in Asia, seemed to be com­
ing to the fore, its victory was not to be complete; Dewey 
retained sufficient political power to help Eisenhower defeat 
Taft for the 1952 nomination. Dulles, despite the disappoint­
ment of his defeat in the special Senate election of 1949, 
continued to walk the tlght-rope between Republican partisan 
and Administration collaborator. In 1953 he was to fulfill
^Transcript, interview with Thomas E. Dewey, p. 21, Dulles 
(Oral). They also met twice in November; Eisenhower to 
Thomas E. Dewey, October 13th, 1949, Thomas E. Dewey to 
Eisenhower, October 19th, 1949, Thomas E. Dewey to Eisen­
hower, December 23rd, 1949, Elsenhower MSS.
37stewart Alsop to Ben Hibbs, September 10th, 1949; Joseph 
-Alsop to Martin Sommers, September 31st, 1949, Alsop MSS. 
3°A. H. Vandenberg to Eisenhower, September 8th, 1949, 
.-Eisenhower MSS.
39Ibid.
■ $5
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his long ambition of becoming Secretary of State, an ambition 
which, would probably have been realised even had Taft won 
the nomination and been elected.
Dulles’ survival was almost certainly based on the lessons 
he had drawn from Woodrow Wilson’s failure over thirty 
years earlier; but his emergence as a Republican partisan 
was to be at the cost of unlearning many of the lessons of 
international relations which, as impartial observer, he 
had absorbed in the inter-war years. His new book, War or 
Peace, which was published in 1950, revealed that he had 
himself come to use the villain nation concept which he had 
deplored in his earlier writings. His reading of Stalin's 
Problems of Leninism, and the analogy readily drawn with 
Mein Kampf. led him to interpret Soviet actions solely in 
ideological terms. In the policy which he offered, how­
ever, there were elements of continuity with his earlier 
writings. Opposing the concept of containment, which was 
too militaristic and too close to the status quo thinking 
which he had always disliked, and opposing both Isolation 
and American (presumably military) domination of the world, 
Dulles' view of the kind of peace they should aim at was
unchanging: "In the pattern of our own national life we
40can find the pattern for world peace". In other words, 
they should aim at a dynamic peace, based on the principles 
of the American political economy: the liter-communication 
of goods, people and ideas. This meant in his view that
^°John Poster Dulles, War or Peace (London: Harrap, 1950),
PP. 17-19.
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hack" totalitarianism by developing a gbbal strategy.
This strategy included pressure for European unity, pressure 
against socialism and state planning, and demonstration
in Japan, West Germany and West Berlin of the advantages
42of freedom. His strategy was explicitly not a military 
or a "material" one: the prime need, he argued, was for "a 
righteous and dynamic faith" and a sense of mission, and 
he deprecated the way in which the United States had come 
to be looked upon "more as a possible source of money and
material things and less as a source of inspiration and
43guidance".
In his rhetoric at least, Dulles was close to Taft in
putting prime emphasis on the Soviet challenge in ideological
rather than military terms. In his view the ascendancy
of the west had come abo.ut because it offered men moral
and economic freedom; or, as he put it in a speech in
February, western ascendance in the world was the work not
44of generals, but of missionaries and merchants. He could 
also find common ground with Taft in his insistence on the 
need to show at home that one could have social Justice 
without accepting the mateiJalist philosophy; this, he said, 
depended on "the individual to accept and discharge social 
obligations to his fellow man". J Thus during his unsuccess­
ful Ibid., pp. 175-7., H I ,  > PP. 215-17, 220, 230-1. f e lb ld . .  pp. 254-5.74New York Times. February 13th, 1949.
^5pulles, War or Peace. p. 259.
the United States must take the offensive in "rolling
41
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ful election campaign in 194-9 lie condemned the Administra­
tion's domestic policy as being injurious to its foreign 
policy: "if, here at home, we concede dependence on the 
all-powerful state, our foreign policy will be bereft of 
power". ° In the campaign he had also described "Federal
control of education" and "socialized medicine" as "chapters
brrout of the Communist book. . ." For all the similarities
between the approaches of Taft and Dulles, one important
division remained: Dulles regarded Europe and Asia as of
48vital importance to the United States, He was further 
convinced that the aim of Soviet policy was to encircle
4 9and then ultimately strangle the United States economically.  ^
For Taft, who had never shared the prevalent belief in the 
need for overseas economic expansion, these areas were not 
vital to the well-being of the United States. Rhetoric, 
however, could lessen the differences, and it enabled 
Dulles to get over the disappointments of 1948-49, to survive 
the bitter partisan years of 1950-52, and to achieve his 
long ambition.
For the remaining member of the Centre group, Arthur 
Vandenberg, only a few months of active life remained. In 
poor health, he played little part in politics from the time 
of the Military Assistance Program's passage in September,
1949. In a speech to European Journalists in September,
46,.„New York Times. September 16th, 1949.
4/lbid., September 20th, 1949.
4°Transcript, Interview with Thomas E. Dewey, p. 20, Dulles 
(Oral).
^James Brandys, "John Foster Dulles: A Case Study of Con­
flicting Self Interests" :(M.A. thesis, State University College of Hew York at Buffalo, 1975), P. 21.
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described by his staff as his probably valedictory, he 
spoke on a familiar theme: of the limit to American resources 
and the need for American aid to Europe to come to an end.
Aside from his dwindling political Influence, he was in his 
private life a tragic, even pathetic figure towards the 
end.^° In January, 1950, Stewart Alsop wrote, "Both Joe 
and I have seen Arthur Vandenberg in the last few days, and 
we both came away with the same impression: he's dying and 
knows it. He's having his last fling, both in a personal 
and political s e n s e . I n  May, 1950, he made his last 
visit to the Senate, in June his wife died, and he died 
the following April. The "Great Debate" in 1951 over the 
stationing of troops in Europe, he could only watch from 
the sidelines. He died by his ora admission an "inter­
nationalist", but it was not a label he took to easily.
Shortly before his death, he wrote, ". . .1 still think 
that our first American fidelity must be to our own American 
security. . .This is only another way of saying that I 
think the 'nationalist' of yeaterday still recognizes this 
axiom when, as a matter of intelligent self-interest, he 
demands 'collective security' as the only means to defend 
our own American welfare and to pursue our freedoms in a 
free world."52 t0 the President, he wrote, just over a month 
before his death, "I have abiding faith in the future of 
our good old IT. S.A.... " ^
•^Transcript, interview with Edward Weintal, p. 11, Dulles 
(Oral).
•^'Stewart Alsop to Martin Sommers, January 14th, 1950, Alsop MSS. 
52yandenberg, Private Parers, pp. 577-8.
53lbld., p. blT.
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Guide to Sources
Major sources for  th is  study may be d ivided in to  three 
ca teg o r ies: 1) the published w ritings o f the in d iv id u a ls  
studied; i i )  the d a ily , contemporary record furnished by 
newspapers and the Congressional Record; i i i )  manuscript 
sources. No p articu lar  problems are a ssoc ia ted  w ith the 
use o f sources in  the f i r s t  and second category. F u ller  
explanation i s  required fo r  the various manuscript c o l ­
le c t io n s , which are both le s s  a c c e ss ib le  and more d i f f i ­
c u lt  to c i t e  accu ra te ly . V ir tu a lly  a l l  the manuscript 
c o lle c t io n s  used are personal papers, sin ce access to  
State Department records for  the period studied i s  not 
yet open to research by foreign  n a tio n a ls . The absence 
of these records i s  probably not a major d e fic ien cy , sin ce  
th is  i s  a study o f a party in  op p osition , although such 
records might conceivably have helped to e s ta b lish  the 
importance o f p o l i t i c a l  considerations in  Adm inistration  
p o lic y  form ulation. For the most part, c ita t io n s  to the 
various c o lle c t io n s  have been kept b r ie f , w ith emphasis 
on the accurate d escr ip tion  o f the document c ite d  rather  
than reference to box numbers; th is  seems a p articu lar  
n e c e ss ity  for  recent c o lle c t io n s  which are more l ik e ly  
to be re-sorted  and re-boxed than o lder esta b lish ed  c o l ­
le c t io n s . The manuscript c o lle c t io n s  used are to be found 
in  seven d iffe r e n t l ib r a r ie s  in  the United S ta te s . The 
date of the present w r ite r 's  v i s i t  to each o f  the lib r a r ie s  
i s  g iven] Information as the a v a i la b i l i t y  and organ ization  
of c o lle c t io n s  a t each lib rary  r e f le c t s  the s itu a t io n  that 
obtained a t the time of the v i s i t .
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Princeton U niversity  Library (1969; 1972)
The most important collection here Is that of John 
Poster Dulles, an extensive collection organized by cate­
gories: viz, correspondence, addresses and speeches, state­
ments and testimony, press releases, notes and memoranda 
etc. The collection also includes certain letters and other 
items of Mrs. Dulles, referred to in citations in the pre­
sent study as the Janet Avery Dulles MSS. Between 1969 
and 1972 a large accession, especially of letters, came 
from the office of Dulles' old law firm, Sullivan and Crom­
well; material found in that later accession., is referred 
to in citations as Dulles (Supplement). To round off the 
Dulles collection is an extensive collection of oral history 
transcripts, referred to in citation as Dulles (Oral).
Also used at Princeton were the papers of H. Alexender 
Smith. At the time used (1969) the collection was found 
to be incompletely sorted; most useful were the diary, 
and the files arranged under Politics 194-4-1959# Foreign 
Relations Committee 1946-1959# and Miscellaneous Public 
Issues. Also used at Princeton, but of limited value, 
were the Selected Correspondence files, 1946-1965# in 
the Bernard M. Baruch collections.
Ullllam L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (1969)
The papers of Arthur H. Vandenberg are deposited here 
amidst largely eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
collections. The collection appears to have been pruned 
by Vandenberg's son, who edited the collection of his 
papers published in 1952# but it remains extremely important.
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Apart from the few diaries and scrapbooks, each Item is 
•filed separately under its date.
Ohio States H isto r ica l S o c ie ty , Columbus, Ohio (1969)
A number of minor collections was found here. The 
most important turned, out to be the papers of John M. 
Vorys, which produced a number of interesting items, 
largely of constituency correspondence. Also used were 
the papers of Clarence J. Brown, Taft's campaign manager 
in 1948, which proved disappointing, and the small collec­
tion of Henry Prather Plectcher papers. Apart from a 
collection of newspaper cuttings in connection with his 
1944 campaign, the papers of John W. Brlcker contained 
nothing of even possible value to this study.
Library o f Congress (1969)
The most useful collection turned out to be the little 
known one of John Callan O'laughlln, owner and publisher 
of the Army and Navy Journal. His alphabetically arranged 
General Correspondence 1933-1949, proved a mine of infor­
mation on affairs in Washington written from the perspec­
tive of a conservative Republican. Also useful were the 
papers of Joseph W. and Stewart Alsop, which contain the 
regular correspondence with Martin Sommers of the Saturday 
Evening Post from 1946. In citation "Alsop” refers to 
Joseph Alsop, whilst letter written by Stewart Alsop are 
described in full. A few items were found in the corres­
pondence files of Robert P. Patterson^(Secretary of War, 
1945-1947). The papers of James W. Wadsworth Jr. are thin,
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but, his diary contains a few useful entries. The 
papers of two senior Senators, Wallace H. White and Tom 
Connally proved unproductive apart from one item in the 
White MSS. file on 194-8 presidential campaign which was 
not found elsewhere. The present writer was denied 
access to the papers of Robert A. Taft, which were closed 
pending the writing of an official biography by J. T. 
Patterson.
Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (1971)
The most useful collection was that of Prank McKaugh- 
ton, Wahhington D. C. correspondent of Time, 1941-194-9.
The collection consists of his regular reports by other 
Time correspondents. McNaughthon appeared to have excellent 
contacts in Washington, and the papers are a major source 
for the politics of the period. The papers of Harry S. 
Truman consist of the vast, and not very useful, collection 
of White House Central Piles; a limited number were looked 
at, and where cited the number of the file is given. More 
useful were the papers of Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel 
to the President, 194-6-1950, whose Political File proved 
valuable for study of the 1948 campaign. Also valuable 
were the papers of George M. Elsey, a member of the White 
House political staff. Especially useful were his Speech 
file and his Subject Pile, both of which catain nondescript 
scraps of paper with intriguing and sometimes cryptic 
information, kept with an eye for history. Less useful 
were the papers of J. Howard McGrath, Chairman of the
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Democratic National Committe, 1947-1949, and the files 
(1948-1953) of Charles 3. Murphy, administrative assis­
tant to the President. The newspaper clipping file of the 
Democratic National Committee Library proved useful, 
especially the large file on Thomas E. Dewey; a few item3 
were found in the separately catalogued National Democratic 
Committee Records. The Library contains a collection of 
oral history transcripts, but a number requested proved to 
have unpublicized restirictions which made their use either 
impracticable or impossible.
Dwight D. Elsenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (1971 )
A few useful items were found in the Dwight jD. Elsen­
hower papers, 1916-1952, and, with regard to the 1948 
campaign, in the papers of Leonard V. Finder. Minor items 
were found in the correspondence files of the papers of 
Earry C. Butcher, naval aide to General Eisenhower, and 
the Library staff drew my attention to some material in 
the papers of Floyd L. Parks. The Republican National 
Committee papers were unavailable at the time of my visit. 
Herbert Hoover Library. West Branch, Iowa (1971)
The Post-Presidential Individual File of the papers of 
Herbert Hoover proved valuable; this contains the most 
important correspondence, filed, except where indicated in 
citation, under the name of individual correspondents. All 
references to the Hoover MSS. are to the Post-Presidential 
Individual File.
The present writer was denied access to the Thomas E. 
Dewey papers which are deposited at the University of Roche3 
ter, New York.
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